

Questionnaire Sent to Authorities of Prolonged User Countries

To check how representative of the broader group of prolonged users the findings of the country case studies were, the IEO sent a questionnaire to the authorities of all the countries identified as prolonged users in this study, as listed in Chapter 2.

Responses were received from the following 21 countries: Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, Jamaica, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Zambia.

A copy of the questionnaire is reproduced below. Most respondents indicated that they did not want to be quoted directly, but the thrust of the views expressed are reflected in the main report, especially in Chapter 5.

Overview

1. What is your general assessment of your country's relations with the IMF over the long term?
2. What do you see as the major factors that explain why your country made extended use of IMF resources? Could or should this have been avoided? What should the IMF have done differently? What has your country learnt from the experience of repeated programs?
3. To what extent were IMF-supported programs for your country motivated by the need for a "seal of approval" in order to mobilize funds from other sources, rather than a need for IMF financing, *per se*? Would it have been feasible or preferable to provide such a "seal of approval" in some other way?

Program formulation and negotiation

4. Did the IMF pay sufficient attention to the concerns of the authorities and other groups in the formulation and negotiation of programs? Were any disagreements on policies generally concerned with their substance, or on the pace and sequencing of measures or to potential difficulties in implementing programs?

5. Was the IMF realistic about the political and social environment of programs and the constraints involved?
6. How did the IMF's prolonged involvement affect the development of economic institutions—including those involved in policy formulation and technical analysis—in the country?

Program design

7. What, in your view, were the major strengths and weaknesses in the design of IMF-supported programs? Were IMF-supported programs too ambitious or overoptimistic? Did IMF-supported programs have an appropriate time-horizon? Did they pay sufficient attention to debt sustainability issues? Did programs make sufficient allowance for exogenous shocks?
8. Did IMF-supported programs put the emphasis on the right structural reforms and prioritize appropriately? Was there an appropriate division of labor between IMF and the World Bank with regard to structural reform?
9. Did the IMF learn from experience in designing successive programs?

Post-program experience

10. In those cases where countries no longer use IMF resources, has the internal political dynamic altered since there has been no lending arrangement? Has the process of policy-making and related technical analysis process altered?
11. For those countries that have made repeated use of precautionary arrangements, what are the main reasons for such an approach? What advantages do you see for a precautionary lending arrangement over regular IMF surveillance?
12. Are there any other issues you would like to bring to our attention?