

V. Survey Evidence

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. **To obtain evidence on perceptions of the Fund in its role as a trusted advisor, the IEO prepared three different surveys to assess the views of country authorities, mission chiefs (MC), and resident representatives (RR).** The surveys were administered by NORC at the University of Chicago. Table 1 summarizes data on the size of the populations surveyed and the participation rates.

Table 1. Surveyed Groups and Participation Rates

	Country authorities	Mission chiefs	Resident representatives
Number of surveys sent	358	493	163
Number of responses	187	257	95
Participation rate	52%	52%	59%

Source: IEO surveys.

2. **This background document is organized as follows.** Section II reviews the survey methodology. Section III presents the response rates to the three surveys, and Sections IV, V, and VI discuss some key observations from the country authority, mission chiefs, and resident representatives' surveys, respectively, with the observations organized according to the questionnaire formats. The appendices present the full survey data from the three surveys.

II. SURVEY METHODOLOGY

3. **For each country, the authorities' survey was sent to both the Central Bank Governor and the Minister of Finance.** The survey included a first section on the demand for advice (or lack thereof) from authorities, followed by a section focusing on the supply of advice during different kinds of missions (Article IV, use of Fund resources (UFR), Technical Assistance (TA), or the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)). Other sections covered the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the role of the resident representative, confidentiality concerns, and finally, an overall assessment.

4. **The staff survey was sent to all IMF staff who had been mission chiefs or resident representatives between 2005 and 2011 and were still currently working at the Fund.**¹ Both staff surveys were constructed similarly, with a first section addressing the survey recipients' experience on the country where they held their longest tenure, followed by a section on their overall experience as mission chiefs or resident representatives. Both questionnaires also included questions on confidentiality, the impact of the 2008 financial

¹ The list of RRs was created from data available on area department internal websites; the list of MCs was created using an OBP database of missions to countries. Staff members who had left the Fund (retirement or separation) were not included. Staff members who had occupied both positions were asked to complete both surveys.

crisis on the perception of the Fund as a trusted advisor, and, looking forward, what they believed could improve their capacity to act as trusted advisor for country authorities.

5. **The authorities' survey was sent to representatives in 190 economies:** 186 member countries, four territorial entities that are not states as understood by international law but that maintain regular interactions with the IMF, and three regional central banks which regularly participated in interactions with the Fund.² The surveys consisted of web-based questionnaires that respondents could fill out online or print and email/fax/mail back to NORC.

6. **The IEO divided the countries into five subgroups based on level of economic development and economic size (Table 2).** The team followed a methodology similar to that used in the IEO evaluation of *IMF Interactions with Member Countries (2009)*. Using the classification from the IMF's *World Economic Outlook (WEO)* report of September 2011, the team grouped the countries between advanced economies and emerging and developing economies. The 34 advanced economies were split into two subgroups: the members of the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were labeled Large Advanced (LA), and the other 27 economies were labeled Other Advanced (OA). The 156 remaining countries were split into 71 Low-Income Countries (LICs)³ and 85 emerging economies. Subsequently, emerging economies were separated in two groups, Large Emerging (LE–19 economies) and Other Emerging (OE–66 economies) on the basis of a GDP threshold of \$300 billion purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2009.

7. **NORC delivered the surveys to country authorities on September 7, 2011 and to IMF staff (mission chiefs and resident representatives) on November 21, 2011.** The authorities survey was closed on February 3, 2012 and the staff surveys were closed on January 27, 2012. All the survey responses were handled directly by NORC in order to preserve the confidentiality of the respondents.

² Somalia, although a member country, was not included as it had not received an Article IV delegation in the time span of our evaluation (2005–11). Three selected territorial entities participated in Article IV missions with the IMF: Aruba, Curaçao-St. Maarten, and Hong Kong SAR. Curaçao and St. Maarten (formerly part of the Netherlands Antilles) have recently become autonomous countries; however, the latest Article IV consultation they participated in (in 2011) was a joint consultation. The IMF does not conduct Article IV discussions with the West Bank and Gaza but it staffs a resident representative office there and maintains regular interactions. In this paper, the term “country” and “economy” are used interchangeably, each referring to both member countries and selected territories. The three regional central banks are the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), and the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC).

³ As per SPR’s classification for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) dated April 2010.

Table 2. Country Groups

Group Name	Number of economies	Description
Large advanced	7	G-7 economies
Other advanced ⁴	27	Defined as “advanced” in the September 2011 <i>WEO</i> but not G-7
Large emerging	19	Defined as “emerging and developing” country in the September 2011 <i>WEO</i> but not eligible to receive PRGT resources, and with a GDP above \$300 billion PPP in 2009
Other emerging ⁵	66	Defined as “emerging and developing” country in the September 2011 <i>WEO</i> but not eligible to receive PRGT resources, and with a GDP below \$300 billion PPP in 2009
Low-income	71	Eligible to draw resources from the IMF’s PRGT
Total	190	

Source: IEO survey.

III. RESPONSE RATES

A. Country Authorities

8. **For the survey of country authorities, NORC received answers from 187 institutions—a response rate of 52 percent.** The response rate was higher for monetary authorities (66 percent) than for Ministries of Finance (40 percent). As a result, the survey contains answers from 111 monetary authorities and 76 ministries of finance.

9. **The response rate varied significantly across country groups (Table 3).**

Table 3. Authorities’ Survey Responses by Country Group

Group	Institutions surveyed	Responses	Response rate
Large advanced	14	14	100%
Other advanced	54	39	72%
Large emerging	38	22	58%
Other emerging	124	60	48%
Low-income	128	52	41%
Total	358	187	52%

Source: IEO survey.

⁴ Includes Hong Kong SAR.

⁵ Includes Aruba (former Netherlands Antilles), Curaçao–St. Maarten (former Netherlands Antilles), West Bank and Gaza.


10. **The number of economies submitting at least one response was much higher in each income group (Table 4).** The IEO received at least one completed questionnaire from 137 economies out of a total of 190—a response rate of 72 percent.

Table 4. Number of Economies Submitting At Least One Response to the Authorities' Survey

Group	Countries surveyed	Number of Countries with at least one response	Response rate
Large advanced	7	7	100%
Other advanced	27	24	89%
Large emerging	19	16	84%
Other emerging	66	48	73%
Low-income	71	42	59%
Total	190	137	72%

Source: IEO survey.

Figure 1. Distribution of All Surveyed Countries (a), and Distribution of Countries Submitting at Least One Response (b), by Income Group



Source: IEO Survey.

11. **The distribution of country responses according to income groups (Figure 1) is close to the distribution of surveyed countries,** albeit with a slight overrepresentation of advanced countries and a slight underrepresentation of LICs.

12. **The participation rate also varied across IMF area departments,** with the highest rate registered in the European Department (EUR) (65 percent) and the lowest in Middle East and Central Asia Department (MCD) (44 percent) (Tables 5 and 6). The political events taking place in the Middle East during the survey period probably partially explain the lower response rate of the MCD countries.

Table 5. Authorities' Survey Response by Department

Area Department	Institutions surveyed	Responses	Response rate
AFR	78	36	46%
APD	65	33	51%
EUR	92	60	65%
MCD	62	27	44%
WHD	64	31	48%
Total	358	187	52%

Source: IEO survey.


Table 6. Number of Economies Submitting At Least One Response to the Authorities' Survey

Group	Countries surveyed	Number of Countries with at least one response	Response rate
AFR	44	27	61%
APD	35	24	69%
EUR	46	40	87%
MCD	31	22	71%
WHD	34	24	71%
Total	190	137	72%

Source: IEO survey.

13. The distribution of results across area department (Figure 2) also shows a slight overrepresentation of countries of the European Department (EUR) (29 percent of the countries that submitted at least 1 response versus 24 percent of the surveyed population) and a slight underrepresentation of countries from the African Department (AFR) and from the Asian & Pacific Department (APD) (respectively 20 percent and 17 percent of countries that submitted at least one response versus 23 percent and 19 percent of the surveyed population).

Figure 2. Distribution of All Surveyed Countries (a), and Distribution of Countries Submitting at Least One Response (b), by Area Department



Source: IEO survey.

B. IMF Staff

14. **The IEO team also surveyed mission chiefs and resident representatives who held that position at any time since 2005 and were still currently employed by the Fund.** This questionnaire was sent by NORC on November 21, 2011. Responses were accepted until January 23, 2012. NORC received answers from 257 mission chiefs and 95 resident representatives, translating into response rates of 52 percent and 59 percent, respectively. Mission chiefs were asked if the majority of their assignment had been on Article IV consultation/UFR missions or on Technical Assistance / FSAP missions. Depending on their answer to this question, they were directed to specific sections of the questionnaire. Of the respondents, 144 had had a majority of their assignments as surveillance or UFR program MCs (80 and 64 respondents, respectively), and 113 as TA or FSAP MCs.

IV. KEY OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SURVEY OF AUTHORITIES⁶

A. The Demand for Advice

15. **The frequency of requesting advice from the IMF appeared to be related to a country's level of economic development,** with the other emerging economies and LICs most frequently requesting advice. When large advanced economies sought views and advice, they were much more likely than other country groups to contact IMF Management and senior staff.

16. **Willingness to seek advice on different topics was also related to country income level,** with LICs more willing to ask the Fund for advice in almost every area. Advanced countries were less willing to seek advice in areas such as exchange rate and monetary policy.

17. **The most commonly selected reasons** for seeking advice were (i) an interest in knowing about other countries' experiences and (ii) a need for advice on institutional areas (fiscal rules, regulation/supervision in the financial sector).

18. **Evenhandedness and bringing value added remain critical issues for building trust.** The existence of sufficient local expertise (a positive factor) and, to a lesser extent, a perception that the IMF had a one-size-fits-all approach (a negative factor) were the two factors that authorities most cited as reasons that mattered in their decision not to seek advice. Among authorities from large emerging economies, the perception that the IMF lacked sufficient country knowledge was also considered a major factor in the decision to not seek IMF's advice.

⁶ See Appendix 1 for full survey data.

19. **Negative experiences with the IMF in the past and the political stigma seen to be associated with working with the Fund represented important barriers to trust, especially in certain regions.** A third of the authorities responding from Asian and Pacific countries said that legacy or political stigma considerations both mattered greatly or somewhat in their decision not to seek the IMF's advice.

B. The Supply of Advice

20. **Fund staff received high praise for providing an environment conducive to a candid dialogue.** Most respondents agreed that the Fund's missions were providing an adequate environment for advice and policy dialogue by clearly explaining the rationale of their advice, by providing an atmosphere suitable for dialogue, by listening to country authorities' perspectives, and by showing willingness to discuss new issues raised by the authorities. These results varied significantly by country income groups.

21. **One-fourth of the respondents felt that missions were more focused on data updating/forecasting than on policy discussions.** This percentage goes up to 37 percent for authorities from LICs.

22. **Under specific circumstances such as the presence of a UFR mission, the positive findings regarding the quality of the dialogue are more nuanced.** Of the respondents whose countries had had a UFR mission at some point since 2005, 42 percent strongly agreed or agreed with the view that UFR missions tended to be driven by their own agenda and were not sufficiently flexible to discuss policy alternatives. Furthermore, a third of respondents whose countries had had a UFR mission indicated that they were reluctant to raise certain topics out of fear that these might subsequently be incorporated into UFR program conditionality.

23. **In contrast, advice provided in the context of TA or FSAP missions was almost unanimously praised by authorities** for its quality and the quality of the discussions associated.

C. The Aftermath of the Crisis

24. **Since the onset of the crisis, authorities have come to see the Fund staff as more open and more flexible in its approach to programs,** but about a third of authorities feel that the Fund has not become more evenhanded in its treatment of countries.

25. **In some areas, the survey results also show a positive trend in the authorities' satisfaction with the quality of the advice and the dialogue with the Fund.** Most notably, 70 percent of authorities found an improvement in the quality of advice on banking sector/financial markets, macrofinancial linkages, and international spillovers. A similar proportion of respondents felt that the IMF had improved in its role as an interlocutor with regards to prudential and supervisory issues in the financial/banking system and with risks

from the international economy. No changes were detected in the area of exchange rate policy advice.

D. The Role of the Resident Representative

26. **The survey showed that authorities valued many attributes of IMF resident representatives but placed relatively little reliance on them for policy advice.** Resident representatives were viewed as trusted advisors (85 percent of respondents in agreement), good counterparts for discussing policy ideas (79 percent of respondents in agreement), and a good source of information on economic policy issues (80 percent of respondents in agreement). Despite these positive findings, a third of the respondents said that they rarely or never approached the resident representative for policy advice, and almost half of the authorities said that they rarely or never included the resident representative in confidential policy discussions.

E. Confidentiality Concerns

27. **Overall, authorities were satisfied with how the IMF handled confidentiality.** However, about a fourth of the respondents from large emerging markets said that when they discussed sensitive issues with IMF country teams, they “often” or “most of the time” felt the need for some reassurances regarding confidentiality (including the category “sometimes” pushed the percentage of large emerging market respondents needing reassurances up to two-thirds).

28. **A notable proportion of the authorities said that concerns about the public disclosure of information made them less willing to seek the Fund’s advice on sensitive issues.** The survey asked authorities how the Fund’s disclosure policy affected their willingness to seek advice on sensitive issues. The most problematic area seemed to be the disclosure to the general public (including guidelines under which authorities may withhold consent to the publication of a report or ask for the deletion of market-sensitive material), with about 30 percent of respondents saying this limited their willingness to discuss or seek advice from the Fund on sensitive issues. There were significant differences across country categories and regions, with almost half the authorities in large emerging markets and in APD countries being reticent to discuss or seek IMF advice because of concerns about disclosure to the public, compared to only 14 percent of those from large advanced economies and fewer than a fourth of those from countries in EUR and AFR.

F. Overall Assessment

29. **Overall, most of the respondents felt that the IMF balanced its role of trusted advisor and fulfilled its surveillance mandate either well or very well** (over 85 percent of respondents in all income groups except large emerging economies). Authorities from large emerging economies were the most critical, with almost half of their respondents considering that the IMF performed “not well” or “poorly.” A similar (but less pronounced) pattern was

observed for the performance of the IMF in balancing its role of trusted advisor with that of providing financial assistance.

30. **In comparison with other international organizations (World Bank, OECD, development banks), the IMF was considered an equal or better performer in the role of trusted advisor.**

V. KEY OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SURVEY OF MISSION CHIEFS⁷

A. Mission Chiefs for Article IV or UFR Missions⁸

31. **Mission chiefs in charge of Article IV or UFR missions had more frequent contact with government counterparts in LICs than in more advanced countries.** The frequency of contact (phone/email) between the mission chief and his/her counterpart in the government (the person they interacted the most with during missions) increased as the income level of countries decreased (about 55 percent of mission chiefs were in contact on a weekly or monthly basis with their counterpart in advanced economies; that number rose to 65 percent in emerging economies and almost 85 percent in LICs).

32. **The frequency of contact between the authorities and the mission chief, aside from missions, also depended heavily on the context of the relationship.** For UFR countries, the frequency of contact was weekly or monthly for 90 percent of the mission chiefs. In contrast, in surveillance-only countries, mission chiefs reported that contact was seldom in about 45 percent of cases. According to mission chiefs, the most frequently cited reasons for authorities to seek the IMF's advice were "major problem (crisis/shock) in their country" in the case of UFR countries and "desire to know about experiences in other countries" and "international spillovers and risks to the country" in the case of surveillance-only countries.

33. **Survey evidence suggests that country authorities tended to avoid requesting advice in some core areas of the Fund's expertise.** Mission chiefs reported that "capital flows and/or external current account issues" and "exchange rate policy" were areas where fewer than 50 percent of the authorities typically sought the IMF's advice (with an even lower proportion, about a third, in surveillance-only countries).

34. **Mission chiefs were also asked about the specific circumstances that might have influenced their interactions with the authorities.** The majority of respondents disagreed with statements that frequent turnover of officials, past negative experiences of the country with the Fund, systemic importance of the country, or perception of unequal treatment played

⁷ See Appendix 2 for full survey data.

⁸ Sections A and B apply only to MCs who mainly led Article IV or UFR missions.

an adverse role in building a trusted relationship. On the other hand, almost 50 percent of the respondents agreed with the statements indicating that “the perception that the Fund’s advice is guided by the “Washington Consensus” and that “the IMF’s advice reflects the interests of its largest shareholders” were prevalent among authorities. These two statements were especially supported by authorities from emerging economies.

B. Overall Experience Since 2005

35. **The survey of mission chiefs shows that several of the practices of Article IV and UFR missions seemed to constrain or negatively affect the dialogue.** More than half of the mission chiefs agreed with several statements indicating that existing practices limit the possibilities for a deep dialogue in the field (“pressures to reduce the duration and frequency of missions constrain the time for dialogue with authorities,” “drafting of the staff report in the field comes at the expense of additional meetings with the authorities,” and “a large share of the mission’s time in the field is devoted to data gathering or developing projections rather than substantive discussions”). In addition, half of the respondents considered that “adherence to guidelines (in briefing papers/policy consultation notes) was too rigid.” Regarding the writing of the staff report, about 60 percent of respondents agreed with the statement indicating that restrictions on the length of staff reports limited the reporting of analytically important issues. A similar proportion also indicated that there were pressures to dilute the candor of staff reports in order to avoid upsetting country authorities.

36. **Mission chiefs generally agreed that missions would benefit from including some informal discussions** (“The dialogue would improve if time were set aside for informal brainstorming sessions/discussions during the mission,” and “the mission’s effectiveness would improve if there were more opportunities for informal social interactions with senior officials (e.g., lunches/dinners/drinks”). About 40 percent of mission chiefs also acknowledged that the downsizing of the IMF had led to a significant decrease in the amount of face-to-face time with the authorities.

37. **The survey also found that the presence of a UFR program did not inhibit the candor of the dialogue with authorities.** Mission chiefs widely agreed that more frequent country visits under a UFR program had a positive effect on building a relationship with the authorities.

C. Technical Assistance and FSAP Missions⁹

38. **Mission chiefs corroborated the findings from the country authorities survey that authorities value the Fund’s technical assistance and FSAP missions.** A large majority of mission chiefs (86 percent) who led TA and/or FSAP missions indicated that the

⁹ This section only reflects the views of MCs who mainly led TA or FSAP missions.

primary motivation for the most recent mission they led was “at the authorities’ initiative” (12 percent indicated that the TA/FSAP mission was “in response to strong urging by the IMF”, and 3 percent said it took place “as a condition for completing a UFR program review”).

39. **Almost all the mission chiefs (99 percent) said that authorities had been “very receptive” or “somewhat receptive” to the recommendations/advice provided during the TA/FSAP mission.** Moreover, more than 70 percent of mission chiefs indicated that authorities had contacted them more than once after the end of the mission to follow-up on the recommendations and advice provided during the mission.

D. Confidentiality

40. **Mission chiefs believed that the evolution of the Fund’s publication/transparency policy had, in most cases, a positive or no impact** (28 percent of respondents said it had a positive impact, 52 percent said no impact, and 19 percent said a negative impact). Moreover, mission chiefs felt that the implementation of the new transparency policy had not affected the candor of the policy dialogue (the negative influence was seen as focused on policy dialogue on the financial sector and on exchange rate policy).

E. The Aftermath of the Crisis

41. **Since the onset of the financial crisis, authorities have shown a renewed interest in the IMF’s advice.** A majority of mission chiefs reported that the crisis had increased the willingness of authorities to seek advice on their own initiative and to initiate a deeper engagement with the Fund. Furthermore, a large majority of respondents agreed that the IMF had become more open to different points of views on policy issues and more flexible in its application of conditionality in programs (86 percent and 92 percent of respondents in agreement, respectively).

42. **However, a majority of mission chiefs (53 percent) agreed with authorities in believing that the IMF had not become more evenhanded** in its treatment of countries since the onset of the crisis.

F. Looking Forward

43. **About a third of the respondents considered that the IMF balances its roles of trusted confidant and ruthless truth-teller “not well” or “poorly”.** Mission chiefs felt that providing more staff visits and more availability of technical assistance would be the best ways for the Fund to strengthen its role as trusted advisor. Echoing some of the main concerns of authorities, mission chiefs believed that the policy dialogue with authorities would benefit from incorporating other country experiences into the advice more often, and from recognizing the social and political implications of the advice by offering a wider set of “feasible second-best alternatives.”

VI. KEY OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SURVEY OF RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES¹⁰

A. Experience in the Country Where They Held Their Longest Tenure as Resident Representative

44. **Resident representatives were asked about the frequency in which, in a typical month, authorities contacted them for advice** either on strategic policy issues or on the specific implementation of policies. Nearly 60 percent responded that they were contacted more than twice a month.

45. **Half of the respondents answered that they were never asked to participate in regular internal policy deliberations within the government.** Moreover, 40 percent of the resident representatives said they were never included in confidential/sensitive policy discussions within the government, and 60 percent said they were never included in direct negotiations between authorities and other international organizations/aid agencies/external lenders. Considering this last example, the contrast is even stronger in the case of resident representatives working in emerging economies, where about 75 percent said they were never included.

46. **While resident representatives felt that the impact of their outreach activities on their role as trusted advisor was positive or slightly positive** (about 70 percent of the respondents), they also said that in most cases authorities remained neutral regarding the resident representatives' outreach activities towards different stakeholders (the country's highest authority, Parliament, the press, civil society, donors/lenders), neither encouraging or discouraging them from explaining economic policy issues to these stakeholders.

47. **Echoing the concerns of mission chiefs, resident representatives said that their ability to be trusted advisors was hindered by authorities' negative perceptions of the IMF.** Their responses showed that "negative past experiences with the IMF," the "perception that IMF advice reflects the interests of its larger shareholders," and the "perception that the Fund's advice is guided by the "Washington Consensus" were important factors in adversely influencing their role as trusted advisors. Slightly less than half the respondents considered each of these factors as very important or somewhat important in adversely influencing their role as trusted advisors.

B. Overall Experience as a Resident Representative Since 2005

48. **Looking at the position of the resident representative vis-à-vis IMF headquarters, half of the respondents felt they had limited influence in changing headquarters' policy views on "their" countries.** About 75 percent of the respondents felt that having more autonomy or delegated authority to the resident representatives would

¹⁰ See Appendix 3 for full survey data.

improve their capacity to act as trusted advisors. Half of the respondents felt that present incentives/practices tended to tilt the balance against the role of trusted advisor (relative to the truth-teller role) and one-third felt the lack of clarity between the role of the resident representative and the mission chief undermined their ability to perform a trusted advisor role.

49. **In their own view, the evolution of the Fund’s publication/transparency policy and the emphasis on increased outreach had had mostly a positive or no impact on the resident representative’s role as trusted advisor.** However, resident representatives felt that authorities still had concerns about disclosure of sensitive information to the Executive Board (20 percent of respondents said it affected their role as trusted advisor somewhat negatively) and to donors/other stakeholders (30 percent said it impacted their role as trusted advisor either somewhat negatively or very negatively).

50. **Overall, resident representatives felt there was potential for improvement in their relationship with authorities.** Almost two-thirds of the respondents believed that authorities could have made better use of their potential as trusted advisors.

C. The Aftermath of the Crisis

51. **Resident representatives believe that the global financial crisis has increased the willingness of authorities to seek advice from the Fund (about 90 percent of respondents in agreement), but that it also increased the authorities’ expectations.** Country counterparts now expected the Fund to be more knowledgeable about global trends and risks that may affect their country.

52. **Resident representatives were asked whether, because of the crisis, authorities had invited them more frequently to participate in confidential policy discussions.** The answers seemed to depend heavily on the seniority of the respondent: Positive answers were received in 30, 50, and 65 percent of cases from staff at the A13/A14, A15, and B levels, respectively.

53. **The resident representatives also confirmed the point made by authorities and mission chiefs about the positive trend in authorities’ satisfaction.** Almost 85 percent of the resident representatives agreed that authorities perceive the Fund as more flexible/responsive to their needs than they did prior to the crisis.

D. Looking Forward

54. **Among the different options offered by the survey to improve the role of the Fund as a trusted advisor, resident representatives designated “adding a RR’s office for the country if none exists; or expanding its size if one already exists” as the measure that would have the most beneficial impact.** This answer was followed by “increasing the

availability of technical assistance” and “expanding resources for papers/workshops/seminars in countries.”

55. **The survey also asked resident representatives which measures would bring important, small, or no payoffs in improving the policy dialogue with authorities, thus including a sense of benefits relative to the cost of implementing the measures.** Similarly to mission chiefs, they gave the highest marks to measures such as “recognizing the social and political implications of the advice by offering a wider set of ‘feasible second best’ alternatives” and “incorporating other country experiences in the advice more often” (about 80 percent of respondents said these measures would have important payoffs). The suggestion to change incentives to reward staff for emphasizing “brainstorming” and informal modalities of policy discussions was also seen as important, with almost half of the respondents indicating it would have an important payoff.

Appendix 1. Results of the Country Authorities Survey

Distribution of answer in percentage			By income level						By region					G20 or non G20 1/		IMF program? 2/	
			Overall	LA	OA	LE	OE	LIC	AFR	APD	EUR	MCD	WHD	G20	Non G20	No	Yes
Number of responses			187	14	39	22	60	52	36	33	60	27	31	30	157	113	74
Participation rate			52.2%	100%	72.2%	57.9%	48.4%	40.6%	46.2%	50.8%	65.2%	43.5%	48.4%	78.9%	49.1%	53.6%	50.3%
Section 1 - Seeking the IMF's Advice																	
1. In a typical year, how often do you contact the following staff to seek their views and advice? Please remember that these are contacts you made on your own initiative.	a. Management (Managing Director, Deputy Managing Directors)	Never	51	36	68	45	52	43	35	65	50	52	53	50	51	61	34
		Less than 3 times	43	36	30	45	43	55	61	32	43	43	33	32	45	33	60
		3 times or more	7	29	3	10	6	2	3	3	7	4	13	18	4	7	6
	b. Department Directors or Deputy Directors	Never	37	29	54	43	30	32	25	61	33	20	47	50	51	50	15
		Less than 3 times	44	36	32	43	50	49	53	29	47	60	30	32	45	32	63
		3 times or more	19	36	14	14	20	19	22	10	20	20	23	18	4	18	22
	c. Mission Chiefs	Never	17	36	30	32	5	8	3	28	18	7	26	40	12	25	3
		Less than 3 times	33	29	43	27	35	27	26	44	39	33	19	30	34	41	21
		3 times or more	50	36	27	41	60	65	71	28	43	59	55	30	54	34	76
	d. Other IMF Staff (e.g. country desk economists, economists in technical departments)	Never	19	21	31	18	16	12	6	22	24	8	29	27	17	24	10
		Less than 3 times	27	21	36	27	23	25	14	38	29	38	16	20	28	30	21
		3 times or more	55	57	33	55	61	63	81	41	47	54	55	53	55	46	69
2. What has prompted you to seek advice from the IMF in the past? (Mark all that apply)	a. Major problem (crisis/shock) in the country		40	18	17	11	45	62	56	24	36	56	26	13	45	19	68
	b. International spillovers and assessment of risks		44	36	38	28	51	47	50	24	48	48	48	26	47	38	52
	c. Desire to know about experiences in other countries		63	36	46	78	72	64	66	59	57	74	65	57	65	63	65
	d. Plans for significant changes in existing policies and/or their implementation		51	36	21	39	58	66	81	28	40	63	43	35	54	42	63
	e. Need for expertise on institutional areas (e.g. fiscal rules, regulations/supervision, financial sector etc.)		73	18	50	67	85	85	91	62	55	81	83	43	78	64	85
	f. We did not seek advice		7	27	17	11	0	2	0	10	12	4	4	17	5	11	0
	g. Other reasons, please specify																
3. How much do you agree with the following statements regarding your experience seeking advice?	a. When we have had questions or issues, it has been clear whom we should contact	Strongly agree	30	63	20	24	23	40	47	8	34	19	36	37	29	19	44
		Agree	66	38	68	65	77	60	53	76	64	81	64	47	69	75	56
		Disagree	3	0	12	12	0	0	0	16	2	0	0	16	2	6	0
		Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	b. We are satisfied with the level of seniority / experience of the IMF staff from whom we have received advice	Strongly agree	29	63	16	12	27	38	38	16	27	31	32	32	28	19	41
		Agree	68	38	84	76	69	62	59	80	73	65	64	58	70	78	57
		Disagree	2	0	0	6	4	0	3	4	0	4	0	5	2	2	1
		Strongly disagree	1	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	1	0
4. When we have sought advice, it has been mostly of:	a. A technical or informational nature		22	25	29	31	26	11	6	36	26	23	23	39	20	31	12
	b. A policy or strategic nature		7	25	21	0	0	9	0	12	19	0	0	11	7	10	4
	c. A mix of the technical/informational and policy/strategic nature		70	50	50	69	74	81	94	52	55	77	77	50	73	59	84
5. Would you be willing to seek advice from the IMF on the following areas? (% of respondents who are willing)	a. Public expenditure / Taxation		73	36	62	67	78	88	93	74	56	95	66	44	78	66	84
	b. Capital flows and external current account issues		75	50	59	76	84	85	87	76	59	96	73	52	80	71	82
	c. Exchange rate policy		65	31	40	61	75	85	88	74	41	95	57	33	72	56	80
	d. Public and/or external debt		77	45	71	78	75	91	90	87	67	88	66	56	81	71	86
	e. Monetary policy / Inflation		71	38	42	68	83	89	90	71	48	100	66	37	77	61	86
	f. Banking sector / Financial markets		85	50	82	95	87	92	94	83	80	92	81	64	89	80	92
	g. Price policy / Subsidies / Social safety nets		65	27	58	53	69	81	94	68	47	80	55	33	71	60	73

Distribution of answer in percentage			By income level						By region					G20 or non G20 1/		IMF program? 2/		
			Overall	LA	OA	LE	OE	LIC	AFR	APD	EUR	MCD	WHD	G20	Non G20	No	Yes	
			Number of responses	187	14	39	22	60	52	36	33	60	27	31	30	157	113	74
			Participation rate	52.2%	100%	72.2%	57.9%	48.4%	40.6%	46.2%	50.8%	65.2%	43.5%	48.4%	78.9%	49.1%	53.6%	50.3%
6. How much did the following factors matter in your decision not to seek the IMF's advice?	a. Sufficient local expertise	Mattered greatly	52	85	64	67	36	43	43	39	69	40	48	70	48	58	41	
		Mattered somewhat	31	8	27	29	44	26	33	32	23	45	31	22	33	27	37	
		Did not matter much	13	0	6	5	12	29	17	25	6	5	17	4	15	10	19	
		Did not matter at all	4	8	3	0	8	2	7	4	2	10	3	4	5	5	3	
	b. Preference for other international institutions or consultants rather than the IMF	Mattered greatly	3	0	3	5	4	2	3	0	4	5	3	0	4	2	5	
		Mattered somewhat	30	0	18	38	40	31	50	30	15	20	41	23	31	27	34	
		Did not matter much	33	33	41	38	28	29	23	30	51	25	17	31	33	32	34	
		Did not matter at all	35	67	38	19	28	38	23	41	30	50	38	46	32	39	27	
	c. Concerns that advice sought informally may be subject to conditionality in an IMF program	Mattered greatly	5	0	3	5	4	10	7	4	4	5	7	4	5	4	7	
		Mattered somewhat	17	0	13	19	22	17	21	22	8	25	17	12	18	15	19	
		Did not matter much	22	0	13	24	24	32	21	30	18	30	17	12	24	18	28	
		Did not matter at all	56	100	72	52	50	41	52	44	71	40	59	73	53	63	46	
	d. Negative experiences with the IMF in the past	Mattered greatly	5	8	0	14	2	5	0	7	2	0	14	11	3	6	2	
		Mattered somewhat	10	0	10	24	8	10	14	25	2	5	10	19	9	13	5	
		Did not matter much	28	8	20	38	33	29	28	25	33	37	17	19	30	27	30	
		Did not matter at all	57	85	70	24	57	56	59	43	63	58	59	52	58	54	63	
	e. Concerns about the political stigma associated with working with the IMF	Mattered greatly	3	0	0	14	4	0	0	4	2	0	10	8	2	4	2	
		Mattered somewhat	18	0	13	38	18	17	14	26	16	24	14	19	18	21	12	
		Did not matter much	23	0	17	29	27	27	24	33	27	24	7	12	26	17	33	
		Did not matter at all	55	100	70	19	51	56	62	37	55	52	69	62	54	57	53	
	f. Perception that the IMF's advice reflects the interests of its larger shareholders	Mattered greatly	6	0	0	19	4	7	7	7	0	0	17	8	5	8	2	
		Mattered somewhat	14	0	19	29	16	5	10	26	10	20	10	12	15	16	11	
		Did not matter much	27	8	19	33	30	32	34	30	29	25	14	27	27	26	28	
		Did not matter at all	53	92	63	19	50	56	48	37	61	55	59	54	53	49	60	
	g. Perception of unequal treatment of countries by the IMF	Mattered greatly	5	0	0	14	8	2	10	7	2	0	7	4	5	5	5	
		Mattered somewhat	13	0	16	33	8	10	0	15	12	15	24	15	12	17	5	
		Did not matter much	30	8	25	29	38	32	34	37	33	35	10	27	31	30	28	
		Did not matter at all	52	92	59	24	46	56	55	41	53	50	59	54	52	46	61	
	h. Perception that the IMF had a one-size-fits-all approach that was not appropriate for our country	Mattered greatly	14	8	10	33	10	15	10	29	6	10	21	19	13	17	9	
		Mattered somewhat	31	8	33	57	38	15	17	36	33	35	34	33	30	34	26	
Did not matter much		29	23	27	10	30	41	45	18	35	25	17	15	32	23	39		
Did not matter at all		26	62	30	0	22	29	28	18	27	30	28	33	24	26	26		
i. Perception that the IMF lacked sufficient country knowledge (e.g. on institutions, political constraints, etc.)	Mattered greatly	8	8	17	19	2	5	7	21	6	0	7	11	8	9	7		
	Mattered somewhat	28	23	33	71	18	17	17	39	29	25	31	48	24	37	14		
	Did not matter much	31	23	17	5	46	39	41	18	37	30	24	15	34	26	40		
	Did not matter at all	32	46	33	5	34	39	34	21	29	45	38	26	34	29	39		
j. Concerns about confidentiality on sensitive topics	Mattered greatly	6	15	9	10	4	3	3	22	4	0	3	11	5	9	2		
	Mattered somewhat	19	0	31	48	14	8	3	37	24	20	10	30	17	24	11		
	Did not matter much	25	8	13	29	32	30	31	22	18	35	28	19	26	27	21		
	Did not matter at all	49	77	47	14	50	60	62	19	55	45	59	41	51	40	66		
k. Other, please specify																		
Section 2 - The Supply of Advice During IMF Missions																		
7. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding Article IV consultations/UFR missions?	a. Missions clearly explain the rationale for their advice	Strongly agree	34	57	24	9	41	38	40	28	37	30	32	33	34	32	38	
		Agree	62	43	76	82	55	56	57	72	61	70	52	60	63	63	61	
		Disagree	3	0	0	5	2	6	3	0	0	0	13	3	3	4	1	
		Strongly disagree	1	0	0	5	2	0	0	0	2	0	3	3	1	2	0	
	b. Missions adequately present policy alternatives and options	Strongly agree	17	21	11	5	16	27	24	16	11	19	23	10	19	13	25	
		Agree	68	50	81	64	73	61	65	66	76	74	55	57	70	69	67	
		Disagree	13	29	8	23	11	10	9	19	13	7	16	27	10	16	7	
		Strongly disagree	2	0	0	9	0	2	3	0	0	0	6	7	1	2	1	
	c. Missions listen to country authorities' perspectives	Strongly agree	28	50	29	14	30	25	26	19	30	30	35	30	28	29	27	
		Agree	65	50	68	73	63	65	63	78	65	70	48	57	66	65	65	
		Disagree	5	0	3	9	7	4	9	3	5	0	6	10	4	4	7	
		Strongly disagree	2	0	0	5	0	6	3	0	0	0	10	3	2	3	1	
	d. Missions provide an atmosphere suitable for a candid dialogue	Strongly agree	34	79	26	23	29	37	34	28	33	33	39	47	31	34	32	
		Agree	62	21	74	64	66	58	60	72	65	67	42	47	64	60	63	
		Disagree	2	0	0	5	5	0	3	0	2	0	6	0	3	2	3	
		Strongly disagree	3	0	0	9	0	6	3	0	0	0	13	7	2	4	1	

Distribution of answer in percentage			By income level						By region					G20 or non G20 1/		IMF program? 2/	
			Overall	LA	OA	LE	OE	LIC	AFR	APD	EUR	MCD	WHD	G20	Non G20	No	Yes
Number of responses			187	14	39	22	60	52	36	33	60	27	31	30	157	113	74
Participation rate			52.2%	100%	72.2%	57.9%	48.4%	40.6%	46.2%	50.8%	65.2%	43.5%	48.4%	78.9%	49.1%	53.6%	50.3%
7. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding Article IV consultations/UFR missions? (cont'd)	e. Missions take into account social and political implications	Strongly agree	8	8	5	0	11	10	9	6	5	7	13	3	9	6	10
		Agree	67	85	84	55	64	60	60	75	75	81	42	62	68	68	66
		Disagree	19	8	11	36	21	19	17	19	18	11	32	28	18	21	17
		Strongly disagree	6	0	0	9	4	12	14	0	2	0	13	7	5	5	7
	f. Missions are more focused on data updating/forecasting than on policy discussions	Strongly agree	4	0	3	9	0	10	6	3	2	8	6	3	5	3	7
		Agree	20	0	13	27	20	27	15	35	14	31	13	10	22	19	22
		Disagree	65	69	76	59	67	55	68	58	74	58	58	69	64	65	65
		Strongly disagree	11	31	8	5	13	8	12	3	11	4	23	17	9	14	5.80
	g. Missions do not contribute anything new (they just repeat the IMF's standard prescription)	Strongly agree	4	0	0	14	4	6	3	3	0	4	16	7	4	6	1
		Agree	21	14	19	36	21	18	17	35	21	19	13	30	19	22	20
		Disagree	59	64	76	32	55	61	54	52	71	67	42	47	61	59	59
		Strongly disagree	15	21	5	18	20	16	26	10	7	11	29	17	15	13	20
8. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the ability of IMF mission teams to promote a constructive dialogue in the context of Article IV consultations/UFR missions?	a. Mission chiefs lack sufficient policy experience	Strongly agree	2	0	0	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	2	2	1
		Agree	7	14	3	18	9	2	0	6	7	11	13	20	5	11	1
		Disagree	65	43	79	73	67	55	53	81	67	63	58	60	66	68	59
		Strongly disagree	26	43	18	5	21	43	47	13	26	26	19	20	28	19	38
	b. Missions lack country specific knowledge	Strongly agree	4	7	3	14	0	6	3	6	0	0	16	13	3	5	3
		Agree	23	14	11	41	26	24	21	34	21	11	29	23	23	27	17
		Disagree	60	64	79	45	53	58	64	53	67	70	39	57	60	58	63
		Strongly disagree	13	14	8	0	21	12	12	6	12	19	16	7	14	10	17
	c. Missions are typically in a rush	Strongly agree	3	0	5	0	0	6	3	3	2	0	6	3	3	3	3
		Agree	17	21	16	18	18	16	6	16	22	22	16	20	17	17	17
		Disagree	66	71	71	82	61	60	58	81	66	67	61	73	65	68	63
		Strongly disagree	14	7	8	0	21	18	33	0	10	11	16	3	16	12	17
	d. Missions are not willing to discuss new issues raised by the authorities	Strongly agree	2	0	0	5	0	6	3	0	0	0	10	3	2	3	1
		Agree	8	14	11	14	2	10	6	6	11	0	16	17	7	7	10
		Disagree	69	64	76	68	71	62	64	84	72	78	45	67	69	72	64
		Strongly disagree	21	21	13	14	27	22	27	9	18	22	29	13	22	18	24
	e. Rapid turnover of mission chief or team members does not allow time to build trust	Strongly agree	6	0	3	14	11	2	9	6	2	7	10	0	7	6	6
		Agree	34	15	34	27	40	34	42	25	39	11	45	24	36	39	26
		Disagree	51	69	61	55	42	48	30	63	51	74	42	69	48	50	53
		Strongly disagree	9	15	3	5	7	16	18	6	9	7	3	7	9	5	16
	f. When changes of mission chief or team member occur, the handover of knowledge about our country is inadequate	Strongly agree	8	0	3	14	12	6	12	6	4	4	16	3	9	8	7
		Agree	33	23	36	36	32	32	33	38	36	26	26	24	34	36	27
		Disagree	52	62	58	45	51	50	39	53	56	59	52	66	50	51	54
		Strongly disagree	7	15	3	5	5	12	15	3	4	11	6	7	7	5	11
	g. More frequent staff visits / informal contact would be welcome	Strongly agree	12	21	0	9	9	22	15	16	5	15	13	13	11	10	14
		Agree	40	14	47	27	39	51	45	52	28	65	26	23	44	39	43
		Disagree	40	57	50	55	42	18	30	29	60	19	42	57	36	44	33
		Strongly disagree	8	7	3	9	11	8	9	3	7	0	19	7	8	7	9
9. The presence of a program supported by UFR (and the associated conditionality) may inhibit the candor of the dialogue. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding UFR missions in your country since 2005?	a. UFR missions tend to be driven by their own agenda and are not sufficiently flexible to discuss policy alternatives /δ	Strongly agree	6	Φ	0	0	3	11	9	0	0	0	19	Φ	6	18	2
		Agree	36	Φ	20	38	31	43	35	63	36	36	25	Φ	35	36	36
		Disagree	53	Φ	80	63	56	43	43	38	59	64	56	Φ	53	45	55
		Strongly disagree	5	Φ	0	0	9	3	13	0	5	0	0	Φ	5	0	7
	b. Country officials are reluctant to raise topics that may subsequently be incorporated into UFR program conditionality /δ	Strongly agree	1	Φ	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	6	Φ	1	5	0
		Agree	34	Φ	20	13	25	49	39	25	18	36	50	Φ	34	45	29
		Disagree	55	Φ	80	88	59	40	35	75	82	55	38	Φ	55	41	60
		Strongly disagree	10	Φ	0	0	13	11	26	0	0	9	6	Φ	10	9	10

Distribution of answer in percentage			By income level						By region					G20 or non G20 1/		IMF program? 2/	
			Overall	LA	OA	LE	OE	LIC	AFR	APD	EUR	MCD	WHD	G20	Non G20	No	Yes
10. Did your country have a TA missions since 2005?	Yes		71	7	26	86	93	90	94	63	48	85	81	41	76	55	96
Number of potential respondents for this section			134	1	11	19	56	47	34	22	30	23	25	13	121	63	71
11. For TA missions, in comparison with Article IV or UFR missions, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	a. TA mission's analysis and recommendations in policy formulation are more useful	Strongly agree	17	0	0	6	21	19	27	10	11	17	16	8	18	10	23
		Agree	67	0	90	78	56	72	67	75	59	74	64	58	68	75	61
		Disagree	14	0	10	17	21	6	3	15	30	9	16	33	12	14	14
		Strongly disagree	2	0	0	0	2	2	3	0	0	0	4	0	2	2	1
	b. TA missions allow for more time to meet with authorities and seek their feedback on findings and recommendations	Strongly agree	21	0	0	6	23	28	33	16	11	26	16	8	22	14	28
		Agree	68	0	90	89	58	68	58	80	67	70	72	83	66	71	65
		Disagree	11	0	10	6	19	4	9	5	22	4	12	8	11	15	7
		Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	c. TA missions provide better environment for an informal exchange of views	Strongly agree	20	0	0	11	23	23	30	15	11	26	16	8	22	10	29
		Agree	70	0	80	83	62	72	64	80	67	70	72	83	68	80	61
		Disagree	9	0	20	6	13	2	3	5	22	4	8	8	9	8	9
		Strongly disagree	2	0	0	0	2	2	3	0	0	0	4	0	2	2	1
12. Did your country have an FSAP missions since 2005?	Yes		70	79	63	62	75	69	83	45	76	70	67	72	69	65	78
Number of potential respondents for this section			133	11	26	14	46	36	30	16	47	19	21	22	111	74	59
13. Considering FSAP missions, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	a. FSAP missions adequately incorporate country specific / institutional features in the analysis	Strongly agree	14	9	4	0	17	23	21	0	5	21	26	5	16	12	17
		Agree	77	82	83	83	79	69	79	92	81	79	53	80	77	75	80
		Disagree	9	9	13	17	5	9	0	8	14	0	21	15	8	13	4
		Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	b. FSAP missions are open to a candid exchange of views when differences in opinions arise	Strongly agree	18	20	4	0	20	31	34	0	5	17	37	11	20	16	20
		Agree	75	70	91	92	76	60	66	100	84	83	47	79	75	76	74
		Disagree	5	10	4	8	5	3	0	0	12	0	5	11	4	4	6
		Strongly disagree	2	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	11	0	2	3	0
	c. FSAP missions, given the sensitivity of issues covered, handle confidentiality adequately	Strongly agree	21	20	17	0	24	29	25	17	14	21	37	16	23	19	25
		Agree	77	70	83	100	76	68	75	83	84	74	63	79	76	79	74
		Disagree	2	10	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	5	0	5	1	1	2
		Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	d. FSAP mission teams encourage an early dialogue and involvement of the authorities in the FSAP process	Strongly agree	16	27	13	0	15	23	21	15	14	17	16	15	17	13	20
		Agree	75	64	70	92	80	71	79	85	70	83	68	75	75	74	78
		Disagree	8	9	17	8	5	6	0	0	16	0	16	10	8	13	2
		Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Section 3 - The Aftermath of the Crisis																	
Number of potential respondents for this section			187	14	39	22	60	52	36	33	60	27	31	30	157	113	74
14. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding how the IMF has changed since the onset of the financial crisis?	a. The IMF has become more open to different points of view	Strongly agree	13	15	3	10	14	19	17	3	7	19	23	11	13	7	21
		Agree	80	77	84	90	83	71	72	90	84	81	71	82	80	83	75
		Disagree	7	8	14	0	3	8	8	6	9	0	6	7	7	9	3
		Strongly disagree	1	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	b. The IMF has become more flexible in its approach to programs	Strongly agree	9	14	3	10	10	12	8	10	5	7	19	10	9	5	17
		Agree	80	86	86	81	78	75	75	81	84	93	65	79	80	85	72
		Disagree	10	0	11	5	12	12	14	10	11	0	13	7	10	10	10
		Strongly disagree	1	0	0	5	0	2	3	0	0	0	3	3	1	1	1
	c. The IMF has become more evenhanded in its treatment of countries	Strongly agree	4	8	0	5	5	4	3	10	2	4	3	4	4	3	6
		Agree	65	58	68	57	70	60	64	63	64	81	55	52	67	64	66
		Disagree	25	33	32	24	19	25	18	27	35	15	23	33	24	27	22
		Strongly disagree	6	0	0	14	5	10	15	0	0	0	19	11	5	7	6
15. Has the quality of the IMF's advice changed in each of the following areas since the onset of the crisis?	a. Fiscal policy / Debt sustainability	Improved	52	54	43	45	45	67	64	66	38	54	48	54	51	42	67
		No Change	45	31	51	50	53	33	36	34	53	46	48	36	47	52	33
		Deteriorated	3	15	5	5	2	0	0	0	9	0	3	11	2	6	0
	b. Exchange rate policy	Improved	24	14	16	11	28	35	38	31	14	35	13	14	26	15	38
		No Change	73	79	84	84	70	61	63	69	84	65	73	79	72	80	62
		Deteriorated	3	7	0	5	2	4	0	0	2	0	13	7	2	5	0

Distribution of answer in percentage			By income level						By region					G20 or non G20 1/		IMF program? 2/		
			Overall	LA	OA	LE	OE	LIC	AFR	APD	EUR	MCD	WHD	G20	Non G20	No	Yes	
15. Has the quality of the IMF's advice changed in each of the following areas since the onset of the crisis? (Cont'd)	c. Monetary policy / Inflation	Improved	32	21	14	21	34	50	47	38	18	46	23	18	34	18	53	
		No Change	64	64	84	68	64	48	50	62	76	50	71	68	63	76	46	
		Deteriorated	4	14	3	11	2	2	3	0	5	4	6	14	2	6	1	
	d. Capital account	Improved	49	46	47	74	47	43	36	57	46	60	50	63	46	50	47	
		No Change	50	46	53	21	53	57	64	39	54	40	47	30	54	48	53	
		Deteriorated	1	8	0	5	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	7	0	2	0	
	e. Banking sector / Financial markets	Improved	69	86	79	55	67	65	68	73	77	59	61	79	67	65	76	
		No Change	30	14	18	45	33	35	32	27	21	41	39	21	32	34	24	
		Deteriorated	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	
	f. Macroeconomic linkages	Improved	71	93	74	70	65	69	77	80	70	65	61	83	68	70	72	
		No Change	29	7	26	25	35	31	23	20	30	35	35	14	32	29	28	
		Deteriorated	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	1	0	
	g. International spillover effects	Improved	69	85	71	65	64	70	71	86	68	48	67	79	67	70	66	
		No Change	28	15	29	25	33	28	19	14	32	52	27	14	31	27	31	
		Deteriorated	3	0	0	10	4	2	10	0	0	0	7	7	2	3	3	
Number of potential respondents for this section			187	14	39	22	60	52	36	33	60	27	31	30	157	113	74	
16. Since the onset of the crisis, how has the performance of the IMF as an interlocutor changed on the following areas?	a. Capital flows and controls	Improved	62	69	72	84	57	47	56	79	59	50	66	81	58	69	49	
		No Change	37	23	28	11	41	53	41	18	41	50	31	11	42	29	49	
		Deteriorated	2	8	0	5	2	0	3	4	0	0	3	7	1	2	2	
	b. Fiscal stimulus and debt sustainability	Improved	57	54	57	47	55	66	60	75	45	62	57	52	59	51	68	
		No Change	40	46	35	53	42	34	37	21	49	38	43	48	38	45	31	
		Deteriorated	3	0	8	0	4	0	3	4	5	0	0	0	3	4	1	
	c. Prudential and supervisory issues in the financial / banking system	Improved	72	62	63	68	64	72	78	54	68	59	69	63	67	60	77	
		No Change	28	38	37	32	36	28	22	46	32	41	31	37	33	40	23	
		Deteriorated	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	d. Monetary policy / Global liquidity	Improved	44	31	33	16	48	60	64	39	37	54	28	22	48	33	61	
		No Change	53	62	64	68	52	38	33	57	61	46	62	63	51	63	38	
		Deteriorated	4	8	3	16	0	2	3	4	2	0	10	15	1	5	2	
	e. Risks from the international economy	Improved	71	69	79	60	69	71	75	75	74	56	69	67	72	72	69	
		No Change	26	31	18	35	27	27	16	25	25	44	28	30	26	26	26	
		Deteriorated	3	0	3	5	4	2	9	0	2	0	3	4	3	2	5	
	f. Global imbalances	Improved	59	54	55	45	65	62	75	54	61	64	38	44	62	57	63	
		No Change	37	38	42	45	31	36	16	43	37	36	55	44	35	40	32	
		Deteriorated	4	8	3	10	4	2	9	4	2	0	7	11	3	4	5	
Section 4 - The Role of IMF Resident Representatives																		
17. Has your country had a resident representative (RR) at any time since 2005?	Yes		56	15	24	76	54	84	69	62	41	65	53	48	57	39	82	
Number of potential respondents for this section			108	3	10	17	34	44	25	22	26	18	17	15	93	47	61	
18. In a typical year, how often do you?	a. Use the RR's services to convey messages to IMF HQ	Often	55	0	33	44	39	79	79	40	38	65	56	43	57	40	67	
		Sometimes	34	0	56	50	42	19	17	50	50	29	19	29	34	44	26	
		Rarely	9	0	11	6	16	0	0	10	13	6	19	29	6	14	5	
		Never	2	0	0	0	3	2	4	0	0	0	6	0	2	2	2	
	b. Ask the RR to obtain information from HQ	Often	39	0	22	31	26	58	48	40	21	47	44	21	42	23	51	
		Sometimes	43	0	67	50	45	35	40	50	50	35	38	50	42	56	34	
		Rarely	15	0	11	19	26	5	8	10	25	18	13	21	14	16	14	
		Never	3	0	0	0	3	2	4	0	4	0	6	7	2	5	2	
	c. Approach the RR for policy advice	Often	28	0	0	6	19	49	44	15	13	35	38	7	32	12	41	
		Sometimes	38	0	44	44	35	40	40	60	25	41	25	29	40	42	36	
		Rarely	17	0	22	19	26	9	12	10	29	18	13	14	17	19	15	
		Never	17	0	33	31	19	2	4	15	33	6	25	50	11	28	8	
	d. Include the RR in confidential policy discussions	Often	21	0	0	19	13	31	28	10	17	31	19	21	21	14	26	
		Sometimes	34	0	33	6	39	43	40	25	29	31	44	0	39	26	34	
		Rarely	27	0	22	38	35	17	24	30	38	25	13	36	25	28	27	
		Never	19	0	44	38	13	10	8	35	17	13	25	43	15	33	19	
	19. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your experiences with Resident Representatives (RR)?	a. RRs are viewed as trusted advisors	Strongly agree	22	0	0	0	19	35	36	11	21	24	13	8	24	12	29
			Agree	63	0	67	81	58	63	60	79	54	65	63	54	65	67	61
Disagree			11	0	22	13	19	2	4	11	17	12	13	23	9	14	8	
Strongly disagree			4	0	11	6	3	0	0	0	8	0	13	15	2	7	2	
b. RRs lack sufficient experience		Strongly agree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		Agree	9	0	0	6	23	2	4	0	8	6	31	8	9	12	7	
		Disagree	70	0	100	69	65	67	56	95	75	76	50	85	68	79	64	
		Strongly disagree	21	0	0	25	13	30	40	5	17	18	19	8	23	10	29	

Distribution of answer in percentage			By income level						By region					G20 or non G20 1/		IMF program? 2/	
			Overall	LA	OA	LE	OE	LIC	AFR	APD	EUR	MCD	WHD	G20	Non G20	No	Yes
Number of potential respondents for this section			108	3	10	17	34	44	25	22	26	18	17	15	93	47	61
19. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your experiences with Resident Representatives (RR)? (cont.)	c. The turnover of RRs is too high	Strongly agree	2	0	0	0	3	2	4	0	0	0	6	0	2	5	0
		Agree	9	0	11	6	13	7	4	16	13	6	6	8	9	10	9
		Disagree	80	0	78	81	77	81	80	84	74	81	81	85	79	81	79
		Strongly disagree	9	0	11	13	7	10	12	0	13	13	6	8	9	5	12
	d. RRs see their role more as an ambassador for the IMF than as an advisor	Strongly agree	3	0	0	0	3	5	13	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	5
		Agree	33	0	38	63	39	15	13	37	43	25	50	77	26	52	18
		Disagree	55	0	63	31	55	63	48	58	57	63	50	23	60	45	62
		Strongly disagree	9	0	0	6	3	18	26	5	0	13	0	0	11	2	15
	e. RRs are good counterparts for discussing our policy ideas	Strongly agree	15	0	0	6	6	29	42	5	0	12	13	0	17	5	23
		Agree	64	0	50	63	65	67	54	79	65	71	50	54	65	62	65
		Disagree	19	0	50	31	26	5	4	16	30	18	31	38	16	29	12
		Strongly disagree	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	4	0	6	8	1	5	0
	f. RRs are a good source of information on economic policy issues	Strongly agree	13	0	0	6	6	24	29	5	0	18	13	0	15	5	19
		Agree	67	0	78	56	68	69	54	84	71	65	63	46	70	71	64
		Disagree	16	0	22	31	23	5	13	11	25	18	13	38	13	17	16
		Strongly disagree	4	0	0	6	3	2	4	0	4	0	13	15	2	7	2
g. RRs should do more outreach with stakeholders outside the government (e.g. NGOs, private sector, or the press)	Strongly agree	12	0	0	0	10	18	22	0	8	13	13	8	12	10	13	
	Agree	52	0	44	63	42	58	65	72	25	53	47	42	53	54	50	
	Disagree	31	0	33	25	42	24	13	28	46	33	33	33	30	29	31	
	Strongly disagree	6	0	22	13	6	0	0	0	21	0	7	17	5	7	6	
20. Based on your experience with Resident Representatives since 2005, how successful or unsuccessful have they been in their role as trusted advisors?	Very successful		22	0	22	0	13	35	32	11	21	24	19	8	24	10	31
	Successful		60	0	44	75	61	60	56	74	50	71	56	46	63	62	59
	Not very successful		13	0	33	25	16	2	8	16	21	6	13	38	9	21	7
	Not successful at all		5	0	0	0	10	2	4	0	8	0	13	8	5	7	3
Section 5 - Confidentiality Concerns																	
Number of potential respondents for this section			187	14	39	22	60	52	36	33	60	27	31	30	157	113	74
21. Have the following concerns limited your willingness to discuss or seek advice on sensitive issues from the IMF? (respondents who answered yes)	a. Disclosure to other staff or management		7	7	11	14	5	4	3	23	5	0	6	10	7	8	6
	b. Disclosure to the IMF board		7	14	14	14	4	2	3	23	5	0	6	21	5	8	6
	c. Disclosure to other international institutions and/or aid agencies		15	0	14	29	16	13	14	33	7	8	16	17	14	15	15
	d. Disclosure to the general public (including guidelines under which authorities may withhold consent to the publication of a report or ask for the deletion of market sensitive materials)		29	14	25	48	28	29	23	47	24	32	26	38	27	30	27
22. When discussing sensitive issues with the IMF country team, did you feel the need for some reassurances regarding confidentiality?	Rarely		55	64	58	33	60	55	49	39	62	74	52	48	57	55	56
	Sometimes		36	36	34	43	34	35	43	42	36	22	32	41	35	35	37
	Often		3	0	3	10	2	4	6	6	0	4	3	0	4	4	3
	Most of the time		5	0	5	14	3	6	3	13	2	0	13	10	5	6	4
23. Overall, were you satisfied as to how the IMF handled confidentiality?	a. Yes		95	100	95	85	96	96	94	93	95	96	97	89	96	95	94
Section 6 - Overall Assessment																	
24. How well has the IMF balanced its role of trusted advisor to individual countries with...?	a. Fulfilling its surveillance mandate	Very well	13	21	5	0	11	24	26	14	10	7	7	11	13	9	18
		Well	78	64	89	53	86	74	69	76	84	85	72	59	81	77	79
		Not well	7	7	5	42	4	0	3	10	5	7	14	22	5	11	1
		Poorly	2	7	0	5	0	2	3	0	0	0	7	7	1	2	1
	b. Providing financial assistance	Very well	14	15	7	6	9	28	27	14	10	12	10	8	16	9	21
		Well	70	77	86	53	80	51	45	62	85	69	76	62	71	77	60
		Not well	13	8	7	29	9	17	18	24	6	19	7	23	11	12	14
		Poorly	3	0	0	12	2	4	9	0	0	0	7	8	2	2	4
25. How do the following institutions compare with the IMF as potential trusted advisors?	a. BIS	Much better than the IMF	3	10	3	6	2	3	8	4	4	0	0	8	2	4	2
		Somewhat better than the IMF	13	50	12	39	2	5	8	19	13	4	19	46	6	16	7
		Same as the IMF	64	30	70	50	72	65	68	63	56	76	65	38	69	68	58
		Somewhat worse than the IMF	17	10	15	6	20	23	12	15	25	12	15	8	19	11	28
	b. Other international institutions (e.g., World Bank, OECD, Development Banks...)	Much worse than the IMF	3	0	0	0	4	5	4	0	2	8	0	0	3	1	5
		Much better than the IMF	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	0	1	0
		Somewhat better than the IMF	7	0	3	20	7	6	13	7	2	4	14	12	6	6	9
		Same as the IMF	71	67	69	62	70	81	81	79	61	81	62	58	74	73	68
Somewhat worse than the IMF		21	33	29	15	21	13	6	14	35	15	21	27	19	20	21	
Much worse than the IMF		1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	

Distribution of answer in percentage			By income level						By region					G20 or non G20 1/		IMF program? 2/	
			Overall	LA	OA	LE	OE	LIC	AFR	APD	EUR	MCD	WHD	G20	Non G20	No	Yes
Number of responses			187	14	39	22	60	52	36	33	60	27	31	30	157	113	74
Participation rate			52.2%	100%	72.2%	57.9%	48.4%	40.6%	46.2%	50.8%	65.2%	43.5%	48.4%	78.9%	49.1%	53.6%	50.3%
25. How do the following institutions compare with the IMF as potential trusted advisors? (cont.)	c. Private consultants	Much better than the IMF	2	0	0	0	4	3	7	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	5
		Somewhat better than the IMF	9	0	6	6	12	13	4	12	6	8	19	8	9	9	10
		Same as the IMF	28	8	23	35	37	25	29	28	25	38	26	21	30	28	29
		Somewhat worse than the IMF	47	42	48	53	42	50	50	48	46	50	41	33	49	47	47
		Much worse than the IMF	14	50	23	6	6	10	11	12	21	4	15	38	9	17	9
	d. Central Banks or Ministries from other countries	Much better than the IMF	6	11	0	12	4	12	10	4	0	0	22	14	5	8	5
		Somewhat better than the IMF	16	33	13	29	17	16	10	28	19	4	19	32	14	18	13
		Same as the IMF	44	33	41	29	46	44	47	36	36	68	37	27	46	42	45
		Somewhat worse than the IMF	31	22	44	24	28	31	33	24	43	28	15	18	33	27	35
		Much worse than the IMF	3	0	3	6	6	3	0	8	2	0	7	9	2	4	2
26. Do you see room for improvement in the IMF's performance as trusted advisor?		Significant room for improvement	12	14	3	35	9	14	15	23	7	7	13	29	9	15	9
		Some room for improvement	71	71	82	65	72	64	74	57	78	81	61	61	73	70	73
		Limited room for improvement	16	14	16	0	17	20	12	17	16	11	23	11	16	15	17
		No room for improvement	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	3	0	0	3	0	1	1	1
Section 7 - Background Information																	
27. Please indicate which of the following best describes your current position.	a. Minister/Deputy Minister or Governor/Deputy Governor of the Central Bank		30	21	11	16	40	42	30	29	21	33	47	11	34	24	39
	b. Permanent secretary, senior advisor, department director		47	50	53	63	39	46	45	32	53	56	43	54	46	45	51
	c. Other (please specify)		23	29	37	21	21	13	24	39	26	11	10	36	20	31	10
28. Please indicate for how many years you have been in the position.	1 year		51	7	21	14	21	6	9	26	17	11	10	17	15	13	18
	2 years		13	7	8	24	14	14	15	6	12	11	23	13	13	15	11
	3 years		16	21	16	10	16	18	21	10	14	19	20	10	17	15	18
	4 years		12	14	11	14	5	20	15	19	5	11	17	13	12	10	15
	5 years		4	0	8	10	2	4	3	10	5	4	0	7	4	5	4
	More than 5 years		39	50	37	29	43	37	36	29	47	44	30	40	39	43	33
29. Please indicate with how many IMF missions you have interacted since 2005.		One	5	7	14	11	0	2	0	21	3	0	3	19	3	8	1
		Two to three	13	7	19	22	12	8	9	11	12	11	24	11	14	16	8
		Four or more	82	86	68	67	88	90	91	68	84	89	72	70	84	76	90

1/ The G20 group includes the 19 countries that are individually represented in the group

2/ The program/surveillance status is assigned according to the country status reported by mission chiefs using the time reporting system and as of February 1st 2012

Φ = Less than 5 observations were available, results are therefore not displayed

shaded area describes questions where the total of the answers does not add up to 100% (mostly yes/no questions where only 1 answer is displayed)

δ/ For this question, respondents were offered the option to answer *Not Applicable* (N/A). The results presented are for respondents who provided an answer (respondents who skipped the question or checked N/A are not taken into account in the frequency computation).

Appendix 2. Results of the Mission Chief Survey

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Overall	Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income
Number of responses				257	80	64	113	151	102	22	64	58
1. Since 2005, the majority of missions you have led have been:	a. Bilateral Surveillance		31	100	0	0	23	44	86	75	22	
	b. UFR		25	0	100	0	20	32	14	25	78	
	c. TA/FSAP		44	0	0	100	57	24	-	-	-	
Section 1 - Experience in the Country Where You Held the Longest Tenure												
Number of potential respondents for this section				144	80	64	-	65	78	22	64	58
2. How would you classify the country of your longest tenure as mission chief since 2005?	a. Large advanced economy (G7)		4	8	0	-	0	8	27	0	0	
	b. Other advanced economy		11	16	5	-	12	10	73	0	0	
	c. Large emerging market economy (G20)		8	13	3	-	0	15	0	19	0	
	d. Other emerging market economy		36	48	22	-	38	35	0	81	0	
	e. Low-income country (ECF-eligible)		40	16	70	-	49	32	0	0	100	
3. During your tenure in this country, how frequently did the following officials request a private meeting to ask for your advice or to discuss a policy issue?	a. President or Prime Minister	Never	57	73	37	-	50	63	82	59	45	
		Sometimes	29	21	40	-	28	29	14	32	33	
		Often	14	6	24	-	22	8	5	10	22	
	b. The Minister or Deputy Minister of Finance	Never	17	28	3	-	13	21	36	21	5	
		Sometimes	35	38	32	-	36	35	45	35	31	
		Often	48	35	65	-	52	45	18	44	64	
	c. Other Senior officer at the Ministry of Finance	Never	16	23	8	-	20	13	23	19	10	
		Sometimes	34	38	30	-	28	40	45	35	29	
		Often	50	40	62	-	52	47	32	46	60	
	d. The Governor or Deputy Governor of the Central Bank	Never	13	18	6	-	14	12	18	19	3	
		Sometimes	38	46	29	-	31	45	64	37	31	
		Often	49	36	65	-	55	44	18	44	66	
	e. Other Senior officer at the Central Bank	Never	20	25	14	-	20	21	23	24	16	
		Sometimes	34	35	32	-	34	33	36	33	33	
		Often	46	40	54	-	45	46	41	43	52	
4. For this country, how frequently were you in contact (phone/e-mail) with your direct counterpart in the government (the person you interact the most with during missions)?		Weekly	25	14	40	-	34	17	14	19	36	
		Monthly	46	43	51	-	41	51	41	46	48	
		Seldom	27	41	10	-	22	32	45	33	14	
		Never	1	3	0	-	3	0	0	2	2	
5. How often did the country's authorities request that the IMF's views/advice on economic policy be provided via...	a. a private note on a specific topic	Never	27	29	25	-	33	23	45	27	21	
		Sometimes	56	56	56	-	52	60	50	56	59	
		Often	17	15	19	-	16	17	5	17	21	
	b. a selected issues paper on a specific topic	Never	36	29	44	-	38	35	18	37	41	
		Sometimes	56	59	52	-	55	56	73	52	56	
		Often	8	13	3	-	8	9	9	11	5	
	c. a workshop or seminar on a specific topic	Never	31	38	24	-	36	28	50	30	26	
		Sometimes	62	53	73	-	56	67	45	63	66	
		Often	7	10	3	-	8	5	5	6	9	
	d. a private meeting with senior management	Never	35	38	30	-	38	32	36	37	31	
		Sometimes	55	54	56	-	53	56	50	55	57	
		Often	11	8	14	-	9	12	14	8	12	
	e. a technical assistance mission	Never	11	18	3	-	6	15	50	5	3	
		Sometimes	48	54	40	-	44	51	45	57	38	
		Often	41	29	57	-	50	33	5	38	59	

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income	
Number of potential respondents for this section				144	80	64	113	65	78	22	64	58
6. Did the country's authorities request, remain neutral, or discourage you to explain the mission's views on the economy to...	a. the country's highest authority (President, Prime Minister, etc.)	Requested	48	31	68	-	59	38	16	45	61	
		Neutral (decision left to MC)	38	49	24	-	30	45	53	40	30	
		Discouraged	14	20	8	-	11	18	32	15	9	
	b. Parliament	Requested	31	25	38	-	30	32	23	33	32	
		Neutral (decision left to MC)	57	57	57	-	62	52	59	52	61	
		Discouraged	12	18	5	-	8	16	18	15	7	
	c. the Press	Requested	34	29	40	-	39	30	27	35	35	
		Neutral (decision left to MC)	50	44	57	-	50	49	45	44	58	
		Discouraged	16	27	3	-	11	21	27	21	7	
	d. Civil Society (e.g. Unions, NGOs)	Requested	24	21	27	-	29	20	32	23	21	
		Neutral (decision left to MC)	71	70	71	-	68	72	59	68	77	
		Discouraged	6	9	2	-	3	8	9	8	2	
	e. Donors/Lenders	Requested	37	24	52	-	43	33	6	31	53	
		Neutral (decision left to MC)	60	71	48	-	56	62	88	64	47	
		Discouraged	3	6	0	-	2	4	6	5	0	
7. In your view, what were the two most important reasons that prompted the authorities to seek economic policy advice from the IMF during your tenure? (Select two answers)	a. Major problem (crisis/shock) in their country		38	21	60	-	45	33	27	27	55	
	b. International spillovers and assessment of risks to their country		34	45	19	-	31	36	59	37	21	
	c. Desire to know about experiences in other countries		37	40	33	-	36	38	45	40	31	
	d. Plans for significant changes in existing policies and/or their implementation		32	29	37	-	30	33	23	32	36	
	e. Need for expertise on institutional areas (e.g. fiscal rules, regulations/supervision, etc.)		36	38	35	-	45	28	18	41	38	
	f. Political motivations (e.g., to get the Fund's support on a contentious economic issue)		12	11	13	-	13	12	9	10	16	
	g. Authorities did not seek advice		4	8	0	-	0	8	9	6	0	
8. In which of the following areas did the authorities seek advice from the IMF during your tenure as mission chief and what type of advice did they seek? (Mark all that apply)	a. Public expenditure / Taxation	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	60	54	69	-	69	53	55	56	67	
		Advice of a technical nature	66	56	78	-	66	65	41	67	74	
	b. Capital flows and/or External current account issues	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	28	21	38	-	17	38	14	33	29	
		Advice of a technical nature	15	11	20	-	14	17	9	14	19	
	c. Exchange rate policy	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	44	31	59	-	45	42	18	36	62	
		Advice of a technical nature	27	16	41	-	29	24	5	23	40	
	d. Public and/or External debt	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	51	35	70	-	55	46	45	42	62	
		Advice of a technical nature	47	34	63	-	45	47	23	44	59	
	e. Monetary policy / Inflation	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	53	39	70	-	46	59	27	45	71	
		Advice of a technical nature	40	26	56	-	38	41	14	36	53	
	f. Banking sector / Financial markets	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	60	58	64	-	63	59	73	61	55	
		Advice of a technical nature	63	58	70	-	68	60	59	61	67	
	g. Price policy / Subsidies / Social safety nets	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	31	19	47	-	32	31	14	23	47	
		Advice of a technical nature	26	19	36	-	32	22	5	30	31	
	h. Growth / Real sector issues	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	48	43	55	-	46	49	36	45	55	
Advice of a technical nature		29	26	33	-	32	26	27	19	41		

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income	
Number of potential respondents for this section				144	80	64	113	65	78	22	64	58
9. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding country-specific circumstances that may have influenced your interactions with the authorities?	a. Frequent changes among high level officials have impeded the building of trust /δ	Strongly agree	5	3	7	-	2	8	0	9	2	
		Somewhat agree	22	27	17	-	19	23	29	20	22	
		Somewhat disagree	34	42	26	-	33	35	50	41	22	
		Strongly disagree	39	28	50	-	46	34	21	30	54	
	b. The Central Bank has been more receptive to the Fund's advice than the ministry of Finance /δ	Strongly agree	12	16	7	-	12	12	18	14	7	
		Somewhat agree	36	41	30	-	33	38	59	37	25	
		Somewhat disagree	37	34	42	-	40	34	14	42	42	
		Strongly disagree	15	9	22	-	15	15	9	7	25	
	c. The country's past experiences with the IMF have resulted in a distrust of the Fund /δ	Strongly agree	9	11	7	-	8	10	7	11	7	
		Somewhat agree	22	21	23	-	21	22	7	31	16	
		Somewhat disagree	31	28	33	-	26	35	33	23	38	
		Strongly disagree	38	39	37	-	44	33	53	34	38	
	d. The systemic importance of the country has influenced the degree of candor in the dialogue /δ	Strongly agree	4	5	3	-	5	4	8	3	4	
		Somewhat agree	16	25	6	-	0	24	42	17	4	
		Somewhat disagree	24	23	26	-	23	25	25	34	11	
		Strongly disagree	55	48	65	-	73	47	25	46	81	
	e. The perception of unequal treatment of countries by the IMF has adversely influenced the relationship with authorities /δ	Strongly agree	7	7	6	-	5	8	0	11	5	
		Somewhat agree	22	27	18	-	18	27	0	33	20	
		Somewhat disagree	24	24	24	-	28	21	44	15	27	
		Strongly disagree	47	42	52	-	49	44	56	42	48	
	f. The perception that IMF advice reflects the interests of its larger shareholders is prevalent among authorities /δ	Strongly agree	6	7	5	-	3	8	6	11	2	
		Somewhat agree	40	38	41	-	36	42	28	40	43	
		Somewhat disagree	24	30	17	-	26	23	44	23	19	
		Strongly disagree	30	25	36	-	34	27	22	26	37	
	g. The perception that the Fund's advice is guided by the "Washington Consensus" is prevalent among authorities /δ	Strongly agree	9	12	5	-	7	11	10	11	6	
		Somewhat agree	40	42	38	-	46	36	35	39	44	
		Somewhat disagree	27	21	35	-	26	28	15	29	30	
		Strongly disagree	24	25	22	-	21	25	40	21	20	

Distribution of answer in percentage			Majority of missions led				Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure		
			Overall	Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income
10. During your tenure as a mission chief, did this country have an FSAP or a technical assistance (TA) mission?		Yes	89	84	95	-	83	94	73	92	91
Number of potential respondents for this section			128	67	61	-	54	73	16	59	53
11. Which of the following best describes the primary motivation for this country's TA/FSAP missions?	a. FSAP missions /6	At the authorities' initiative	57	67	43	-	71	51	67	75	26
		In response to strong urging by the IMF	41	33	52	-	29	46	33	25	68
		As a condition for completing a UFR program	2	0	4	-	0	3	0	0	5
	b. MCM TA missions /6	At the authorities' initiative	82	90	75	-	77	87	100	90	72
		In response to strong urging by the IMF	14	7	19	-	15	13	0	7	22
		As a condition for completing a UFR program	4	2	6	-	8	0	0	2	7
	c. FAD TA missions /6	At the authorities' initiative	84	91	78	-	80	86	Φ	86	80
		In response to strong urging by the IMF	15	9	19	-	18	12	Φ	12	18
		As a condition for completing a UFR program	2	0	3	-	2	2	Φ	2	2
	d. STA TA missions /6	At the authorities' initiative	77	76	78	-	70	84	60	80	77
		In response to strong urging by the IMF	20	22	20	-	25	16	40	18	21
		As a condition for completing a UFR program	2	2	2	-	5	0	0	3	2
12. How receptive were the authorities to the recommendations / advice provided during the TA / FSAP mission?		Very receptive	49	35	56	-	59	41	19	59	47
		Somewhat receptive	45	25	41	-	39	51	75	32	51
		Somewhat unreceptive	5	23	3	-	2	7	6	7	2
		Not receptive at all	1	18	0	-	0	1	0	2	0
Section 2 - Overall Experience since 2005 2/											
Number of potential respondents for this section			144	80	64	-	65	78	22	64	58
13. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your experience in the field?	a. Pressures to reduce the duration and frequency of missions constrain the time for dialogue with the authorities	Strongly agree	38	35	43	-	45	33	23	33	50
		Somewhat agree	27	25	30	-	23	31	32	25	28
		Somewhat disagree	20	23	17	-	16	24	32	27	9
		Strongly disagree	14	18	10	-	16	12	14	14	14
	b. Drafting of the staff report in the field comes at the expense of additional meetings and discussions with the authorities	Strongly agree	29	24	35	-	33	26	9	24	41
		Somewhat agree	32	33	32	-	33	32	36	35	28
		Somewhat disagree	22	23	21	-	22	22	23	29	14
		Strongly disagree	17	21	13	-	13	21	32	13	17
	c. The dialogue would improve if more time were set aside for informal brainstorming sessions / discussions during the mission	Strongly agree	18	14	22	-	16	20	14	16	21
		Somewhat agree	48	47	49	-	48	47	29	48	55
		Somewhat disagree	26	32	19	-	28	25	48	26	19
		Strongly disagree	8	6	10	-	8	8	10	10	5

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Overall	Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income
Number of potential respondents for this section				144	80	64	113	65	78	22	64	58
13. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your experience in the field? (cont.)	d. The mission's effectiveness would improve if there were more opportunities for informal social interactions with senior officials	Strongly agree	18	20	16	-	25	13	9	16	24	
		Somewhat agree	44	47	40	-	36	51	36	52	38	
		Somewhat disagree	28	24	33	-	28	29	41	21	31	
		Strongly disagree	10	9	11	-	11	8	14	11	7	
	e. A large share of the mission's time in the field is devoted to data gathering or developing projections rather than substantive discussions	Strongly agree	18	18	17	-	19	17	5	19	21	
		Somewhat agree	39	29	52	-	48	31	18	26	62	
		Somewhat disagree	28	27	30	-	23	32	27	40	16	
		Strongly disagree	15	27	0	-	9	19	50	15	2	
	f. Staff visits provide a better environment for an open/informal dialogue than Article IV consultation and UFR missions	Strongly agree	25	25	24	-	31	19	10	24	31	
		Somewhat agree	41	46	35	-	42	40	43	44	36	
		Somewhat disagree	25	22	30	-	22	27	29	25	24	
		Strongly disagree	9	8	11	-	5	13	19	6	9	
	g. High turnover of staff on my mission team has negatively affected the relationship with authorities	Strongly agree	18	22	14	-	25	13	23	18	17	
		Somewhat agree	36	39	32	-	39	34	32	35	38	
		Somewhat disagree	32	32	32	-	20	40	36	34	28	
		Strongly disagree	14	8	22	-	16	13	9	13	17	
14. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	a. Adherence to guidelines (in briefing papers / policy consultation notes) is too rigid	Strongly agree	13	14	11	-	14	12	5	14	14	
		Somewhat agree	38	38	38	-	42	35	32	35	43	
		Somewhat disagree	43	46	38	-	38	46	55	46	34	
		Strongly disagree	7	3	13	-	6	8	9	5	9	
	b. Senior management typically prefers that mission chiefs not engage in discussions on topics not included in the brief	Strongly agree	9	8	11	-	9	9	5	10	10	
		Somewhat agree	29	34	22	-	34	23	36	26	29	
		Somewhat disagree	47	44	51	-	48	47	55	45	47	
		Strongly disagree	15	14	16	-	8	21	5	19	14	
	c. There are pressures to dilute the candor of staff reports in order to avoid upsetting country authorities	Strongly agree	15	18	13	-	13	18	14	17	14	
		Somewhat agree	42	46	37	-	34	47	45	41	41	
		Somewhat disagree	28	25	32	-	33	24	36	27	26	
		Strongly disagree	15	11	19	-	20	10	5	14	19	
15. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding staff reports?	a. The time allowed for writing the staff report after the mission has become too short	Strongly agree	20	28	10	-	16	23	18	25	14	
		Somewhat agree	38	34	44	-	39	38	23	38	45	
		Somewhat disagree	33	29	38	-	41	26	41	29	34	
		Strongly disagree	9	10	8	-	5	13	18	8	7	
	b. The policy consultation note (PCN) is increasingly written with a view to becoming the staff report	Strongly agree	20	26	13	-	18	22	10	30	14	
		Somewhat agree	48	53	42	-	50	47	57	49	44	
		Somewhat disagree	25	18	34	-	26	24	29	18	32	
		Strongly disagree	6	3	11	-	6	7	5	3	11	

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income	
Number of potential respondents for this section				144	80	64	113	65	78	22	64	58
15. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding staff reports? (cont.)	c. The restrictions on the length of staff reports limit the reporting of analytically important issues	Strongly agree	25	25	25	-	29	23	18	26	28	
		Somewhat agree	35	35	35	-	33	37	18	37	40	
		Somewhat disagree	32	30	33	-	33	31	41	34	26	
		Strongly disagree	8	9	6	-	5	9	23	3	7	
16. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the influence of a Use-of-Fund-Resources (UFR) program on the dialogue with authorities?	a. The presence of a UFR program inhibits the candor of the dialogue /δ	Strongly agree	2	5	0	-	0	4	0	5	0	
		Somewhat agree	25	41	16	-	22	28	36	26	22	
		Somewhat disagree	41	41	41	-	50	34	36	47	37	
		Strongly disagree	32	14	43	-	28	34	27	21	41	
	b. The present practices of UFR missions do not allow enough flexibility to discuss policy alternatives /δ	Strongly agree	5	5	5	-	7	4	0	5	6	
		Somewhat agree	29	46	19	-	30	28	10	39	25	
		Somewhat disagree	47	43	49	-	50	45	60	39	50	
		Strongly disagree	19	5	27	-	13	23	30	16	19	
	c. Authorities are reluctant to raise topics that may subsequently be incorporated into UFR program conditionality /δ	Strongly agree	11	21	6	-	7	16	13	16	8	
		Somewhat agree	52	56	49	-	61	44	38	59	48	
		Somewhat disagree	28	21	32	-	26	30	38	19	33	
		Strongly disagree	9	3	13	-	7	10	13	5	12	
	d. More frequent country visits under a UFR program have a positive effect on building a relationship with the authorities /δ	Strongly agree	48	31	57	-	60	38	30	33	62	
		Somewhat agree	37	37	37	-	24	46	50	39	33	
		Somewhat disagree	13	29	5	-	11	15	20	22	6	
		Strongly disagree	2	3	2	-	4	0	0	6	0	
	e. UFR program conditionality is too rigid, reducing the room for dialogue with authorities /δ	Strongly agree	3	6	2	-	7	0	0	3	4	
		Somewhat agree	21	34	14	-	22	22	30	22	19	
		Somewhat disagree	55	51	57	-	52	59	60	53	56	
		Strongly disagree	20	9	27	-	20	20	10	22	21	
17. How many years...	a. do you consider essential to obtain a good understanding of a country	Less than 1 year	13	9	19	-	11	14	9	13	16	
		1 year	42	46	38	-	43	42	45	46	36	
		2 years	31	32	31	-	34	30	32	25	38	
		More than 2 years	13	14	13	-	12	14	14	16	10	
	b. on average have your postings as mission chief lasted	Less than 1 year	5	5	5	-	8	3	9	3	5	
		1 year	11	13	8	-	16	6	14	10	11	
		2 years	49	44	54	-	48	48	36	48	54	
		More than 2 years	36	38	33	-	27	43	41	39	30	
18. In any of your postings, have any of the following factors had a negative impact on your advisory relationship with the authorities? (mark all that apply)	Gender	4	5	2	-	6	1	14	3	0		
	Nationality	4	5	3	-	2	6	9	5	2		
	Race/ethnicity	6	5	8	-	3	9	0	8	7		
	Age	3	5	0	-	3	3	0	3	3		
	Religion	1	0	3	-	2	1	0	0	3		

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Overall	Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income
Section 3 - Technical Assistance and FSAP Missions												
Number of potential respondents for this section				113	-	-	113	86	24	-	-	-
19. The primary motivation for this mission was...	a. at the authorities' initiative			86	-	-	86	88	79	-	-	-
	b. in response to strong urging by the IMF			12	-	-	12	10	13	-	-	-
	c. as a condition for completing a UFR program review			3	-	-	3	1	8	-	-	-
20. What was the area of focus for this mission? (Mark only one)	a. FSAP / Follow-up / Update			19	-	-	19	14	42	-	-	-
	b. Public expenditure / Taxation			35	-	-	35	40	25	-	-	-
	c. Debt management			4	-	-	4	3	0	-	-	-
	d. Monetary policy			4	-	-	4	5	0	-	-	-
	e. Exchange rate policy			1	-	-	1	1	0	-	-	-
	f. Banking sector / Financial markets (apart from FSAP)			13	-	-	13	14	8	-	-	-
	g. Statistics			9	-	-	9	8	13	-	-	-
	h. Other			15	-	-	15	15	13	-	-	-
21. How receptive were the authorities to your recommendations / advice provided during the TA / FSAP mission?		Very receptive	76	-	-	76	79	67	-	-	-	
		Somewhat receptive	23	-	-	23	20	33	-	-	-	
		Somewhat unreceptive	1	-	-	1	1	0	-	-	-	
		Not receptive at all	0	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	
22. Do you consider that the time available to discuss and explain the advice given during this mission was appropriate?		Yes, it was appropriate	81	-	-	81	79	83	-	-	-	
23. After the end of this mission, how often did the authorities contact you to follow-up on the recommendations and advice you provided during the mission?		More than once	71	-	-	71	68	83	-	-	-	
		Once	21	-	-	21	25	8	-	-	-	
		Never	8	-	-	8	7	8	-	-	-	
24. Thinking about all TA and FSAP missions you have been involved in since 2005, at what level do you usually discuss your advice?	a. Minister or Central Bank Governor			48	-	-	48	48	54	-	-	-
	b. Deputy Minister or Deputy Governor			23	-	-	23	21	29	-	-	-
	c. Head of the implementing agency			29	-	-	29	31	17	-	-	-
	d. Technicians at the implementing agency			0	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	-
Section 4 - Confidentiality												
Number of potential respondents for this section				257	80	64	113	151	102	-	-	-
25. Since 2005, how has your role as a trusted advisor been influenced by the following?	a. Evolution of the publication / transparency policy	Very positively	6	3	6	9	10	1	-	-	-	
		Somewhat positively	22	22	14	27	21	23	-	-	-	
		No impact	52	45	59	54	55	47	-	-	-	
		Somewhat negatively	18	29	17	11	12	28	-	-	-	
		Very negatively	1	1	3	0	1	1	-	-	-	
	b. Emphasis on increased outreach efforts	Very positively	13	9	17	12	13	12	-	-	-	
		Somewhat positively	40	33	46	41	41	38	-	-	-	
		No impact	40	40	29	46	43	34	-	-	-	
		Somewhat negatively	7	15	8	1	2	15	-	-	-	
		Very negatively	1	3	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure		
				Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income
Overall				80	64	113	151	102	22	64	58
25. Since 2005, how has your role as a trusted advisor been influenced by the following? (cont.)	c. Concerns of authorities that sensitive issues might be disclosed to the Executive Board	Very positively	2	3	0	3	3	1	-	-	-
		Somewhat positively	2	1	0	4	3	2	-	-	-
		No impact	73	64	81	75	77	67	-	-	-
		Somewhat negatively	21	30	16	17	16	27	-	-	-
		Very negatively	2	3	3	1	1	3	-	-	-
	d. Concerns of authorities that sensitive issues might be disclosed to donors / other stakeholders	Very positively	3	1	2	5	5	0	-	-	-
		Somewhat positively	3	3	0	4	3	3	-	-	-
		No impact	68	60	79	67	70	65	-	-	-
		Somewhat negatively	23	32	16	21	20	28	-	-	-
		Very negatively	3	4	3	2	2	4	-	-	-
26. Since 2005, how has the implementation of the new transparency policy ("voluntary but presumed") affected the candor of the policy dialogue in the following areas?	a. Financial sector	Positive influence	10	10	6	12	11	9	-	-	-
		No influence	72	62	76	77	76	66	-	-	-
		Negative influence	18	27	17	11	14	25	-	-	-
	b. Fiscal policy	Positive influence	13	10	11	16	16	9	-	-	-
		No influence	79	77	81	80	79	78	-	-	-
		Negative influence	8	13	8	3	5	12	-	-	-
	c. Exchange rate policy	Positive influence	8	11	6	6	9	6	-	-	-
		No influence	72	57	77	81	76	65	-	-	-
		Negative influence	21	33	16	13	15	29	-	-	-
	d. External debt	Positive influence	9	8	11	9	10	9	-	-	-
		No influence	83	82	84	84	83	83	-	-	-
		Negative influence	7	10	5	6	7	9	-	-	-
	e. Monetary policy	Positive influence	9	6	11	9	8	10	-	-	-
		No influence	82	79	81	87	85	77	-	-	-
		Negative influence	9	14	8	5	6	13	-	-	-
27. Typically, to whom do you disclose the content of confidential policy discussions?	a. No one		1	0	0	3	1	0	-	-	-
	b. Mission team members		87	89	87	86	86	91	-	-	-
	c. Mission reviewers (own department)		90	97	100	79	88	93	-	-	-
	d. Department head		70	70	67	73	64	81	-	-	-
	e. SPR reviewers		36	52	72	7	28	49	-	-	-
	f. Management		33	44	50	16	23	47	-	-	-
	g. Executive Board		3	3	8	0	2	4	-	-	-
Section 5 - The Aftermath of the Crisis											
28. Did you lead a mission after 2007?		Yes	91	89	92	92	93	88	-	-	-
Number of potential respondents for this section			234	71	59	104	140	90	-	-	-
29. Since 2007, compared to your earlier experiences, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	a. The crisis has increased the willingness of authorities for a deeper engagement with the Fund	Strongly agree	30	27	22	36	35	23	-	-	-
		Somewhat agree	61	59	61	62	56	67	-	-	-
		Somewhat disagree	6	8	12	1	5	7	-	-	-
		Strongly disagree	3	5	4	1	3	2	-	-	-
	b. The crisis has increased the willingness of authorities to seek advice on their own initiative	Strongly agree	25	17	16	34	27	22	-	-	-
		Somewhat agree	62	66	64	59	61	64	-	-	-
		Somewhat disagree	12	17	18	5	11	14	-	-	-
		Strongly disagree	1	0	2	1	2	0	-	-	-
	c. The crisis has required that staff receive more training about financial markets and instruments	Strongly agree	40	44	33	42	43	37	-	-	-
		Somewhat agree	48	46	53	45	46	48	-	-	-
		Somewhat disagree	11	10	14	10	10	12	-	-	-
		Strongly disagree	1	0	0	3	0	2	-	-	-

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income	
Number of potential respondents for this section				Overall	71	59	104	140	90	-	-	-
29. Since 2007, compared to your earlier experiences, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (cont.)	d. Since the crisis, authorities request that missions incorporate more cross-country perspectives in their advice	Strongly agree	23	16	22	27	23	22	-	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	51	48	37	60	51	48	-	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	23	31	35	10	21	26	-	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	5	5	6	3	5	4	-	-	-	
	e. Since the crisis, authorities request a deeper analysis of global trends and risks that may affect their countries	Strongly agree	29	29	22	33	29	30	-	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	54	52	62	50	54	52	-	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	13	15	12	13	13	15	-	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	4	5	4	4	4	4	-	-	-	
	f. The availability of new financing instruments since the onset of the crisis has increased the desire of authorities to engage in policy discussions	Strongly agree	14	10	18	15	16	13	-	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	38	29	27	54	41	33	-	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	32	38	40	22	26	40	-	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	15	24	16	8	16	14	-	-	-	
30. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding how the IMF has changed since the onset of the financial crisis?	a. The IMF has become more open to different points of views on policy issues	Strongly agree	24	25	26	22	27	19	-	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	62	58	66	63	60	67	-	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	11	13	7	13	11	10	-	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	3	4	2	2	2	3	-	-	-	
	b. The IMF has become more flexible in its application of conditionality in programs	Strongly agree	30	26	34	29	34	23	-	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	62	62	57	65	58	69	-	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	7	10	9	5	7	7	-	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	1	1	0	1	1	1	-	-	-	
	c. The IMF has become more evenhanded in its treatment of countries	Strongly agree	6	3	9	7	8	3	-	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	41	36	38	46	43	39	-	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	38	45	41	31	35	40	-	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	15	16	12	17	14	18	-	-	-	
31. Since the onset of the crisis, how has the performance of the IMF as an interlocutor changed on the following areas?	a. Capital flows and controls	Improved	69	69	76	64	71	67	-	-	-	
		No Change	26	25	24	27	24	27	-	-	-	
		Deteriorated	5	6	0	8	5	6	-	-	-	
	b. Fiscal stimulus and debt sustainability	Improved	76	80	71	76	83	67	-	-	-	
		No Change	19	17	22	19	16	25	-	-	-	
		Deteriorated	5	3	7	5	2	8	-	-	-	
	c. Prudential and supervisory issues in the financial / Banking system	Improved	74	81	69	72	75	73	-	-	-	
		No Change	25	19	31	26	24	27	-	-	-	
		Deteriorated	0	0	0	1	1	0	-	-	-	
	d. Monetary policy / Global liquidity	Improved	52	54	55	49	57	46	-	-	-	
		No Change	46	45	42	49	42	52	-	-	-	
		Deteriorated	2	1	4	1	2	1	-	-	-	
	e. Risks from the international economy	Improved	82	85	89	76	81	85	-	-	-	
		No Change	18	15	11	24	19	15	-	-	-	
		Deteriorated	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	
	f. Inward / Outward spillovers	Improved	74	79	80	65	73	76	-	-	-	
		No Change	25	21	20	31	25	23	-	-	-	
		Deteriorated	1	0	0	3	2	1	-	-	-	
	g. Macrofinancial linkages	Improved	74	74	70	78	76	72	-	-	-	
		No Change	24	26	30	19	22	28	-	-	-	
		Deteriorated	1	0	0	3	2	0	-	-	-	

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Overall	Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income
Number of potential respondents for this section				234	71	59	104	140	90	-	-	-
32. What impact has the downsizing at the IMF had on the amount of face-to-face time with the authorities?		Significant increase	5	1	0	10	8	0	-	-	-	
		No significant change	52	49	57	51	50	54	-	-	-	
		Significant decrease	43	49	43	40	42	46	-	-	-	
Section 6 - Looking Forward												
Number of potential respondents for this section				257	80	64	113	151	102	-	-	-
33. In your view, how well does the IMF balance its role of "trusted confidante" versus "ruthless truth-teller" to individual countries in the context of...	a. Surveillance	Very well	6	5	8	6	8	4	-	-	-	
		Well	59	60	54	62	56	64	-	-	-	
		Not well	30	27	31	31	31	27	-	-	-	
		Poorly	5	8	7	2	5	5	-	-	-	
	b. Providing financial assistance	Very well	11	4	15	15	12	12	-	-	-	
		Well	64	59	71	63	65	61	-	-	-	
		Not well	21	31	13	19	21	22	-	-	-	
		Poorly	3	6	2	3	2	5	-	-	-	
	34. Do you see room for improvement in the IMF's performance as trusted advisor?		Significant room for improvement	25	29	24	22	26	23	-	-	-
			Some room for improvement	63	57	63	68	66	61	-	-	-
			Limited room for improvement	10	11	13	8	8	14	-	-	-
			No need for improvement	2	3	0	2	1	3	-	-	-
35. How could the Fund improve its role as a trusted advisor? (rank from 1 (will improve the most) to 6 (will improve the least) (Average score is displayed)	a. Longer missions		4.97	5.13	5.14	4.76	4.93	5.01	-	-	-	
	b. More staff visits		2.86	2.67	2.57	3.17	2.94	2.74	-	-	-	
	c. More ressources for papers / workshops / seminars in countries		3.75	3.58	4.16	3.63	3.75	3.75	-	-	-	
	d. Additional staff per country		3.33	3.15	3.17	3.62	3.36	3.27	-	-	-	
	e. Adding a resident representative's office for the country, if none		3.18	3.04	2.38	3.75	3.30	3.00	-	-	-	
	f. More availability of technical assistance		2.82	3.45	3.38	2.04	2.62	3.14	-	-	-	
36. How much of a payoff do you think the following changes could have in improving the policy dialogue with authorities?	a. Recognizing the social and political implications of the advice by offering a wider set of "feasible second best" alternatives	Important payoff	71	68	64	78	75	65	-	-	-	
		Small payoff	25	31	30	17	21	30	-	-	-	
		No payoff	4	1	6	5	3	5	-	-	-	
	b. Incorporating other country experiences in the advice more often	Important payoff	82	79	81	84	85	78	-	-	-	
		Small payoff	17	19	17	15	14	21	-	-	-	
		No payoff	1	1	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	
	c. Changing incentives to reward staff for emphasizing "brainstorming" and informal modalities of policy discussions	Important payoff	44	53	41	39	45	41	-	-	-	
		Small payoff	46	37	50	50	44	49	-	-	-	
		No payoff	10	11	9	11	11	9	-	-	-	

Distribution of answer in percentage				Majority of missions led			Grade 1/		Income level of country of longest tenure			
				Overall	Art. IV	UFR	TA/FSAP	A14/A15	B1 or higher	Advanced	Emerging	Low Income
Number of potential respondents for this section				257	80	64	113	151	102	-	-	-
36. How much of a payoff do you think the following changes could have in improving the policy dialogue with authorities? (cont.)	d. Establishing best practices to ensure a smooth transition when there is a new team member	Important payoff	45	44	48	45	50	39	-	-	-	
		Small payoff	45	45	39	49	42	49	-	-	-	
		No payoff	10	12	13	6	8	11	-	-	-	
	e. Strengthening guidance provided to mission chiefs regarding their expected roles	Important payoff	31	26	28	36	37	23	-	-	-	
		Small payoff	51	49	47	55	48	54	-	-	-	
		No payoff	18	26	25	9	15	23	-	-	-	
	f. Increasing the IMF's awareness of the authorities' desired communication / outreach strategy	Important payoff	36	25	27	48	41	29	-	-	-	
		Small payoff	50	54	56	45	49	53	-	-	-	
		No payoff	14	21	17	7	10	18	-	-	-	
	g. Introducing random satisfaction interview of authorities after missions	Important payoff	20	13	13	28	26	9	-	-	-	
		Small payoff	50	47	59	46	48	54	-	-	-	
		No payoff	30	39	28	25	26	37	-	-	-	
37. Do you have specific suggestions to strengthen the Fund as a trusted advisor? (write suggestions)												
Section 7 - Background Information												
38. Please indicate your grade.	A14	26	9	3	53	44	0	-	-	-		
	A15	33	35	44	25	56	0	-	-	-		
	B1 / B2	21	26	33	10	0	52	-	-	-		
	B3 or higher	19	30	19	12	0	48	-	-	-		
39. During your Fund career, how many missions (including staff visits) have you led?	One	4	1	3	6	4	2	-	-	-		
	2 to 4	18	18	8	23	23	9	-	-	-		
	5 to 10	26	34	23	21	29	22	-	-	-		
	More than 10	53	48	66	50	44	68	-	-	-		
40. During your Fund career, to how many countries have you led missions?	One	9	5	16	7	10	5	-	-	-		
	2 to 3	34	53	31	22	36	31	-	-	-		
	4 to 5	23	28	30	16	21	26	-	-	-		
	More than 5	35	15	23	55	34	37	-	-	-		

1/ Four respondents did not provide an answer for this question and are therefore not taken into account

2/ Starting from this section, respondents were asked to answer based on their entire experience, with the exception of Section 3.

Φ = Less than 5 observations were available, results are therefore not displayed

Shaded area describes questions where the total of the answers does not add up to 100% (mostly yes/no questions where only 1 answer is displayed)

5/ For this question, respondents were offered the option to answer *Not Applicable* (N/A). The results presented are for respondents who provided an answer (respondents who skipped the question or checked N/A are not taken into account in the frequency computation).

Appendix 3. Results of the Resident Representative Survey

Distribution of answer in percentage			Overall	Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure	
				A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low Income
Number of responses			95	55	22	18	38	57
Section 1 - Experience in the Country Where You Held the Longest Tenure as a Resident Representative								
1. How would you classify the country of your longest tenure as a resident representative since 2005?		Advanced economy	4	2	5	11	11	0
		Large emerging market country (G20)	15	4	14	50	37	0
		Other emerging market country	21	25	18	11	53	0
		Low-income country (ECF-eligible)	60	69	64	28	0	100
2. How long was your longest assignment since 2005?		Less than a year	7	11	5	0	5	9
		One to two years	18	24	5	17	21	16
		More than two years	75	65	91	83	74	75
3. During your tenure as a RR, did the country have an active UFR program?		Yes	69	78	77	33	50	82
4. During that assignment, were you assigned an office at...		The Central Bank	45	47	45	39	53	40
		The Ministry of Finance	8	7	18	0	3	12
		Another Government facility	6	9	5	0	5	7
		A privately owned office building	40	36	32	61	39	40
5. Not counting social events and period of mission's visits, how often in a typical month did you meet with the following people in the country?	a. The President or Prime Minister	Never	68	62	68	89	82	60
		1 time	28	33	32	11	16	37
		2-3 times	3	5	0	0	3	4
		3+ times	0	0	0	0	0	0
	b. The Governor of the Central Bank	Never	18	13	18	33	32	9
		1 time	38	31	45	50	39	37
		2-3 times	16	16	23	6	13	18
		3+ times	28	40	14	11	16	37
	c. Deputy Governors	Never	15	19	9	11	16	14
		1 time	27	19	32	44	39	18
		2-3 times	26	26	27	22	24	27
		3+ times	33	37	32	22	21	41
	d. The Minister of Finance	Never	16	11	9	39	34	4
		1 time	33	29	32	44	42	26
		2-3 times	23	22	41	6	11	32
		3+ times	28	38	18	11	13	39
	e. Other Ministers	Never	28	27	14	50	47	16
		1 time	54	56	64	33	45	60
		2-3 times	12	9	18	11	3	18
		3+ times	6	7	5	6	5	7
	f. Deputy Ministers or Permanent Secretaries	Never	6	7	0	11	13	2
		1 time	26	26	23	28	26	25
		2-3 times	33	31	41	28	34	32
		3+ times	35	35	36	33	26	41

Distribution of answer in percentage				Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure		
				Overall	A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low Income
Number of potential respondents				95	55	22	18	38	57
5. Not counting social events and period of mission's visits, how often in a typical month did you meet with the following people in the country? (cont.)	g. Department Heads (or their equivalent)	Never	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		1 time	5	4	9	6	11	2	
		2-3 times	22	20	18	33	29	18	
		3+ times	73	76	73	61	61	81	
	h. Junior officials	Never	4	4	9	0	5	4	
		1 time	5	5	5	6	5	5	
		2-3 times	14	15	9	17	16	12	
		3+ times	77	76	77	78	74	79	
	i. Donors and NGOs	Never	1	0	0	6	3	0	
		1 time	11	5	14	22	21	4	
		2-3 times	16	16	14	17	18	14	
		3+ times	73	78	73	56	58	82	
6. How often in a typical month did authorities contact you for...	a. ...conveying messages to HQ	Never	13	15	0	22	18	9	
		1 time	48	45	50	56	50	47	
		2-3 times	26	24	36	22	26	26	
		3+ times	13	16	14	0	5	18	
	b. ...data about other countries or the world economy	Never	24	31	18	11	21	26	
		1 time	49	49	59	39	42	54	
		2-3 times	16	13	18	22	21	12	
		3+ times	11	7	5	28	16	7	
	c. ...information about other countries' experiences with similar policy challenges	Never	21	27	14	11	24	19	
		1 time	52	45	73	44	45	56	
		2-3 times	17	16	9	28	21	14	
		3+ times	11	11	5	17	11	11	
	d. ...advice or discussions of a technical nature or on the specific implementation of policies	Never	8	9	0	17	13	5	
		1 time	32	35	27	28	39	26	
		2-3 times	31	29	45	17	26	33	
		3+ times	29	27	27	39	21	35	
	e. ...advice or discussions on policy / strategic issues	Never	14	15	5	22	21	9	
		1 time	34	38	32	22	37	32	
		2-3 times	22	16	41	17	18	25	
		3+ times	31	31	23	39	24	35	
7. How often did authorities ask you to participate in...	a. ...regular internal policy deliberations within the government	Never	49	47	45	61	61	42	
		Occasionally	33	31	45	22	32	33	
		Frequently	18	22	9	17	8	25	
	b. ...confidential / sensitive policy discussions within the government	Never	42	40	50	39	45	40	
		Occasionally	44	45	41	44	50	40	
		Frequently	14	15	9	17	5	19	
	c. ...direct negotiations between authorities and other international organizations / aid agencies / external lenders	Never	57	56	50	67	74	46	
		Occasionally	31	27	36	33	26	33	
		Frequently	13	16	14	0	0	21	

Distribution of answer in percentage				Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure		
				Overall	A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low Income
Number of potential respondents				95	55	22	18	38	57
8. How often did the authorities request views/advice on economic policy via the following?	a. A note or paper on a specific topic	Never	22	31	9	11	16	26	
		Occasionally	65	56	82	72	71	61	
		Frequently	13	13	9	17	13	12	
	b. A joint research paper with local staff	Never	65	70	64	50	62	67	
		Occasionally	34	28	36	50	35	33	
		Frequently	1	2	0	0	3	0	
	c. A workshop or seminar on a specific topic	Never	18	20	14	17	18	18	
		Occasionally	61	60	59	67	61	61	
		Frequently	21	20	27	17	21	21	
9. In which of the following areas did the authorities seek advice from you during your tenure as resident representative and what type of advice did they seek? (Mark all that apply)	a. Public expenditure / Taxation	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	65	69	68	50	45	79	
		Advice of a technical nature	72	69	73	78	71	72	
	b. Capital flows and/or External current account issues	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	42	35	41	67	47	39	
		Advice of a technical nature	48	44	50	61	53	46	
	c. Exchange rate policy	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	45	42	50	50	32	54	
		Advice of a technical nature	44	44	41	50	39	47	
	d. Public and/or External debt	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	55	58	50	50	39	65	
		Advice of a technical nature	59	64	55	50	50	65	
	e. Monetary policy / Inflation	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	51	51	55	44	37	60	
		Advice of a technical nature	57	65	45	44	53	60	
	f. Banking sector / Financial markets	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	55	53	55	61	53	56	
		Advice of a technical nature	61	55	73	67	68	56	
g. Price policy / Subsidies / Social safety nets	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	40	47	36	22	32	46		
	Advice of a technical nature	35	36	32	33	29	39		
h. Growth / Real sector issues	Advice of a policy/strategic nature	48	51	45	44	34	58		
	Advice of a technical nature	49	49	41	61	47	51		
10. How often did authorities ask you to explain or follow-up on policy issues raised by the missions?	Never	6	7	0	11	13	2		
	Occasionally	45	47	23	67	47	44		
	Frequently	48	45	77	22	39	54		
11. Did the country's authorities request, remain neutral, or discourage you to explain economic policy issues to...	a. ...the country's highest authority (President, Prime Minister, etc.)	Requested	33	33	48	17	19	42	
		Neutral (decision left to the RR)	47	56	29	44	50	46	
		Discouraged	19	11	24	39	31	12	
	b. ...Parliament	Requested	30	25	43	28	22	35	
		Neutral (decision left to the RR)	56	64	52	39	59	54	
		Discouraged	14	11	5	33	19	11	
	c. ...the Press	Requested	17	20	18	6	18	16	
		Neutral (decision left to the RR)	71	73	68	67	66	74	
		Discouraged	13	7	14	28	16	11	
	d. ...civil society (e.g. Unions, NGOs)	Requested	19	18	27	11	13	23	
		Neutral (decision left to the RR)	74	78	64	72	76	72	
		Discouraged	7	4	9	17	11	5	
	e. ...donors/lenders	Requested	52	56	48	44	35	63	
		Neutral (decision left to the RR)	46	44	52	44	59	37	
		Discouraged	2	0	0	11	5	0	

Distribution of answer in percentage			Overall	Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure	
				A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low Income
Number of potential respondents			95	55	22	18	38	57
12. What kind of impact did your outreach activities (e.g. press conferences, interactions with civil society...) have on your role as a trusted advisor?		Positive impact	48	62	36	22	42	53
		Slightly positive impact	21	15	23	39	21	22
		No impact	17	18	14	17	18	16
		Slightly negative impact	14	5	27	22	18	11
		Negative impact	0	0	0	0	0	0
13. How important were the following country features in adversely influencing your role as a trusted advisor?	a. Frequent changes among high level officials	Very important	14	15	10	17	13	14
		Somewhat important	23	22	38	11	13	30
		Somewhat not important	16	20	5	17	18	14
		Not important at all	47	44	48	56	55	41
	b. Perception of unequal treatment of countries by the IMF	Very important	7	7	5	12	5	9
		Somewhat important	29	27	36	24	30	28
		Somewhat not important	20	20	14	29	27	16
		Not important at all	44	45	45	35	38	47
	c. Perception that IMF advice reflects the interests of its larger shareholders	Very important	12	11	9	18	14	11
		Somewhat important	30	25	36	35	35	26
		Somewhat not important	19	18	18	24	27	14
		Not important at all	39	45	36	24	24	49
	d. Perception that the Fund's advice is guided by the "Washington Consensus"	Very important	13	16	5	11	13	12
		Somewhat important	29	25	32	39	34	26
		Somewhat not important	21	20	23	22	26	18
		Not important at all	37	38	41	28	26	44
	e. Strong ideological differences within the government or between the Central Bank and Ministries	Very important	7	9	10	0	5	9
		Somewhat important	23	22	24	28	21	25
		Somewhat not important	23	20	24	33	29	20
		Not important at all	46	49	43	39	45	46
	f. Negative past experiences with the IMF	Very important	22	20	29	22	26	20
		Somewhat important	23	15	29	44	24	23
		Somewhat not important	22	25	14	22	21	23
		Not important at all	32	40	29	11	29	34
Section 2 - Overall Experience as a Resident Representative Since 2005 2/								
14. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	a. More autonomy or delegated authority to the RR would improve their capacity to act as a trusted advisor	Strongly agree	35	40	27	28	-	-
		Agree	42	35	55	50	-	-
		Disagree	22	25	18	17	-	-
		Strongly disagree	1	0	0	6	-	-
	b. Allocating more analytical work on the country to the local office would improve the role of the RR as a trusted advisor	Strongly agree	11	13	5	11	-	-
		Agree	39	36	45	39	-	-
		Disagree	43	44	41	44	-	-
		Strongly disagree	7	7	9	6	-	-
	c. The RR has limited influence in changing IMF headquarters' policy views on a country	Strongly agree	11	9	23	0	-	-
		Agree	39	44	32	33	-	-
		Disagree	32	31	23	44	-	-
		Strongly disagree	19	16	23	22	-	-

Distribution of answer in percentage				Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure		
				Overall	A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low Income
Number of potential respondents				95	55	22	18	38	57
14. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (cont.)	d. RRs are rotated too often for them to achieve a trusted advisor status	Strongly agree	6	5	9	6	-	-	
		Agree	24	27	18	22	-	-	
		Disagree	56	53	59	61	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	14	15	14	11	-	-	
	e. Lack of clarity between the roles of the RR and mission chief undermines the RR's ability to perform as a trusted advisor	Strongly agree	12	11	14	11	-	-	
		Agree	19	15	27	22	-	-	
		Disagree	51	56	41	50	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	18	19	18	17	-	-	
15. The role of RR has often been described as a balancing act between two roles: trusted confidante vs ruthless truth-teller. In that light, how much do you agree with the following statements?	a. Achieving a proper balance between these two roles is difficult	Strongly agree	9	9	14	6	-	-	
		Agree	36	35	27	50	-	-	
		Disagree	49	49	59	39	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	5	7	0	6	-	-	
	b. Present incentives/practices tend to tilt the balance against the role of trusted confidante	Strongly agree	12	15	9	6	-	-	
		Agree	36	33	45	33	-	-	
		Disagree	52	51	45	61	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	1	2	0	0	-	-	
16. How has your role as trusted advisor been influenced by the following?	a. Evolution of the publication / transparency policy	Very positively	14	20	9	0	-	-	
		Somewhat positively	24	22	18	39	-	-	
		No impact	43	44	50	33	-	-	
		Somewhat negatively	19	15	23	28	-	-	
		Very negatively	0	0	0	0	-	-	
	b. Emphasis on increased outreach efforts	Very positively	19	25	9	11	-	-	
		Somewhat positively	34	33	41	28	-	-	
		No impact	31	33	23	33	-	-	
		Somewhat negatively	17	9	27	28	-	-	
		Very negatively	0	0	0	0	-	-	
	c. Concerns of authorities that discussion on sensitive issues might be disclosed to the Executive Board	Very positively	0	0	0	0	-	-	
		Somewhat positively	4	7	0	0	-	-	
		No impact	75	71	82	78	-	-	
		Somewhat negatively	21	22	18	22	-	-	
		Very negatively	0	0	0	0	-	-	
	d. Concerns of authorities that sensitive issues might be disclosed to donors / other stakeholders	Very positively	0	0	0	0	-	-	
		Somewhat positively	3	6	0	0	-	-	
		No impact	67	65	67	72	-	-	
		Somewhat negatively	26	28	29	17	-	-	
		Very negatively	4	2	5	11	-	-	
17. To whom do you disclose information given to you in confidence? (Mark all that apply)		No One	10	13	10	0	-	-	
		Your immediate supervisor at HQ	86	85	86	89	-	-	
		The Director of your department	21	17	19	33	-	-	
18. Have authorities inquired as to whom you would disclose the content of confidential discussions?		Yes	20	20	14	28	-	-	
		No	80	80	86	72	-	-	

Distribution of answer in percentage				Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure		
				Overall	A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low Income
Number of potential respondents				95	55	22	18	38	57
19. Based on your experience, how many years does it take ...	a. ...to learn enough about the country and its institutions for you to be an effective advisor	Less than a year	15	20	9	6	-	-	
		1 year	61	59	68	56	-	-	
		2 years	21	19	14	39	-	-	
		More than two years	3	2	9	0	-	-	
	b. ...for the authorities to get to know the RR sufficiently to gain their trust and confidence	Less than a year	15	19	14	6	-	-	
		1 year	54	52	52	61	-	-	
		2 years	24	22	24	28	-	-	
		More than two years	8	7	10	6	-	-	
20. In any of your postings, have any of the following factors had a negative impact on your advisory relationship with the authorities? (mark all that apply)	Gender	1	0	0	6	-	-		
	Nationality	9	13	5	6	-	-		
	Race/ethnicity	2	2	0	6	-	-		
	Age	4	4	5	6	-	-		
	Religion	0	0	0	0	-	-		
21. In sum, in regard to your potential as a trusted advisor, do you think that the authorities...	made full use of it	32	33	32	28	-	-		
	could have made better use of it	64	63	68	61	-	-		
	did not use it at all	4	4	0	11	-	-		
Section 3 - The Aftermath of the Crisis									
22. Have you been a RR after 2007?		Yes	93	98	95	75	-	-	
Number of potential respondents				89	54	21	14		
23. Was there a UFR program as a result of the financial crisis in that country during your tenure?		Yes	36	38	43	21	-	-	
24. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	a. The crisis has increased the willingness of authorities to seek Fund advice on their own initiative	Strongly agree	38	42	24	43	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	51	44	67	50	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	12	14	10	7	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	-	-	
	b. Authorities now expect the Fund to be more knowledgeable about global trends and risks that may affect their countries	Strongly agree	51	52	38	64	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	40	38	52	29	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	8	8	10	7	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	1	2	0	0	-	-	
	c. The availability of new financing instruments since the onset of the crisis has increased the desire of authorities to engage in policy discussions	Strongly agree	17	18	20	7	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	46	48	35	57	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	30	28	30	36	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	7	6	15	0	-	-	
	d. Because of the crisis the authorities have invited me to participate more frequently in confidential/sensitive policy discussions	Strongly agree	16	15	14	21	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	30	23	38	43	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	40	47	33	29	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	13	15	14	7	-	-	
	e. The authorities see the Fund as more flexible/responsive to their needs than they did prior to the crisis	Strongly agree	33	34	38	21	-	-	
		Somewhat agree	51	50	33	79	-	-	
		Somewhat disagree	12	12	19	0	-	-	
		Strongly disagree	5	4	10	0	-	-	

Distribution of answer in percentage			Overall	Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure	
				A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low Income
Section 4 - Looking Forward								
Number of potential respondents			95	55	22	18		
25. Do you see room for improvement in the IMF's performance as a trusted advisor?	Significant room for improvement		16	15	23	11	-	-
	Some room for improvement		67	69	68	61	-	-
	Limited room for improvement		16	15	9	28	-	-
	No need for improvement		1	2	0	0	-	-
26. How could the Fund improve its role as a trusted advisor? (rank from 1 (will improve the most) to 6 (will improve the least) (Average score is displayed))	a. Longer missions		5.32	5.47	5.05	5.24	-	-
	b. More staff visits		3.56	3.8	3.24	3.29	-	-
	c. More ressources for papers / workshops / seminars in countries		3.31	3.08	3.55	3.61	-	-
	d. Additional staff per country		3.72	3.75	3.86	3.47	-	-
	e. Adding a resident representative's office for the country, if none exists; or expanding its size, of one already exists		1.86	1.85	1.73	2.06	-	-
	f. More availability of technical assistance		3.16	3.02	3.48	3.17	-	-
27. How much of a payoff do you think the following changes could have in improving the policy dialogue with authorities?	a. Recognizing the social and political implications of the advice by offering a wider set of "feasible second best" alternatives	Important payoff	81	85	82	67	-	-
		Small payoff	17	11	18	33	-	-
		No payoff	2	4	0	0	-	-
	b. Incorporating other country experiences in the advice more often	Important payoff	77	70	86	83	-	-
		Small payoff	23	30	14	17	-	-
		No payoff	0	0	0	0	-	-
	c. Changing incentives to reward staff for emphasizing "brainstorming" and informal modalities of policy discussions	Important payoff	47	42	50	61	-	-
		Small payoff	44	45	45	39	-	-
		No payoff	9	13	5	0	-	-
	d. Establishing best practices to ensure a smooth transition when there is a new team member	Important payoff	44	48	41	33	-	-
		Small payoff	48	43	55	56	-	-
		No payoff	9	9	5	11	-	-
	e. Strengthening guidance provided to mission chiefs regarding their expected roles	Important payoff	38	40	36	33	-	-
		Small payoff	47	45	50	50	-	-
		No payoff	15	15	14	17	-	-
	f. Increasing the IMF's awareness of the authorities' desired communication / outreach strategy	Important payoff	44	46	50	28	-	-
		Small payoff	43	37	41	61	-	-
		No payoff	14	17	9	11	-	-
	g. Introducing random satisfaction interview of authorities after missions	Important payoff	20	22	18	17	-	-
		Small payoff	49	52	55	33	-	-
		No payoff	31	26	27	50	-	-
28. Do you have specific suggestions to strengthen the Fund as a trusted advisor? (write suggestions)								

Distribution of answer in percentage			Grade			Income level of country of longest tenure	
			A13 / A14	A15	B1 or higher	Advanced / Emerging 1/	Low income
Section 5 - Background Information							
Number of potential respondents		95	55	22	18	38	57
29. Please indicate your current grade.	A13	6	11	0	0	-	-
	A14	52	89	0	0	-	-
	A15	23	0	100	0	-	-
	B1 / B2	14	0	0	72	-	-
	B3 or higher	5	0	0	28	-	-
30. Since 2005, how many postings have you had as a Resident Representative?	One	83	85	82	78	-	-
	Two	16	13	18	22	-	-
	Three or more	1	2	0	0	-	-

1/ Because of the low number of RRs who officiated in advanced economies, the two categories are counted together

2/ Starting from Section 2, respondents were asked to answer based on their entire experience. Therefore the income level of the country of their longest tenure is not relevant anymore and is not presented.

shaded area describes questions where the total of the answers does not add up to 100% (mostly yes/no questions where only 1 answer is displayed)