1. The IEO conducted surveys of IMF staff and member country officials in November 2008. The surveys were administered by ICF International. All survey recipients were advised that their responses were confidential and that individual country and staff respondents would not be identified. The survey questionnaires are included at the end of this annex.

2. The trade policy issues covered in the surveys comprised the design and implementation of trade policies narrowly defined (i.e., policies that directly and primarily aim to influence the quantity and/or value of a country’s imports and exports of goods and services—exchange rate policy was not considered) and the assessment of the macroeconomic effects of these narrowly defined trade policies. Specifically, the surveys considered six different trade policy issues:
   (i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agricultural;
   (ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial;
   (iii) Preferential trade agreements (PTAs), e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, and preferential schemes;
   (iv) Customs administration;
   (v) Effects of a country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position, or balance of payments;
   (vi) Effects of a country’s trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues).

A. Survey of IMF Staff

3. The objective of the survey was to obtain staff views on the motivation for IMF missions to cover trade policy; cooperation with other institutions on trade policy; how well informed IMF missions were about the trade policy issues on which they took substantive positions; the effectiveness of their trade policy advice; and the role of the IMF with regard to trade policy.

Sample and response rate

4. The survey was sent to 678 staff members, grades A14 and above, in the five area departments (African (AFR), Asia-Pacific (APD), European (EUR), Middle East and Central Asia (MCD), and Western Hemisphere (WHD)) and four functional departments (FAD, Monetary and Capital Markets (MCM), PDR, and RES). Survey recipients were asked to fill out the survey whether or not they were actively involved in trade policy issues.

5. Respondents were asked to answer questions with respect to their experience in a single country based on at least two missions (surveillance, UFR, or TA) during 2005–07. Respondents who had been on the IMF staff for less than a year, who had been on fewer than two missions to a single country, or who worked on an EU member country during 2005–07 were directed to a subset of questions that were not country-specific.

6. The overall response rate was 56 percent (383 responses). The response rate was fairly even among area departments, but varied across functional departments (Figure A2.1). There were 308 country-specific responses in total: 281 based on missions to emerging and developing countries and 27 based on missions to advanced countries. The breakdown of respondents by grade was: 178 A14 staff members, 96 A15 staff members, 86 B1–B3 staff members, and 23 B4 staff members. No B5 staff members answered the survey.

1 Based on the most recent WEO classification of advanced and emerging and developing countries.
**Main findings**

**IMF missions considered macroeconomic/systemic implications as the main criterion for covering a trade policy issue**

7. Where trade policy issues were discussed, respondents were asked to characterize the reason(s) their mission covered each issue (Question 8), choosing from among the following options: macroeconomic or systemic implications; request from the authorities; request from the World Bank or other institution; request from an Executive Director of another country; and other reasons. More than one reason could be specified for each issue covered. The first reason—“macroeconomic or systemic implications”—was cited most often for all trade policy issues, followed (substantially behind) by “request from the authorities” and “other reasons” (Figure A2.2).

8. Where there were trade policy issues that were not discussed, respondents were asked to characterize the reason(s) their mission decided not to raise the issue (Question 9), choosing from among the following options: there were no obvious macro-linkages or systemic implications; the mission lacked time, expertise, or resources; the World Bank took the lead on the issue; there was a potential conflict with WTO commitments or negotiations; management gave instructions not to raise the issue; a Board member requested the issue not be raised; and other reasons. As before, more than one reason could be specified for each issue not covered. The most frequently cited reason for not covering a trade policy issue was that it had no obvious macro linkages or systemic implications (Figure A2.3). “Other” reasons were chosen almost as frequently but were not elaborated. (In focus group interviews, some staff members noted that word counts in staff reports could have been a constraining factor.)

**IMF staff cooperated quite closely with the World Bank on trade policy issues but less so with other institutions**

9. Respondents were asked to rate their cooperation with staff from other institutions with regard to trade policy issues in the country on which they were working (Question 12). Cooperation with the World Bank was quite close, with at least 50 percent of respondents characterizing the contact as frequent to occasional in surveillance, UFR, and FSAP work and around 25 percent in TA and research (Table A2.1). In contrast, no respondents reported close cooperation and fewer than 10 percent reported occasional cooperation with the WTO across all areas of trade work. This likely reflects the much smaller size and different institutional setup of the WTO Secretariat compared to the IMF. There are no country economists in the WTO Secretariat with whom IMF area department staff could naturally interact. Instead, area department staff and mission teams usually directed their trade policy questions to PDR’s Trade Policy Division, which served as the Fund’s main channel of communication with the WTO Secretariat. The majority of respondents also reported negligible cooperation on trade work with staff from other institutions, such as the OECD and regional development banks. In focus group interviews, IMF staff indicated that their interactions with staff from these organizations tended to be based on personal rather than institutional contacts.

10. Respondents were then asked how often they drew on resources from other institutions, such as country-specific reports on trade policy, research papers, and trade policy data (Question 13). Again,
Figure A2.2. Reasons for Covering Trade Policy Issues
(Percent of respondents for each issue)

- Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture: 149 respondents
- Liberalization of trade in services, including financial: 104 respondents
- Preferential trade agreements: 179 respondents
- Customs administration: 160 respondents
- Effect of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments: 174 respondents
- Effects of trade policies on other countries/regional/global trade (including market access issues): 119 respondents

- Macroeconomic/systemic implications
- Request from authorities
- Request from World Bank/other
- Request from management
- Request from other country’s ED
- Other
- Don’t know
Figure A2.3. Reasons for Not Raising a Trade Policy Issue
(Percent of respondents for each issue)
respondents were most familiar with World Bank resources—53 percent used country-specific reports by the World Bank on trade policy, 45 percent used World Bank research papers on trade policy, and 44 percent used World Bank trade data or indicators at least sometimes (Table A2.2). Around 40 percent of the respondents reported having sometimes or always referred to the WTO’s TPR for their country. 56 percent of the respondents said they drew on in-house (IMF) research. A major portion of the respondents did not use resources from other agencies. This could reflect the fact that some institutions that work on trade only cover certain countries or regions. For example, of the respondents who worked on an advanced country, 71 percent said they always or sometimes used country-specific reports from the OECD and 62 percent said they always or sometimes used research from the OECD.

**IMF staff considered their missions reasonably well informed on trade policy issues**

11. For each trade policy issue covered by their mission, respondents were asked the basis for the mission’s specific position on the issue, choosing one or more from among the following options: analytical/empirical studies (in-house or external) specific to the country; analytical/empirical studies not specific to the country (e.g., based on cross-country panel-data analyses); views of other agencies (e.g., the World Bank, WTO, OECD); pressure from another IMF member; the “Washington consensus”; or other grounds (Question 14). Across the six trade policy issues, the most common basis was analytical/empirical studies, followed by views of other agencies (Figure A2.4). Interestingly, 12 percent of respondents (across all grades) cited the Washington consensus as the sole basis for their mission’s position on each trade policy issue that was covered.

12. For missions that covered one or more trade policy issues, respondents were asked to characterize the relevant trade policy qualifications of their mission team (Question 17). Fully 75–90 percent of respondents rated their team’s qualifications as strong or fair, meaning that at least one member of the team had clear expertise or had some analytical or operational background in the area (Figure A2.5). Only 6–21 percent considered their team’s trade policy expertise to be weak or superficial. In focus

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**Table A2.1. Cooperation with the World Bank and Other Institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Surveillance (186 respondents)</th>
<th>UFR (127 respondents)</th>
<th>TA (50 respondents)</th>
<th>FSAP (20 respondents)</th>
<th>Research (308 respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vis-à-vis the World Bank, percent of respondents reporting:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close/frequent cooperation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional cooperation</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible cooperation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation not applicable</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vis-à-vis the WTO, percent of respondents reporting:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close/frequent cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional cooperation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible cooperation</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation not applicable</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vis-à-vis other institutions (e.g., OECD, regional development banks, etc.), percent of respondents reporting:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close/frequent cooperation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional cooperation</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Negligible cooperation</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Cooperation not applicable</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
group interviews, several staff members pointed out that PDR’s Trade Policy Division provided more than adequate backstopping on trade policy issues even if no trade economist was on the mission team.

**IMF staff felt that their trade policy advice was on average well received by country authorities and at least somewhat effective in promoting good policies**

13. For missions that covered one or more trade policy issues, respondents were asked to characterize the extent of the authorities’ agreement with the mission’s position on each issue (Question 18). For the most part, respondents felt that there was strong to moderate agreement by the authorities with the mission’s position (Figure A2.6). This was reflected across all trade policy issues, with the strongest agreement in customs administration, an area where the IMF advice is often provided through TA. Fewer than 10 percent of respondents reported little to no agreement on any one policy issue.

14. Respondents were then asked to rate the effectiveness of their mission’s trade policy advice. For missions that covered one or more trade policy issues, respondents were asked, to the best of their knowledge, how the authorities responded to the mission’s advice on each issue (Question 21). 57–69 percent of respondents reported that their mission’s

### Table A2.2. Use of Resources from the World Bank and Other Institutions  
(Percent of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World Bank</th>
<th>WTO</th>
<th>OECD</th>
<th>Regional Development Banks</th>
<th>UNCTAD</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of 308 respondents reporting using:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country-specific reports on trade policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research (e.g., working papers) on trade policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade policy data or indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A2.4. Basis for the Mission’s Specific Positions on Trade Policy Issues
(Percent of respondents for each issue)

Annex 2 • Surveys
advice was largely or partially implemented (Figure A2.7). The results were similar for advanced and developing country missions.

15. Respondents were also asked if, on average, their mission’s advice on trade policy issues—regardless of whether the authorities implemented or agreed with them—was effective in enhancing the debate on trade-macro linkages, promoting change in the right direction and/or preventing change in the wrong direction (Question 22). The majority of respondents believed that their mission’s advice was highly or somewhat effective (Figure A2.8).

**The IMF has a role to play in trade policy issues**

16. Finally, all survey respondents were asked what the IMF’s role in trade policy should be, given the IMF’s institutional mandate and putting aside any resource constraints that the IMF may face (Question 23). Respondents were asked to choose one or more options among the following: advising on how to liberalize trade policies; calling attention in Article IV consultations to instances when countries change trade policies in a protectionist direction; assessing effects of trade policy changes on fiscal revenues, the balance of payments, growth, and (for trade in services) financial sector stability; occasional coverage of global or regional trade policy issues in the *WEO* or *REOs*; advocating multilateral trade liberalization through public outreach efforts; other activities; or no role at all. Only 2 percent of the 383 respondents said that the IMF should have no role in trade policy. The majority of respondents felt that the IMF has some role to play, especially in assessing the effects of trade policy changes on fiscal revenues, the balance of payments, growth, and financial sector stability; calling attention in Article

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**Figure A2.5. Qualifications of the Mission Team to Take Positions on Trade Policy Issues**

*(Percent of respondents for each issue)*

![Graphs showing qualifications of mission team on various trade policy issues.](image-url)
IV consultations in instances where countries change policies in a protectionist direction; and occasionally covering global/regional trade policy issues in the WEO or REOs (Figure A2.9).

B. Survey of Country Officials

17. The objective of the survey was to obtain IMF member country officials’ views on: the motivation for IMF missions to cover specific trade policy issues; the quality of IMF work on trade; the effectiveness or usefulness of IMF trade policy advice; and the role of the IMF with regard to trade policy.

Sample and response rate

18. Two surveys were sent to every IMF member country: one to the ministry of finance and one to the ministry of trade (or their equivalent agencies). In total, 326 surveys were sent out. Country officials were asked to answer the survey questions based on their experience with the IMF during 2005–07. If their ministry/government agency did not have active discussions with the IMF on trade policy during that period, they were directed to a subset of questions that were not country-specific. The survey was open from November 2008 to April 2009.

19. A total of 71 completed responses was received. Most of these (51) were from finance ministry officials (including two responses from central bank officials) — the Fund’s traditional interlocutors. 20 responses came from trade ministry officials.

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2 Surveys were not sent to individual EU member countries. Instead, surveys were sent to the European Commission: one to the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and one to the Directorate-General for Trade.

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Figure A2.6. Extent of the Authorities’ Agreement with the Mission’s Position on Trade Issues
(Percent of respondents for each issue)
Figure A2.7. How the Authorities Responded to the Mission’s Trade Policy Advice
(Percent of respondents for each issue)

- Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture: 144 respondents
  - Largely implemented
  - Partially implemented
  - Largely not implemented
  - Don’t know

- Liberalization of trade in services, including financial: 97 respondents
  - Largely implemented
  - Partially implemented
  - Largely not implemented
  - Don’t know

- Preferential trade agreements: 174 respondents
  - Largely implemented
  - Partially implemented
  - Largely not implemented
  - Don’t know

- Customs administration: 159 respondents
  - Largely implemented
  - Partially implemented
  - Largely not implemented
  - Don’t know

Figure A2.8. Perceived Effectiveness of the Mission’s Trade Policy Advice
(Percent of respondents for each issue)

- Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture: 146 respondents
  - Highly effective
  - Somewhat effective
  - Not at all
  - Don’t know

- Liberalization of trade in services, including financial: 97 respondents
  - Highly effective
  - Somewhat effective
  - Not at all
  - Don’t know

- Preferential trade agreements: 174 respondents
  - Highly effective
  - Somewhat effective
  - Not at all
  - Don’t know

- Customs administration: 156 respondents
  - Highly effective
  - Somewhat effective
  - Not at all
  - Don’t know
Most of the responses (58) were from emerging and developing countries; only 12 responses came from advanced countries. The breakdown of responses by region (based on IMF area departments) was: 27 percent from the Asia-Pacific region, 21 percent each from Africa and the Western Hemisphere, 20 percent from Europe, and 11 percent from the Middle East and Central Asia.

20. The response rate was extremely low—less than 20 percent on average (28 percent for finance ministry officials and 12 percent for trade ministry officials). The low response rate is itself an indication of the extent to which the Fund has disengaged from trade policy issues in the last few years—many officials declined to participate in the survey on the grounds that they did not discuss trade policy with the IMF.

21. Among those officials who did answer the survey, 34 percent did not recall discussing any of the six trade policy issues with IMF missions during 2005–07. When trade policy issues were discussed, it was usually in the context of Article IV consultations. No trade ministry respondent recalled having had discussions with IMF TA or UFR missions. The trade policy issues that officials said they most commonly discussed with IMF missions were the effect of the country’s trade policy changes on its macroeconomic variables (e.g., GDP growth, fiscal position, or balance of payments) and PTAs. (There was no appreciable difference between the types of trade policy issues discussed with the ministry of finance and the ministry of trade.)

22. Because of the low response rate, the results of the survey may not be representative of IMF membership as a whole and should be interpreted with caution.

**Main findings**

*Macroeconomic and/or systemic effects seemed to be the main motivation for IMF missions to raise trade policy issues*

23. When trade policy issues were discussed with the IMF mission, respondents were asked what they thought motivated the mission to raise the issue(s), choosing one or more from among the following options: the mission believed that the trade policy issue had important implications for the country’s growth, fiscal, or balance of payments outcomes; the mission believed that the country’s trade policies had systemically and/or regionally important effects; the mission had been asked by another IMF member country to raise the issue; the mission was
supporting the World Bank or other international institution which was taking the lead (Question 3). Most of the 48 respondents felt that the primary motivation for the IMF mission to raise the issue was that the issue had macroeconomic implications (Figure A2.10). This is consistent with the finding from the staff survey.

The IMF’s trade policy advice was largely consistent with the World Bank’s advice but not always consistent with the views of other institutions

24. For each trade policy issue discussed with the IMF, respondents were asked if IMF advice/conditionality/TA took into account their country’s commitments to and ongoing negotiations in the WTO (Question 7) and if IMF advice was consistent with that from other institutions, including the World Bank (Question 8). More than 30 percent of the 25–32 respondents said the IMF took into account their WTO commitments most of the time (Table A2.3). The majority of respondents viewed the advice from the IMF and the World Bank as fully consistent across all trade policy issues. However, with regard to other institutions, the responses were split three ways among “fully consistent,” “at times inconsistent,” and “don’t know.” These findings suggest that interinstitutional cooperation may not be working as well as it could be but the small number of responses precludes a firm conclusion.

Respondents generally found IMF missions to be open-minded and adequately qualified to discuss trade policy issues

25. Based on their experience during 2005–07, respondents were asked to characterize the main approach of the IMF mission to trade policy issues in their country (Question 4). Almost two-thirds of the 48 respondents believed that the IMF was open-minded (Figure A2.11).

26. Respondents were then asked to rate the IMF mission’s expertise on the trade policy issues that were discussed: strong (at least one member of the IMF team had clear expertise in the area); fair (at least one member of the IMF team had some analytical or operational background); or weak (no member of the IMF team seemed to have more than a superficial background) (Question 5). More than three-fourths of respondents for each issue rated the IMF mission team’s qualifications as strong or fair. Again, the small number of responses for each issue precludes any firm conclusions; however, the findings here broadly reflect the findings from a similar question in the staff survey.

27. Next, for each trade policy issue discussed with the IMF, respondents were asked to rate the quality of the IMF mission’s analytical assessment of

Figure A2.10. Perceived Motivation of the Mission to Raise Trade Policy Issues
(Percent of respondents for each issue)
Table A2.3. Comparison of IMF Advice with Advice from the World Bank and Other Institutions
(Percent of respondents for each issue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>IMF advice was fully consistent</th>
<th>IMF advice was at times inconsistent</th>
<th>IMF advice was mostly inconsistent</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>World Bank did not discuss trade policy</th>
<th>Other institutions did not discuss trade policy</th>
<th>IMF advice took these into account most of the time</th>
<th>IMF advice took these into account sometimes</th>
<th>IMF advice rarely took these into account</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Country is not a WTO member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization of Trade in Goods, Including Agriculture (26 respondents)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization of Trade in Services, Including Financial Agreements (25 respondents)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreements (32 respondents)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Administration (30 respondents)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vis-à-vis the World Bank’s trade policy advice, percent of respondents reporting:
- IMF advice was fully consistent: 42%
- IMF advice was at times inconsistent: 8%
- IMF advice was mostly inconsistent: 0%
- Don’t know: 15%
- World Bank did not discuss trade policy: 35%

Vis-à-vis trade policy advice from other institutions, percent of respondents reporting:
- IMF advice was fully consistent: 23%
- IMF advice was at times inconsistent: 23%
- IMF advice was mostly inconsistent: 0%
- Don’t know: 31%
- Other institutions did not discuss trade policy: 15%

Vis-à-vis commitments to or negotiations at the WTO, percent of respondents reporting:
- IMF advice took these into account most of the time: 31%
- IMF advice took these into account sometimes: 27%
- IMF advice rarely took these into account: 4%
- Don’t know: 15%
- Country is not a WTO member: 23%

The macroeconomic effects of trade policy changes it advocated (Question 9). The results vary across trade policy issues. For customs administration, most of the 29 respondents rated the quality of the IMF’s analysis as high (Figure A2.12). For the other issues, 30–40 percent of respondents (the majority in the case of PTAs and trade in services) said that no assessment was provided by the IMF mission for the trade policy changes it advocated. For the more traditional goods trade liberalization issues, almost 40 percent of the 26 respondents rated the quality of the mission’s analysis as high.

28. Respondents were also asked if they thought the IMF was evenhanded in its trade policy advice or if it pressed most strongly in a particular group of countries (advanced, middle-income, or less-developed) for removing restrictions on trade (Question 11). More than a third of the respondents said they did not know (Figure A2.13). Of the rest, the largest proportion felt the IMF pressed less-developed countries most strongly on trade liberalization. Only 17 percent of respondents felt that the IMF showed no bias.

Figure A2.11. Main Approach of the Mission to Trade Policy Issues
(Percent of respondents)

- Open-minded
- Doctrinaire
- Don’t know

48 respondents
The IMF’s trade policy advice mostly met with agreement and was found to be at least moderately effective in promoting good policies

29. For each trade policy issue discussed with the IMF mission, respondents were asked to characterize the extent of their ministry’s agreement with the mission’s position (Question 12). In general, across all issues, respondents felt that there was strong to moderate agreement with the mission; very few believed there was little or no agreement (Figure A2.14). These findings broadly matched those from the staff survey.

30. For each trade policy issue discussed with the IMF mission, respondents were asked how effective the mission’s recommendations/conditionality/TA was in enhancing the debate—within or outside the government—and/or promoting a change of policy (Question 15). For issues related to the liberalization of trade in goods and services and to customs administration, more than half of the respondents considered the IMF’s advice to be moderately to very effective. For PTA issues, the majority of respondents were unable to provide a view on the Fund’s effectiveness in enhancing the policy debate (Figure A2.15).

31. As to whether the IMF’s advocacy of multilateral trade liberalization (e.g., through speeches and
press statements by high-level IMF staff and through IMF publications such as the WEO and REOs) was worthwhile, more than three-fourths of all respondents answered “yes” or “probably so.” Only 14 percent felt that the IMF’s advocacy was not or probably not worthwhile (Figure A2.16).

**The IMF has a role to play in trade policy issues, but it is not the only player**

32. All survey respondents were asked what the IMF’s role in trade policy should be, choosing one or more possibilities from the same options as provided in the staff survey (Question 19). None of the respondents thought that the IMF had no role to play. Three-fourths of the respondents felt that the IMF had a role to play in assessing the effects of trade policy changes on fiscal revenues, the balance of payments, growth, and financial sector stability (Figure A2.17). The responses were similar to those from the staff survey, except that a much higher proportion of the surveyed staff (82 percent) than of the surveyed country officials (41 percent) felt that the IMF should call attention in Article IV consultations to instances when countries changed trade policies in a protectionist direction.

33. Finally, all respondents were asked whether another institution would have been well placed to fill the gap if the IMF had not addressed the trade policy issues it did (Question 20). Across all trade policy issues, the overwhelming majority of respondents said that another institution possibly could have addressed the issue in the absence of the Fund; only 6–13 percent felt that no other institution could have filled the gap (Figure A2.18).
Figure A2.15. Effectiveness of the Mission’s Trade Policy Advice in Enhancing the Debate and/or Promoting a Change of Policy

(Percents)

- Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture: 24 respondents
- Liberalization of trade in services, including financial: 22 respondents
- Preferential trade agreements: 30 respondents
- Customs administration: 27 respondents

Figure A2.16. Is the IMF’s Advocacy of Multilateral Trade Liberalization Worthwhile?

(Percent of respondents)

- Yes
- Probably so
- Probably not
- No
- Don’t know

70 respondents
Figure A2.17. What Should the IMF’s Role in Trade Policy Be?
(Percent of respondents)

Advising on how to liberalize trade policies
Calling attention in Article IV consultations to instances when countries change trade policies in a protectionist direction
Assessing effects of trade policy changes on fiscal revenues, the balance of payments, growth, and (for trade in services) financial sector stability
Occasional coverage of global or regional trade policy issues in the WEO/REO
Advocating multilateral trade liberalization through public outreach efforts
No role
Other
Don’t know

Figure A2.18. Would Another Institution Have Been Well Placed to Fill the Gap if the Mission Had Not Addressed the Trade Issue?
(Percent of respondents for each issue)
STAFF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

This survey gathers information on your views on the IMF’s involvement in international trade policy issues during 2005–07. Conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation are dependent on receiving high participation rates from A1–B5 staff in functional and area departments—regardless of whether you personally were actively involved in trade policy issues.

The survey should take no more than 20 minutes to complete. The survey is constructed to direct you to parts that are relevant to your experience as revealed by your specific responses to questions early in the survey. Information provided will be strictly confidential: it will be used only by ICF International (ICF) and the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF to evaluate the IMF’s approach to international trade policy issues. Findings will be published only in summary form without attribution to any individual, mission, or department.

Trade policy issues referred to in this survey comprise:

(i) the design and implementation of trade policies narrowly defined (policies that directly and primarily aim to influence the quantity and/or value of a country’s imports and exports of goods and services—exchange rate policy is not considered in this survey);

(ii) the assessment of the macroeconomic effects of these narrowly defined trade policies.

A. QUESTIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES

1. Did you make more than one visit during 2005–2007 to a single country as a member (including head) of a surveillance, use of Fund resources (UFR), or technical assistance (TA) mission?
   a—“Yes (go to questions 2a, 3a, and 4),” b—“No (go to question 2b)”

2a. Of the countries that you visited more than once during 2005–07, which did you visit most recently? Please answer all of the questions in this survey with respect to your experience working on this country.
   [Drop-down menu of countries]

2b. Were you a Fund staff member for more than one year during 2005–07?
   a—“Yes (go to question 3b),” b—“No (go to questions 6 and 23)”

3a. Which department were you in the first time you visited the country specified above?
   a—“AFR,” b—“APD,” c—“EUR,” d—“MCD,” e—“WHD,” f—“PDR,” g—“FAD,” h—“MCM,” i—“RES”

3b. Please indicate the department in which you spent the most amount of time during 2005–07. Please then answer the remaining questions on the basis of your average overall Fund experience over the past three years.
   a—“AFR,” b—“APD,” c—“EUR,” d—“MCD,” e—“WHD,” f—“PDR,” g—“FAD,” h—“MCM,” i—“RES”

4. Please indicate the purpose(s) of the missions to the specified country. (Please check all that apply.)
   a—“Article IV surveillance,” b—“Use of Fund resources (UFR),” c—“Technical Assistance (TA),” d—“FSAP”

5. Do you recall ever having had discussions with [Country] during 2005–07 in any of the following areas? (Please check all that apply.)
   a—“Yes,” b—“No”

   (i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
   (ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
   (iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g. free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments
(vi) Effects of trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues)

B. YOUR EXPERTISE ON TRADE POLICY ISSUES

6. On which trade policy issues do you feel that your expertise is strong enough to provide substantive advice to countries on trade policy issues and respond confidently to any critics? (Please check one for each issue.)

   a—“Fully confident,” b—“Reasonably confident,” c—“Not confident”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments
(vi) Effects of trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues)

C. ADEQUACY OF GUIDANCE ON HOW/ WHEN TO COVER TRADE POLICY ISSUES

7. Overall, do you feel you understood the circumstances in which your mission(s) should and should not have covered the following trade policy issues in [Country] during 2005–07? (Please check one for each issue.)

   a—“Mostly,” b—“Sometimes,” c—“Rarely”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments
(vi) Effects of trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues)

8. How would you characterize the reasons your mission(s) covered the following trade policy issues in [Country] at any point during 2005–07? (Please check all that apply for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Macroeconomic/systemic implications,” b—“Request from authorities,”
   c—“Request from World Bank/other institution,” d—“Request from management,”
   e—“Request from other country’s ED,” f—“Other,” g—“Don’t know,”
   h—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments
(vi) Effects of trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues)

9. How would you characterize the reasons your mission(s) decided not to raise one or more trade policy issues in [Country] during 2005–07? (Please check all that apply for each applicable issue.)

   a—“No obvious macro linkages/systemic implications,”
   b—“Mission lacked time/expertise/resources,” c—“World Bank took the lead on the issue,”
**D. COOPERATION BETWEEN IMF AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS**

12. How would you describe your cooperation on trade policy issues for [Country] with staff from other institutions during 2005–07? *(Please check one for each row.)*

a—“Close/frequent,” b—“Occasional,” c—“Negligible,”

World Bank staff

(i) Surveillance
(ii) UFR work
(iii) TA
(iv) FSAP
(v) Research

WTO Secretariat staff

(vi) Surveillance
(vii) UFR work
(viii) TA
(ix) FSAP
(x) Research

Other (e.g., OECD, BIS, regional development banks)

(xi) Surveillance
(xii) UFR work
(xiii) TA
(xiv) FSAP
(xv) Research

13. Which of the following resources did your mission(s) to [Country] draw upon at some point during 2005–07? *(Please check one for each row.)*

a—“Always,” b—“Sometimes,” c—“Never,” d—“Don’t know,” e—“N/A”
Country-specific reports on trade policy by:

(i) WTO (Trade Policy Review)
(ii) World Bank (Country Focus/Economic Sector Work)
(iii) OECD
(iv) Regional development banks
(v) Other

Research (e.g., working papers, occasional papers) on trade policy by:

(vi) IMF
(vii) WTO Secretariat
(viii) World Bank
(ix) OECD
(x) Regional development banks
(xi) Other

Trade policy data/indicators compiled by:

(xii) WTO Secretariat
(xiii) World Bank (e.g., overall trade restrictiveness indices)
(xiv) OECD
(xv) UNCTAD
(xvi) Other

E. TOOLS AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO ANALYSIS OF TRADE POLICY

14. What was the basis for the mission’s specific positions on trade policy issues in [Country] during 2005–07? (Please check all that apply for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Analytical/empirical studies (in-house or external) specific to [Country],”
   b—“Analytical/empirical studies not specific to [Country] (e.g., panel-data analyses),”
   c—“Views of other agencies (e.g., World Bank, WTO, OECD),”
   d—“Pressure from another IMF member,” e—“Washington Consensus,” f—“Other,”
   g—“Don’t know,” h—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments
(vi) Effects of trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues)

15. How much did you use the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) compiled in PDR as background for the work on [Country] during 2005-07? (Please check one.)

   a—“Often,” b—“Occasionally,” c—“Rarely,” d—“Never,” e—“Don’t know”

16. Based on your experience in [Country] during 2005–07, how difficult was it for the mission to identify trade policy changes that moved [Country] in a protectionist direction? (Please check one.)

   a—“Not difficult,” b—“Somewhat difficult,” c—“Very difficult,” d—“Don’t know/didn’t try”

17. How would you describe the qualifications your mission team to [Country] had during 2005–07 to take positions on the following trade policy issues? (Please check one for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Strong: at least one member of the team had clear expertise in this area,”
   b—“Fair: at least one member of the team had some analytical background,”
   c—“Weak: no member of the team seemed to have more than a superficial background,”
   d—“Don’t know,” e—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”
F. DIALOGUE WITH AUTHORITIES

18. How would you characterize the extent of the authorities’ agreement with the mission’s positions on the following trade policy issues in [Country] during 2005–07? (Please check one for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Strong agreement,” b—“Moderate agreement,” c—“Little or no agreement,” d—“Don’t know,”
   e—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments
(vi) Effects of trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues)

19. How would you characterize the reasons for any disagreements some or all of the authorities had with the staff’s position on the following trade policy issues in [Country] during 2005–07? (Please check one for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Difference in basic economic analysis,” b—“Domestic political considerations,”
   c—“Administrative constraints on implementation,”
   d—“Conflicts with broader trade policy strategy (e.g., WTO negotiations),”
   e—“Other,” f—“Don’t know,” g—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of the country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its own GDP growth, fiscal position or balance of payments
(vi) Effects of trade policies on other countries’/regional/global trade (including market access issues)

20. How would you characterize any domestic resistance in [Country] from outside the government to the thrust of the mission’s advice during 2005–07 in the following areas on trade policy? (Please check one for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Strong and broadly based in the population,” b—“Strong, but concentrated in certain groups,”
   c—“Moderate,” d—“Little or none,” e—“Don’t know,”
   f—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
G. EFFECTIVENESS

21. When the mission(s) discussed trade policy issues in [Country] during 2005–07, to the best of your knowledge, how did the authorities respond? (Please check one for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Largely implemented,” b—“Partially implemented,” c—“Largely not implemented,”
   d—“Don’t know,” e—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”

   (i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
   (ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
   (iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
   (iv) Customs administration

22. On average, do you think the positions of your mission(s) on trade policy issues in [Country] during 2005–07 (regardless of whether the authorities implemented or agreed with them) were effective in enhancing the debate on trade-macro linkages, promoting change in the right direction and/or preventing change in the wrong direction? (Please check one for each applicable issue.)

   a—“Highly,” b—“Somewhat,” c—“Not at all,” d—“Don’t know,” e—“N/A (Mission did not address this issue)”

   (i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
   (ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
   (iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
   (iv) Customs administration

H. OPTIMAL ROLE FOR IMF IN TRADE POLICY ISSUES

23. Putting aside resource constraints that the IMF may face but recognizing the IMF’s institutional mandate (“to promote the expansion and balanced growth of world trade”), what do you think the IMF’s role in trade policy should be? (Please check all that apply.)

   a—“Advising on how to liberalize trade policies,”
   b—“Calling attention in Article IV consultations to instances when countries change trade policies in a protectionist direction,”
   c—“Assessing effects of trade policy changes on fiscal revenues, the balance of payments, growth, and (for trade in services) financial sector stability,”
   d—“Occasional coverage of global or regional trade policy issues in the WEO/REO,”
   e—“Advocating multilateral trade liberalization through public outreach efforts,”
   f—“No role,” g—“Other,” h—“Don’t know”
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

This survey relates mainly to any discussions you had on trade policy issues with IMF missions [Article IV surveillance, use of Fund resources (UFR), and technical assistance (TA)] during 2005–07. It also includes some general questions on your views about the IMF's role in trade policy issues.

The survey should take no more than 20 minutes of your time to complete. The information requested will be strictly confidential: it will be used only by ICF International and the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF to evaluate the IMF’s approach to international trade policy issues. Findings will be published only in summary form without attribution to any individual or country.

The electronic version of this survey is constructed to direct you to parts of the survey that are relevant to your experience as revealed by your specific responses to questions early in the survey. If you are using the hard copy (either because you prefer it or you are using a translation) boxes where you can indicate that a question is not applicable to you are included.

The survey has been sent to two ministries/government agencies—the finance ministry and the trade ministry (or their functional equivalents)—in each country that is a member of the IMF. ICF will collect responses from each ministry in your country separately. As the head of one of these two ministries/government agencies, your input is essential to this evaluation whether or not your ministry/government agency was actively involved in discussions on trade policy with IMF staff.

Trade policy issues referred to in this survey comprise:

(i) the design and implementation of trade policies narrowly defined (policies that directly and primarily aim to influence the quantity and/or value of a country’s imports and exports of goods and services—exchange rate policy is not considered in this survey);

(ii) the assessment of the macroeconomic effects of these narrowly defined trade policies.

If your country had a lending arrangement with the IMF during 2005–07, please answer the questions based on your overall experience with IMF missions during the period, taking into account that trade policy issues may have been discussed or TA received even when no trade policy conditionality was finally agreed. If your country did not have a lending arrangement, please answer the questions based on your overall experience during 2005–07 with surveillance and/or TA missions. If trade policy was discussed on only one occasion during 2005–07, please answer the questions with respect to that single occasion.

A. QUESTIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES

1. Which ministry/government agency do you represent?
   a—“Ministry of Finance (or equivalent government agency),”
   b—“Ministry of Trade (or equivalent government agency),”
   c—“Other (please specify)”

2. Do you recall ever having had discussions with any type of IMF mission during 2005–07 in the following areas? (Please check all that apply.)
   a—“Article IV Surveillance,” b—“Use of Fund Resources (UFR),” c—“Technical Assistance (TA),”
   d—“None”
   (i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
   (ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
   (iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
   (iv) Customs administration
   (v) Effects of your country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its growth, fiscal position and balance of payments
   (vi) Effects of your country’s trade policy on other countries (including market access issues)
B. IMF STAFF EXPERTISE ON AND APPROACH TO TRADE POLICY ISSUES

3. When an IMF mission raised trade policy issues with your ministry/government agency during 2005–07, what do you think motivated the IMF mission to raise them? (Please check all that apply.)

   a—“Mission believed the trade policy issue had important implications for growth, fiscal, or balance of payments outcomes in my country,”
   b—“Mission believed my country’s trade policies had systemically/regionally important effects,”
   c—“Mission had been asked by another IMF member country to raise [a] particular issue[s],”
   d—“Mission was supporting the World Bank or other international institution, which was taking the lead,”
   e—“Don’t know”

4. The IMF’s mandate is to “promote the expansion and balanced growth of world trade.” Within this mandate, from your experience during 2005–07, how would you characterize the main approach of the IMF missions to trade policy issues in your country? (Please check one.)

   a—“Open-minded,”
   b—“Doctrinaire,”
   c—“Don’t know”

5. How would you characterize the IMF mission’s expertise on trade policy issues you discussed with them during 2005–07? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

   a—“Strong: at least one member of the team had clear expertise in this area,”
   b—“Fair: at least one member of team had some analytical or operational background,”
   c—“Weak: no member of the team seemed to have more than a superficial background,”
   d—“Don’t know,”
   e—“My ministry/government agency did not discuss this issue with the IMF mission”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of your country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its growth, fiscal position and balance of payments
(vi) Effects of your country’s trade policy on other countries (including market access issues)

6. How would you characterize the IMF mission’s contribution to the discussions of each of the following trade policy issues with your ministry/government agency any time during 2005–07? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

   a—“Mission’s own views featured at least once,”
   b—“Mission sought information, but did not express views,”
   c—“Mission only repeated views of other institutions (such as the World Bank),”
   d—“No mission covered this issue with my ministry/government agency”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of your country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its growth, fiscal position and balance of payments
(vi) Effects of your country’s trade policy on other countries (including market access issues)

C. COOPERATION BETWEEN IMF AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS CONCERNED WITH TRADE POLICY ISSUES

7. In your experience during 2005–07, did IMF advice/conditionality/TA on trade policies adequately take into account your country’s commitments to and ongoing negotiations in the WTO? (Please check one for each issue listed.)
a—“Most of the time,” b—“Sometimes,” c—“Rarely,” d—“Don’t know,” e—“Not a WTO member”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration

8. In your experience during 2005–07, how did IMF advice/conditionality/TA on trade policy relate to that of other international institutions? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

a—“Fully consistent,” b—“At times inconsistent,” c—“Mostly inconsistent,” d—“Don’t know,” e—“We did not discuss trade policy with this institution,” f—“No mission covered this issue”

World Bank
(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration

Any other institution
(v) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(vi) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(vii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(viii) Customs administration

D. QUALITY OF TRADE POLICY ADVICE FROM IMF MISSION

9. How would you rate the quality of the IMF mission’s analytical/quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic effects (on the balance of payments, fiscal position, or GDP growth) of the trade policy changes it advocated during 2005–07? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

a—“High,” b—“Moderate,” c—“Low,” d—“No assessment provided,” e—“Mission did not advocate any trade policy changes”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration

10. How would you rate the quality of the IMF mission’s analytical/quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic effects (on the balance of payments, fiscal position, or GDP growth) of any trade policy changes your country implemented during 2005–07—whether the IMF mission supported or did not support them? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

a—“High,” b—“Moderate,” c—“Low,” d—“No assessment provided,” e—“No trade policy changes with potential macro effects were made”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration

11. A key aim of the IMF is to be even-handed in its advice to countries. In your opinion, in which group of countries did the IMF press most strongly for removing restrictions on trade (in merchandise, agriculture, or services, including financial services) during 2005–07?
E. EFFECTIVENESS OF IMF MISSION’S ADVICE ON TRADE POLICY

12. How would you characterize the extent of your ministry/government agency’s agreement with the IMF mission’s positions on trade policy? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

   a—“Strong agreement,” b—“Moderate agreement,” c—“Little or no agreement,” d—“Don’t know,”
   e—“Mission did not provide advice on this aspect of trade policy”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of your country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its growth, fiscal position and balance of payments
(vi) Effects of your country’s trade policy on other countries (including market access issues)

13. How would you characterize the reasons for any disagreements your ministry/government agency had with the IMF mission’s position on the following trade policy issues during 2005–07? (Please check all that apply.)

   a—“Difference in basic economic analysis,” b—“Domestic political considerations,”
   c—“Administrative constraints on implementation,”
   d—“Conflicts with broader trade policy strategy (e.g., WTO negotiations),” e—“Other,”
   f—“Don’t know,” g—“No disagreement/Mission did not provide advice on this issue”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of your country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its growth, fiscal position and balance of payments
(vi) Effects of your country’s trade policy on other countries (including market access issues)

14. How would you characterize any resistance from outside your government to the thrust of the IMF mission’s advice during 2005–07 in the following areas of trade policy? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

   a—“Strong and broadly based in the population,” b—“Strong, but concentrated in certain groups,”
   c—“Moderate,” d—“Little or none,” e—“Don’t know,”
   f—“Mission did not provide advice on this aspect of trade policy”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration

15. How effective was the IMF mission’s trade policy recommendations/conditionality/TA in enhancing the debate—within or outside the government—and/or promoting a change of policy on trade policy issues? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

   a—“Very effective,” b—“Moderately effective,” c—“Not effective,”
   d—“Counterproductive,” e—“Don’t know,” f—“IMF mission did not address this issue”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
16. In 2004 the IMF introduced the Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) to augment lending to countries suffering from preference erosion as a result of multilateral trade liberalization. Regardless of whether your country participated in this mechanism, how would you characterize its contribution to increasing support for multilateral trade liberalization? (Please check one.)

a—“Not aware TIM existed,”  b—“Very important,”  c—“Somewhat important,”
 d—“Not important,”  e—“No views on its contribution”

17. Do you think that the IMF’s advocacy of multilateral trade liberalization (e.g., through speeches and press statements by high-level IMF staff and IMF publications such as the World Economic Outlook and Regional Economic Outlooks) is worthwhile? (Please check one.)

a—“Yes,”  b—“Probably so,”  c—“Probably not,”  d—“No,”  e—“Don’t know”

F. OPTIMAL ROLE FOR IMF IN TRADE POLICY ISSUES

18. Putting aside resource constraints that the IMF may face and recognizing the IMF’s institutional mandate, what do you think the IMF’s role in trade policy should be? (Please check all that apply.)

a—“Advising on how to liberalize trade policies,”
 b—“Calling attention in Article IV consultations to instances when countries change trade policies in a protectionist direction,”
 c—“Assessing effects of trade policy changes on fiscal revenues, the balance of payments, growth, and (for trade in services) financial sector stability,”
 d—“Occasional coverage of global or regional trade policy issues in the WEO/REO,”
 e—“Advocating multilateral trade liberalization through public outreach efforts,”
 f—“No role,”  g—“Other,”  h—“Don’t know”

19. In your view, if the IMF mission (surveillance, UFR, or TA) had not addressed the trade policy issues that it did during 2005–07, would another international institution (e.g., the WTO, World Bank, OECD) or regional institution (e.g., regional development bank) have been well placed to fill the gap? (Please check one for each issue listed.)

a—“Yes,”  b—“Maybe,”  c—“No,”  d—“IMF did not address this issue in my country”

(i) Liberalization of trade in goods, including agriculture
(ii) Liberalization of trade in services, including financial
(iii) Preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade agreements, customs unions, partnership agreements, preferential schemes)
(iv) Customs administration
(v) Effects of your country’s trade policy changes (actual or proposed) on its growth, fiscal position and balance of payments
(vi) Effects of your country’s trade policy on other countries (including market access issues)