IMF Interactions with Member Countries
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IMF Interactions with Member Countries
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The following conventions are used in this publication:

- In tables, a blank cell or N/A indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (…) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
- An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2008–09 or January–June) indicates the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between years or months (for example, 2008/09) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY (for example, FY2009).
- “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
- “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).

As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.

Some of the documents cited and referenced in this report were not available to the public at the time of publication of this report. Under the current policy on public access to the IMF’s archives, some of these documents will become available five years after their issuance. They may be referenced as EBS/YY/NN and SM/YY/NN, where EBS and SM indicate the series and YY indicates the year of issue. Certain other documents are to become available 10 to 20 years after their issuance, depending on the series.
This evaluation investigated the effectiveness of IMF interactions with member countries. It found that IMF interactions were least effective with advanced and large emerging economies, together accounting for about 90 percent of global GDP. Interactions were most effective with low-income countries (those eligible for the Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility), and, to a lesser extent, with other emerging economies, reflecting the broad effectiveness of interactions in a program and/or technical assistance context. In general, interactions contributed to a good exchange of views and provided objective assessments. However, in other areas, including the international dimensions of IMF surveillance, effectiveness and quality were not rated highly. Outreach with stakeholders beyond government was found to contribute little to the effectiveness of IMF interactions. The evaluation also found that interactions were undermanaged, although some individuals managed particular interactions very well.

The evaluation’s recommendations aim at improving the effectiveness of core IMF activities, which will be more important as the financial crisis subsides. They are also relevant to the implementation of initiatives that have taken shape since the close of the evaluation period and that are too recent to be assessed—both the new responsibilities supporting international policy coordination that the IMF has been given in the wake of the crisis, and the new country-level approaches that the IMF has adopted. As Executive Directors stressed in their discussion of the report in December 2009, concerns raised in the evaluation about the effectiveness and independence of Fund surveillance in advanced and large emerging economies merit serious consideration. The perceived lack of candor and value-added, and concerns about evenhandedness, point to challenges requiring close follow up.

Going forward, IMF management’s formulation of a plan to implement the recommendations endorsed by the Board will provide an opportunity to consider how these issues will be managed in the context of a time-bound action plan with monitorable benchmarks for assessing results. Given the critical importance of interactions to the Fund’s overall effectiveness, ongoing and future IEO evaluations will have more to say about them in particular contexts. In the meantime, it is hoped that this report will contribute to a fruitful debate about how best to pursue the needed improvements.

John Hicklin
Acting Director
July–October 2009
Independent Evaluation Office
IMF Interactions with Member Countries

This report was discussed by the IMF’s Executive Board on December 14, 2009. Under the overall direction of then IEO Director Thomas A. Bernes (through July 2009), the evaluation team was led by John Hicklin and Sarat Chandran (through August 2009) and included Joanne Salop, Louellen Stedman, Marie Thérèse Trasino, Roxana Pedraglio, Scott Standley, Jennet Hojanazarova, Angela Lisulo, and, at various stages, Iqbal Zaidi, Nils Bjorksten, Hugh Young, Rob Gregory, and Armen Gomtsyan. Contributions were commissioned from Tony Dean, John Dodsworth, Anthony Elson, Michael Hammer and Shana Warren, Arntraud Hartmann, Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, David Peretz, Jan Aart Scholte, Shinji Takagi, Paulo Vieira da Cunha, and Kenneth Watson. Administrative assistance was provided by Annette Canizares, Arun Bhatnagar, Jeanette Abellera, Erika Marquina, and Sarah Balbin. Editorial and production assistance was provided by Rachel Weaving and Esha Ray. In cases of potential or perceived conflict of interest, team members recused themselves from interviews with country officials or staff and related follow-on work. The IEO is responsible for all judgments—and any errors—contained in the report, and the views are not necessarily those of individual members of the team, including of co-leader Sarat Chandran. By contrast, background papers commissioned in the context of this evaluation are the views of the authors and not necessarily of the IEO. The final report was approved by John Hicklin in his capacity as Acting Director.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>African Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>Asia and Pacific Department</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>BIS</td>
<td>Bank for International Settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPTAC-DR</td>
<td>Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic Technical Assistance Center</td>
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<td>CARTAC</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Center</td>
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<td>CCL</td>
<td>Contingent Credit Line</td>
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<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<td>DMD</td>
<td>Deputy Managing Director</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>ECCU</td>
<td>Eastern Caribbean Currency Union</td>
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<td>ED</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
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<td>EFF</td>
<td>Extended Fund Facility</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Exogenous Shocks Facility</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUR</td>
<td>European Department</td>
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<td>EXR</td>
<td>External Relations Department</td>
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<td>FCL</td>
<td>Flexible Credit Line</td>
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<td>FDMD</td>
<td>First Deputy Managing Director</td>
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<td>FSAP</td>
<td>Financial Sector Assessment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GFSR</td>
<td>Global Financial Stability Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of Seven major industrial countries</td>
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<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty industrial and emerging market countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative</td>
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<td>HRD</td>
<td>Human Resources Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEO</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MCD</td>
<td>Middle East and Central Asia Department</td>
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<td>MCM</td>
<td>Monetary and Capital Markets Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDRI</td>
<td>Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OED</td>
<td>Office of Executive Director</td>
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<td>PDR</td>
<td>Policy Development and Review Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>Public Information Notice</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing power parity</td>
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<td>PRGF</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Policy Support Instrument</td>
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<td>PSRAI</td>
<td>Princeton Survey Research Associates International</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>REO</strong></td>
<td>Regional Economic Outlook</td>
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<td><strong>RES</strong></td>
<td>Research Department</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ROSC</strong></td>
<td>Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes</td>
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<td><strong>RTAC</strong></td>
<td>Regional technical assistance center</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SBA</strong></td>
<td>Stand-By Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SIP</strong></td>
<td>Selected issues paper</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SPR</strong></td>
<td>Strategy, Policy, and Review Department</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SSA</strong></td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TA</strong></td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TSR</strong></td>
<td>Triennial Surveillance Review</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UEMOA</strong></td>
<td>Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UFR</strong></td>
<td>Use of Fund resources</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WEO</strong></td>
<td>World Economic Outlook</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WHD</strong></td>
<td>Western Hemisphere Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WP3</strong></td>
<td>Working Party 3 (OECD)</td>
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This evaluation assesses the degree to which IMF interactions with member countries were effective and well managed in 2001–08, with particular attention paid to 2007–08. It contains a number of findings that are relevant to the tasks that lie ahead for the Fund in implementing the new responsibilities it has recently been given to help members deal with the global financial crisis.

Overall, the evidence is mixed. While one may be tempted to take solace from relatively high perceptions of overall effectiveness in some country groupings, such reaction needs to be tempered by clear evidence of lack of agreement between the authorities and staff on the scope of interactions in some cases, and of widely varying effectiveness in particular roles. Interactions were effective in a program and technical assistance context and, in general, in contributing to a good exchange of views and in providing objective assessments. However, in other areas, including in the international dimensions of its surveillance and other work, where one would expect the IMF to excel, effectiveness and quality were not rated highly.

The evaluation evidence shows that IMF interactions were least effective with advanced and large emerging economies. They were most effective with PRGF-eligible countries, and, to a lesser extent, with other emerging economies. Particularly troubling was the continuing strategic dissonance with large advanced economies, especially about the Fund’s role in international policy coordination, policy development, and outreach. The authorities did not give the Fund high marks for its effectiveness in these areas. Neither did staff, who nevertheless aimed to do more. The evidence also points to limited effectiveness with large emerging economies, many of whom saw the surveillance process as lacking value and/or evenhandedness.

The evaluation found that outreach with stakeholders beyond government contributed little to the effectiveness of IMF interactions. The Fund’s transparency policy did less than staff had hoped to increase the Fund’s traction, as some authorities blocked timely dissemination of mission findings. Dissemination initiatives designed to gain influence in domestic policy debates by repositioning the Fund as an informed analyst—and distancing it from the negative legacy of past engagement—remain work in progress.

The evaluation found that interactions were undermanaged, although some individuals managed particular interactions very well. The Fund’s strategy was ineffective in enhancing traction with surveillance-only countries. The Fund paid too little attention to the technical expertise and other skills that might have added value, and neglected to manage pressures that staff felt to provide overly cautious country assessments—a finding of major concern, especially in respect to staff work on systematically important countries. In PRGF-eligible countries, an institutional strategy replete with attractive financing, debt relief, and strong links to donor funding made for an abundance of traction. But in some cases it also led to what authorities perceived to be arrogant and dictatorial staff behavior—though they saw evidence of progress in recent years. Staff incentives and training largely ignored interactions, and responsibilities and accountabilities for relationship management were not clear.

The following recommendations aim at enhancing the effectiveness of IMF interactions with members:

- To make the Fund more attractive to country authorities and promote traction: (i) improve the quality of the international dimensions of the Fund’s work; (ii) recruit specialist skills and bring more experts on country visits, especially where traction is waning; (iii) articulate menus of products and services for emerging market and advanced economies; and (iv) replace the now defunct country surveillance agendas with strategic agendas to enhance country focus and accountability.

- To improve the effectiveness of outreach: (v) clarify the rules of the game on outreach; and (vi) decide how to handle the Fund’s negative reputational legacy in countries where it is a factor undermining interactions, and equip staff with the skills and resources to follow through.

- To improve the management of interactions: (vii) develop professional standards for staff interactions with the authorities on country assessments; (viii) increase mission chief and staff tenure and training, and improve incentives for interactions; and (ix) clarify relationship management responsibilities and accountabilities.
1. This report presents the evidence and findings of an evaluation of the effectiveness of IMF interactions with member countries. It is being issued at a critical juncture for the international monetary system, when the IMF has adopted a more flexible approach to lending, and been given important new responsibilities and a major injection of resources to help members deal with the global financial crisis. Implementation of the new roles will present major challenges, as will maintaining traction when the crisis subsides, and with it the demand for the Fund’s quick response role, in which it has traditionally been effective.

2. Against this background, this report highlights the evaluation’s findings and lessons learned most relevant to the tasks that lie ahead for the Fund. It does so through the lenses of the evaluation’s two main questions: (i) whether interactions between the IMF and its member countries were effective and (ii) whether they were well managed. It focuses on interactions during 2001–08, with special attention to 2007–08. It covers interactions with the entire membership; for analytic purposes, it uses three main country groups—advanced economies, emerging economies, and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)—eligible countries.

3. In conducting the evaluation, the team examined evidence covering a wide variety of IMF experience and country circumstances, triangulating across data sources where possible (see Box 1). Interview and documentary evidence was gathered and analyzed for 49 case study countries, including interviews with officials and IMF staff working on those countries. Surveys polled country authorities and civil society in member countries, and IMF staff. Special studies explored selected themes, and in the course of their work, evaluation team members visited selected countries to follow up on issues that had surfaced in preliminary interviews with country officials at IMF headquarters or in written responses to questionnaires. Interviews also were conducted in several non-case-study countries in conjunction with IEO visits for different purposes. The team drew on the evidence of previous IEO evaluations.

4. The structure of this main report is as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the evidence on the effectiveness of the IMF’s interactions with country authorities. Chapter 3 summarizes the evidence on interactions with other in-country stakeholders, and Chapter 4, the evidence on whether interactions were well managed. Chapter 5 draws conclusions and makes recommendations. Annex 1 profiles the country groups used in the analysis.1 Companion papers on the three main country groups consider the evaluation’s evidence and analysis in more depth.

1The evaluation also covers interactions with selected territorial entities that are not states as understood by international law but which maintain regular interactions with the IMF. Throughout this report, the term “country” refers to both member countries and these selected territories.
CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION

Motivation for the evaluation. This evaluation is motivated by the central importance of the IMF’s interactions with member countries to the institution’s ability to achieve its goals, and by the persistence of criticisms from country authorities, staff, and outside observers. Also relevant, aspects of interactions and their shortcomings have been recurring themes in past IEO evaluations. As the nature of interactions with member countries has evolved in recent years, and more changes are in prospect, it is timely to review past practices and lessons learned as inputs into future strategies and actions.

Definition of interactions. For purposes of the evaluation, interactions are defined to include exchanges of information, analysis, and views between IMF officials and country authorities, or other people or entities in member countries. They include the policy dialogue between the authorities and staff in the context of surveillance and financial and monitoring programs, as well as capacity building. They also include informal contacts with the authorities that can build mutual understanding and trust. They involve interactions with others, including parliamentarians and civil society, as they affect that key relationship between the authorities and staff.

Evaluation scope. In defining its scope, the evaluation starts with the IMF’s results chain, which includes as critical ingredients: (i) the quality of the Fund’s analysis, advice, and assistance; (ii) its interactions with member countries; and (iii) its impact on country policies, and in due course, on outcomes. Within this results chain, the evaluation focuses on the middle stage of interactions. In so doing, the evaluation does not ignore the other two stages of the results chain—the quality of analysis and impact on policy directions and outcomes—but it does not address them in depth. The evaluation also looks at three instruments in the management of interactions—strategy, staffing, and relationships; it asks how and how well the Fund calibrated each to promote effective interactions.

Definition of effectiveness. The evaluation considers interactions to be effective to the extent that they contribute to the overall purposes of the IMF as established in the Articles of Agreement and Executive Board policies. Those policies countenance a range of roles for interactions, from the identification of risks to external stability for the benefit of the international community as a whole, to the provision of advice and related services for the benefit of individual countries. The evaluation does not equate effectiveness with maintaining smooth and harmonious relations at all times.

Measurement of effectiveness and related properties. The evaluation polled the country authorities and IMF staff on their perceptions of the overall effectiveness of IMF interactions in each country. It also polled them on the relevance and effectiveness of ten different IMF roles—in contributing, for example, to the development of domestic policy frameworks or to international policy coordination—and about the quality of various aspects of interactions. The resulting data were used to construct composite indicators of interactions for comparing the Fund’s role relevance, role effectiveness, quality, strategic alignment, and overall perceived effectiveness across five country subgroups—the large and other advanced economies, the large and other emerging economies, and the PRGF-eligible countries.

Evidentiary sources. The evaluation relied on three main data sources—surveys, interviews, and internal documents. Each of these three sources is covered in a companion background technical document which sets out how the data were obtained and analyzed, and catalogues its findings, albeit in very summary form with a view to protecting confidential sources. Survey responses were received from representatives of the authorities in 129 countries, and civil society representatives in 159 countries. Eight hundred and thirty staff members responded to the survey working on 170 countries. The interview evidence, which was focused on the 49 case-study countries, was gathered in face-to-face and telephone meetings with about 300 country officials and stakeholders and IMF staff members. The document review involved the reading of internal documents delivered to IEO by the IMF’s five area departments for the 49 case-study countries for the entire 2001–08 evaluation period. To manage possible interpretation and measurement risks associated with individual pieces of evidence, the evaluation triangulated across the individual sources of evidence and applied judgment when different sources suggested different answers.

See IEO (2008).

Box 1. Evaluation Building Blocks
5. In assessing the effectiveness of interactions between the IMF and the authorities of member countries, the evaluation focused on the perceptions of country officials and individual Fund staff members working on those countries. Evidence on these perceptions was gathered through surveys of the whole membership, and interviews focused on 49 countries that explored a number of aspects of effectiveness, which were then considered in tandem with the evaluation’s documentary evidence. This chapter explores what the evaluation’s evidence has to say about the effectiveness of this interface, looking at it from a substantive perspective. The strategic, stylistic, and relationship management issues associated with the management of interactions are taken up in Chapter 4.

6. The evaluation took the view that general perceptions of overall effectiveness, to be meaningful, needed to be grounded in a common understanding on the part of the authorities and the IMF staff of what interactions were supposed to achieve, and in evidence that agreed roles were performed effectively and were of high quality. With this in mind, the evaluation framework developed measures for different aspects of perceptions of interactions. It also provides a systematic basis for considering the evaluation’s other evidence (from interviews, documents, and case studies) in forming its overall judgments.

7. On this basis, overall, the evidence is mixed. While one may be tempted to take solace from relatively high perceptions of overall effectiveness in some country groupings, such reaction needs to be tempered by clear evidence of lack of agreement between the authorities and staff on the scope of interactions in some cases, and of widely varying effectiveness in particular roles. Interactions were effective in a program and technical assistance context, and, in general, in contributing to a good exchange of views and in providing objective assessments. However, in other areas, including in the international dimensions of its surveillance and other work, where one would expect the IMF to excel, effectiveness and quality were not rated highly.

8. In turn, these findings translate into the evaluation’s broader implications about effectiveness across country groups—that the Fund has been most effective with the PRGF-eligible countries and the smaller emerging economies. They were the least effective with the advanced and large emerging economies, together accounting for about 90 percent of global GDP, where there also have been continuing differences between the authorities and staff on the Fund’s role and relevance in interacting with them.

9. Against this background, the chapter starts with cross-cutting issues—setting out first the big picture, drawn primarily from the survey evidence, and several key themes that the evidence highlights. It complements that discussion with a brief exploration of the particular issues arising by country group, drawing from the evaluation’s case studies of 10 advanced economies, 23 emerging economies, and 16 PRGF-eligible countries, which are discussed in greater detail in the three companion papers on the country groups.

A. Cross-Cutting Issues

10. Measurement framework and key themes. This section sets out the measurement framework developed by the evaluation for structured discussion of different aspects of effectiveness. It then explores four Fund activities (basic country assessment of surveillance and other Fund activities, international dimensions of Fund country analysis, policy dialogue, and country programs and technical assistance) using the framework’s building blocks.

Indicators of interactions

11. Box 2 presents composite indicators of interactions, derived from the authorities’ perceptions as recorded in the evaluation survey. They cover the authorities’ ratings for (i) role relevance, (ii) role effectiveness, (iii) quality, (iv) strategic alignment with
staff views, and (v) overall perceived effectiveness—all as defined in the box. Figure 1, shown later in the chapter, presents the same indicators from the IMF staff’s perspective.

- Taken together, the data show that PRGF-eligible countries were satisfied in important respects with the substance of their interactions with the Fund—and to a lesser extent so were the other emerging economies. This does not mean there were no problems in interactions with these countries or that there was not much to improve, but it does show the importance of relevant products and services for effectiveness. These results are reinforced by the interview and documentary evidence, and also by the staff survey.

- But for the advanced and large emerging economies, the indicators are less favorable to the Fund. Role effectiveness was rated the lowest by the authorities of the large emerging economies, while role relevance and quality were rated the lowest by the authorities of the large advanced economies. Low marks also came from staff working on large advanced economies with respect to overall perceived effectiveness and other dimensions of effectiveness.

12. Key features of Box 2’s indicators are discussed below.

- **Role relevance.** For the advanced and the large emerging economies, the low level of this indicator in part reflects these authorities’ limited interest in programs and technical assistance. But that is not the full story. The underlying data also point to limited interest in the Fund’s policy advice (including on operational aspects) and related outreach, and very limited interest by the large advanced economies in a contribution by the Fund to international policy coordination. In both cases, the results raise questions as to why these ratings are so low—and in particular whether it was the quality of the staff analysis that had caused the authorities’ interest to wane or whether they simply did not want IMF staff critiquing their policies in the first place—issues to which the report returns in the discussion of the advanced economies below (paragraphs 20–23).

- **Role effectiveness.** This measure is higher for the large advanced economies than for the large emerging economies. As a composite of underlying scores, the difference reflects, inter alia, the much higher score the large advanced economies and the much lower score the large emerging economies give to the effectiveness of two roles—assessing and exchanging views on countries’ policies and prospects—to which they both assign a high priority. (These points are discussed further in paragraph 15 below and illustrated in Figure 2. They are discussed in more detail in the companion paper on the advanced economies.)

- **Quality.** Noteworthy here is the relatively low score provided by the large advanced economies, as highlighted in Box 2. It reflects the frequent assignment of a rating of “average” to most aspects. Exceptions are the Fund’s work in responding quickly to the authorities’ requests for analytical work and actively engaging in a constructive dialogue for which most large advanced country respondents said the Fund did a good or excellent job. The quality scores provided by the other groups, especially the PRGF-eligible countries, are higher. The two activities with the worst scores overall were: (1) bringing quickly to the authorities’ attention the implications of changing external conditions and (ii) presenting alternative scenarios and addressing “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions.

- **Strategic alignment (between authorities and staff).** Most noteworthy is the much higher level of strategic alignment among the PRGF-eligible countries, and to a lesser extent the other emerging economies, than in the three other country groups. To a considerable extent, this difference reflects the much greater meeting of the minds between the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries and other emerging economies and staff on issues such as the contribution of the Fund to the development of policy frameworks, and to the development and maintenance of policy consensus outside government. There is no such meeting of the minds on these issues between the authorities of the advanced and large emerging economies and the staff—topics to which the paper returns in Chapter 4.

- **Overall perceived effectiveness.** Compared with some of the other ratings, this indicator is relatively high for the large advanced economies and relatively low for the large emerging economies. It reflects the authorities’ ratings for the direct question on the overall effectiveness of interactions with the IMF over the last two years (2007–08), implicitly leaving respondents to apply the weights

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1As discussed and illustrated later in the chapter, in paragraph 23 and Figure 8, the other country groups have much greater interest in such work.

4In brief, as a composite, this indicator is very much affected by the weights survey respondents attach to its underlying elements, whether these weights are explicitly articulated or implicit in the respondents’ answers.
The above indicators measure five dimensions of interactions—role relevance, role effectiveness, quality, strategic alignment, and perceived effectiveness.

- **Role relevance.** This is measured by the average of authorities’ interest (“a fair amount” or “very much”) in ten possible purposes of IMF interactions.¹

- **Role effectiveness.** This is measured by the authorities’ ratings for the Fund’s perceived effectiveness (“effective” or “very effective”) across the ten purposes, with the rating for each purpose weighted by its perceived relevance (the share of authorities who wanted each purpose “a fair amount” or “very much”).

- **Quality.** This is measured by the average of the authorities’ perceptions of the IMF’s performance (“good” or “excellent”) in ten qualitative aspects associated with effective interactions.²

- **Strategic alignment.** This refers to the degree of agreement between the authorities and the staff on the ten purposes of IMF interactions, whose relevance was rated by survey respondents. The indicator is shown with an inverted scale: the average absolute percentage point difference across the ten purposes between how much the authorities wanted the IMF to fulfill each purpose and how much staff aimed to do so (“a fair amount” or “very much”). (0 = perfect alignment; 100 = perfect misalignment.)

- **Overall perceived effectiveness.** This indicator shows the share of authorities answering “effective” or “very effective” to a direct question on perceived effectiveness of IMF interactions during the last two years (2007–08).

Source: IEO calculations based on surveys.

¹These are: (i) providing a clear and objective assessment of their country’s policies and prospects; (ii) contributing to a good exchange of views; (iii) contributing to the development of policy frameworks; (iv) advising on operational aspects in implementing policies; (v) helping to build and maintain policy consensus within the government; (vi) helping to build and maintain policy consensus through contacts outside government; (vii) presenting analysis and assessments of the country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets; (viii) contributing to international policy coordination, including spillover analysis; (ix) providing financial and/or monitoring support for the country; and (x) assisting in building capacity in their country.

²These are: (i) listening carefully to the authorities’ perspectives; (ii) responding in general to the authorities’ changing needs and priorities; (iii) responding quickly to requests for analytical work; (iv) actively engaging in a constructive dialogue; (v) focusing on topics of interest to the country; (vi) providing advice and analysis suited to country circumstances; (vii) providing analysis based on the experiences of other countries; (viii) bringing quickly to the authorities’ attention the implications of changing external conditions; (ix) presenting alternative scenarios and addressing “what if” or “what’s missing” questions; and (x) taking a long-term strategic approach to the relationship.
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Figure 1. Composite Indicators of Interactions (Staff Results)

they deemed appropriate to particular roles. For the large advanced economies, it may be that the relatively high rating implicitly reflects the high rating given to the two roles that these authorities value highly (discussed in paragraph 15). This said, it cannot be ruled out that the authorities are giving the Fund at least some credit for other services it performs, for example vis-à-vis other countries. Conversely, in the large emerging economies, it also cannot be ruled out that consideration of other contextual factors—as discussed further in this chapter—is affecting this rating. Whichever the explanations, it is impossible to ignore the staff’s self-assessment of its effectiveness in these countries—measured both by role effectiveness and by overall perceived effectiveness, as illustrated in Figure 1 above.

13. The evaluation also constructed composite indicators based on the IMF staff survey, as pictured in Figure 1. These show the usual pattern of more positive ratings by the staff than the authorities. The sole departure, which is quite marked, is for the effectiveness ratings provided by the staff working on large advanced economies. The two effectiveness ratings for 2007–08 shown in Figure 1 are in the 44–45 percent range. Also, they show the reverse pattern displayed by the authorities of the large advanced economies, for whom relevance and quality were rated low but effectiveness, relatively high. In contrast, for the staff, relevance and quality are high and perceived effectiveness is low, suggesting that staff feel they are doing the right thing and doing it right, but somehow are not getting through. These issues are explored in more detail in the companion paper on the advanced economies.

Key themes

14. Four themes capture the essence of the evaluation survey’s findings with respect to the similarities and differences in views about the Fund’s effectiveness across the country groups—findings echoed in the evaluation’s interview and documentary evidence. They relate to: (i) the basic purposes of interactions, relevant to all members through surveillance and other processes; (ii) international dimensions of the Fund’s work, including importantly on surveillance; (iii) dialogue on country policy frameworks; and (iv) programs and technical assistance. Each is discussed briefly in turn in the following paragraphs, and in subsequent sections of the report.

1Indeed, the indicator closely tracks alternative formulations of the composite indicator for role effectiveness that are weighted towards the authorities’ top priority roles.
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15. Two basic purposes of interactions queried in the evaluation survey received very high scores for relevance from most authorities. These were: (i) providing a clear and objective assessment of their country’s policies and prospects; and (ii) contributing to a good exchange of views—two roles often associated with Article IV consultations, but also relevant to program discussions. As shown in Figure 2, the authorities of all country groups—except the large emerging economies—gave those two purposes very high effectiveness ratings, as did staff working on all country groups. In interviews, the authorities of the large emerging economies generally saw the surveillance process as “going through the motions,” providing little value added, and having too little depth—issues explored in more depth below and in the companion paper on the emerging economies.

16. Surveyed authorities were decidedly less enthusiastic about Fund performance on several international dimensions of the Fund’s work. As Figure 3 shows, the authorities did not rate highly the effectiveness of interactions in contributing to international policy coordination including analysis of spillovers. They rated somewhat higher the quality of the job done in alerting authorities about imminent external risks, and providing cross-country analysis—although still far below Figure 2’s ratings for the basic assessment and exchange of views. For the most part, only minorities of country respondents thought the Fund did a good or excellent job. One exception is PRGF-eligible country authorities’ views on the Fund’s bringing quickly to their attention the implications of changing external conditions. Based on the evaluation interviews, this reflects the Fund’s quick response to the food and fuel crises of 2007–08, which the authorities found helpful in the dialogue, and, later in the evaluation period, actions taken in September 2008 to make the Exogenous Shocks Facility easier to access.

In terms of cross-country analysis, this was one area where the large emerging economies gave the highest scores. Elsewhere it was a more serious concern, for example with an official of one advanced economy capturing a more widespread sentiment in describing the staff use of relevant cross-country experience as “erratic” and seemingly accidental, depending on who happened to be on the mission and what that person happened to know. Preferably, the analysis would have been the result of a systematic effort to prepare for the mission by looking into the challenges the country was facing, drawing on knowledgeable staff, and the broader stock of knowledge accumulated within the institution, for material that might be helpful to the discussions.

17. The survey results suggest limited interest by the authorities of large advanced and emerging economies in the Fund’s contribution to the development of policy frameworks, which they rated even lower for effectiveness. As shown in Figure 4, the authorities...
Figure 3. International Dimensions of IMF Surveillance: Authorities’ Views of Quality/Effectiveness
(Percent of authorities who responded favorably)

1 Shows the share of authorities who responded “effective” or “very effective.”
2 Shows the share of authorities who responded “good” or “excellent.”

Figure 4. IMF Contribution to Development of Policy Frameworks: Authorities’ Views of Role Relevance and Role Effectiveness
(Percent of respondents)

1 Shows the share of respondents who answered “a fair amount” or “very much.”
2 Shows the share of respondents who answered “effective” or “very effective.”
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B. Interactions in Different Country Groups

19. The following three sections deepen the discussion of interactions on the cross-cutting issues by focusing on the underlying country issues and concerns, especially those that arose during the evaluation interviews. They also provide additional evidence drawn from the companion country papers and other sources.

Advanced economies

20. The weight of the evaluation evidence from all sources suggests that IMF interactions with the advanced economies were effective only over a very limited range of roles. The large advanced economies (the G-7) were generally uninterested in the Fund’s work on their own economies, beyond a quiet exchange of views. The authorities in most of these economies did not want contributions to the development of policy frameworks or staff presentations to other countries and markets of their country’s economic analysis and assessment. Interactions were somewhat more effective with the other advanced economies than they were with large advanced economies, although not enormously so, reflecting the greater range of Fund activities of interest to this larger group of countries and their greater “demand” for external inputs and sounding boards.

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1Figure 5 shows an entry for the large advanced economies under monitoring/financial programs. This reflects an entry by one respondent to the survey.
Figure 6. Large Advanced Economies: Strategic Alignment Between Authorities and Staff
(Percent of staff who thought IMF “aimed” to perform each role minus percent of authorities who “wanted” the IMF to do so)

Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets
Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects
Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government
Contribute to the development of policy frameworks
Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies
Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government
Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects
Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program
Assist in building capacity in your country
Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree

0 20 40 60 80 100

(especially in perilous times, as during the recent crisis). Neither the large nor the other advanced economies rated highly Fund inputs on key services such as the provision of cross-country lessons of experience, customized to their country’s conditions, the delivery of timely “heads-up” about upcoming threats, or the linkages between macro and financial sector analysis, although the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) process generally received high marks from authorities in the G-7 and the other advanced economies.

21. There were important differences of views between the authorities of the large advanced economies and staff working on them on the relevance of several possible Fund roles—including contributions to the development of policy frameworks and providing information on the economy to other countries and financial markets, roles in which the authorities and staff agreed that interactions were not effective. More broadly—and as illustrated in Figure 6—underpinning Box 2’s strategic alignment indicator for the large advanced economies lie disagreements on four of the ten queried roles—the two just mentioned plus two others, namely: (i) contributing to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects (discussed below) and (ii) helping build policy consensus outside government (discussed in Chapter 3). On the priority (or not) of the other six roles, the authorities and staff broadly agreed on two as priorities (objective assessment of policies and prospects, and good exchange of views) and on four as nonpriorities (capacity building; consensus inside government; operational aspects of implementing policies; and program support/monitoring).

22. Figure 7 illustrates the authorities’ and staff survey responses for the large and other advanced economies on the relevance and effectiveness of the Fund’s contributing to international policy coordination, including the analysis of spillovers. It shows the mismatch in perceptions between the G-7 authorities and staff on the role of the Fund, but their much greater agreement on its limited effectiveness. Indeed, only about half of G-7 survey respondents wanted such work done, while almost all staff working on G-7 countries said they had aimed to do it, notwithstanding what they perceived as a lack of interest on the other side. As one staff member
working on a G-7 country confided, the only kind of spillover that the authorities of the country he worked on cared about were inward spillovers from the rest of the world to it; outward spillovers from it to the rest of the world were of no interest. Meanwhile for the other advanced economies the story is very different, as the right-hand panel of Figure 7 shows: there, a strong majority of authorities wanted the Fund to contribute to international policy coordination. But in the event, many fewer rated Fund performance in this role as effective.

23. More generally, majorities of all country groups, except for the large advanced economies, both wanted a greater Fund presence in international policy coordination and spillover analysis and—including the large advanced economies—gave the Fund low marks for effectiveness in this area (Figure 8). With the then unfolding global crisis in people’s minds, interviewed officials from advanced economies generally took the view that the IMF had been “no worse than others” in predicting (or not) the events of 2008. But they also said that the institution was not playing to what should be its comparative strengths in being able to analyze crosscutting global themes and identifying risks. Meanwhile, several interviewees complained about the lack of a U.S. FSAP, especially in current circumstances. In sum, several large advanced economies had not bought into key aspects of surveillance, whether for reasons associated with the perceived quality of the Fund’s work or for other reasons; at the same time, their preference to limit the Fund’s work on their own economies also contributed to and reinforced their and others’ judgments that the Fund did not add much value. Against this background, the recent decision by the membership to give the Fund a more explicit role in policy coordination provides an important opportunity to reset Fund activities in these areas, but also an important delivery challenge.

Emerging economies

24. Taken together, the survey, interview, and documentary evidence suggest that IMF interactions with the large emerging economies were effective over a fairly limited range of activities, and that they were effective over a broader range of activities with the other emerging economies. This said, as for all country groups, unique country factors shaped interactions with the Fund.
views of some interviewed country officials whose authorities would be reluctant to enter into any relationship with the IMF that would involve (or be perceived to involve) a loss of policy autonomy.

• For Fund staff, the transition entailed a downgrade from a position of power and influence to a new regime of reduced interest by the authorities in dialogue with them, and in turn reduced access to key people and information. Indeed, in contrast to the authorities’ low interest in engaging with the Fund on the policy framework (as shown in Figure 4), well over 80 percent of staff working on those countries said they aimed to do just that. And in interviews, they reflected on the missed opportunities they saw in the institution’s failing to define a strategy for the new terrain. Several resident representatives linked these problems to the difficulties they experienced in building relations of trust with the authorities.

27. Against this background of changing circumstances and context, interviewed officials from several large emerging economies saw the surveillance exercise as routine and uninteresting—adding little value, as per their low effectiveness ratings for interactions in Figure 2.

• A majority of interviewees indicated that the IMF’s advice offered few new perspectives or was behind the curve on global financial developments affecting their economies. Some officials indicated that they were looking for new angles on their own policies, but did not get them from the Fund. They were attracted to formats where more interesting discussions took place, increasingly through regional and other broader fora involving interactions with peers.

• Meanwhile, some mission chiefs tried to deepen the surveillance dialogue, for example, by dovetailing technical assistance with surveillance in ways that both sides considered useful. Other staff reached out to authorities in providing follow-up analysis and advice after missions. According to staff, the authorities tended to value seminars, which provided an informal setting for freer debate than the more formal Article IV dialogue, outside experts, and cross-country perspectives.

• Several authorities expressed the view that they received less valuable input from Article IV consultations than from technical interactions with the IMF, notably those that took place in the context of the FSAP, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), technical assistance (for inflation targeting in many cases), and training. Several attributed this to the fact that such activities were more closely targeted to countries’ specific needs. Further, authorities for the most
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29. The 62 other emerging economies themselves constitute a diverse group, comprising subgroups of “small states,” emerging Europe, and relatively small countries in the Middle East, and other regions.

- Interviewed officials from these economies offered more positive comments about the basics of interactions than those from large emerging economies, in line with the survey results illustrated in Figure 2. Some welcomed the Article IV process as an opportunity to test their own ideas and to debate alternatives. But others agreed with the large emerging economies that Article IV reports and discussions were often just updates with very little new or interesting to the authorities.

- Officials from other emerging economies generally said that interactions were improving, with some associating the improvement with their countries’ transition from program to nonprogram status, and others with their countries’ recent change into program status. In the former, officials said they were positive about the changing relationship, largely because they now felt more in control and did not have to deal with conditionality. In the latter, officials cited the redefined conditionality as an improvement, with interactions in the program context very intensive and fruitful, compared to

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8See http://go.worldbank.org/QLCDU7B8T0.
9One distinguishing feature of these countries is their average population of 6 million people compared with 200 million in the large emerging economies or 70 million if China and India are excluded.
CHAPTER 2 • WERE INTERACTIONS WITH COUNTRY AUTHORITIES EFFECTIVE?

what they characterized as the irrelevance of earlier times.

• The authorities of these economies gave Fund technical assistance—especially that delivered through its regional technical assistance centers—high marks, in the survey results and the interviews. Interviewed officials from several countries highlighted the staff’s help on banking supervision and inflation targeting. And the FSAP process came in for high praise, including from officials of small states, who more generally were using the IMF to help ratchet up their technical expertise.

PRGF-eligible countries

30. PRGF-eligible countries rated IMF interactions higher than other country group/subgroups on all evaluation indicators set out in Box 2. The high strategic alignment rating is particularly relevant given that it is only for the PRGF-eligible countries that the Fund has an institutional strategy, as discussed in Chapter 4 and developed in more detail in the companion paper on PRGF-eligible countries. In current circumstances, it means that for each of the ten purposes of interactions set out in the evaluation survey, what the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries said they wanted from IMF interactions was closely aligned with what the staff working on PRGF-eligible countries said they aimed to do. (See Figure 10—also in comparison with Figure 6 for the large advanced economies.) In turn, this alignment contributes to effectiveness, as broadly speaking the authorities and staff are both working towards the same goals in their interactions.

31. The evaluation evidence also suggests that most authorities and staff believe that during the evaluation period, the Fund added value in PRGF-eligible countries through financial and monitoring programs, debt relief, and donor signaling. This “suite” of products and services brought to those countries substantial financial benefits, direct and indirect, securely anchoring the Fund’s role with this group of countries. The result was an abundance of traction in Fund interactions—in contrast to the situation in the surveillance-only advanced and emerging economies discussed above. But there was also a downside risk. Summarizing the views of several officials from PRGF-eligible countries, one minister of finance suggested that this traction put staff in a position of power vis-à-vis the authorities, raising questions about how the exercise of that power affected interactions in both substance and style. Substantive issues are touched on below, with the style issues taken up in Chapter 4. Both are explored further in the companion paper on PRGF-eligible countries.
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Figure 11. Is the Fund Inflexible, Unwilling to Innovate, and Closed to New Approaches?
(Percent of authorities who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”)

- For the authorities of some PRGF-eligible countries—especially those subject to major program interruptions and/or delays in debt relief—the underlying power imbalance was seen to drive interactions, including the adoption of what they saw as demanding and inflexible positions by Fund staff to which the authorities had to agree, or else. For several interviewed authorities, “inflexibility” was a lightning rod for bitter complaints about Fund interactions on conditionality, many of which related to major program interruptions and/or delays in delivery of debt relief. Some felt that the policy agenda and program undertakings had driven by Fund staff in Washington, in part through what some senior officials called the “tyranny of the PDR review process.”

- For the authorities of other PRGF-eligible countries, the Fund’s power was seen as helpful to their interests whether in dealing with the Paris Club, other creditors, and donors, or in helping them to discipline spending ministries and other interests at home. Several interviewed authorities also pointed to the Policy Support Instrument as an important innovation put them more squarely in the driver’s seat and gave more meaning to country “ownership” than did the PRGF.

- The authorities’ perceptions about the Fund’s flexibility have improved in recent years. The survey evidence illustrated in Figure 11 shows that 30–40 percent of PRGF-eligible respondents said that Fund policies and procedures were inflexible and that the staff was insufficiently willing to innovate. But half also said the staff’s willingness to consider different approaches had improved over the past two years. Indeed, most of the specific complaints raised in the interviews of officials from PRGF-eligible countries dated from the 2002–04 period, as detailed in the companion paper on the PRGF-eligible countries.

33. Important exceptions notwithstanding, the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries generally gave the Fund high marks for technical assistance and the specific expertise on which it draws, while raising questions about its strategic thrust and the sustainability of its effects. Some expressed concerns about plans to introduce charges for technical assistance.

- In the survey, 95 percent of respondents said they wanted the Fund to help build capacity and 80 percent said the Fund was effective in this role. These numbers are much higher than for other country groups, even than for the other emerging economies. They praised staff delivering the Fund’s technical assistance, especially those from the regional technical assistance centers.

- But several interviewed officials, noting the large quantities of IMF technical assistance that had been provided to their countries over the years, questioned what results it had produced in terms of sustained improvements in local capacity. This
raises questions about the programming of technical assistance, and how it relates to the country’s and Fund’s medium-term vision, and about its implementation.

• The documentary evidence reviewed for the evaluation suggests that the links between Fund technical assistance programs and country priorities improved over the evaluation period, but still remained relatively weak. The Fund’s surveillance agendas, introduced in 2006 as a short-hand strategy brief, often included technical assistance in the section on the staff’s work program, but did not make clear how the programmed items fit into the overall agenda. The Regional Strategy Notes on technical assistance, meant to improve the prioritization of technical assistance in line with the strategic objectives of both recipient countries and the Fund, were launched late in the evaluation period and are still finding their way, especially with respect to links to other work of the Fund and technical assistance provided by donors.10

10See IMF (2008b).
were empowered by the transparency policy, which set the stage for a wave of outreach activities designed to inform key stakeholders about Fund activities and advice in member countries. They involved meetings and seminars with parliamentarians and the general public to inform them about Fund findings and recommendations about their country, typically with no objection from the country authorities.

The third kind involves staff trying to influence the course of country policies by stepping outside the policy dialogue with authorities and into the wider public debate about the direction of policy. For example, the European Department’s (EUR) outreach strategy notes that its “ultimate measure of success is the extent to which our outreach increases the chances that we influence policy. [And that] outreach therefore needs to be an integral part of EUR’s operations.”11 In a similar vein, the Western Hemisphere Department’s (WHD) communications strategy states: “The ultimate goals of our outreach efforts are to affect policies or support them when they are appropriate. To meet these goals, our outreach effort aims at influencing the broader public debate and constituencies that indirectly but eventually determine policymakers’ choices.”12

36. The evaluation finds increasing staff effort devoted to outreach activities, but little evidence of actual success in “influencing.” During the evaluation period, such activities included the timely dissemination of Fund mission findings in some cases and public seminars on regional economic outlooks and other topics. Sometimes, such activities were encouraged by the authorities—especially in other advanced and emerging economies and in PRGF-eligible countries—who in some cases sought Fund staff assistance in securing support for reform. But in other cases, the authorities objected to such activities—most often in connection with the media—and when they did, the activities

11EUR’s internal guidance on outreach strategy.
12WHD’s communications strategy.
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Box 3. What Are the Country Constraints to Effective Outreach?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reputational legacy from prior program engagement</th>
<th>Advanced Economies</th>
<th>Emerging Economies</th>
<th>PRGF-Eligible Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament and economic sovereignty</td>
<td>Only relevant in one case during the evaluation period.</td>
<td>Major concerns with many stakeholders outside government about past programs.</td>
<td>Major concerns with many stakeholders outside government about structural adjustment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country concerns about IMF legitimacy</td>
<td>None, though many stakeholders outside government about past programs.</td>
<td>Major issues in large emerging economies, who see the IMF as biased in favor of the large advanced economies.</td>
<td>Not a major issue in most PRGF-eligible countries, though it arises in criticisms about different treatment of rich and poor countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities’ other views about outreach</td>
<td>Many authorities do not want Fund staff to interact with media and others on their economy.</td>
<td>Many authorities do not want Fund staff to interact with media and others on their economy.</td>
<td>Many PRGF-eligible countries want Fund staff outreach to help educate the public about economic management and reform.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

generally did not take place (consistent with IMF staff guidance). In between, the evaluation found a gray zone, where, for example, discussions with think tanks and market participants were viewed less warily by the authorities, with different staff members responding to such openings in different ways. In terms of results, only 21 percent of official survey respondents said that the Fund was effective in helping to build/maintain policy consensus outside government, and only 5 percent said it was very effective; the staff’s ratings were little higher—at 27 percent and 10 percent, respectively.

37. The evaluation’s civil society survey received 704 responses from civil society representatives living in 159 countries. Responses came primarily from think tanks, private sector associations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with fewer from the press and labor unions. In the advanced economies, most respondents were from think tanks and private sector associations. In the PRGF-eligible countries, almost half were from NGOs. Of the 704 respondents, 443 said they had had interactions with Fund staff between 2001 and 2008. Their responses portray staff as respectful, listening, and aware of host-country cultures, though with lower scores on cultural sensitivities from NGO representatives in general and from respondents from PRGF-eligible countries and large emerging economies. About half of the respondents who had met with staff did not answer the questions on whether (i) their views were taken into account in IMF discussions with the government and (ii) their discussions with the IMF generally contributed to building national support and initiative towards “IMF-backed policies.” About half of those who did answer said their views had been reflected—though the numbers were smaller for respondents in PRGF-eligible countries—and that their discussions had contributed to building national support for policies.

38. Box 3 summarizes the main thrust of the evaluation’s analysis of country constraints to effective influencing in the country groupings, which is briefly discussed below and detailed in the companion country papers. In many advanced economies, the deterrent to greater staff outreach was perceived resistance from the authorities themselves. In emerging economies, bad memories of past involvement with the Fund, compounded by concerns about the Fund’s legitimacy constrained staff outreach efforts. In PRGF-eligible countries, a major constraint was the reputational legacy of structural adjustment which reduced public receptivity to the IMF. This said, the PRGF-eligible authorities had the most positive survey responses on outreach of the country groupings, as explored in more detail in the companion paper on interactions with PRGF-eligible countries.

39. Elaborating on the findings on the specific country groupings, the evaluation found that in the advanced economies, Fund staff faced considerable challenges with respect to outreach. In these countries, interactions with other stakeholders, especially the media, can in principle provide a source of traction which is otherwise in short supply. Speaking on behalf of one of the area departments covering the advanced economies, one senior staff member said that the overwhelming factor in the 2001–08 period had been the transparency initiative, which led to a situation where the authorities had a greater incentive to be
interested in the work of the Fund because the media dimension became more important. However, this sword cuts both ways. The surveyed and interviewed authorities of advanced economies were typically not enthusiastic about increased outreach in their countries, despite their support for such activities in other countries. Indeed, the survey evidence shown in Figure 12 illustrates the strong strategic dissonance between the very limited amount of policy-related outreach the authorities wanted and the far greater amount that staff aimed to provide. The dissonance was especially pronounced in respect to the large advanced economies. And, in terms of timely dissemination of Article IV mission messages, for example, few advanced economies have seen end-mission press conferences, although in most cases the mission’s concluding statements are released in a timely manner. In the circumstances, staff faced recurring dilemmas about how much to push for more and better outreach: they had to weigh possible negative short-run effects of such efforts—including with respect to activities such as briefings for think tanks on mission findings—on their interactions with country counterparts, against the potential for positive medium-term effects such efforts may have on the Fund’s traction and effectiveness.

40. In the emerging economies, staff used different approaches to outreach depending on country circumstances. In some large emerging economies, especially in East Asia and Latin America, the evaluation found that the Fund’s continuing unpopularity—which derived from its association with past financial crises and austerity programs, combined with cautions from authorities—deterred staff outreach. Whereas, in “emerging Europe,” and in a number of other emerging economies, the situation on the ground was quite different, and the Fund was seen in a more favorable light. The survey evidence makes clear that while many authorities in emerging economies did not have a problem with the Fund making outside contacts—and surveyed civil society organizations (CSOs) expressed generally favorable views about their interactions with the staff—only 10 percent of authorities of large emerging economies wanted the IMF to help build and maintain policy consensus through contacts outside the government. The percentage for the other emerging economies is much higher; though at 30 percent it is still not large. The cumulative effect of the various constraints was an abundance of caution by staff, who generally took a low profile in engaging beyond the authorities. In a number of cases, for example in Latin America, outreach beyond the authorities and market participants was—and remains—specifically off limits, especially in respect to the media. Meanwhile, the evaluation found more recent area department initiatives to disseminate analytic work in a variety of regional fora (including Regional Economic Outlooks) to reposition the Fund as a technical expert and analyst. Some of these efforts have also provided a useful platform for building relationships across countries and repositioning the Fund in regions and countries where bad memories of past Fund engagement remain strong.
41. The evaluation found some progress in outreach in PRGF-eligible countries, especially in the very recent period, as compared with earlier evaluation findings. As discussed in depth in the companion paper on these countries, the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries were the most open to further outreach by the Fund to all groups, especially to parliamentarians and market participants. But staff efforts in many country contexts still lagged in part because of resource constraints. The unresolved reputational legacy of structural adjustment and privatization was also a deterrent to staff, who sometimes encountered hostile receptions from local civil society groups. This legacy continues to complicate outreach in many PRGF-eligible countries, where civil society views the Fund very negatively; during the evaluation period, it severely limited the Fund’s influence beyond the dialogue with the authorities and inhibited staff from engaging productively with other stakeholders. However, the evaluation did find examples of change, in which staff outreach—in the context of a growing economy—was able to rebrand the IMF from perceived agent of unpopular privatization and structural adjustment measures to champion of much more popular fiscal transparency initiatives.

\[^{14}\text{Notably, the evaluation did find evidence of increased outreach in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries since the IEO’s SSA evaluation, which had found earlier efforts to be “limited and ineffective.” See IEO (2007a).}\]
42. This chapter focuses on the management of interactions. It looks at (i) institutional and country strategies for promoting and improving the effectiveness of interactions; (ii) staff-related management issues germane to the achievement of effective interactions; and (iii) of overarching importance, relationship-management issues, including the pulling together of the various strands of interactions into a coherent and consistent interface with the country authorities. It concludes: first, that institutional and country strategies played a limited role in promoting and improving the effectiveness of interactions. Even when there was an operational strategy, the associated staffing and relationship management issues were not always adequately addressed, to the detriment of the overall effectiveness of interactions. Second, that several issues in the management of human resources warrant particular attention—staff style and professional standards, including for candor—as they bear importantly on the effectiveness of interactions through the all-important interpersonal dimension of interactions. And third, that greater attention to the clarity of responsibilities and accountabilities is needed in the Fund’s approach to relationship management, which should embrace the overall effectiveness of interactions as a performance benchmark.

A. Strategy

43. How did strategy guide the overall direction of IMF interactions with member countries and promote and improve their effectiveness? At the institutional level, the formalization of strategies has varied, with quite a bit more attention devoted to the strategy for engagement with PRGF-eligible countries than for other country groups. While at the country level, there have been several institution-wide attempts over the years to develop a systematic approach, including experiments with internal country strategy briefs and ex post assessments for program countries. More recently, internal “surveillance agendas” were introduced at end-2006 for all member countries, but they were eliminated at end-2008.

44. Looking at interactions with the advanced economies, the Fund did not have an explicit institutional strategy during the evaluation period, and its implicit strategy was weak in dealing with the challenge of effectiveness. The latter, inferred from the documentary evidence and from the staff surveys and interviews, revolved around the surveillance process as the main vehicle for interactions with these economies. It involved writing reports and avoiding conflict with the authorities and—to enhance traction—pursuing in-country outreach unless the authorities objected. But as shown in Chapter 2, the authorities of these economies neither wanted nor gave the Fund good marks on aspects of interactions that staff thought important—marks that staff generally agreed with. Nor, as shown in Chapter 3, did authorities embrace Fund outreach activities, especially with the media. In such circumstances, the staff lacked a convincing strategy for increasing these authorities’ interest in interactions with them beyond a good exchange of views, and for bridging differences on important issues—such as on the Fund’s contributing to international policy coordination, including the analysis of spillovers, and to the development of policy frameworks.

45. Nor did the Fund have an explicit institutional strategy for interactions with emerging economies during the evaluation period, or a successful implicit one. Elements of institutional strategy specific to these countries were embedded in policy statements, such as the Fund’s Medium-Term Strategy,\textsuperscript{15} which highlighted financial and capital market issues and the Fund’s framework for financing. At the country level, the Fund’s implicit approach revolved around the surveillance process, the prevention and resolution of financial crises, and the stepped up provision of technical assistance—especially for other emerging economies. The implicit strategy also supported country efforts to wean themselves from the prolonged use of resources, although without putting in place a conscious strategy for making this transition, and in particular for engaging substantively

\textsuperscript{15}See IMF (2005c).
thereafter. As in the advanced economies, the staff’s strategy for generating traction and influence in non-program contexts was linked to the Fund’s transparency policy. But also as in the large advanced economies, the authorities of most large emerging economies had little appetite for Fund outreach on their economies, especially in any fora involving the media. As a fallback, staff invested heavily in regional work designed to reposition the Fund as a knowledge-based institution specializing in the economic policy challenges that countries face, and the global and regional external environments that shape them. The jury is still out on the effectiveness and impact of these activities at both the regional and country levels.

46. For PRGF-eligible countries, what had long been an implicit institutional strategy became increasingly explicit over the evaluation period, culminating in the 2008 paper “The Role of the Fund in Low-Income Countries” (IMF, 2008b). To be sure, the articulation of the strategy was motivated by continuing Board questions about the Fund’s operational role in PRGF-eligible countries, about which some Executive Directors had major misgivings. But genesis aside, one result was that the Fund had a clear institutional strategy for its operational work with PRGF-eligible countries, around which the authorities and staff showed considerable strategic alignment about the roles and purposes of Fund interactions. Beyond this, the Fund was less systematic in customizing its approach to individual country conditions, especially—as a number of authorities complained—in taking account of country-specific political economy and other dimensions relevant to the feasibility and appropriate sequencing of reforms. Also, as believed by 35–40 percent of program mission chiefs and resident representatives in PRGF-eligible countries, management and senior staff were unwilling to consider different approaches to achieving desired outcomes. Meanwhile, for much of the evaluation period, they gave little priority to managing face-to-face interactions with these authorities. One result was the aggravation of already difficult situations associated with program interruptions and delays, especially in the 2002–04 period, which remain vivid in the minds of authorities despite the passage of much time. Indeed, as one high-ranking staff member indicated—taking into account all the dimensions of interactions—there was no systematic strategy for Fund engagement at the country level, rather it depended very much on individual factors largely at the discretion of the mission chief. This lacuna is also relevant for the growing business of technical assistance where the importance of ensuring a strategic and country-focused perspective in the identification of priorities including for the Fund’s Regional Strategy Notes remains paramount, and for the Fund’s engagement in the broader dialogue on country policies and actions needed for growth and external stability.

B. Staff Style, Skills, and Incentives

47. In looking at how the management of staff and related resources contributed (or not) to the effectiveness of interactions, the evaluation found some good news but also some bad. The good news is that contrary to a popular critique, large majorities of respondents to the authorities’ survey portrayed IMF staff as analytic, respectful, and responsive. The bad is explored below, which sets out evidence of continuing concerns about style, skills, and professional standards, and points to the need for corrective action.

48. It is no secret that critics have portrayed the Fund’s signature style as arrogant and overbearing—and so have some authorities. In the evaluation interviews, for example, some government officials complained about staff attitudes, which they saw as causing problems, although most such comments referred to the first half of the evaluation period rather than the more recent period. In a backhanded compliment, one minister of finance from a PRGF-eligible country referred to what he called the staff’s “dictatorial style” as a thing of the past. Though some authorities did register ongoing complaints about style, the survey evidence does point to perceptions of change among the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries and other emerging economies, especially in the perceived respectfulness of staff towards the authorities, as illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 13. In emerging economies, the concerns about style that have persisted—with staff working on those countries reporting in the evaluation interviews that the IMF is seen as arrogant and high-handed—have been balanced by some interviewed officials’ characterizations of staff as respectful and open-minded.

49. The evaluation evidence also raises questions about staff objectivity—and the management of candor on the one hand and diplomacy on the other. The left-hand panel of Figure 14 shows that staff working on all country groupings said that they had toned down their assessments “to preserve the relationship with the authorities.” Some self-censorship may be due to staff diffidence (and deference) in the face of large teams of knowledgeable officials that gives the authorities’ position the benefit of the doubt. But the companion data shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 14 suggests that many staff also feel they will not get support from management or senior staff in the case of disagreements. One implication is that some staff feel that if they provide a candid assessment that displeases the authorities, the latter will complain and

the staff member’s career will be hurt. To be sure, there may be instances in which staff mechanistically applied analysis to situations that warranted more judgment or nuance, or greater diplomacy was needed in the delivery of the message. Still, the survey numbers remain worrying—especially in the context of the advanced economies, given their systemic importance and given that interviews with the authorities and staff confirmed the problem. Indeed, one interviewed official from a large advanced economy said that mission chiefs have been too ready to tone down their conclusions. Mirroring these observations, interviewed staff members said that their strategy was to try not to antagonize the authorities because of the risk that they would pick up the phone to management and complain. One senior staff member said that management effectively told the team that they did not want the mission to say anything that the finance minister would not like.

50. The evaluation evidence identified skills deficits in several areas of importance to authorities. In the survey results, summarized in Figure 15, different country groups raised different concerns: PRGF-eligible countries and emerging economies wanted more country knowledge; large emerging economies wanted more practical experience in policymaking and implementation, as well as language skills—so critical for effective interpersonal exchanges; and large advanced economies wanted more technical skills, including on the financial sector. Supporting and complementing these results, an overarching theme of the interviews was interest in more specific expertise. It arose in conversations with officials from PRGF-eligible countries that were just starting the transition to emerging economy status; it arose with officials from emerging economies, where technical and operational skills were in demand; and it arose with officials from emerging and advanced economies, which were looking for innovative approaches to new and/or unforeseen challenges. In the quest for improved traction, topping up the Fund’s skills base with specific expertise and better managing it, so that it can support and complement the authorities’ capacity, is clearly a priority.

51. Lastly, the evaluation evidence indicates that institutional incentives do not favor interactions, or staff continuity, with the authorities. Figure 16 shows that a majority of staff respondents feel that their interactions with the authorities carry too little weight in their own and colleagues’ performance assessments. In addition, many feel they have too little time for such interactions (and the associated preparations) with other work for internal and Board audiences crowding it out. While continuity of relationships was clearly valued by authorities and IMF audiences alike, the review found that insufficient continuity was a significant concern, particularly for a number of small states and more generally of PRGF-eligible countries and other emerging economies. Interviewed authorities of PRGF-eligible countries and other emerging economies said that the Fund’s approach to staff turnover “undermined rather than supported capacity building . . . .” Some 75 percent of staff working on these countries said there was no incentive to work on a country for more than two years, which most interviewed authorities and staff
solutions, to the kinds of issues highlighted above, such as managing candor with the authorities, and managing within the institution.\footnote{The courses offered on negotiating and influencing, managing effective missions and media and public relations include some material and skill practice on external interactions. These courses are seen as quite useful, but they are taken mainly by staff before they assume leadership roles.}

Staff also said there was very little training for senior staff, including mission chiefs, on how to interact effectively with country authorities or how to manage interactions. Their expressed concern has been the lack of structured learning activities, through which they could share with colleagues particular challenges they have faced, along with their innovative
C. Relationship Management

52. Interactions in all their dimensions come together in the Fund’s country relationships, which require proper management for effectiveness. Box 4 summarizes the survey evidence on the authorities’ perceptions about the effectiveness of Fund relationship management. By one measure, over 90 percent of authorities’ survey responses from every country subgroup agreed the Fund’s arrangements for relationship management were conducive to effective interactions. But on another closely related but differently structured survey question, the scores were much lower, as many survey respondents answered “average” to the question about the Fund’s long-term strategic approach to the relationship, when given the option. Clearly, for an institution like the Fund, with its aspirations and commitment to excellence, “average” is not good enough, hence the need to focus on areas where relationship management can be improved, as discussed below.

Box 4. Relationship Management in the Fund: Is Average Good Enough?

The figure below shows the evaluation survey evidence on the authorities’ perceptions about the effectiveness of Fund relationship management. By one measure, over 90 percent of authorities “agreed/strongly agreed” that Fund relationship management was conducive to interactions. These ratings are shown in the left-hand panel. But another, closely related question, produced different ratings. As shown in the right-hand panel, the favorable scores are much lower—unless ratings of “average” are also counted.

The difference reflects the choices given to survey respondents. For the left-hand panel, respondents had to say whether they agreed or not. Fence sitting was not an option. For the right-hand panel, the respondents could say good, poor, or average. Some 40 percent of respondents who said they agreed in answering the question illustrated in the left-hand panel, answered “average” rather than “good” in responding to the question illustrated in the right-hand panel.
53. Against this background, this section focuses on areas where the Fund’s approach to relationship management appears to fall short, drawing on evidence on internal arrangements and a review of comparator organizations. Particular concerns warranting further attention include: (i) the clarity of responsibilities and accountabilities for relationship management; (ii) the cohesion across interlocutors in the Fund’s interactions with the authorities; and (iii) the management and role of resident representatives within Fund country teams.

54. A lack of clarity about responsibilities and accountabilities for interactions was manifested in several ways, including in the above-noted shortfalls in taking a long-term strategic approach, as well as evidence of departures from the maxim that the Fund “speaks with one voice” in its interactions with authorities. In interviews, staff emphasized the importance of ensuring cohesion across departments and the need to take into account what one senior resident representative said was the functional departments’ diverse organizations and style of interactions with the authorities. Some staff members on occasion expressed frustration that the MD/DMDs had taken a different line in meetings than had been expected, or had not been effective with senior officials. And in a few cases, authorities were also disappointed by the way in which issues were handled. More generally, the distinction between management’s direct role in interactions, and indirect role of delegating responsibility to senior staff, was unclear, as evidenced by the lack of explicit understanding, and uncertainties felt by staff.18 Some of these factors, together with limited MD/DMD interactions with some countries, may have influenced the authorities’ and staff’s responses to the survey question on the effectiveness of particular channels of interaction (Figure 17). The highest ratings went to staff working on technical assistance and programs and resident representatives, with the lowest to the MD/DMDs. For the authorities, interestingly, this is one instance in which the large advanced and the large emerging economies have given the most positive survey responses—perhaps reflecting the special attention that the MD/DMDs give to these key shareholders—although even here the level of positive responses is not that high. In responses from staff, the low ratings for the MD/DMDs are not isolated to those working on one group of countries, but cut across all country groups.

55. The lessons learned from comparator organizations are of interest, including on the importance of ensuring cohesion across interlocutors. Organizationally, the IMF lies in between the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the World Bank in size and complexity, and for this reason, as discussed in a background paper on comparator organizations prepared for the evaluation, neither provides a clear comparator model for the Fund.19 However, both provide lessons worth considering, not least because both received higher ratings than the Fund for relationship management from authorities in the evaluation survey—the BIS from the advanced and large emerging economies, the World Bank from the other emerging economies and the PRGF-eligible countries.

- The main lessons of the BIS experience include the desirability of senior staff focus on finding ways to facilitate discussion and exchange of information among country officials. This is especially relevant for Fund work on advanced and large emerging economies, where the “face” of the Fund

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18. The specific responsibilities and priorities for which the Managing Director will be held accountable by the Executive Board in the area of relationship management are not clear. The Managing Director conducts under the direction of the Executive Board the ordinary business of the Fund. A working group of Executive Directors was to report by early 2009 on the objectives to be used to assess the Managing Director’s performance. The Deputy Managing Directors are responsible for overseeing staff work and for maintaining high-level contacts with member governments. Memoranda sent to the Executive Board and staff following each change in the management team since 2000 indicate that the responsibilities for each Deputy Managing Director more generally cover “country relations” with a specified list of countries: the extent to which the Deputy Managing Directors are responsible for conducting interactions themselves, as opposed to holding senior staff accountable for doing so, is not made explicit; nor is the process by which performance is assessed.

interacting with ministry of finance and central bank officials may vary with the topic and the venue—in the context of bilateral surveillance versus financial sector surveillance versus multilateral consultations versus the G-7, G-20, Working Party 3, Financial Stability Forum, and so on. For the BIS, the underlying communications challenges are easier, with a narrower (central bank) focus than the Fund and regular face-to-face meetings with officials from capitals in board and committee meetings. But senior Fund staff concentrating on G-20 countries, for example, constitute a fairly small circle, and the Fund could do more to take advantage of various working group meetings to enhance engagement with participating officials. The BIS also illustrates the desirability of leveraging rather than replicating member country technical staff and the value of comparator best-practice analysis in securing traction with the authorities—lessons that are especially relevant to the Fund’s work with surveillance-only advanced and large emerging economies.

- The World Bank experience also provides two lessons, of more relevance to the Fund’s work on the other emerging economies and the PRGF-eligible countries. The first is the critical importance of ensuring that as the number of institutional voices grows in interactions with the authorities, it is clear to all (outside and inside the institution) which voice is responsible and accountable for the country relationship. The second is the importance of avoiding supply-driven work programs by anchoring the design of country work squarely within the ambit of the area departments—holding those departments accountable for strategy and program design and the functional departments accountable for the quality of products and services, a lesson of increasing relevance with the growth of the Fund’s work on capacity building and the fact that about a third of country-specific resources are outside the control of the area department.  

56. Also central to the cohesion of the Fund’s approach to relationship management is the role of its 72 resident representatives, where the evidence points to under-management in some cases and missed opportunities in many. As Figure 17 above shows, the contribution of this cadre of staff is clearly valued by the authorities, who are generally satisfied with their in-country arrangements as well. A consistent theme of the evaluation interviews with the authorities was their appreciation of low profile people with strong technical skills, who were knowledgeable about the Fund itself and what it might provide; none called for a more powerful resident representative or visible IMF presence on the ground. Some authorities did highlight, however, the desirability of resident representatives’ being a key part of the Fund team, basically the Fund person on the ground. In interviews with resident representatives and mission chiefs of PRGF-eligible countries, team work between the mission chief and the resident representative emerged as an important ingredient. Where it was absent, the contribution of the resident representative to interactions was obviously less, in part because of the impact on his/her morale. Interviews with resident representatives in large emerging economies suggest that their effectiveness varied greatly, depending on the country circumstances, as well as the skills, seniority, and personality of the individuals involved and their own working relationships with mission chiefs.  

20In total, six staff years, some $1.6 million, are spent on average per country per annum, varying widely across the membership, both in total and in time spent in the field.  

21In the World Bank, country departments/directors prioritize country programming across a wide array of functional departments using the country assistance strategy/country partnership strategy, in consultation with member countries and partners.  

22See Dodsworth (2009).
57. Putting together all the evidence—on substance as well as style—the evaluation concludes that IMF interactions were least effective with advanced and large emerging economies; they were most effective with PRGF-eligible countries, and, to a lesser extent, with other emerging economies. Of great importance is the finding of strategic dissonance between the authorities and staff working on large advanced economies, especially about the role of the Fund in contributing to international policy coordination including through analysis of spillover effects, but also with respect to the development of policy frameworks and outreach aimed at building consensus on policies. Equally troubling is the Fund’s limited effectiveness—and strategic dissonance—with large emerging economies, many of whom saw the surveillance process as lacking value and/or evenhandedness.

58. The evaluation also concludes that outreach with stakeholders outside government contributed little to the effectiveness of interactions with the authorities during the evaluation period. The transparency policy did less well than staff had hoped in increasing traction, as some authorities blocked timely dissemination of mission findings. Dissemination initiatives designed to gain influence in domestic policy debates by repositioning the Fund as a think tank—and distancing it from the negative reputational legacy of the past—remain work in progress.

59. Finally, the evaluation finds that interactions were undermanaged, although some individuals managed particular interactions very well. The Fund’s strategy for interactions was ineffective in enhancing traction with surveillance-only members. In PRGF-eligible countries, the Fund’s suite of concessional lending instruments, debt relief, and donor signaling made for an abundance of traction. But the Fund paid too little attention to the diplomatic skills that might have engendered collegiality and trust in those countries—though there is evidence of progress in the past two years—and to the technical expertise and other skills that might have added value in surveillance-only countries. Staff incentives and training largely ignored interactions.

60. Against this background, the evaluation’s recommendations focus on steps the IMF can and should take to generate and nurture traction, and to prevent its erosion, in light of the findings highlighted in earlier chapters and alluded to above. Prior to setting them out, two critical preamble items. First, the resolution of the larger governance issues is essential. As things stand now, the distrust felt by some large emerging economies corrodes the institution’s effectiveness in these countries and elsewhere as well. Though this topic goes beyond the scope of this evaluation, it is clearly a relevant contextual factor. Second, the financial crisis has led to increased interest by the large advanced and emerging economies in a greater role for the Fund in the international coordination of policies. Indeed, the call from the G-20 to facilitate a mutual assessment process is a positive sign (as was the earlier U.S. request to participate in the FSAP). But beyond urging and nudging, there is nothing this evaluation can recommend that will induce the authorities of the large advanced economies to engage more profoundly and to sustain such engagement over the longer term—although it can and does recommend steps designed to make it more attractive to do so. Related issues are being addressed more directly in the IEO evaluation on the IMF and the run-up to the global financial crisis.

61. Going beyond this preamble, the evaluation has the following recommendations:

To make the Fund more attractive to country authorities and promote traction:

- Improve the quality and relevance of the international dimensions of the Fund’s work. The Fund has faced a credibility problem with its past work (both analysis and advice) on policy coordination. To rise to the occasion presented by the recent requests for the IMF to be more closely involved in coordination work in the wake of the financial crisis, the reasons for the lackluster engagement observed during the evaluation period need to be diagnosed and problems of analysis and approach resolved. But the other international dimensions of the Fund’s work also need upgrading.

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See IEO (2009).
including through the development of new products for interactions with the authorities that capitalize on Fund strengths. An obvious example is on cross-country analysis. The Fund does much research and analysis of relevant topics, but fails to systematically tap into that work to customize for the authorities. For instance, a new knowledge product, such as a “Cross-Country Brief” could be prepared on demand (by the authorities) on requested topics and/or periodically, mining the latest work coming out of experience and research available within the Fund. But any number of new ways of engaging are possible, drawing on the Fund’s huge store of country and macro-financial knowledge, and its convening power to leverage expertise and excellence from outside the Fund.

- **As part of new ways of engaging and to underpin the Fund’s strategic shift, bring more experts on country visits, especially when country interest and traction are waning.** A number of authorities raised issues about the Funds’ skills mix, especially with respect to key specialist skills. To stay relevant and keep countries engaged, the Fund must increasingly offer specific expertise to work directly with authorities. To provide this, it needs to further improve the staff skills mix by recruiting highly skilled technical experts and mid-career practitioners who would add value and command peer respect, and by using the services of a panel of world class experts to join key staff visits, and add to the policy debate.

- **As an element of concerted strategy to engage more deeply with both emerging and advanced economies, develop menus of products and services to be offered and make sure they are transparent, compelling, and feasible.** The institution has done this for PRGF-eligible countries, and needs to do something for the other country groupings as well, in consultation with the country authorities, who should be asked what would be most useful to them in light of sometimes rapidly changing circumstances. Recent additions to its potential lending role (including flexible credit lines) and anticipation of a greater contribution to peer review are important components, but the challenge will also be to develop new knowledge products and anticipate new ways to be influential with members post-crisis. Where useful, also consider such strategic menus for other subgroups of countries, such as the small states who face special challenges, cutting across area department lines.

- **Replace the now defunct country surveillance agendas with strategic agendas.** The Fund lacks a systematic and strategic approach to interactions with individual member countries, and its focus continues to be inward towards the bureaucracy and the Board rather than outward towards the membership. To remedy this, the proposed approach would aim to focus the staff’s energies in an outward direction while focusing them on clearly identified and measurable objectives and deliverables related to interactions with member countries. To this end, the strategic agendas would: (i) include effectiveness of interactions as a specific goal; (ii) spell out the linkages across surveillance, programs, and any technical assistance plans, and to traction, over the medium term; (iii) clarify the outreach plan—its strategic links to traction and constraints to its effectiveness; (iv) build in consultation with authorities to help generate buy-in; (v) align the associated budgetary and staffing requirements; and (vi) to increase accountability and learning, reflect staff self-assessments of what the Fund’s previous interactions achieved. In its oversight function, the Board should periodically review Fund-wide retrospectives on these strategic agendas and their implementation (including the quality of advice).

**To improve the effectiveness of outreach:**

- **Clarify the rules of the game on outreach.** The transparency initiative has had major implications for IMF interactions with stakeholders beyond the authorities. But it also has affected interactions with the authorities themselves, many of whom are wary of outreach to the media on issues relating to their country. This often gives staff pause and leads to missed opportunities, including on other kinds of outreach. Clarification of the policy intent is essential, mindful that such outreach is potentially one of the main foundations of traction in large emerging and advanced economies.

- **Decide how to handle the Fund’s negative reputational legacy and tell staff so that they can act upon it.** Such advice goes beyond the new communications toolkits for mission chiefs and resident representatives and media training available to staff. In many PRGF-eligible countries and emerging economies, the perceived legacy of structural adjustment, fiscal stringency, and privatization continues to poison Fund interactions within and outside official circles, may stigmatize authorities that deal with the IMF, and in turn limits its influence. Articulating a positive message about a winning and up-to-date agenda is of course essential. But dealing forthrightly with the past is as well. Staff need guidance on what they can and cannot say. Without such guidance, given the risk aversion of Fund staff, they will say nothing.
To improve the management of interactions:

• **Provide guidance and training on professional conduct for staff interactions with the authorities and IMF senior/staff management on matters of country assessments.** Staff survey and interviews provide evidence of overly cautious assessments by staff, designed to preserve the relationship, at least in some cases to forestall complaints to management. One aspect is a major issue of professional conduct, which needs to be addressed forthwith. To this end, the Managing Director should commission a task force of staff at all levels, with participation by the ethics officer, to consider guidance for staff on how to be both appropriately forthright, and respectful. Such guidance would include how to address the challenges that staff face in providing the Fund’s best professional judgment to the authorities, in the face of conflicting evidence and uncertainties, and how to deal with managers who want staff to alter their professional conclusions. The task force should report back by summer 2010, and the actionable points to be reported to the Executive Board for its endorsement and oversight.

• **Increase mission chief and staff tenure on country assignments, as well as training and incentives for interactions.** Current turnover rates are vexing to all country groupings, except for the G-7, and need to be reduced along with the transition costs of the handover to new teams. Equally, staff training for interactions needs to be enhanced, especially for senior staff, including practical advice based on country experience on (i) delivering sometimes difficult messages in ways that are most likely to command attention and get an appropriate policy response; and (ii) more generally handling the dialogue with the authorities and other stakeholders, and managing interactions. Meanwhile, staff effectiveness on interactions needs to be reflected in staff performance appraisals, mindful of the risks discussed above of staff’s desire to preserve the country relationship affecting the objectivity of their professional work.

• **Clarify relationship management arrangements, emphasizing the importance of teamwork—setting out clearly who is responsible and accountable for what, along with appropriate performance measures.** There are missed opportunities for better relationship management and team work in some areas, and a heightened need in others as service delivery becomes more complex. The links (interrelationships and overall management responsibility) between the mission chief and the resident representative in the countries with such arrangements need to be clarified and systematized, with a view to improving the quality of interactions with the authorities and other stakeholders. In addition, the Fund should continue to strengthen implementation of its vision for country-specific technical assistance strategies, involving a joint agenda with countries, with the area departments responsible and accountable for the overall strategy and the functional departments for the delivery and quality of the specific technical assistance products. Finally and importantly, the responsibilities and accountabilities of the MD and DMDs for interactions need to be better established.
1. The evaluation studies interactions with the entire membership. For analytical purposes, the IEO separated the membership into three subgroups based on stage of development and economic size: advanced economies, emerging economies, and PRGF-eligible countries. Table 1 summarizes the groups and the criteria used to define them. Table 2 lists the economies in the various groups.

2. The evaluation team first divided the membership into two groups using classifications from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). The October 2008 WEO—published just prior to delivery of the IEO survey—included 30 “advanced economies,” and the remaining were defined as “emerging and developing.”

3. The 30 advanced economies were further divided into subgroups based on economic size. Specifically, the G-7 economies were defined as “large advanced” and the remaining 23 economies as “other advanced.” Together, they accounted for about 68 percent of global GDP in 2008 at current exchange rates ($41 trillion), and 62 percent of IMF quotas. Three Fund area departments manage interactions with the advanced economies—the Asia and Pacific Department covers five countries, the European Department covers 23, and the Western Hemisphere Department covers two.

4. For purposes of the evaluation’s analysis, the emerging and developing economies were also separated into two groups—emerging economies and PRGF-eligible countries. Because of the large differences in economic size within the group, the emerging economies were further split into “large emerging economies” and “other emerging economies.” India, though in principle PRGF-eligible, is included for analytic purposes among the large emerging economies This process yielded 64 other emerging economies and 19 large emerging economies. Together, these countries had a combined GDP of nearly $18 trillion in 2008, accounting for 30 percent of global GDP measured at current exchange rates. They account for about 32 percent of Fund quotas. Interactions with emerging economies are managed by all five Fund area departments.

5. The evaluation also covers IMF interactions with 77 PRGF-eligible countries eligible for borrowing from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). These 77 countries had a combined GDP of around $1 trillion in 2008, amounting to 2 percent of global GDP measured with current exchange rates. Together, they hold almost 6 percent of Fund quotas. Interactions with PRGF-eligible countries are managed by all five Fund area departments; about half the number of PRGF-eligible countries are in the African Department.

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1 As mentioned in the main text, the evaluation also covers interactions with selected territorial entities that are not states as understood by international law but which maintain regular interactions with the IMF. Throughout all sections of the evaluation, the term “country” refers to both member countries and these selected territories.

2 The evaluation considered 188 economies: 184 member countries and 4 territories which maintain regular interactions with the IMF. There are currently 186 member countries, but Kosovo and Montenegro were excluded because they each became members after the start of the evaluation. The sample also included three territories that participate in Article IV consultations with the IMF: Aruba, Hong Kong SAR, and the Netherlands Antilles. Macao SAR has received Article IV missions, but was excluded from the sample because no such missions took place during the evaluation period. The West Bank and Gaza was also included; while the IMF does not conduct Article IV consultations with the West Bank and Gaza, it staffs a resident representative office and maintains regular interactions.

3 At the time the study began there were 31 economies included in the WEO universe of advanced economies; Taiwan Province of China was not surveyed. Subsequent to the start of this study the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic were classified as advanced economies, but for the purposes of the study they have been included as emerging economies as defined by the October 2008 WEO.

4 The advanced group accounted for 54 percent of global GDP using purchasing-power-parity exchange rates in 2008.

5 The percentage of IMF quotas for the 30 advanced economies excludes Hong Kong SAR.

6 There were officially 78 PRGF-eligible economies at the time of the survey, but India was included in the large emerging economy group. The PRGF is the IMF’s low-interest lending facility for low-income countries. Eligibility is based principally on the IMF’s assessment of a country’s per capita income, drawing on the cutoff point for eligibility to World Bank concessional lending (currently 2007 per capita gross national income of $1,095).

7 The emerging economies accounted for 43 percent of global GDP using purchasing-power-parity exchange rates in 2008.

8 PRGF-eligible countries accounted for 4 percent of global GDP using purchasing-power-parity exchange rates in 2008.
# ANNEX I • COUNTRY GROUP PROFILES

## Table 1. Country Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of economies</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>G-7 economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Non-G-7 economy defined by the October 2008 WEO as “advanced.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Defined by the October 2008 WEO as “emerging and developing,” not eligible to receive PRGF resources, and with GDP more than $250 billion PPP in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Defined by the October 2008 WEO as “emerging and developing,” not eligible to receive PRGF resources, and with GDP less than $250 billion PPP in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Eligible to draw resources from the IMF’s PRGF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: India is PRGF-eligible but is included in the large emerging economy group.

## Table 2. List of Economies by Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Advanced</th>
<th>Other Advanced</th>
<th>Large Emerging</th>
<th>Other Emerging</th>
<th>PRGF-Eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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Companion Papers
IMF Interactions with Advanced Economies

I. Introduction and Overview

1. This paper focuses on IMF interactions in advanced economies. Like the other country papers prepared for the evaluation, it looks at the evidence on whether interactions were effective and whether they were well managed in the group of countries under study. It focuses on interactions with the authorities of 30 advanced economies in a surveillance-only context—in as much as surveillance was the primary vehicle through which the Fund interacted with the authorities of these economies during 2001–08. It also considers the Fund’s interactions with other in-country stakeholders, especially as they affected interactions with the authorities.

2. The paper finds that IMF interactions with advanced economies had limited effectiveness. Many authorities had little interest in what the Fund could provide beyond an objective assessment of policies and prospects and a good exchange of views. Staff working on these economies saw their role as considerably broader in some areas than did their counterparts, for example in contributing to the international coordination of policies and/or the development of policy frameworks, and they expended much effort in these (and related) areas. But only minorities of authorities found the work compelling and the interactions engaging. More generally, the Fund lacked a convincing strategy for bridging differences between the authorities and staff on the scope of the Fund’s engagement and for increasing the authorities’ interest in the analysis it could provide. Nor was it successful in using the new transparency policy to enhance leverage, as many authorities discouraged media outreach when the messages were likely to be critical. Meanwhile, a desire (reinforced by management) to avoid displeasing the authorities, was a fact of life for staff working on the advanced economies, and a challenge to the independence of their analysis; the consequences for the identification and management of global risks were especially troubling in respect to the large advanced economies, given their systemic importance. The paper identifies missed opportunities for strengthening country relationships, underpinned by weak staff incentives for interactions and uneven management attention.

3. The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this chapter profiles the advanced economies and the evidence on which the chapter is based, and summarizes the policy guidance governing interactions during the evaluation period. Chapter II discusses interactions with the authorities of advanced economies. Chapter III discusses interactions with other in-country stakeholders. Chapter IV discusses the management of interactions with advanced economies. Chapter V concludes.

A. Country coverage

4. The evaluation covers IMF interactions with 30 economies corresponding to the World Economic Outlook (WEO) definition of advanced economies.2 Taken together, the 30 economies are large and systemically important by any measure: they had a combined GDP of close to $41 trillion in 2008, amounting to 68 percent of global GDP measured with current exchange rates, or 54 percent of global GDP using purchasing-power-parity exchange rates; and, they accounted for more than 80 percent of worldwide stock market capitalization in 2008.

5. Within the group of advanced economies, the main report and this paper present the evidence for “large advanced economies” and “other advanced economies” as distinct subgroups; the G-7 economies constitute the large advanced economies and remaining 23 economies the other advanced economies. This is because the survey and interview data reveal important differences between the two groups of countries.

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1 Aspects of interactions in the context of Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) and multilateral surveillance were covered by earlier IEO evaluations. See IEO (2006a and 2006b).

2 The evaluation used the October 2008 WEO to construct its country groups. The 30 advanced economies are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
in their perceptions about interactions with the Fund. The 30 advanced economies are managed by three IMF area departments: 22 of the 30 advanced economies are covered by the European Department (EUR); 6 are covered by the Asia and Pacific Department (APD); and 2 by the Western Hemisphere Department (WHD).

6. The evaluation uses a sample of ten advanced economies for more in-depth analysis. This subset comprises four large advanced economies—Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and six smaller advanced countries—Australia, Austria, Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland.

B. Evidence base

7. Sources of evidence for the paper include survey, documentary, and interview data developed specifically for the evaluation, as well as data drawn from previous evaluations. The evaluation’s extensive survey evidence covers the authorities and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the 30 advanced economies, and IMF staff working on these countries. The evaluation survey of country authorities was answered by 50 respondents from 28 advanced economies, for an overall country response rate of 83 percent. Responses to the staff survey totaled 71, covering work on 29 advanced economies. The civil society survey received 155 responses from civil society representatives in 29 of the 30 advanced economies.

- The evaluation team reviewed the Fund’s internal documentary record for the ten countries in the evaluation sample. The material included confidential briefing memoranda to management, mission back-to-office reports, and interdepartmental correspondence on related country issues. This material gave the IEO a window into internal debates about staff positions on particular issues, whether and how IMF management may have contributed to an issue, and how country views influenced the internal debate and decisions.

- Country visits by the evaluation team to Australia, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom provided opportunities for in-depth interviews with a representative spectrum of authorities and others in those countries. The team also interviewed the U.S. authorities. In addition, taking advantage of the IMF Spring and Annual Meetings in Washington, plus teleconferences, the evaluation team interviewed at headquarters many representatives of the authorities and Fund staff who worked on the evaluation sample countries, and met with representatives from think tanks, market participants (including bankers), and the media. IEO staff also took advantage of travel related to other activities to interview authorities and stakeholders in nonsample countries. Broadly speaking, the interviews focused on what aspects of the Fund’s interactions were most successful, what aspects were least successful, how far innovations in surveillance had been carried through at the country level and whether they had worked, suggestions for how the surveillance process could be better managed, and, in the case of nongovernment interviewees, what had been the nature of interactions with Fund staff.

- Other evidence includes material drawn from earlier IEO evaluations and several external analyses conducted in the context of this evaluation. In particular, the team examined previous evaluations of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), multilateral surveillance, and the Fund’s exchange rate advice (IEO 2006a, 2006b, and 2007)—and also several studies that were specially commissioned by IEO for this evaluation.

C. Policies and guiding principles

8. The Fund’s interactions with the advanced countries are, in the main, governed by its policies on bilateral surveillance, particularly exchange rates, and on financial sector surveillance. In turn, this guidance flows directly from the Articles of Agreement, in particular Article IV that states that “the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies.” The guidance to Fund staff on the conduct of surveillance, and recent conclusions of the Executive Board, are briefly summarized below.

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1The evaluation managed risks of interpretation by applying judgment grounded in triangulation across different sources of evidence, which—as in all such endeavors—may contain measurement and/or interpretation errors. The evaluation survey was quite complex, with many questions and many respondents from a large number of countries; this raises the risk that some questions may have been interpreted differently by different recipients. Interview bias is a common feature of such evidence, subject to potential biases by both interviewers and interviewees. Finally, the use of the documentary evidence is, of course, also subject to bias, not the least of which is its having been written for another time and for another audience, one quite familiar with the Fund’s culture and issues.

4For the authorities’ survey in each economy, one questionnaire was sent to the ministry of Finance and one to the central bank, with each requesting an institutional rather than a personal response.

5Guidance to staff on the conduct of bilateral surveillance is set out in “The 2007 Surveillance Decision: Revised Operational Guidance,” June 2009, and the “Statement of
9. The guidance for interactions with advanced countries covers:

- **Policy dialogue.** Staff are expected to foster a frank policy dialogue to support members’ receptiveness to Fund advice. The dialogue should include cross-country comparative studies to add value to policy discussions and, more generally, consultations should attempt to bring to bear other countries’ experiences in addressing similar problems, drawing out policy implications. Spillover effects to and from others should be discussed where relevant.

- **Scope and selectivity.** Priority is for macro-economic issues related to external sustainability, vulnerability to balance of payments or currency crises, sustainable growth with price stability, and the systemic or regional impact of policies in large economies. Financial sector issues should receive thorough coverage. Bilateral surveillance should be informed by multilateral and regional surveillance.

- **Communication of policy messages.** To strengthen communication of the Fund’s messages on policy, staff are encouraged to develop outreach programs and enhance contacts beyond authorities. Press conferences should be held after Article IV missions and/or Board meetings, unless departments see reasons not to hold them, notably if authorities object. Similar guidance is embodied in the conclusions of reviews of the Fund’s policies on transparency and communications. The Fund’s 2008 Triennial Surveillance Review (TSR), for example, emphasized that “improvements in brevity, timeliness, and clarity, and a strategic delivery of a few key messages are also needed.”

10. This chapter considers the evidence on the effectiveness of IMF interactions with the authorities of the advanced economies. It begins with the survey-based indicators of interactions developed in the main report, looking within their component parts for further insights about interactions with the authorities of advanced economies. It then turns to interactions on three specific themes of particular interest in the context of advanced economies, namely: (i) international policy coordination, including spillover analysis; (ii) cross-country analysis and sharing of the lessons of experience; and (iii) financial-sector/ macro linkages.

11. The weight of the evidence considered in the chapter suggests that the Fund faced major challenges in its interactions with advanced economies over the evaluation period. The authorities of large advanced economies in particular were not enthusiastic about the relevance or effectiveness of Fund interactions with them in many roles that the staff thought quite important. And they rated the quality of many IMF activities as “average.” Meanwhile staff in large majorities felt they expended much effort on what they saw as relevant and high-quality activities in their work on large advanced economies, although only a minority felt their interactions were actually effective. In respect to the individual themes considered in the chapter, the evidence suggests that staff produced many papers for the authorities, for the IMF Executive Board, and for external publication—but important exceptions notwithstanding, their official counterparts did not find the work compelling. For the other advanced economies, the conclusions are similar to these but generally less pronounced.

A. Indicators of interactions

12. The main report uses survey-based indicators to compare the country groups’ perceptions about different aspects of interactions. This section analyzes some of those indicators for the advanced economies in more depth, to see what insights they may provide about interactions with those countries.

13. Figure 1 reproduces the composite indicators of interactions from Box 2 of the main report. As shown, the large advanced economies’ indicators are the lowest of all country groups for role relevance and quality. They are similar to other advanced and large emerging economies on strategic alignment (the difference between what the authorities wanted and what staff aim to do). And on the two measures of effectiveness shown in the chart, they provide a mixed picture, as they reflect different weights attached to various...
IMF INTERACTIONS WITH ADVANCED ECONOMIES

Figure 1. Composite Indicators of Interactions (Authorities’ Results)

The other advanced economies’ indicators for relevance and quality were generally higher than those for the large advanced economies by some 20–25 percent, and somewhat lower for the role effectiveness and overall perceived effectiveness.

**Large advanced economies**

14. How are these indicators to be understood? The indicators are composite scores, driven by micro-data derived from the underlying survey answers. For relevance, the underlying data is illustrated in Box 1, which shows that there are only two roles—(i) providing an independent assessment of policies and prospects and (ii) contributing to a good exchange of views whether or not there was an agreement—for which most large advanced economies wanted interactions with the Fund. And as illustrated in Box 2, these two roles are rated highly by the authorities; staff also rate both highly for relevance and effectiveness. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, there is a similar convergence, in which the authorities and staff agree that activities are low priority—such as monitoring support and capacity building.

15. But in between, it is more complicated—as large majorities of staff working on these countries think certain activities are priorities and the authorities do not. Indeed, as shown in the lower panel of Box 1, several of these activities go to the heart of how staff see their job, such as to contribute to the development of policy frameworks, public debate about policies, and—of heightened importance following the recent decision by the membership—the coordination of international policies. Yet only minorities of the authorities, as shown in the upper panel of Box 1, think these are important roles for the Fund. This “strategic dissonance,” coupled with the lack of support staff feel they get from management and senior staff when tensions arise with the authorities explains much of why staff working on the large advanced economies feel as they do about their effectiveness (Figure 2).8,9

8The staff ratings show the usual pattern of much more positive quality and relevance scores by staff than the authorities. The twist here is on overall perceived effectiveness, for which the staff rating is extremely low—only 22 percent for 2001–08 (not shown), and 45 percent for 2007–08—notwithstanding much higher scores for role relevance and quality (61 percent and 75 percent, respectively). In turn, this reflects the high implicit weights the staff attach to individual roles with very low effectiveness scores, such as the Fund’s contribution to the development of policy frameworks, international policy coordination, and the development of policy consensus outside government.

9Figure 9 later in the paper discusses the issue of management backing for staff in cases of disagreement.
**Box 1. Relevance Indicator: Ten Roles**

**Authorities.** The underlying survey data for the authorities’ views on the ten roles and purposes is shown below. It shows the share of survey respondents of the large advanced economies and the other advanced economies who said they had wanted the Fund to engage in a role “a fair amount” or “a great deal” over the past two years.

![Chart showing relevance of roles](chart)

**Staff.** The underlying survey data for the staff views on the ten roles and purposes is shown below. It shows the share of staff survey respondents working on the large advanced and other advanced economies who said they had aimed to carry out the particular role “a fair amount” or “a great deal” over the past two years.

![Chart showing staff relevance of roles](chart)
Box 2. Role Effectiveness: Authorities’ and Staff Views

**Authorities.** Shown below is the share of authorities’ survey respondents of the large and the other advanced economies who said that interactions in each of the respective roles had been “effective” or “very effective” over the past two years.

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<th>Role Description</th>
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<th>Other Advanced</th>
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<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
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<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
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<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
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<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
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<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Assist in building capacity in your country¹</td>
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<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program²</td>
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**Staff.** Shown below is the share of staff survey respondents working on the large and other advanced economies who said interactions in each of the respective roles had been “effective” or “very effective” over the past two years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Description</th>
<th>Large Advanced</th>
<th>Other Advanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Includes only those who responded that their country received IMF technical assistance or training.
²Includes only those who responded that their country had an IMF financial or monitoring program.
16. There are two views about what drives the low interest of the authorities of the large advanced economies in some of these functions that staff see as key—a debate that is highly relevant to the challenge the institution now faces as it implements its new responsibilities on the coordination of policies. On one view, the authorities simply do not want staff (or other outsiders) at the policy table, especially on issues related to possible actions that they might be encouraged to take to avoid adverse spillovers to other countries. The other view focuses on quality, which is seen as not good enough to warrant a seat at the policy table. The evaluation took the view that an in-depth review of the quality of Fund products was beyond its scope, but it did ask authorities and staff about their perceptions of different dimensions of quality, as summarized in the quality indicators of Figures 1 and 2 and detailed in Box 3. In this context it is noteworthy that the large advanced economies rated quality lower than did any other country group, as shown in Figure 1.

17. Boxes 1–3 suggest strong differences between the authorities of the large advanced economies and staff views on virtually all polled issues. On quality and relevance, staff rate interactions 25 percentage points higher than the authorities. While on perceived overall effectiveness, they are more than 25 percentage points below. These are wide variations by any measure, suggesting major disconnects between the authorities and staff on the fundamental purposes and results of interactions.

Other advanced economies

18. For the other advanced economies, the underlying relevance and quality indicators numbers are more favorable to the Fund than are those for the large advanced economies, but even these are not that high (47 percent and 64 percent, respectively). Conversely, staff have a much more positive view of interactions with them than with the large advanced economies. Large majorities of other advanced economies wanted Fund involvement on two additional roles beyond the two indicated by the large advanced economies, viz., contributing to the development of policy frameworks and to international policy coordination, including spillover analysis—two roles that are among the staff’s top priorities as well. In terms of quality, majorities of the other advanced economies rated eight of the ten polled attributes as good or excellent. The other advanced economies’ ratings for overall perceived effectiveness are lower than those of the large advanced economies (57 percent for 2001–08), but improving (68 percent for 2007–08).
Box 3. Quality Indicator: Ten Attributes

**Authorities.** Shown below is the share of authorities’ survey respondents of the large and the other advanced economies who said the Fund had done a “good” or an “excellent” job on the following ten attributes over the past two years.

![Graph showing the share of authorities' survey respondents](image)

- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue
- Respond quickly to your requests for analytical work
- Listen carefully to your perspectives
- Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship
- Respond in general to your needs and changing priorities
- Focus on topics of interest to your country
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country
- Bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions

**Staff.** Shown below is the share of staff survey respondents working on the large and the other advanced economies who said the Fund had done a “good” or an “excellent” job on the following ten attributes over the past two years.

![Graph showing the share of staff survey respondents](image)

- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue
- Listen carefully to your perspectives
- Respond quickly to your requests for analytical work
- Focus on topics of interest to your country
- Respond in general to your needs and changing priorities
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country
- Bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions
B. Key themes

19. This section examines interactions in the context of three themes: (i) the Fund’s contribution to international policy coordination, including the analysis of spillovers—a topic of increased interest going forward; (ii) cross-country analysis; and (iii) macro-financial sector linkages, drawing on the evaluation’s more detailed survey, interview, and documentary evidence. It explores what lies behind the findings from the indicator analysis that the authorities of many advanced economies had serious doubts about the relevance, quality, and effectiveness of many Fund activities involving interactions with them, while staff felt they do high-quality and relevant work, albeit also of limited effectiveness.

International policy coordination, including spillover analysis

20. Given the preponderance of systemically important countries among the advanced economies, a natural question concerns the Fund’s role in and interactions on international policy coordination and the analysis of economic and financial spillovers. This question was asked in the evaluation survey, and received decidedly different answers from different groups of respondents—including the large advanced economies, the other advanced economies, and the staff, as shown in Figure 3.

21. Most striking is the limited apparent interest of the large advanced economies in such activities. Among such survey respondents, fewer than half (46 percent) said they wanted the Fund to contribute to international policy coordination including the analysis of spillovers, while among the other advanced economy respondents 73 percent wanted the Fund to do it. Almost all staff (96 percent) working on large advanced economies, and 80 percent of those working on the other advanced countries, said they aimed to do it. On the effectiveness of this work, there is a greater meeting of minds between large advanced authorities and staff—40–50 percent said the Fund’s analysis was effective or very effective. Among the other advanced economies, by contrast, only 27 percent of the authorities felt that the analysis was effective or very effective, while twice as many staff felt this way.

22. Article IV documents for the advanced economies are replete with examples of analytical work...
on policy coordination, including the analysis of spillovers. The internal documentary evidence reviewed by the evaluation team—including management feedback on mission briefs and back-to-office reports—suggests that senior staff and management continuously pushed staff to add to and sharpen the analysis of spillovers. With respect to the United States, for example, this work covered: the contribution of net trade with the United States to growth in its trading partners; the contribution of the U.S. current account deficit to Japanese and euro area surpluses; influences of the United States on the world economy through trade, stock markets, interest rates, and exchange rates; cross-country productivity growth and the U.S. current account deficit; and wealth spillovers from foreign holdings of U.S. assets. Non-U.S. examples include: the impact of yen depreciation on Asian economies and the impact of structural and fiscal reforms in Japan on global growth and external imbalances; the impact of growth in China on patterns of world trade; trade and investment linkages between China and Korea; inter-relationships between U.S. and European growth and German economic growth, and the impact of growth spillovers from Germany elsewhere in Europe; the risks for New Zealand of its banks’ dependence on international capital markets for funding; and the macroeconomic impact of immigration to the United Kingdom from central Europe.

23. Interviewees from large advanced economies were not impressed by all this material on policy coordination and spillover analysis, with doubts about Fund relevance and effectiveness recurring themes of the conversations. Rather, interviewees expressed a range of views, from dissatisfaction with what the Fund had done in this area to a lack of interest in the Fund’s doing any more. In general, there was a lack of interest in discussions of spillovers and global imbalances, which some saw as the Fund’s cue for going on about China’s exchange rate, the U.S. fiscal deficit, and Europe’s structural rigidities. One official observed that the Fund had failed to bring an international perspective to the Article IV consultation with his country. While a former official from a large advanced economy said that he and his colleagues had been struck by the view that the country had been given an easy time in its Article IV discussion. Echoing these views, a senior staff member working on a large advanced economy said that the ministry of finance has made it clear that there is little interest in Fund views other than spillovers to the country from the rest of the world. Another observer in a large advanced economy questioned whether and how the Fund was tying together its work and advice on major global financial centers.

24. Officials from the other advanced economies saw things differently, but in the survey rated the effectiveness of interactions on international coordination even lower than did the large advanced economies. (See the right-hand panel of Figure 3.) They looked to the Fund for an analysis of spillovers emanating from the large advanced economies and other sources, and saw this function as central to the Fund’s job. In light of the (then) unfolding financial crisis, some questioned why the Fund had not taken a more forthright stance delving into monetary and financial sector policies of large advanced economies that affected others (in particular pointing to the lack of U.S. participation in the FSAP). Others expressed their appreciation for the work the Fund had done on spillovers. One such interviewee said that work done on global approaches to various problems had been quite valuable.

25. In both the large and the other advanced economies, many of the authorities felt that the Fund had not effectively alerted them to the implications of changing external conditions (Figure 4). Only 46 percent of the survey respondents from large advanced economies said the Fund did a good or an excellent job in this role, and even fewer (38 percent) of those from other advanced economies said so. The staff, meanwhile, rated their own performance almost twice as highly: 68 percent of those working on large advanced economies, and 96 percent of those working on other advanced economies, said that staff did a good or an excellent job.

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10For example, see the Fund’s 2008 Triennial Surveillance Review, Thematic Findings, page 9, which cite multiple instances of spillover analysis for advanced economies in 2007: Austria, euro area (2), Hong Kong SAR, Iceland (3), Ireland, Japan (2), Korea (2), Malta, New Zealand, Portugal (2), United Kingdom (3), and United States (5).
Cross-country analysis

26. The provision of analysis based on the experiences of comparator countries and lessons learned is one aspect in which the IMF work should be excellent. Is it? The survey and interview evidence provided by the authorities suggest that in the evaluation period it was not, although Fund staff did much relevant work towards this end.

27. Here too the evaluation survey results show wide differences between the authorities’ and staff views on the Fund’s work. As illustrated in Figure 5, only 38 percent of the surveyed authorities from large advanced economies and 53 percent of those in other advanced economies thought that in areas of its expertise and mandate the Fund did a good or excellent job of providing analysis based on the experience of other countries. Most of the remainder rated the Fund’s performance “average,” with 10–15 percent rating it “poor.” Among staff, by contrast, more than 60 percent of those working on large advanced economies, and 94 percent of those working on other advanced countries, thought that the Fund had done a good job.

28. The evidence suggests that staff did a great deal of work in areas involving comparator and cross-country analysis. Much of this work was incorporated into the multilateral surveillance documents the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), and into the Regional Economic Outlooks (REOs), all of which were meant to inform bilateral surveillance as well. During the evaluation period, the Fund also brokered country-to-country cross fertilization, as in presentations to the Austrian authorities on Canada’s experience with a large, front-end-loaded, expenditure-based fiscal adjustment. Cross-country analysis also took place through country team work on multiple countries, as in Australia and New Zealand, exploring methodological issues related to the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates, analyzing housing price developments, and understanding the impact of commodity prices on structural fiscal balances, including through comparisons with other OECD countries. Meanwhile, much cross-country research was done on topics such as inflation targeting, and sometimes the findings of that work provided the basis for advice to individual countries, such as Switzerland. Other examples from the evaluation sample countries include the pulling together of extensive cross-country evidence and analysis on taxes, government spending, and other variables and focusing it on the size and role of government in an individual country, such as Sweden.

29. Notwithstanding the staff effort on cross-country issues, the evaluation interviews suggest a failure to convert that effort into a systematic—and valued—feature of Fund interactions with advanced economies. Interviewed officials from advanced economies said that IMF missions’ knowledge of relevant experience in other countries often seemed more a matter of happening, depending on which countries the team members had recently engaged with. But, as in other areas and on other topics, interviewees expressed a full range of views.

30. The authorities from large advanced economies expressed limited interest, at best, in the kind of cross-country analysis the Fund was providing. Published evidence suggests that even a country such as Canada, whose authorities were generally receptive to the Fund’s advice, found that in the course of its Article IV consultation the Fund contributed too little that was new (Box 4). During the evaluation interviews with officials from large advanced economies, one interviewee did not see a need for any work on cross-fertilization from the Fund, while another wanted more, and a third said there was very little at present. Among staff working on large advanced economies, one said that he would be surprised to hear that the authorities were interested in the experiences of others, as they saw themselves as far ahead of their peers. Another said the Fund could and should do better on this. And a third stressed the importance of the Fund’s functional departments in providing the essential cross-country perspective.

31. Interviewed officials from other advanced economies expressed much greater interest in cross-country analysis than those in the large advanced economies—but also, for the most part, greater dissatisfaction with the Fund’s performance. Authorities generally complained that the Fund provided too little cross-country analysis. Some cited the erratic nature of the Fund’s ability to advise on cross-country issues, and wished that the Fund had more to say about relevant
Box 4. Canada’s Article IV Consultations: What’s New?

A research paper by a Canadian academic examined Canada’s experience with the Article IV process over the period 1999–2005.1 The author interviewed Department of Finance officials and reviewed staff reports and selected issues papers. The paper found that Department of Finance officials:

- liked the mix of Fund staff and were not concerned with mission turnover;
- found staff to be competent, knowledgeable about Canada, and technically skilled;
- expected Fund staff to bring something to bear from their own or other countries;
- felt that Fund staff rarely contributed cross-country analysis and that the OECD performed better on structural issues and on providing “relevant policy advice that was usable;”
- welcomed the check on the robustness of the department’s own analysis provided by the consultations—if anything, it was the best external review the department received;
- but in the end, thought that Fund staff did not really bring anything new to the table.

1See Momani (2006).

practices/experience in other countries. One interviewee put it more positively, saying that through interactions he hoped to receive recommendations based on international experiences.

Macro-financial linkages

32. The global financial crisis has shown yet again the importance of integrating macroeconomic and financial sector surveillance. This was a key recommendation from the IEO’s 2006 Evaluation of the Financial Sector Assessment Program, which called for the links between the FSAP and surveillance to be strengthened, and suggested that in countries with important financial sectors the Article IV consultation should be fully integrated with an annual FSAP update, with a single integrated mission covering both.11 That evaluation also suggested using a name-and-shame approach to encourage systemically important countries that had not yet volunteered for the FSAP, to do so. Today, among the advanced economies, the United States stands alone without an FSAP, although one has now been scheduled and the staff preparation is under way.

11See IEO (2006a).
system surfaced. IMF staff convinced the authorities of the need to act promptly; they also provided concrete recommendations for legislation.

35. Staff who were interviewed stressed the challenges of integrating financial and macro surveillance—highlighting the specialized skills needed for financial sector analysis. In the words of one staff member, macro-financial analysis is difficult because there is no received wisdom and governments are reluctant to talk about it. Financial analysis must often be very detailed, requiring complex assessments of the quality of portfolios, risks to the fiscal sector, and linkages to the private sector, as well as implications for exchange rate policy and for the conduct of monetary policy. Corresponding to the views expressed by some authorities, several staff members see this type of expertise as lacking. One staff member said the Fund has not kept up with financial markets as it should have, while another said that Fund preparation on financial sector issues never got the staff onto the same page as the financial sector regulators. The structure of surveillance missions themselves was also cited by staff as having limited the effectiveness of the Fund’s interactions concerning the financial sector. According to one staff member, good interactions require having the right person from MCM on the mission team, but since financial sector expertise is very micro, it is hard to get someone who knows every area. Similarly, another said that the team would have benefited from more in-depth analysis, but there is a limit as to what you can do with two to three MCM representatives on a team for two weeks, compared to the thirty staff members who work on an FSAP for two to three months. One staff member noted that Fund staff were in favor of combining Article IV and FSAP updates, but that the institution was not there yet.

36. Meanwhile, the internal documents that were provided for the evaluation point to increasing attention to financial sector issues in recent years. Each of the 2007–08 surveillance assessments for the ten evaluation sample countries gave some prominence to financial topics, with some being quite specific and others simply stating that more work was to be done on macro-financial linkages. In the large advanced economies, the work program included, in one case, an examination of options for strengthening deposit insurance and banking supervision; in another, an analysis of the efficiency of financial sector institutions; in a third, an analysis of, and planned input into, planned financial sector reforms; and an evaluation of financial sector stress and risks, building on the recent FSAP. Similar work program items were included in the surveillance agendas for the other advanced economies, such as an assessment of risks identified in a recent FSAP; monitoring the implementation of FSAP recommendations; the monitoring of bank exposure to foreign currency lending; and the development of recommendations to improve financial sector supervision. For one other advanced economy, the work included getting a better understanding of the linkages from financial sector development to potential growth.

III. IMF Interactions with Other Stakeholders in Advanced Economies

37. Looking at IMF interactions with stakeholders beyond the monetary and fiscal authorities, this chapter examines recent developments in such interactions, and constraints on their effectiveness. It finds that an increasing amount of outreach took place to parliamentarians, civil society, the media, think tanks, and market participants over the evaluation period. It also finds very limited interest among the authorities of advanced economies in having the Fund engage in public discussions about their policies, especially through the media, which blocked a potential avenue for the staff to gain traction for its work on the advanced economies—a topic taken up in Chapter IV.

A. Recent developments

38. The Fund’s transparency policy took effect at the beginning of the evaluation period, putting a premium on the publication of Article IV reports and related papers. Companion efforts to enhance Fund staff communications emphasized outreach to in-country stakeholders beyond the authorities—to parliamentarians as the countries’ elected officials, to representatives of civil society as key constituencies, including the media as vehicles for getting messages out to the wider public, and market participants, with whom Fund staff had long interacted as part of its fact-finding work. Staff interactions with many of these stakeholders intensified during the evaluation period. For example:

• Parliamentarians. Staff interactions took place through seminars, meetings with visiting groups of parliamentarians at IMF headquarters and in the field, and management speeches to members
IMF INTERACTIONS WITH ADVANCED ECONOMIES

of parliaments, often under the aegis of the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank. Documentary evidence for the evaluation sample countries shows that staff reached out to parliamentarians, including members of the National Diet of Japan, members of parliaments in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and, since 2008, the United Kingdom and the United States.13

- **Civil society.** As noted in Chapter I of this paper, the evaluation survey of civil society received 155 responses from representatives of civil society in 29 advanced economies.14 The large majority of responses were from private sector associations, think tanks, and academics, but also from many NGOs; relatively few were from the media and labor unions. Ninety-four respondents said that they had had interactions with Fund staff between 2001 and 2008. Their responses portray staff as respectful, listening, and aware of host-country cultures, though with lower scores on cultural sensitivities from the NGO representatives. Over half of the survey respondents who had met with staff did not answer the questions15 on whether (i) their views were taken into account in IMF discussions with the government and (ii) their discussions with the IMF generally contributed to building national support and initiative towards “IMF-backed policies.” Of those who did answer, about 80 percent said their views had been reflected and about half said that their discussions had contributed to building national support for policies.

- **Trade unions.** According to the responses to an EXR survey of country teams carried out in 2007, staff had met with trade union representatives in the previous two years in 80 percent of the advanced economies; exceptions included Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. The surveyed staff said they found the meetings to be useful in all cases, with almost half reporting that the meetings influenced the IMF’s policy advice, although those reporting such influence made very general observations on the nature of that influence, such as that “Labor market rigidities [were] one of the most important economic issues facing the country, as reflected in the country’s persistently high unemployment rate.”

- **Market participants, think tanks, and academia:** In mid-2005, RES and area departments, especially the European Department, began conducting more outreach events associated with the World Economic Outlook. During the evaluation period, MCM and EXR worked to intensify outreach on the GFSR to financial markets and to the private sector, and greater efforts began to be made to use senior staff in outreach to key European financial centers. In October 2008, for the first time, the WEO and the GFSR were covered together during an international conference call in which analysts and academics from all over the world took part.

- **Media and other stakeholders.** IMF area departments also used Regional Economic Outlooks (REOs) to engage with the authorities and other stakeholders in member countries. EUR’s first REO was launched in London in 2007; the second in Frankfurt; and the third in Brussels. Along with country seminars and presentations, they provided opportunities for IMF senior staff to engage with technical staff, academics, and policymakers from a number of countries in the region, including in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. They also provided occasions for press briefings, conferences, and interviews, as well as meetings with other stakeholders. The presentations of APD’s many REOs were accompanied by outreach activities in major cities in the region, and at meetings of ASEAN and APEC. APD recently expanded its non-REO-related activities, both through media events and high-level regional seminars and conferences hosted by the Fund and also in collaboration with regional entities such as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. WHD’s REOs largely targeted the region’s emerging-market audience, with no events in Canada or in the United States.

B. Constraints on more—and more effective—outreach

39. Fund staff faced considerable challenges in translating these outreach efforts into influence on policy debates within advanced economies during the evaluation period. In these countries, interactions with other stakeholders, especially the media, can in principle provide a source of traction which is otherwise in short supply. In underlining this point, one senior staff member stated that the overwhelming factor in the 2001–08 period was the transparency initiative, which led to a situation where the authorities...

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14Scholte (2009) covered Canada, France, and the United Kingdom among the advanced economies, although its focus was on PRGF-eligible countries and to a lesser extent the emerging economies. The report noted that the “largest number and the greatest depth of IMF interactions with civil society have so far always involved associations based in North America and Western Europe.”
15“No response,” “not applicable,” or “don’t know.”
had a greater incentive to be interested in the work of the Fund because the media dimension became more important.

40. However, the survey evidence suggests that IMF outreach in their countries is not high on the advanced economies’ agenda, although staff see things differently. Indeed, as shown in Figure 6, only 17 percent of the respondents from large advanced economies and 36 percent of the respondents from the other advanced economies said they wanted the IMF to be involved at least to some extent in helping to build/maintain policy consensus through contacts outside government.16 Asked whether the IMF was effective or not in this role, only 8 percent of the respondents from large advanced economies, and 24 percent of those from the other advanced economies, said the Fund was effective or very effective. The numbers for staff are much higher.

41. The evaluation survey also asked the authorities whether they wanted more, less, or about the same amount of outreach with a variety of groups going forward (Figure 7). The authorities from large advanced economies generally said they wanted “about the same” amount for parliamentarians, media, and CSOs, including think tanks, both before and after policy decisions were made. The only departure was with respect to market participants, for which 36 percent of the authorities from large advanced economies said they would like more outreach. The authorities of other advanced economies wanted a little more outreach than the authorities from large advanced economies in most categories, but they did not highlight a need for extra outreach to market participants. The survey results also suggest that the authorities in the other advanced economies are more open to IMF engagement with civil society—80 percent of the civil society respondents in other advanced economies said that the authorities had encouraged their interactions with the Fund, compared with only 58 percent in the large advanced group.

42. Notwithstanding the limited enthusiasm for staff outreach indicated in the authorities’ survey responses, interviewed officials expressed an interest in the Fund doing more to communicate its views. One recurring suggestion was for greater use of end-of-mission roundtables with outsiders as well as officials, at which the conclusions could be presented and discussed. Another suggestion was to hold more seminars on particular country-specific issues—a move that would be strongly welcomed by think tanks, CSOs, and others. Interviewed officials generally supported the holding of end-of-mission press conferences, whose timing would be set in advance, even in countries where this is not yet the practice.

43. But internal documents and other interviews show that IMF staff pushed the authorities of several countries to do just this, to no avail. And the survey painted a different picture of the authorities’ views on such approaches. As shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 6, none of the respondents from the large advanced economies supported the idea

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16The other response choices were framed in terms of “not very much” or “not at all.”
of wider discussion through more public seminars and the like, and only 24 percent of the respondents from the other advanced economies wanted more.

44. The Fund website suggests that end-of-mission press conferences were held in only half the advanced economies during the evaluation period. Press conferences/calls associated with the publication of the Public Information Notice and the Staff Report took place in the remaining countries, with the exceptions of Australia and New Zealand. End-of-mission press conferences became more common over the course of the evaluation period, and the U.S. mission held a press conference for the first time in 2007. Among the large advanced economies, Canada (until recently), Japan, and the United States were the only countries that allowed this practice, with Switzerland among the other advanced economies. Among the evaluation sample countries, by 2008, all except New Zealand allowed for the publication of the concluding statement of the Article IV consultation mission.

IV. Management of Interactions

45. Were interactions with the advanced economies well managed? This chapter addresses three dimensions of this question—strategy, staffing, and relationship management. It draws the following conclusions:

- First, and important also for the other findings, the Fund did not have an effective strategy for increasing the interest of advanced economies in interactions with it beyond a good exchange of views, especially in view of the limitations on outreach discussed above.

- Second, the management of staffing helped with the large advanced economies, as mission chief tenures were longer than elsewhere. But rapid turnover was a major complaint of the other advanced economies, both in the survey and in the interviews. Across the advanced economies, staff sometimes sacrificed candor for harmony in the relationship—an approach that reduced tensions with important shareholders but did not enhance effectiveness. Meanwhile, staff skills, while good, did not have the cutting-edge power needed to get/sustain the attention of some authorities.

- Third, and more broadly, the Fund’s approach to relationship management was not systematic: it fell short on staff incentives; Fund management’s own interactions with authorities was uneven; and there were missed opportunities to the relationship with country authorities as circumstances changed.
A. Strategy

46. As set out in Chapter I above, the Articles of Agreement require the Fund to exercise firm surveillance over members’ exchange rate policies. Article IV staff guidance covers the provision of information on (i) the country’s economic situation and outlook, (ii) confidential policy advice, and (iii) crucially for systemically important countries, the risk of international spillovers with adverse implications for external stability. Also, the guidance urges staff to “foster a frank policy dialogue that supports members’ receptiveness to Fund advice.”

47. Figure 8 captures the central strategic challenge that staff face in supporting the advanced countries’ “receptiveness to Fund advice.” While almost 80 percent of the surveyed staff working on the large advanced economies countries aimed to contribute to country policy frameworks, fewer than 40 percent of the surveyed officials from the large advanced economies said they wanted such contributions. For the other advanced economies, both numbers are slightly higher, but the disconnect between the authorities and staff is broadly the same. And in both cases, low effectiveness ratings followed.

48. But the scale of the disconnect between the authorities’ and staff views on priorities for interactions went much further. As touched on in Chapter II and summarized in Box 5, there were very large differences between what the authorities thought were worthwhile activities for interactions and what staff thought. For the large advanced economies there were four roles for which the staff and the authorities had differences of view of between 40 and 60 percentage points. For the other advanced economies, there were similarly large differences between the authorities and staff on the purposes of interactions, but also several areas of agreement on high priority items (independent assessment and good exchange of views) and low priority items (programs and capacity building). These large differences raise questions about how such large differences in perspectives have persisted and their implications managed.

49. In this context, the evaluation evidence suggests the Fund lacked an effective strategy for bridging such large differences in perspective about the role of the Fund in the advanced economies. The picture that emerges from the interviews and internal documentary evidence, including the surveillance agendas—suggests a three-pronged strategy for the Fund’s
Box 5. Strategic Dissonance Between the Authorities of Advanced Economies and Staff

**Large advanced economies.** The figure below shows the underlying survey data on the relevance of ten queried purposes. For each of the ten items, it shows the proportion of staff working on the large advanced economies who responded that they had aimed to carry out the role “a fair amount” or “a great deal” minus the proportions of the authorities of the large advanced economies who said they wanted the fund to engage in that role “a fair amount” or “a great deal.”

**Other advanced economies.** The figure below shows the underlying survey data on the relevance of ten queried purposes. For each of the ten items, it shows the proportion of staff working on the other advanced economies who responded that they had aimed to carry out the role “a fair amount” or “a great deal” minus the proportions of the authorities of the other advanced economies who said they wanted the fund to engage in that role “a fair amount” or “a great deal.”
approach to interactions with the advanced economies at the country-level, consisting of: (i) writing reports; (ii) avoiding conflict with the authorities; and (iii) to enhance traction, pursuing as much in-country outreach as the authorities felt comfortable with. But these efforts amounted to little more than swimming against the tide. Meanwhile, other evaluation evidence—from the surveys (see Figure 7, for example) and the authorities’ interview evidence discussed in Chapter II—shows that the strategy failed to achieve effective interactions, especially in the large advanced economies.

50. Staff are clearly aware of the problem. As illustrated earlier in the chapter (in Figure 2), staff working on the large advanced economies rated the effectiveness of interactions much lower than did staff working on any other country group/subgroup, and lower than did the authorities of any country group/subgroup. Only 22 percent of staff survey respondents working on large advanced economies said they thought interactions were effective/very effective for the evaluation period as a whole and only 45 percent thought so for 2007–08, compared with 70–83 percent for the other four country groups. In other words: staff working on large advanced economies do not feel that they are getting through.

B. Staffing

51. Discussed below are three staff-related issues highly relevant to strategy: staff independence and candor, skills, and continuity. On independence and candor, the evidence raises questions about staff independence in preparing and presenting professional assessments to the authorities; it also highlights the lack of institutional guidance and training to staff on managing trade-offs between candor on the one hand and diplomacy on the other. On skills, the survey results for the large advanced economies and the interviews with officials from both the large and other advanced economies point to the importance of professional excellence for obtaining traction, and also communications skills for delivering tough messages. Finally, for the other advanced economies albeit not for the large advanced economies, limited staff continuity deterred the building of relationships of trust between the staff and the authorities.

Professional independence and candor

52. The evaluation evidence suggests that management and staff strove to avoid disagreements with the authorities as far as possible, with very difficult implications for institutional integrity and staff morale. More than half of the surveyed staff working on advanced economies said that a desire to preserve the relationship had caused them to make assessments that were “too cautious,” as shown in Figure 9.17 Asked whether they had received insufficient management support when tensions arose, 46 percent agreed or strongly agreed (47 percent of the staff working on large advanced economies and 45 percent of the staff working on other advanced economies).

53. Evaluation interviews generally corroborated the survey finding that staff had toned down their conclusions. One staff member said that their strategy was to try not to antagonize the authorities because of the risk that they would pick up the phone to management and complain. Another said management was

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17These ratings suggest that staff are somewhat more cautious with advanced countries than with countries in other groups. See Figure 14 of the main report.
not inclined to push hard on sensitive issues such as banking reform. And yet another said management effectively told the team that they did not want the mission to say anything that the finance minister did not like. And from the authorities, one official of a large advanced economy was of the view that the staff message is generally not given firmly enough. And another said that there might be occasions where they would welcome stronger pressure from the Fund, either put confidentially to the minister or even in the concluding statement. Yet another confided that much effort is put into influencing the staff’s final press statement to ensure that it is supportive of the authorities’ policy. He also said that in his experience, mission chiefs have been too ready to tone down their conclusions at the last minute after discussion with officials.

54. But several of the interviews provided nuances. One staff member who had worked on large advanced economy said that when staff disagreed with the authorities’ analysis, it was often professionally difficult to push back: given the depth of the analytic capability underpinning the authorities’ position, it often seemed prudent to accept that position. In the view of one mission chief it is hard to add value when the other side has 30–40 Fund-level economists. Another wondered what five or six economists could bring to bear; the tendency was to give the authorities the benefit of doubt. Though several interviewees portrayed staff as cautious, and sometimes overly so, some saw the staff approach as diplomatic and helpful for getting results. Indeed, as one government official said, it was helpful that the tone of exchanges and advice was not confrontational and that helps get things done.

Skills

55. Advanced economy authorities’ responses to the evaluation survey generally portrayed staff as respectful, well prepared, and well educated. Figure 10 shows that survey respondents from the large advanced economies thought that Fund staff had adequate country knowledge and practical experience, but too little relevant technical knowledge, including financial sector expertise. Some of the authorities (fewer than 20 percent) from the other advanced economies voiced concern about the staff’s country knowledge and practical experience in policy formulation. Figure 10 also suggests that IMF staff language skills were not a major issue in the advanced economies—either for the authorities from large and other advanced economies. This said, in interviews both national officials and staff noted that language skills were of course important, if mission chiefs were to interact with ministers in non-English-speaking countries and to help get a sense of the politics of a country.

56. The evaluation interviews also supported these generally favorable views about staff skills, albeit with a few concerns—again mostly on the financial sector. On the positive side, interviewees from one evalua-
59. Interviewed authorities expressed a range of views on the turnover issue. Some country officials were quite relaxed about staff turnover. Other officials—mostly from other advanced economies—saw staff turnover as a problem, echoing concerns raised by officials of some emerging economies and PRGF-eligible countries. Some highlighted the costs to the authorities of educating new mission chiefs about country conditions and institutions, while others said they thought that turnover had worsened, with many changes to the Article IV team and new members not as knowledgeable as those they replaced. But others thought things had improved, indicating that continuity in the discussions required that IMF staff turnover not be too rapid: this had been the case some years

### Turnover

57. Staff continuity clearly affects the institutional relationship. In this context, IMF staff turnover was a concern for the authorities of many of the other advanced economies, though not for the authorities of the large advanced economies countries. As shown in Figure 11, more than 40 percent of the survey respondents from the other advanced economies said that the Fund had not provided enough continuity or a relatively smooth changeover of mission chiefs and mission members. None of the survey respondents from the large advanced economies shared this view.

58. This difference among the advanced country groups is also reflected in the staff survey responses. Half of the staff working on large advanced economies and 73 percent of those working on other advanced economies said that staff had little or no incentive to work on a country for more than two years. The latter proportion is similar to those for the PRGF-eligible and emerging market country groups. In turn, these responses are consistent with the finding that the tenure of mission chiefs working on large advanced economies was roughly twice that for the other advanced economies. Also, 29 percent of the staff working on large advanced economies, and 45 percent of the staff working on other advanced economies, said that they had received too little briefing/handover from their predecessors.

59. Interviewed authorities expressed a range of views on the turnover issue. Some country officials were quite relaxed about staff turnover. Other officials—mostly from other advanced economies—saw staff turnover as a problem, echoing concerns raised by officials of some emerging economies and PRGF-eligible countries. Some highlighted the costs to the authorities of educating new mission chiefs about country conditions and institutions, while others said they thought that turnover had worsened, with many changes to the Article IV team and new members not as knowledgeable as those they replaced. But others thought things had improved, indicating that continuity in the discussions required that IMF staff turnover not be too rapid: this had been the case some years.
back and the situation is now better. These differences of view were also reflected in the survey results, and in the evaluation interviews with banking association members, one of whom said that turnover did not matter one way or the other, as there were no discernable differences between mission chiefs; all were experts with a clear view, while recognizing that differences in personal style reflected the variety of cultures of the different mission chiefs’ home countries. However, another observer remarked that the costs of staff rotation should not be underestimated.

60. Interviewed staff spoke more generally about Fund turnover policies than about the specifics pertaining to the advanced economies. One mission chief said that excessive turnover of country teams was a major problem, and reflected the fact that management had sided with “staff vested interests” in frequent turnover. He deplored the fact that mistakes were made because the staff did not know about country-specific factors. Another noted that the institution does not nurture country specialists as did the OECD, for example.

C. Relationship management

61. The authorities’ responses to the survey gave mixed signals about how the Fund managed its relationship with them. As shown in Box 4 of the main report, all of the large advanced economies and 89 percent of the other advanced economy survey respondents said the Fund’s relationship management was conducive to effective interactions. But far fewer of them rated highly the Fund’s performance on long-term strategic approach to the relationship. Only 54 percent of the responding authorities from large advanced economies (and 65 percent of those from other advanced economies) thought the Fund did a good or excellent job here, with about 38 percent of large advanced economy respondents (and 24 percent for other advanced economies) rating the Fund’s performance as “average.” Meanwhile, the BIS and ECB scored better in the survey questions on relationship management.

62. The evidence also points to several specific qualitative concerns, discussed below, including (i) staff incentives; (ii) the conduct of IMF management’s interactions with the authorities; and (iii) the care with which the institution has addressed the particular sensitivities and concerns of country counterparts.

Staff incentives for interaction

63. Area department staff said that face-to-face interactions with the authorities and other stakeholders were neither satisfactorily rewarded nor resourced. About 55 percent of staff respondents working on advanced economies said that such interactions with the authorities was given too little weight in their annual performance reviews. More than 50 percent said they thought too little time was devoted to interactions relative to other work. More than 45 percent reported not getting adequate support from senior staff and/or management on disagreements with the authorities. As Figure 12 shows, these concerns are not limited to staff

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18Staff were more sanguine: 60 percent of those working on G-7 economies, and 82 percent of those working on other advanced economies, thought the Fund did a good or excellent job.
working on the advanced economies, but rather are endemic across area department staff.

**Effectiveness of different interlocutors**

64. The survey results suggest that some channels for interactions with the authorities were more effective than others, with IMF management the least effective of all. Figure 13 shows the responses of authorities and staff to the survey question on the effectiveness of three channels of interaction for the advanced economies—staff working on surveillance, staff working on FSAP/ROSCs, the Executive Directors’ offices, and IMF management. The highest survey ratings from the authorities of the large advanced economies and the other advanced economies went to the Executive Directors and their staff; and the lowest went to FSAP staff by the respondents from the large advanced economies, and to the Managing Director/Deputy Managing Director (MD/DMD) by respondents from the other advanced economies. The MD/DMDs scored much higher among the authorities from the large advanced economies. Among the staff, only 44 percent thought MD/DMDs interactions were effective. In interviews, a few staff pointed to instances when, in their view, management had been ineffective in pursuing important issues during meetings with authorities.

**Missed opportunities**

65. Interviews with authorities and staff point to a number of instances where the Fund missed opportunities to strengthen the country relationship. For example, the Fund lost influence with the authorities in a large advanced economy following a change in government that saw the retirement of a key individual who had been a conduit for, and actively sought, the Fund’s advice; subsequently mission staff could not re-establish substantive contact on a regular basis with senior management in the finance ministry and did not meet with the finance minister. In another large advanced economy, where there was a long tradition of interactions between the Fund and staff in the main economic institutions, Fund staff had access to officials at the highest levels, including very good access to the finance minister at mission-end; however, over the last few years of the evaluation period, Fund staff observed that senior officials tended to be less open, advancing the standard policy line and prepackaging the discussions, while meetings were short, and senior officials
did not appear to be actively engaged. In-country presence, in this case Korea, exemplified another type of missed opportunity: after a long period of rebuilding the relationship after the East Asia crisis, Fund management decided to close the resident representative office in Seoul, despite widespread advice to the contrary, to the effect that closure would undermine hard-won trust and constitute a significant loss of on-the-ground perspectives and ongoing contacts with banking and other groups.

V. Conclusions

66. The evidence presented in this paper points to limited effectiveness of IMF interactions with the advanced economies, and especially the large advanced economies. The authorities of many of these countries had limited interest in the work the Fund could provide beyond an objective assessment of policies and prospects and an exchange of views, interactions they widely considered to be effective. One important topic on which most large advanced economies did not want to interact with the Fund on international coordination of policies and the analysis of economic and financial spillovers, for which they rated interactions as ineffective. The other advanced economies had greater interest in a Fund role here, but they also rated interactions on it as ineffective. In areas such as cross-country analysis and macro-sectoral linkages, the evidence considered suggests that staff did a lot of papers but did not succeed in making its mark with the advanced economies.

67. The Fund’s transparency policy, launched at the start of the evaluation period, affected interactions in important ways. It clearly influenced interactions with stakeholders such as the media, contacts with which grew over the period. It also affected interactions with the authorities themselves. Fund staff saw the transparency initiative as a vehicle for gaining leverage with the authorities of the advanced economies, who now had to worry about what the Fund said. However, the authorities of some advanced economies that had been major proponents of the Fund’s transparency policy in practice resisted the timely disclosure and dissemination of mission findings. This greatly diminished the scope for enhanced leverage.

68. In evaluating the management of interactions, the paper focused on strategy, staffing, and relationship management. On strategy, the evidence points to large differences between the authorities and staff on priorities for interactions. It also suggests the Fund lacked an effective strategy for bridging these differences and for increasing the authorities’ interest in the analysis it could provide. On staff-related issues, a particularly troubling finding—emerging from the evaluation interviews with the authorities and staff as well as from the staff survey—is that a desire to preserve the country relationship (and possibly protect their careers) had led to assessments that were too cautious. Clearly a desire to please the authorities, or at least to avoid displeasing them, was a fact of life for staff working on the advanced economies, and a challenge to the independence of their analysis. On relationship management, the paper found missed opportunities for strengthening the country relationship, underpinned by weak staff incentives.

References

I. Introduction and Overview

1. This paper examines IMF interactions in emerging economies. It focuses on interactions with the authorities during 2001–08, with particular attention paid to 2007–08. Like the companion papers on the advanced economies and the PRGF-eligible countries, it considers the extent to which interactions were effective and well managed. Like them, it also looks at interactions with country stakeholders beyond the authorities, especially as they affected the primary relationship with the authorities.

2. The paper finds that IMF interactions with the large emerging economies had limited effectiveness; they were more effective with the other emerging economies. The large emerging economies rated interactions with the IMF lower than the other emerging economies. These differences reflected the two groups’ different perspectives on the relevance and effectiveness of individual IMF roles, especially on contributions to the development of policy frameworks, programs, and capacity building, but on other roles as well. A key driver of these differences was the large emerging economies’ declining interest in the Fund’s existing products and services—which in some cases entailed a transition from a program to a surveillance-only relationship and a dramatic decline in the Fund’s influence—and the Fund’s lack of a strategy for dealing with it. Meanwhile, many authorities of large emerging economies found the surveillance process provided little value added and/or lacked evenhandedness, especially vis-à-vis advanced economies. In trying to increase traction, staff launched a number of initiatives—including new modalities, expanded outreach, and stepped up country analysis on a case-by-case basis—which had limited impact overall given the scale of the challenge to the Fund’s relevance. For the other emerging economies, the evaluation found some of these same issues, albeit to a smaller degree, and a wide variety of experience. Importantly, their problems with interactions tended to be more straightforward, related to the management of turnover and these countries’ desire for greater institutional attention to the challenges they faced. In such circumstances, successes came easier as solutions were more amenable to individual country teams’ ability to meet countries’ particular circumstances.

3. The evidence and analysis that lead to these conclusions are developed in the remainder of this paper, which is structured as follows. This first chapter profiles the emerging economies and the evidence on which the paper is based, and summarizes the policy guidance governing interactions during the evaluation period. Chapter II discusses interactions with the authorities, first, providing an overview based on the survey evidence and the country case studies and, second, examining in turn the evaluation evidence on programs and transitions; surveillance; and knowledge transfer and capacity building. Chapter III discusses interactions with other in-country stakeholders beyond the authorities. Chapter IV discusses the management of interactions, taking up in more detail issues of strategy, style, and relationship management. Chapter V concludes. An annex contains the list of countries covered by the paper.

A. Country coverage

4. The paper covers IMF interactions with 81 economies in the WEO definition of emerging economies—a large and diverse group in the Fund’s membership. They range from large federations such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia to small island economies such as Barbados and St. Kitts and Nevis. Some, like China, because of their size and systemic importance in the world economy, have implications for surveillance similar to those of advanced countries. Together, the emerging economies had a combined GDP of nearly $18 trillion in 2008, accounting for 30 percent of global GDP measured in current exchange rates; they represent 64 percent of global population. Together, they

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1For purposes of the evaluation, emerging economies are those economies not included among the advanced economies, and are not eligible for PRGF resources (India being an exception). Macao and Montenegro were not surveyed. Macao did not have Article IV consultations during the evaluation period.

2Annex I lists the 81 emerging economies considered in the paper.
account for about 32 percent of Fund quotas. Of 24 Executive Directors on the IMF Board, 19 have emerging economies in their constituencies.

5. Within the group, the paper looks at “large emerging economies” and “other emerging economies.” The “large” category includes 19 countries, which together account for 24 percent of global GDP. The “other” category includes 62 countries and territories, which together account for about 6 percent of global GDP.

6. IMF interactions with emerging economies are managed by all five Fund area departments. As shown in Figure 1, 28 percent of emerging economies are covered by the Western Hemisphere Department (WHD), 25 percent by the European Department (EUR), 23 percent by the Middle East and Central Asia Department (MCD), 14 percent by the Asia and Pacific Department (APD), and 10 percent by the African Department (AFR).

7. The evaluation used a sample of 23 emerging economies for more in-depth analysis. The sample consisted of 9 large emerging economies (Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey), and 14 other emerging economies (Algeria, Barbados, Botswana, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Oman, Suriname, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago).

8. These countries engaged in a variety of activities with the IMF. Each received extensive technical assistance in almost every year. Each engaged in Article IV consultations. With the exception of China, Indonesia, and Suriname, each participated in the FSAP just before or during the evaluation period. Brazil, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, and Turkey had program arrangements for part of the evaluation period.

9. Sources of evidence for this paper include survey, documentary, and interview data developed specifically for the evaluation. (They are detailed in the accompanying background technical documents.)

10. The evaluation’s extensive survey evidence covers the authorities and civil society organizations (CSOs) in emerging economies, and IMF staff working on these economies. A response to the survey was received from either the central bank or finance ministry, or from both, in 17 of 19 large emerging economy authorities (89 percent) and 43 of 62 other emerging economy authorities (69 percent). Responses to the staff survey totaled 296 who worked on emerging economies (95 on large and 201 on other emerging economies). The civil society survey received 290 responses from civil society representatives in 69 of the 81 emerging economies (87 respondents from CSOs in large and 203 respondents from CSOs in other emerging economies).

11. Evidence was also gathered from confidential interviews with authorities and Fund staff. Interviews were conducted with respect to 8 large emerging economies and 13 other emerging economies in the sample; the authorities of the remaining sample countries, one large and one other, sent a written response to the interview questions. Interviews were conducted with 27 mission chiefs and/or resident representatives working on the 9 large emerging economies and 27 mission chiefs and/or resident representatives working on the 14 other emerging economies. The evaluation team also conducted interviews with authorities from and staff working on emerging economies outside the sample countries as opportunities arose. Interviews took place in Washington during the IMF Spring and Annual Meetings, during other visits by the authorities or staff to Washington, and by telephone. The evaluation team also visited Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Oman, following up the evaluation questionnaire that had been sent to the authorities. Additional targeted

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The evaluation managed interpretation risks by applying judgment grounded in triangulation across individual sources of evidence, which—as in all such endeavors—may contain measurement errors. The evaluation survey was quite complex, with many questions and many respondents from a large number of countries; all this raises the risk that some questions may have been interpreted differently by different recipients. Also, interview bias is a common feature of such evidence, subject to potential biases of both sides. Finally, the use of the documentary evidence, of course, is subject to many sources of bias, not the least of which is its having been written for another time and another audience—one quite familiar with the Fund’s culture and issues, and one where strict word limits apply to all documents, so that many issues of interest receive quite abbreviated attention.

For the authorities’ survey, one questionnaire was sent to the ministry of finance and one to each national central bank, requesting an institutional rather than a personal response.

The interviews with authorities were at the level of finance ministers, central bank governors, or senior officials.

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Although discussions took place, no Article IV consultation with China was concluded in 2007 or 2008.

St. Kitts and Nevis participated through the ECCU.
interviews were conducted to assess the role of resident representatives and management of them in interactions in 5 large emerging market economies. These additional interviews were conducted with current and former resident representatives, as well as mission chiefs and country officials who interacted with the resident representatives.

12. The evaluation team reviewed the Fund’s extensive internal documentary record for the 23 countries in the evaluation sample. The material included confidential briefing memoranda to IMF management, mission back-to-office reports, and interdepartmental correspondence on related country issues. Such material gave the IEO a window into internal debates about staff positions on particular issues, if/how IMF management may have weighed in on an issue, and how country views influenced the internal debate and decisions.

13. Other evidence includes data developed for earlier IEO evaluations; IMF ex post assessments, which are available for three of the 23 sample countries; and special studies commissioned by the IEO for the evaluation.

C. Policies and guiding principles

14. The emerging economies are the most varied of the three country groups considered in the evaluation. Depending on country conditions and IMF activities, some emerging economies are similar to advanced countries in terms of policy challenges and institutional capacity, while others are closer to PRGF-eligible countries in terms of the challenges they face and their interactions with the Fund. Accordingly, the Fund’s interactions with emerging economies run the gamut of the Fund’s activities, with the exception of access to concessional resources. There is no overarching institutional strategy for engaging emerging economies; IMF interactions with them are governed by the policies and guidelines that apply to all members.

Programs

15. Two issues of relevance to some emerging economies over the evaluation period (considered in subsequent chapters) are Fund lending instruments and conditionality. Fund financial assistance to emerging economies is provided primarily through Stand-by Arrangements (SBAs) to help countries with short-term balance of payments problems; they may be provided on a precautionary basis, both within the normal access limits and in cases of exceptional access. Financial assistance provided to the large emerging economies during the evaluation period was mainly under SBAs. The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is available to help countries address longer-term balance of payments problems requiring fundamental reforms; the financial assistance extended to other emerging economies over the evaluation period was mainly under the auspices of EFFs. The Contingent Credit Line (CCL) was established in 1999 to provide a precautionary line of credit to members with sound economic policies, but who were vulnerable to contagion effects from capital account crisis in other countries. The CCL was never used and expired in November 2003.8

16. The Fund’s approach to conditionality evolved over the evaluation period. It began in 2000 with new staff guidance to narrow the scope of structural conditionality to conditions that were “macro relevant.” In 2002, guidelines called for “parsimony” and “criticality” in the use of conditions. In its 2005 review of the guidelines for conditionality, the Board welcomed streamlining on the breadth of coverage of structural conditionality, although that there had not been much in the way in a reduced number of conditions. Following a 2007 IEO evaluation of structural conditionality, the Board concluded that Board documents should provide a clear description of the links between structural conditionality and program goals and supporting reforms. Guidance was contained in “Revisions to the Operational Guidance Note on Conditionality” of July 2008.9

Surveillance

17. Guidance on surveillance flows directly from the Articles of Agreement. Article IV states that “the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies.” For most of the period covered by the evaluation, operating principles for surveillance were contained in the 1977 Surveillance Decision and associated guidelines. The main principle guiding exchange rate policies was that members should avoid exchange rate manipulation to prevent balance of payments adjustment or gain an unfair competitive advantage. Protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in exchange markets, for example, would be cause for discussion with a member as it could be inconsistent with the international adjustment process. The decision was to be reviewed every two years.

18. Staff guidance for bilateral surveillance was contained in the “Operational Guidance Note for Staff

8In March 2009, after the period considered here, but while the survey and other evidence was being gathered, the Board established the Flexible Credit Line (FCL). The new FCL provides a credit line with large upfront financing to members with very strong fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks, and that have track records of very strong policies and remain committed to maintaining such policies in the future. There is no traditional ex post conditionality nor prior actions.

Following the 2002 Biennial Surveillance Review,” September 2002. It was updated in the May 2005 “Surveillance Guidance Note.” Essential elements of surveillance were: a clear depiction of the economic situation; a candid analysis of the short-term economic outlook; a clear assessment of the prospects for noninflationary longer-run growth; a substantive policy discussion; and pointed summaries of staff’s analysis and policy conclusions. Coverage and focus included: the range of issues covered, including nontraditional but macroeconomically relevant areas; selectivity; evenhandedness; trade matters; governance; candor; particularly the treatment of exchange rate issues; fiscal issues; financial sector issues; vulnerability assessments; indicators of external vulnerability; debt sustainability analysis; and reporting on social indicators.

19. The June 2007 Surveillance Decision introduced the concept of external stability as the organizing principle for bilateral surveillance. The decision provided guidance on the conduct of exchange rate policies to cover all major causes of external instability. It also set out the modalities of effective modern surveillance, including its collaborative nature, the importance of dialogue and persuasion, and the need for candor and evenhandedness. Interim guidance, “Implementing the 2007 Surveillance Decision—Interim Guidance Note,” was available in June 2007. The interim guidance included the requirement for a clear assessment of the exchange rate level, and, if fundamental misalignment causing external instability were present beyond any reasonable doubt, there had to be a clear statement that this is so. In the event, the categorization of an exchange rate as fundamentally misaligned proved difficult to implement, and the guidance was later revised to remove the requirement to use the term “fundamental misalignment” in recognition of the uncertainty in attributing economic outcomes to exchange rate policies alone.10

20. There is separate guidance for the financial sector, which was provided in “The 2004 Financial Sector Guidance Note.” Current guidance, albeit issued after the evaluation period, is contained in “Financial Sector Guidance Note,” April 24, 2009. There is also separate guidance for FSAPs and FSAP updates.11

Technical assistance

21. For technical assistance, the 2001 policy statement highlighted the importance of country ownership and called for a review of past and current efforts, including a country’s track record in implementing Fund-supported TA. An IEO evaluation in 2005 called for the development of a medium-term country framework setting TA priorities, embedded in surveillance and UFR activities; subsequently, area departments began preparing TA Country Strategy Notes for intensive and systemic users of TA. They have been superseded by Regional Strategy Notes (RSNs) that specify medium-term TA priorities across all countries covered by each area department. The 2008 Board discussion of reforms to enhance the impact of Fund technical assistance underlined the need to advance the integration of technical assistance with surveillance and lending operations; and to improve the prioritization of TA in line with the strategic objectives of both recipient countries and the Fund, and by introducing a charging regime.12

II. Were IMF Interactions with the Authorities Effective?

22. This chapter examines the evidence on the effectiveness of IMF interactions with the authorities of emerging economies. It begins by addressing some of the overarching themes that emerge from the survey evidence and that are underscored by the evaluation’s interview and documentary evidence. It then explores in more detail specific issues arising during the evaluation’s consideration of the evidence on interactions in the context of programs, and transitions; surveillance; and knowledge transfer and capacity building.

A. Overarching issues

23. As set out in Box 2 of the main report, and recapped in Figure 2 below, of all the country groups, the large emerging economies were the most negative group in their views about the effectiveness of IMF interactions as measured by the evaluation’s composite indicators. The views of the authorities of the other emerging economies were closer to the average view of all authorities. Different perceptions between the large emerging economies on the one hand and the other emerging economies on the other hand were also apparent in the interview and other evidence, but more muted, as discussed later in this chapter. On role relevance and strategic alignment (discussed in Chapter IV), the other emerging economies also were more in line with the average, while the larger emerging economies were lower, and more in line (on average but not in every detail) with the views of the advanced economies. For quality, the authorities of the large and other emerging

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12IMF (2008c).
IMF Interactions with Emerging Economies

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**Figure 2. Composite Indicators of Interactions (Authorities’ Views)**

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24. **Box 1** pictures the underlying survey data on role relevance. It shows that the large and other emerging economies generally ranked the relevance of Fund roles in a similar manner, although the other emerging economies were generally more interested in the Fund’s involvement in every role. For both groups, the two most relevant Fund roles were: providing a clear and objective assessment; and contributing to a good exchange of views. Beyond that, the large emerging economies favored a Fund role in international policy coordination, while the other emerging economies favored the Fund’s advising on operational aspects of policies. For both groups, the three least relevant roles were: building consensus outside and inside government; and providing program and monitoring support.

25. **Box 2** shows the underlying survey data on role effectiveness. As shown, the large and other emerging economies generally rate the effectiveness of Fund roles in a similar manner, although, as with relevance, the other emerging economies are typically more positive. For both groups, the most effective Fund roles and activities are: good exchange of views, objective assessment, and capacity building for the large emerging economies and program support for the other emerging economies; the three least effective were: building consensus inside and outside government; and international policy coordination.

26. **Box 3** pictures the underlying survey data on ten attributes of the quality of interactions. It shows that the large and other emerging economies generally rank the quality attributes in a similar manner, and score them at similar levels. For both groups, the highest rated attributes are: focusing on topics of interest; responding quickly to requests for analytic work; actively engaging in a constructive dialogue; and listening to the authorities’ perspective. The lowest rated attributes are: bringing quickly to your attention changing external conditions; “what if” questions; long-term approach to the relationship; and cross-country analysis.

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**B. Key issues**

27. The remainder of this chapter looks at interactions between the authorities and staff in the context of
Box 1. Role Relevance of Interactions

**Large Emerging Economies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other Emerging Economies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shows the share of authorities who wanted the IMF to perform each role “a fair amount” or “very much.”

programs (including transitions into and out of them); surveillance; and knowledge transfer and capacity building. It draws on the evaluation’s more detailed survey, interview, and documentary evidence. The discussion details the positives and the negatives, painting a mixed picture of such interactions during the evaluation period, and especially in the last two years. Boxes 4 and 5, respectively, set out aspects of the engagement between the Fund and the large and other emerging economies in the evaluation sample.
Programs and transitions

28. The character of Fund engagement in member countries depends significantly on whether a country is in a surveillance-only or a program relationship. Within the emerging economies group, both types of relationships were present during the evaluation period, and a number of countries transitioned from programs into surveillance-only status.

29. Some 40 percent of emerging economies had programs at one time or another during the evaluation period. This included about half of the large emerging economies.
Box 3. Quality of Interactions

Large Emerging Economies
(Percent of respondents)

- …focus on topics of interest to your country
- …respond quickly to your requests for analytical work
- …listen carefully to your perspectives
- …actively engage in a constructive dialogue
- …provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
- …respond in general to your needs and changing priorities
- …provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country
- …take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship
- …present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions
- …bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions

Other Emerging Economies
(Percent of respondents)

- …focus on topics of interest to your country
- …respond quickly to your requests for analytical work
- …actively engage in a constructive dialogue
- …listen carefully to your perspectives
- …respond in general to your needs and changing priorities
- …provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country
- …take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship
- …provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
- …bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions
- …present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions

Note: Shows the share of authorities who responded that the IMF did a “good” or an “excellent” job to …

As Figure 3 shows, for the 2007–08 period about which the question was asked, there was much less interest by large emerging economies than by other emerging economies. This reflects very different financial situations of the two groups, and the sharply improving external positions of many large emerging economies over the evaluation period, with only two countries, Turkey and Ukraine, with programs during 2007–08. Among the other emerging economies, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Hungary, Iraq, Macedonia FYR, Latvia, Lebanon, Paraguay, Peru, and Seychelles had programs at some time during this period.
official stressed, the Fund was in a position of power relative to the authorities, limiting the authorities’ bargaining power.

31. Interviewed authorities generally characterized their program relationships as lacking in flexibility on the Fund’s side. The large emerging economies were more pronounced in this criticism in their survey responses, as shown in Figure 4. Indeed, a majority of survey respondents from large emerging economies—and almost 40 percent of respondents from other emerging economy—agreed that IMF policies and procedures were inflexible or burdensome, with even higher numbers for the IMF’s unwillingness to innovate. About 35 percent of large and 20 percent of other emerging economy authorities responded that staff had been unwilling to consider different approaches to achieve desired policy outcomes. However, the survey evidence suggests that perceptions have changed for the better. Nearly 40 percent of each group responded that the Fund had done a better job in the last two years in its willingness to consider other approaches compared to the previous six years.

32. The transition from program to surveillance as the primary mode of interactions brought for many authorities a fundamental change in their relationship with the Fund. Interviewed authorities said that as countries transitioned from a program to a surveillance-only relationship, the authorities felt freer to reject the Fund’s advice, and the Fund seemed to listen more closely to their views. Most emerging economy authorities that experienced this transition, either within the evaluation period or earlier, viewed the less prescriptive relationship under surveillance more favorably. At least one interviewed authority who had experienced this shift in the nature of interactions noted relief in ceasing to be lectured to as in a “professor-student relationship.” Instead, the relationship under surveillance was characterized by several authorities as a dialogue among peers, with the result that authorities felt more confident to voice their own ideas. Broadly similar sentiments were expressed by interviewed officials of both large and other emerging economies with past program relationships. However, some authorities regretted the more limited availability of advice following the change from program to surveillance-only status.

33. While the authorities of emerging economies welcomed the new surveillance-only relationship with the Fund, for staff the transition entailed a serious downgrade in influence especially on country policies. Accompanying the downgrade was reduced access to key people and information and reduced interest by the authorities in dialogue with them especially about policies. Indeed, the documentary evidence for the program period foreshadowed the problems, with, for example, one back-to-office report to management noting the authorities’ extreme reluctance to discuss economic
IMF interactions with the nine large emerging economies in the evaluation sample evolved over the period as circumstances in their economies and priorities for the Fund shifted.

Of the three large emerging economies that had program relationships with the IMF during the review period, Turkey remained in a program virtually throughout the period, while Brazil and Indonesia experienced the transition to a surveillance-focused relationship.

- In Turkey there were three consecutive Stand-By Arrangements beginning in 1999 and concluding in 2008. Interactions were characterized by frequent back and forth with staff, including on technical and policy issues and a strong connection between IMF management and senior policymakers.

- The program in Brazil (concluding with post-program monitoring in 2005) was widely viewed as a success of country ownership, with the IMF stepping in to support the authorities’ own priorities. Strong anti-IMF sentiments lingered beyond the program period and affected the evolution of the relationship and interactions once it returned to a surveillance focus. In the more arm’s-length relationship, technical input was sought more than policy dialogue.

- Indonesia concluded its program with the IMF in December 2003, with post-program monitoring continuing until October 2006. Interactions with the Fund for most of the period were intense, with market reactions to policies a key focus of discussions. Once the program ended, the relationship shifted, with more room for homegrown policies but also a need for new ways to engage substantively and provide value added.

Three other large emerging economies transitioned out of program status in the two years preceding this evaluation.

- In Egypt (SBA concluded in 1998), substantive dialogue characterized interactions in the period, with a give and take in policy discussions and room for disagreement. The authorities looked to the IMF for analysis, and the Fund was influential, even though reforms moved at a slower pace than staff thought desirable.

- In Russia (SBA concluded in 2000) the transition to a surveillance-focused relationship, combined with a rapid strengthening of the economy, changed the focus of staff work to more selective topics of interest to the authorities. In some areas this was supported by technical assistance, though in general the expertise of the civil service improved strongly through the period. While the continuing dialogue with the Fund was helped by staff continuity, there was less to and fro on policy issues as well as gradually reduced access to some high-level policymakers.

- Thailand completed its SBA with the Fund in June 2000; post-program monitoring ended in 2002. Interactions through surveillance reflected Fund staff efforts to build relationships by taking a low-key approach.

Finally, three large emerging economies—China, India, and South Africa—had no program relationship with the IMF during the review period, nor immediately prior to it. Interactions with these countries revolved largely around surveillance, with a relatively limited role for technical assistance—particularly in India and South Africa, though FSAPs have been conducted in both of these countries. Concerns were raised, to different degrees, about the value that the IMF brought to the table through its analysis and advice, and about evenhandedness in the conduct of surveillance.

Box 4. Evaluation Case Studies: Large Emerging Economies

IMF interactions with the nine large emerging economies in the evaluation sample evolved over the period as circumstances in their economies and priorities for the Fund shifted.

Surveillance

34. Both large and other emerging economies expressed interest in the basic elements of Fund surveillance, though the large emerging economies rated the effectiveness of these activities lower than all other country groups. As discussed in the main report, and reproduced in Figure 6 below, the survey evidence shows that around 90 percent or more of responding authorities from emerging economies said that they wanted the Fund to provide objective assessments of their economies and to participate in a good exchange of views (whether or not there is agreement). But while 80 percent of other emerging economies’ authorities thought the Fund was effective in these roles, only 60 percent or so of authorities from large emerging economies thought so—for both activities.
emerging economies were in line with other groups in areas in which the IMF fell short. As shown in Figure 7, analysis.

A few said that the Fund had been associated with developments; or that the Fund never said anything either routine, or offered very limited perspectives; that it was behind the curve on global financial constraints; that it was behind the curve on global financial advice failed to take into account country-specific concerns about what they perceived to be a lack of value added from the surveillance process. Interviewees, from both large and other emerging economies, expressed views such as: that the IMF’s advice was either routine, or offered very limited perspectives; that advice failed to take into account country-specific constraints; that it was behind the curve on global financial developments; or that the Fund never said anything new. A few said that the Fund had been associated with policy recommendations that were ill- advised, while others argued that the advice was insufficiently backed by analysis.

The survey evidence highlights several key areas in which the IMF fell short. As shown in Figure 7, emerging economies were in line with other groups in their view of the Fund’s poor performance in quickly bringing to authorities’ attention the implications of changing external conditions and in contributing to international policy coordination (including through the analysis of spillover effects from one country to another). One bright spot was that more large emerging economies were satisfied with the Fund’s provision of cross-country analysis (70 percent); other emerging economies were less satisfied (50 percent). The survey evidence also points to some Fund shortcomings in the area of innovation and considering alternative scenarios. Meanwhile, as shown in Box 3, about 40 percent of emerging economy respondents thought the Fund did a good job providing alternate scenarios and addressing “what if” questions. The survey also points to limited effectiveness in providing operational advice, though few large emerging economies (42 percent) looked to the Fund for this role—and even fewer found its performance satisfactory. This activity was much more important to other emerging economies, as over 80 percent of authorities indicated that they wanted the IMF to do so. Yet only half of respondents thought that the Fund carried out this role effectively.

Box 5. Evaluation Case Studies: Other Emerging Economies

The interviews and document reviews for the 14 evaluation sample other emerging economies revealed different kinds of country situations and, in turn, interactions with the Fund during the evaluation period.

Two countries in the sample exited Fund programs as they made progress on economic reforms and moved toward EU accession. Lithuania successfully completed a precautionary SBA in 2003, and Bulgaria completed a precautionary SBA in 2007 (following an earlier SBA and EFF). Interactions continued through surveillance in both cases, with some drop in intensity. FSAPs and FSAP updates were featured for both during the period, with specific recommendations emerging for Bulgaria with respect to technical assistance.

In three countries, the nature of interactions changed as they moved out of, or into, programs with the IMF. With Algeria, interactions during the period focused on a more open dialogue through surveillance—following a program that concluded in 1998. With Lebanon, on the other hand, which entered into a program relationship through emergency post-conflict assistance in 2007, interactions under the program were considered effective, in contrast to earlier disagreements on the policy stance. In Kazakhstan, a precautionary program was cancelled during the period. With the Kazakh economy transforming rapidly, the focus of dialogue shifted from structural adjustment to financial sector issues. Two FSAP updates were conducted during the period, and technical assistance included support for modernization of the central bank.

For the “small states” in the sample (Barbados, Suriname, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago), none of which had programs over the period, interactions took place in the context of surveillance, including the FSAP process, and technical assistance. The regional technical assistance center, CARTAC, played a key role in assessing, planning for, and providing technical assistance. While surveillance engagement with IMF staff was appreciated, as giving an additional viewpoint to consider, evidence of missteps or missed opportunities emerged in some cases.

Interactions with the remaining countries in the sample—Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Botswana, Kuwait, and Oman—were focused primarily on surveillance. In Costa Rica, interactions through surveillance and technical assistance were intensive and effective, with many staff visits outside the Article IV mission cycle.1 Interactions with Costa Rica were set in a regional and strategic context, facilitated by a regional resident representative (beginning in 2006), Fund participation in regional finance ministry, central bank, and regulatory fora (and, now, the new regional technical assistance center, CAPTAC-DR). In other cases, for varying reasons, the IMF faced challenges in maintaining constructive engagement, with questions raised in individual cases about the value of IMF missions, the tone of reporting, the transience and style of mission chiefs, or the confidentiality of information.

Value added

35. Though many authorities preferred the interactions under a surveillance-only relationship to what they had experienced with programs, some also raised concerns about what they perceived to be a lack of value added from the surveillance process. Interviewees, from both large and other emerging economies, expressed views such as: that the IMF’s advice was either routine, or offered very limited perspectives; that advice failed to take into account country-specific constraints; that it was behind the curve on global financial developments; or that the Fund never said anything new. A few said that the Fund had been associated with policy recommendations that were ill-advised, while others argued that the advice was insufficiently backed by analysis.

36. The survey evidence highlights several key areas in which the IMF fell short. As shown in Figure 7, emerging economies were in line with other groups in their view of the Fund’s poor performance in quickly bringing to authorities’ attention the implications of...
37. The evaluation interviews add nuance to some of the survey findings on the value-added (or lack thereof) of interactions in the context of surveillance. The importance of cross-country analysis was raised repeatedly in interviews by both authorities and staff—and it was highlighted in 2004 by the Executive Board in a call to increase its use to add value to policy discussions. However, some interviewed emerging economy authorities wished the IMF would have provided more relevant and timely cross-country information, with a few pointing out that the comparator countries used were not pertinent to their country cases. Several mission chiefs, too, expressed...
Figure 6. Authorities’ Views on the Fund’s Role and Effectiveness in Interactions in Assessing Economies’ Policies and Prospects and in Contributing to a Good Exchange of Views
(Percent of respondents)

1 Shows the share of authorities who responded “a fair amount” or “very much.”
2 Shows the share of authorities who responded “effective” or “very effective.”

Figure 7. International Dimensions
(Percent of respondents)

1 Shows the share of authorities who responded that interactions had been “effective” or “very effective” in the role.
2 Shows the share of authorities who responded that the Fund had done a “good” or an “excellent” job.
the view that, while cross-country experience provides a comparative advantage for the institution in aiding deeper dialogue with the authorities, it was not being effectively used.13

Evenhandedness

38. Some large emerging economies question the evenhandedness with which the Fund conducts surveillance, undermining confidence in the Fund’s advice. In the evaluation survey, 86 percent of authorities from large emerging economies said that surveillance served the interests of the largest IMF shareholders, a higher share of authorities than thought that surveillance served the interests of the countries themselves (68 percent). Large emerging economies do not perceive IMF programs or technical assistance in the same way, as nearly all of those who had an IMF program or TA believed they aimed to serve their interests. The view of surveillance in large emerging economies also contrasts sharply with that of officials from other emerging economies, 82 percent of whom said surveillance served their interests. Only 59 percent of this group answered that surveillance served the interests of the largest shareholders.

39. The interview evidence supports and complements the survey evidence on the large emerging economies’ concerns about evenhandedness. Interviewed authorities underscored their desire for advice that is objective and fair, based on evidence, and driven by facts rather than ideology. But several thought this standard had not been met. Instead, one authority felt that a double standard was being applied, with decisions and policies of the IMF influenced by noneconomic factors from its largest shareholders. Staff also reported that interactions were undermined by views in member countries that the Fund had acted in the interests of the market rather than the countries during the Asian crisis of the 1990s. There was also a sentiment that the Fund’s 2007 Bilateral Surveillance Decision reflected an agenda driven by the large advanced economies. Some interviewed staff members also reported that authorities felt that way and said that such sentiments diminished the authorities’ trust and confidence and the ability of the Fund to influence the domestic debate.

40. For other emerging economies, concerns were expressed about a different facet of evenhandedness—in particular, whether small countries received the same treatment as large. Interviews revealed views that large country issues dominated the Fund’s agenda, along with concerns about international stability, which crowded out time for and attention to issues of concern about domestic economies. In this context, concerns were expressed about the Fund’s increased focus on exchange rate issues, global imbalances, and the 2007 Surveillance Decision. The authorities of one country complained that the staff had suggested that their stance of macroeconomic policy be made more expansionary in line with global needs, an action they felt was not in their interest.

41. Such examples of what authorities considered misguided advice were seen to reflect the staff’s weak accountability for its advice, inter alia. Figure 8 shows that 38 percent of the respondents from large emerging economies and 28 percent of those from other emerging economies agreed with the critique queried in the evaluation survey that over the past two years there had been insufficient accountability for the quality of advice given. Over one-quarter of staff respondents working in emerging economies agreed.

New modalities

42. The evaluation also looked at the evidence on efforts to enhance the dialogue with authorities through new initiatives. Several mission chiefs in emerging economies experimented with new ways to enhance the dialogue, such as seminars, regional conferences of finance ministers and central bank governors, selected issues papers (SIPs) jointly authored by authorities and staff, and, even in one case, internal reorganization. There were also institutional initiatives such as streamlined Article IV consultations,14

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13After the close of the evaluation period, the IMF has introduced a collaborative intranet workspace on “Cross-Country Work, Spillovers and Linkages.”

14Streamlined Article IV consultations are conducted for countries in which there is no current need for detailed coverage of all the issues usually treated in Article IV consultation reports. They are followed by a regular consultation in the subsequent year.
and multilateral consultations. Interviewed mission chiefs said that they tried to deepen the surveillance dialogue by dovetailing technical assistance with surveillance in ways that both sides considered useful, and some staff reached out to authorities in emerging economies to provide follow-up analysis and advice after missions.

43. According to staff, the authorities of emerging economies tended to value seminars, which provided an informal setting for freer debate than the more formal Article IV dialogue, brought in outside experts, and provided cross-country perspectives. Some authorities also praised specific seminars and conferences which they found useful. Survey evidence supports that view more generally: a quarter of the authorities of large and a third of those from other emerging economies wanted somewhat more or much more use of seminars.

44. The authorities’ views on the value of selected issues papers (SIPs) were more mixed. A few authorities of large emerging economies said that they did not find that SIPs added much value. But in several other emerging economies, well-directed SIPs with a relevant choice of topics were seen as useful by the authorities and, according to mission chiefs, had played instrumental roles in policy changes. Also, as shown in Box 3, 80–85 percent of responding authorities from emerging economies thought that the IMF did a good or excellent job of selecting topics relevant to the country, although that question was not specifically related to SIPs. According to mission chiefs, officials of emerging economies were not enthusiastic about co-authoring SIPs with staff, because such co-authorship might be construed to commit them to a particular policy position. Meanwhile, authorities in some other emerging economies found streamlined consultations and abridged staff reports less useful than the full versions; according to the interviews, they preferred more comprehensive coverage of their policy developments and prospects.

45. The evidence suggests that an internal reorganization improved interactions with some small states. Notably, the Fund’s consolidation of all its work on Eastern Caribbean Currency Union countries into one division in WHD in 2003 was an attempt to achieve greater focus on Caribbean countries and regional issues. It was generally felt by authorities and staff that the consolidation had helped to strengthen surveillance in the region and to improve the underlying technical work, with several interviewed mission chiefs noting that the move had helped to integrate bilateral and regional surveillance and to better coordinate Fund work in the region.

Knowledge transfer and capacity-building

46. Authorities in almost all emerging economies attach the most value to IMF interactions that they consider as augmenting their own knowledge and understanding of economic and financial policy challenges. Figure 9 shows the survey results for relevance and effectiveness of interactions on capacity building.

47. Interviewed officials from several emerging economies said that they received more valuable input from technical interactions with the IMF—notably those that take place in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP); Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs); technical assistance (for inflation targeting in many cases); and training—rather than from Article IV consultations. Several attributed this to the fact that the technical interactions were more closely targeted to countries’ specific needs and that they brought something new to the table. Part of the enhanced value arose from the greater use of consultative processes with the authorities in FSAP and TA. Further, the authorities noted that the technical interactions were often conducted by individuals with implementation experience. In describing a successful FSAP mission to an emerging economy, one of the staff involved identified the team’s considerable knowledge of the local environment as a reason for the mission’s success, noting that the authorities had taken comfort from the fact that the mission members had an understanding of their system.
48. Several authorities considered that interactions through the Fund’s regional technical assistance centers (RTACs) contributed to capacity building. Some authorities attributed part of the success of interactions through the RTAC (in particular the Caribbean regional technical assistance center) to participating countries seeing it as their initiative, with the Fund playing a supporting role.

III. Were Interactions with Other Stakeholders Effective?

49. This chapter looks at IMF interactions with other stakeholders. As in the companion country papers, it looks at the quantity and quality of IMF interactions with other stakeholders, and constraints to more and better interactions. It finds that in many emerging economies, staff faced a conundrum in interacting with other stakeholders, especially if the media might be involved. Sometimes they were pressed by Fund management and senior staff to do more outreach, yet they knew that the authorities preferred it not to be done. Many authorities did not want the Fund to be seen to be criticizing their policies, nor to be praising them, as either could have political fallout. Mission chiefs and resident representatives were profoundly aware of these concerns, which affected the way they conducted outreach.

A. Recent developments

50. During the evaluation period, IMF outreach to other stakeholders in emerging economies included engagement with representatives from parliaments, civil society organizations, the media, and market participants. Staff generally interacted more often with market participants and think tanks than they did with parliamentarians and civil society organizations. Detailed data are not available, but interactions with market participants have been a regular feature of staff work for many years. Contacts with think tanks and academics have been less frequent than those with market participants, but increasing as the Fund has increased its dissemination of analytic products such as the World Economic Outlook (WEO), the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), and Regional Economic Outlines (REOs), which were new products developed during the evaluation period. These analytic products have also provided a platform for interactions with the media that were more acceptable to country authorities than discussions of mission findings about country policies and prospects.

51. Staff outreach to parliamentarians included meetings with staff; speeches by management particularly during country visits; and seminars. Staff interviews suggest that many of the resident representatives in the large emerging economies had contacts with parliamentarians, though such interactions were often informal, low profile and off the record. The internal documents reviewed for the evaluation sample countries suggest that area department staff made an effort to increase their interactions with parliamentarians during the evaluation period, pointing to meetings with members of the legislature in Algeria and South Africa; in Indonesia; in Russia; in Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Kuwait; and in Barbados, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Suriname. Also, staff organized country and regional seminars for parliamentarians in Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia.

52. Responses to the IEO evaluation survey of civil society painted a picture of meetings with civil society in which staff were seen as respectful and listening. But almost half of the survey respondents in large emerging economies who had interacted with Fund staff noted some lack of sensitivity to cultural differences; the proportion was much smaller for respondents from other emerging economies. Survey respondents indicated that they had met with Fund representatives in the context of visiting missions, but meetings with resident representatives also loomed large, especially in the large emerging economies. There were very few meetings with IMF Executive Directors. About half of the respondents who had met with staff did not answer the question on (i) whether their views were taken into account in IMF discussions with the government; and (ii) whether their discussions with the IMF generally contributed to building national support and initiative towards “IMF-backed policies.” Of those who did answer more than half have said their views have been reflected, and that their discussions had contributed to building national support for such policies. In both cases, the scores were broadly the same for the large and for the other emerging economies.

53. An EXR survey of outreach with trade unions was carried out in 2007 and covered staff working on emerging economies. According to the respondents, mission chiefs and/or resident representatives had

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11IMF (2007d) also notes that “the overall finding is that in general, beneficiaries are highly satisfied with the performance of Middle East Regional Technical Assistance Center (METAC).”

12Examples provided in this section are taken mainly from the evidence for 23 case studies and for other countries visited. They do not cover the full range of activities in all 81 emerging economies.


14This survey received 290 responses from representatives of private sector associations (including chambers of commerce and trade or industry associations), media, nongovernment organizations, labor unions, academics, and think tanks in 69 emerging economies. Thirty percent of the responses were from civil society representatives in large emerging economies, and 70 percent from other emerging economies.

15“No response,” “not applicable,” or “don’t know.”
met with trade union representatives in the previous two years in 42 percent of all emerging economies. Such meetings took place in 30 percent of large emerging economies—including Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, and South Africa—compared with 50 percent of the other emerging economies.

54. Area departments used outreach on REOs, WEOs, and other analytic products to seek to reposition the Fund as a knowledge-based institution. During the evaluation period, WHD produced eight REOs including updates; various issues were presented to country and regional audiences (including government officials, academics, and think tanks) in El Salvador, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, inter alia, with a Caribbean-specific version of the REO recently launched. The other area departments have also their REOs in similar ways—to reposition the Fund as more of a knowledge institution. For example in Egypt, MCD has done presentations/workshops with think tanks and academia using its REO supplemented by presentations on the WEO and the GFSR. APD’s REO outreach events in Thailand have also aimed to reach a broad audience, including representatives of academic and private sector. APD’s REOs have also been presented in major cities in the region and in regional meetings such as ASEAN and APEC. EUR has presented its three REOs at seminars at various times in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

55. Staff interactions with the media included press conferences, dissemination of concluding statements, and interviews—when consistent with maintaining the relationship with member authorities. There were cases in which authorities objected to such media contact and/or when it was considered by staff to be counterproductive; staff generally refrained from outreach in such cases. In other cases, staff undertook to develop and maintain open informal lines of communication with key media players. In the evaluation sample countries, press conferences at the close of Article IV missions were held in Algeria, China, and Turkey. Mission concluding statements for Article IV consultations, including preliminary conclusions, were published in Egypt, Russia, and Turkey, among the large emerging economies in the evaluation sample and in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, and Lithuania, among the other emerging economies in the sample.

B. Constraints to more and better interaction with stakeholders

56. Interview evidence suggests that Fund staff contacts outside government were constrained by the authorities’ guidance and preferences. Mission chiefs working on emerging economies emphasized that the outreach that IMF staff can extend to other stakeholders—such as parliamentarians, civil society, the media, and market participants—partly depends on what the authorities feel comfortable with. As the Fund’s guidance to staff on outreach to legislators and civil society organizations indicates, staff take their cue from the authorities regarding the manner and extent of such outreach.20 The interviews also pointed to differences across countries, especially as between large emerging economies and the other emerging economies, as highlighted in Box 6.

57. Staff said that many authorities of emerging economies expected them to play at most a low-key role in outreach, and especially to be careful to avoid being seen as driving the policy agenda. The authorities of some large emerging economies and other stakeholders, including civil society, still recall with bitterness the crises of the 1990s, and the role the Fund was perceived to have played in the austerity programs that followed. In some such countries, the authorities seen to be cooperating with the Fund are easily stigmatized, partly because of the reputational damage the IMF has faced in some quarters in the past. Where these negative factors were not present, some authorities supported IMF outreach, which they thought would help them gain support for their reform efforts. Mission chiefs said they used the interactions that took place with civil society organizations to carry out the aims outlined in the Fund’s guidelines—notably to provide information on IMF policy advice, and to get information from other sources to round out their own views. Some said they conveyed the views of civil society organizations on policy matters back to the authorities—which apparently was appreciated (the authorities may not always get the candid views of civil society directly).

58. Staff interactions with the media about country policies and prospects are the most delicate area. Interviewed staff said they usually took the authorities into confidence before any media contacts and were extremely careful not to appear critical, so as to maintain their relationship with the authorities. Staff felt that their careers might suffer if the authorities were to complain to IMF management about being misreported in the media. Therefore the tendency often was to be less proactive in media outreach. However, in a few cases where authorities had once opposed press contacts, there was evidence that attitudes were softening in recent years. For example, in one large emerging economy, where the authorities had historically been very resistant to IMF outreach, especially with the media, some initiatives by the resident representative in recent years had been tolerated, including media appearances. Officials ascribed the change to

Box 6. Surveyed Authorities’ Views on IMF Outreach: Do They Want More, Less, or About the Same?

The difference—as between large and other emerging economies—in perspective on outreach to other stakeholders is reflected in the survey evidence. As shown below, large majorities of both large and other emerging economies want the same amount of outreach going forward, including to parliamentarians, civil society, the media, and market participants. But for the large emerging economies, 5–10 percent want less outreach in each category, and 10–20 percent want more, with 70–80 percent content with current levels. For the other emerging economies, about 60–70 percent are content with current levels, and almost none want less in any category; about 40 percent want more with parliamentarians, civil society, and market participants and about 30 percent want more with the media.

1At an early stage of policy discussions.
increasing self-confidence on both sides—suggesting lessons for future approaches. On the authorities’ side, the greater confidence was due to good economic performance and a sense of vindication that they had been wise not to follow earlier IMF macroeconomic policy advice. On the staff side, the confidence to pursue initiatives depended on the personality and skills of the individual staff member, and their ability to establish a relationship of trust with the authorities. In one small state, the authorities had traditionally been reluctant to support outreach as the Fund’s image was still tainted by association with earlier crisis, yet they now agreed to issuance of the mission’s press statement.

59. The above views are reflected in the survey responses, which show a very limited interest of the authorities in staff discussions of policies outside government circles. Figure 10 shows that only 11 percent of large emerging economy survey respondents and less than a third of responding authorities from other emerging economy respondents saw a role for the IMF in helping to build policy consensus through contacts outside government. Even fewer felt that the IMF had been effective in such activities, as shown in the middle panel of Figure 10. Staff were generally more positive on whether the Fund aimed to help build consensus outside government and in their assessment of the effectiveness of these activities. The disconnect on the latter was larger for the large emerging economies than for the other emerging economies. (The right-hand panel of Figure 10 shows how the authorities of all country groups view staff consensus-building activities, with the large and other emerging economies in line with the respective views of the large advanced and other advanced economies.)

60. The above suggests—especially in large emerging economies—little harmony with the area departments’ outreach strategies, which are largely focused on enhancing traction with the authorities by influencing public opinion. Indeed, interviewed staff pointed to internal debates in which some wanted the mission team to hold press conferences in the country, while the mission chief felt that such an activity would backfire with the authorities. There were some references to outreach in the internal documents reviewed for the evaluation, but most, including the Surveillance Agendas, were generally silent on any strategic objectives. An exception was EUR’s country outreach strategies, which were prepared on a pilot basis for FY2008. These country outreach plans contained key messages/policy priorities; main obstacles to recommended policies; outreach steps to reduce resistance; and a matrix of proposed messages, audiences, and delivery. In WHD, the individual strategies for the outreach efforts were less explicit in larger
economies; though in some individual smaller cases the aims were stated. For example: in one, the planned outreach effort aimed at “influencing the broader public debate,” in another, it aimed “to help build a consensus for reform;” and, in a third case, the efforts “...focused on increasing public awareness and underscoring the urgency of fiscal consolidation.”

61. Limited resources were another constraint to outreach. Due to their field presence, resident representatives tended to have more interactions with outside stakeholders than did mission chiefs. However, some of the interviewed representatives in emerging economies said that their offices lacked enough resources to be more actively involved in outreach. A few resident representatives considered that the Fund’s limited number of products tailored to meet country needs made continuity of outreach in emerging economies more difficult.

62. Mission chiefs said that, in the limited time they had, they faced a trade-off between discussing policy with the authorities and interacting with other stakeholders. While most mission chiefs to emerging economies viewed outreach as an important aspect of interactions, their revealed preference was to spend their limited mission time in policy discussions with the authorities. Given this, it is unsurprising that some scheduled outreach meetings, taking place during missions, became pro-forma as reported by some interviewed staff. The situation was different when the resident representative or headquarters staff devoted time to planning and implementing special events.

IV. Were Interactions Well Managed?

63. This chapter looks at three aspects of the management of interactions—strategy; staff style, skills, and turnover; and relationship management. It asks how and how well each was calibrated to promote effective interactions. It concludes that for the large emerging economies, the problem of interactions was a failure of strategy—essentially the absence of one for effectively engaging post-program and other surveillance-only economies. For many other emerging economies, the lack of an explicit overall strategy was less of an immediate concern, as they had greater interest in Fund programs, signaling services, and other advice (such as for meeting EU requirements). For these countries, problems with the management of interactions came down to a number of different things—for some, a lack of an effective country-level strategy, and for others poor management of staff turnover and continuity of the relationship.

A. Strategy

64. The Fund did not have an explicit institutional strategy for interactions with emerging economies during the evaluation period, or a successful implicit one. Elements of institutional strategy specific to these countries were embedded in policy statements, such as the Fund’s Medium-Term Strategy, which highlighted financial and capital market issues and the Fund’s framework for financing. At the country level, the Fund’s implicit approach revolved around the surveillance process, the prevention and resolution of financial crises, and the stepped up provision of technical assistance—especially for other emerging economies. The implicit strategy also supported country efforts to wean themselves from the prolonged use of resources—thus launching the transition from a program relationship to a surveillance-only relationship that was a fact of life for several emerging economies and the IMF staff working on them, as discussed in Chapter II. However, this was done without putting in place an effective approach to post-program interactions that took into account the very real concerns of the country authorities about further engagement with the Fund (see Box 7).

65. As in the advanced economies, the staff’s strategy for generating influence in nonprogram contexts was linked in part to the Fund’s transparency policy and communications strategy. But, as also in the advanced economies, the authorities of the large emerging economies had little appetite for Fund outreach on their economies, especially in fora involving the media. As a fallback, staff invested heavily in regional work designed to reposition the Fund as a knowledge-based institution specializing in the economic policy challenges that countries face, and the global and regional external environments that shape them. The jury is still out on the effectiveness and strategic impact of these activities at both the regional and country levels, which are work in progress.

Large emerging economies

66. As shown in Figure 2 in Chapter II, the strategic alignment between the authorities of the large emerging economies and the staff working on them was relatively low in 2007–08. Figure 11 looks beneath this composite measure at its components. As shown there, for six roles there was a gap of more than 20 percentage points between what the authorities think are priorities and what the staff think, with differences of more than 40 percentage points for consensus building within the government and contribution to the development of policy frameworks. (In other words, 64 percent of staff aimed to help build internal consensus on policies, while only 16 percent of authorities wanted this; and 86 percent of staff said they aimed to contribute to the development of policy frameworks, while only 42 percent of authorities said they wanted this.) These large differences point to either lack of knowledge by staff
of what the authorities wanted from the Fund, or unresolved issues in the dialogue with the authorities about what the interactions are supposed to achieve. In either case, they raise questions about the Fund’s strategy for interactions with this group of countries.

67. What do the interviews with staff and the Fund’s internal documents say about these traction issues for the large emerging economies in the evaluation sample? The staff interviews suggest that staff did grapple with the Fund’s limited traction in these countries, especially in surveillance-only cases. As noted earlier, several interviewed resident representatives linked the difficulties they were experiencing in building relations of trust with the authorities to the Fund’s failure to articulate a strategy for engaging with post-program surveillance-only countries. Meanwhile, interviews with mission chiefs and the internal documents show considerable debate about how to proceed in several large emerging economies, including with respect to outreach, given the many country sensitivities involved. These cases reveal individual concerns about, and struggles for, increasing relevance and influence, rather than any institutional imperative of the kind that guides the Fund’s approach to macroeconomic stability or exchange rate policy.

Box 7. Exit Strategies from Fund Programs in Emerging Economies

The IEO commissioned an assessment of the transition from program to surveillance-only among a select group of emerging economies—Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania—and its impact on interactions. The assessment found:

• Background. The Fund’s operating concept was that surveillance was the paragon—the foundational relation of the IMF with its membership. Lending was seen as abnormal, an exception accepted only in crisis or to prevent one, and against conditionality.

• Case study findings. The expectation in the programs considered was the ultimate transition back to a surveillance-only relationship, in line with the Articles of Agreement. Precautionary programs also aimed at achieving exit. Each case study contained a clear understanding of what the exit process involved. Nevertheless, the exit process did not address the post-exit strategy, except as the return to surveillance, which was considered a well-understood, welcome, and sufficient mode of future operation.

• Question. Why is there little discussion of post-program strategy? If the Fund were a firm about to lose a significant part of its clientele, it would develop new products, or reinvent itself. The challenge is not to get rid of surveillance but make it work in an environment where most of the global GDP is concentrated in surveillance-only countries. In current circumstances, such relationships have tended to become excessively formal, distant, and lower value-added relationships in line with those in advanced economies. The IMF is less influential and with marginal impact on policy design and implementation.

• Going forward. The issue is not exit but the quality of surveillance if current deficiencies in country-specific post-exit relations with this new layer of emerging economies are to be addressed.


Other emerging economies

68. For the other emerging economies, as shown in Figure 12, strategic dissonance between the authorities and staff is much smaller. Five roles have differences above 20 percentage points, but those differences are considerably smaller than for the large emerging economies. For this group of other emerging economies, the evaluation found country-level differences in strategy were decisive for the effectiveness (or not) of interactions in particular country contexts. Some cases (such as in emerging Europe) worked well as there was a clear strategy aimed at EU entry; whereas, others worked less well, as the understandings of the authorities and staff were unclear as to what was to be achieved in the interactions.

B. Staff style, skills, continuity, and incentives

69. The survey and interview evidence examined on these topics point to some concerns about the Fund’s management of staff resources—in particular its staffing of country teams with the skills needed to provide quality advice to large emerging economy authorities and its management of turnover in other emerging economies. There was a broad level of consistency between large and other emerging economies in terms of their views on staff style, but there were important differences with respect to the adequacy of staff skills, staff preparation for meetings, and the management of continuity. Large emerging economy authorities were more critical of staff skills and preparation, while staff turnover was a more serious issue for the other emerging economies than for the large emerging economies.

Style

70. Overall, the message from authorities about the style of engagement is positive, but the number cit-
ing concerns remains too large. A majority of survey respondents (respectively 80 and 75 percent of surveyed authorities from large and other emerging economies, see Box 3) said that the Fund did a good job of listening to their perspectives, a central aspect of respect. Almost 20 percent of the large emerging economy authorities responding to the evaluation survey flagged concerns about the staff’s respectfulness in their dealings with the authorities and their staff. As shown in Figure 13, 19 percent of large emerging economy authorities said that staff showed insufficient respect to them over the last two years, although 27 percent said the situation was improving. As in other areas the numbers for the other emerging economies are much better—only 3 percent of surveyed authorities found staff disrespectful and 42 percent said the situation had improved. In interviews, both staff and country officials of large emerging economies indicated that relationships with the Fund had in the past
been soured by the style of some Fund staff members, who had come across as highhanded and arrogant, with a tendency to lecture rather than listen. Some authorities also conveyed concerns about what they saw as the staff’s ideological rigidity about policies. Another source of irritation was what an interviewed official of one country referred to as the tendency for staff to give specific advice, for example on monetary policy, when the authorities considered the staff’s role to be less prescriptive, focused on providing the analysis that would help inform policymaking. Interviews also revealed specific instances of style irritations in other emerging economies, although some authorities complimented staff, for instance, for being respectful and open-minded.

 Authorities who thought IMF staff showed insufficient respect over last two years
Authorities who thought IMF staff were better over the last two years compared to earlier years

Figure 13. Respectfulness Towards the Authorities
(Percent of authorities who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”)

71. One-third of large emerging economies indicated that inadequate staff preparation for missions reduced the effectiveness of meetings. Five percent of other emerging economies thought so, as indicated in Figure 14. Meanwhile, nearly a quarter of large emerging economies indicated that staff had not presented their assessments in a clear and convincing manner. For other emerging economies, the numbers were lower and more in line with those provided by the other country groups.

72. Figure 15 gives the evaluation survey evidence on whether the lack of diversity of staff members (both in terms of nationality and educational background) working on the emerging economies had adversely affected interactions. It shows that 14 percent of the large emerging economies thought there was an issue, while only 3 percent of other emerging economies thought so and 4–5 percent of surveyed staff working on emerging economies thought so. The issue arose in the evaluation interviews with the authorities of one country. In interviews with staff, three staff members raised diversity as an issue—two in the context of a single country situation where the ethnic composition of Fund teams was a consideration for the authorities, and one suggesting that more diverse staff teams might bring a broader perspective to the table.

Figure 14. Authorities’ Views on Staff Mission Preparation and Presentations
(Percent of authorities who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”)

Staff have not presented their assessments in a clear and convincing manner
Staff have not provided clear written presentation of their assessments
Staff have changed positions without well-supported analysis
Inadequate preparation by staff has reduced the effectiveness of meetings

Figure 15. Evaluation Survey Evidence on Lack of Diversity in Staff Working on Emerging Economies
(Percent of authorities who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”)

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Figure 15. Staff Diversity: Authorities’ and Staff Views
(Percent of respondents who answered “agree” or “strongly agree” that the nationalities and/or backgrounds of IMF staff restricted effective interactions)

![Staff Diversity Chart]

Skills

73. One-third (or more) of large emerging economies expressed concerns about staff competencies in three of four areas queried in the evaluation survey—practical experience, country knowledge, and language proficiency. As illustrated in Figure 16, over 40 percent of respondents indicated that staff lacked sufficient practical experience in policy formulation and implementation. One-third also thought that inadequate country knowledge and language skills had compromised interactions. Fewer emerging economy authorities criticized staff’s technical capabilities (19 percent). For the other emerging economies, the share of authorities who were critical was much smaller for each skill assessed. Interview evidence reinforced the importance of hands-on practical skills and technical expertise to the authorities of large emerging economies, as noted in Chapter II’s discussion of knowledge transfer and capacity building. And notwithstanding the concerns about country knowledge, some interviewed authorities praised the staff’s country knowledge. As one official from a large emerging economy reported, the capacity of the Fund to understand his authorities’ domestic restrictions, together with their firm commitment to performance, had been key to the success of the program.

Staff turnover

74. Staff turnover—and the ability of the Fund to manage it smoothly—is a concern of many emerging economy authorities. As shown in Figure 17 about a quarter of authorities from both groups felt that the IMF had not provided enough continuity and smooth changeover of mission chiefs and mission members. The interview evidence suggests that the Fund has done less to ensure continuity of the relationship in the other emerging economies, and especially in small states and other relatively small countries, which typically have the least capacity to manage rapid staff turnover.22 The

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22 Over the eight-year period, the evidence suggests that, on average, there were 3.8 mission chiefs for a large emerging economy, and 4.0 for an other emerging economy, with some small states having as many as 5 mission chiefs.
authorities of one small state complained that mission chiefs to their country had changed so frequently that they had no clear contact point with Fund staff. But the evaluation also found that Fund area departments have attempted to facilitate continuity, including efforts to ensure that all mission members not change at the same time, to bring area department management or the previous mission chief along to introduce the new mission chief, and to send new mission chiefs on familiarizing missions before the start of their posting.

75. Staff expressed a sense that continuity is not managed well within the institution. This conclusion is supported by both survey and interview evidence. Staff survey responses suggest that internal structures and incentives have not been conducive to promoting continuity—particularly so for those working in other emerging economies. As also shown in Figure 18, more than 60 percent of staff working on the large emerging economies and nearly 75 percent working on the other emerging economies agreed that staff had little incentive to work on the same country for more than two years. Nearly half of staff working on other emerging economies also pointed to insufficient briefings to successors (compared to 36 percent of large emerging counterparts). The interview evidence points to specific incentives that may underpin these broad conclusions. Some mission chiefs said that staff prefer to work on program countries due to these countries’ greater visibility, which improves career prospects. Some staff also suggested that the lack of sufficient briefings for successors is related to the staff’s attaching more importance to “hitting the ground running” for their next job than to briefing their successor, despite this activity’s role in helping smooth the transition and maintain productive relations with country authorities.
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Staff incentives for effective face-to-face interactions

76. Area department staff working on emerging economies—and more generally across the Fund—said that the incentives they faced did not favor interactions with the authorities. Figure 18 shows that 59 percent of staff working on large and 65 percent of staff working on other emerging economies indicated that interactions with the authorities were given too little weight in staff annual performance reviews. Staff interviews pointed to other incentives that pushed against closer interactions, such as one staff member who reminded the interviewers that mission chiefs who develop strong relationships with their authorities are seen to have lost their objectivity and independence.

77. Many staff also said they were allowed too little time for interactions relative to other work, such as servicing the Board or management and responding to reviewers’ comments. This result was similar for staff working on both large and other emerging economies (50 percent and 44 percent, respectively). These survey results are supported by evidence from interviewed area department staff, whose perspectives on institutional procedures revealed frustration at the importance given to internal processes that they say take a substantial amount of their time—particularly requirements for briefing and the “crafting” of papers for a smooth passage through the Board (an implicit indicator of performance).23

C. Relationship management

78. Interactions in all their dimensions come together in the Fund’s country relationships, which require proper management for effectiveness. Box 4 in the main report shows the evaluation survey evidence on the authorities’ and staff’s perceptions about the effectiveness of Fund relationship management. By one measure, 80–90 percent of emerging economy authorities’ survey responses agreed the Fund’s arrangements for relationship management were conducive to effective interactions. (The staff’s survey numbers were in the same range.) But on another measure—whether the Fund takes a long-term strategic approach to the relationship—the scores are much lower, with 5–10 percent rating the Fund’s performance as excellent, 45 percent as good, and 35 percent as average. Against this background, this section presents the evidence on three aspects of relationship management: (i) the effectiveness of different Fund interlocutors in their interactions with the authorities; (ii) decentralization and the management and role of Fund resident representatives; and (iii) trouble shooting.

Interlocutors

79. The evaluation survey asked the authorities and staff about which they thought was the Fund’s most effective channel for interactions. As shown in Figure 19, the authorities of the large emerging economies gave the highest scores to the staff working on surveillance, notwithstanding their concerns discussed earlier about the surveillance process. They gave the lowest scores to management and to program staff. The authorities of the other emerging economies gave the highest scores to technical assistance staff and the lowest to manage-
80. In the survey, both authorities and staff rated interactions with the EDs more highly than those with management. This finding was true for both large and other emerging economies, though differences in the views of staff and authorities were more pronounced in the other than in the large emerging economies. In other emerging economies, 75 percent of authorities called interactions with the EDs effective, compared to 60 percent of staff. Over 70 percent of both staff and authorities in large emerging economies rated these interactions as effective. The pattern was similar for interactions with management, though effectiveness scores were lower across the board. In large emerging economies, 65 percent of authorities and 53 percent of staff called interactions with management effective, compared to around 50 percent for both groups in other emerging economies.

81. In interviews, mission chiefs generally considered that IMF management can play a useful role in interactions by building an appropriate relationship with a country’s political executive at the highest level. This was particularly the case, they felt, in large emerging economies where the staff do not have access at the highest levels. Even in such cases, however, some interviewed mission chiefs expressed the view that management should be careful discussing details of programs and policies with the authorities.24 On occasion, messages conveyed by management were unexpected or not previously discussed fully with staff, to the detriment of relations with the authorities.

**Decentralization**

82. The IMF has not joined the international trend towards geographical decentralization. If anything, it has moved in the opposite direction, as budget cuts have led to the closing of some country offices. However, the Fund still maintains resident representative offices in 24 emerging economies—11 large and 13 other emerging economies.

83. Emerging economy authorities, for the most part, expressed satisfaction with current arrangements in their countries. As shown in Figure 20, in response to a survey question, none of the large-emerging authorities wanted more engagement from a resident representative office (85 percent preferred the status quo, and 24% of the respondents who answered “somewhat more” or “much more.”

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*IMF Office of Internal Audit and Inspection (2002) also points out that “Management has become more directly involved in negotiations through face-to-face meeting with senior country authorities. Important quality control points within the institution would appear to have been weakened or short-circuited by this process and that Management may be more exposed.” In any case, the appropriate balance between the oversight of staff interactions and direct conduct of interactions by management would be worth reviewing and clarifying.

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**Figure 20. Resident Representatives: Authorities’ and Staff Views**

(Percent of respondents)

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<th>Large emerging</th>
<th>Other emerging</th>
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<tr>
<td>Authorities who thought that the limited level of responsibilities delegated to the resident representative adversely affected interactions</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff who thought that the limited level of responsibilities delegated to the resident representative adversely affected interactions</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorities who wanted more engagement with a resident representative</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff who wanted more engagement with a resident representative</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>60%</td>
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1 Shows the share of respondents who answered “somewhat more” or “much more.”
2 Shows the share of respondents who answered “agree” or “strongly agree.”
Box 8. The Handling of Complaints and Tensions

The evaluation survey asked a variety of questions about the way in which the Fund handles complaints from member countries. The chart below summarizes the relevant survey data across country groups. It raises questions about equal treatment of countries in the handling of complaints from the authorities: In particular, it shows that:

For the authorities:
- In terms of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the process for handling complaints, all country groups fell in the narrow range of 15–26 percent dissatisfied or 74–85 percent satisfied.
- But there are notable differences in how satisfied countries are with the outcomes of their complaints. The emerging economies were the most dissatisfied with the outcomes of their complaints—with almost half of large emerging economies dissatisfied.
- None of the large advanced economies had problems with the outcomes of their complaints to the IMF. For the other advanced and PRGF-eligible countries, about one-quarter of surveyed authorities were dissatisfied.
  
For staff:
- Among staff, the converse is true: almost half of staff working on the large advanced economies said they received insufficient backing from management/senior staff when tensions arose with the authorities.
- But only 29 percent of staff working on large emerging economies perceived insufficient backing.

15 percent wanted less engagement). For other emerging economies, 76 percent preferred the status quo, 16 percent more, and 7 percent less. The staff was more bullish on an enhanced presence in large emerging economies, with 19 percent saying “more” and 3 percent, “less.” Of some relevance here—and further evidence of the authorities’ interest in technical inputs as opposed to policy advice—when asked about resident technical advisors, authorities in somewhat larger numbers (20 percent of large and 32 percent of other emerging
economies) wanted the IMF to provide “more” and none wanted “less.”

84. Interviewed mission chiefs argued that resident representatives could play a more strategic role in building relations and maintaining traction with authorities. Their general view was that resident representatives had the potential to greatly improve interactions with the authorities and enhance the quality of Fund surveillance. Some said that particularly in dynamically changing economies, an annual consultation plus staff visits and ad hoc contacts with management were unlikely to be sufficient to sustain an ongoing policy dialogue or facilitate the identification of emerging risks and vulnerabilities. In the context of budget cutbacks and pending closures of resident representative offices, many mission chiefs maintained that adding resources at headquarters by way of additional staff or increasing the use of technology would not be an adequate substitute for local presence.

85. However, resident representatives themselves, particularly those in large emerging economies, were of the view that the potential benefits from resident representatives in these countries were not being fully realized. Many noted they had quite limited relations with the authorities and were not in a position to participate in an ongoing policy dialogue that they viewed as essential to fulfill their role. Several said that in order to increase effectiveness, resident representative positions needed to be viewed more strategically, as the best channel available for relationship building with the authorities. They argued that in the absence of a re-establishment of trust, and well-defined rules of the game, surveillance in the large emerging economies would remain unsatisfactory. Many viewed continued centralization efforts by the Fund as counterproductive. They argued that closure of resident representative posts would only diminish further the Fund’s visibility and make it less able than other international players to maintain the close relationships with authorities necessary to make its voice heard. In internal documentation some IMF area departments have also expressed concerns about the effects of resident office closures.

Troubleshooting

86. The large emerging economies were the most dissatisfied of all country groups in respect to how their complaints about interactions were handled. Survey responses suggest that when authorities brought a complaint to the Fund, most but not all, were mostly satisfied with the way it was handled. As shown in Box 8, 18 percent of respondents from large, and 26 percent from other emerging economies, said that they were dissatisfied with the process by which complaints were handled. But a much higher share of authorities—especially of respondents from large emerging economy authorities (45 percent) were dissatisfied with the outcomes of their complaints.27 Meanwhile, looking at the staff perspective, about a third of staff working on emerging economies believed they did not receive sufficient backing from management and/or senior staff in the case of tension with the authorities—with less country dissatisfaction in cases where staff receive less management support and vice versa.

V. Conclusions

87. The first conclusion of the paper is that the effectiveness of IMF interactions differs as between the large and the other emerging economies. Several country exceptions notwithstanding, interactions are less effective in the large emerging economies than in the other emerging economies. This conclusion follows from the weight of the evidence on most dimensions considered in the evaluation.

88. Second, the Fund’s ineffectiveness in the large emerging economies derives importantly from a failure of strategy for promoting institutional relevance in post-program and other surveillance-only economies. Other points on the large emerging economies follow:

- The large emerging economies rated the effectiveness of interactions with the authorities of the other emerging economies, in four out of five of the indicators of interactions developed by the evaluation. One driver of these differences was the large emerging economies’ declining interest in the Fund’s existing products and services, which in some cases entailed a transition from a program relationship to a surveillance-only relationship and a dramatic decline in the Fund’s influence.

- Though many authorities welcomed the greater harmony of their post-program surveillance-only relationships, bad memories of past programs tended to dominate the evaluation interviews with many country officials. They stressed that going forward their authorities would be reluctant to enter into any relationship with the IMF that would involve (or be perceived to involve) a loss of policy autonomy.

\[25\text{From a different perspective, Box 1 in a paper to the Committee on the Budget, IMF (2005b) noted that “[Executive] Directors were of the view that resident representatives should play a more important role in capacity building and outreach activities, notwithstanding that the direct work with the authorities should remain as the core objective of posts.”}\\[26\text{For example, the business plan of APD for FY2009–11 noted that such closures could lead to some lost interactions with authorities and others on the ground in several still-vulnerable Asian countries.}\\[27\text{These figures include only those authorities who indicated that they had raised a complaint to the IMF, though this group represents a sizable share of all emerging economy respondents; half of large emerging and 39 percent of other emerging economy authorities had a complaint to convey to the IMF.}]}\]
• Meanwhile, the challenge posed for the IMF in surveillance-only relationships is how to gain and sustain the interest and trust of post-program authorities. To meet this challenge (without the provision of financial assistance), the IMF must bring—and be perceived to bring—value beyond what countries already achieve; a task increasingly difficult given the much higher levels of expertise and capacity than in the past. The authorities of many large emerging economies think that the surveillance process failed this test during the evaluation period, especially during 2007–08. In their view, it provided little value added and/or lacked evenhandedness, especially vis-à-vis advanced economies.

• In trying to increase traction, staff launched a number of initiatives during the evaluation period—including new modalities, expanded outreach, and stepped up country analysis on a case-by-case basis. Overall, these had limited impact on interactions as a whole, given the scale of the challenge to the Fund’s relevance and the absence of an overarching strategy that bridges the authorities’ concerns and the institution’s mission and mandate.

89. Third, for the other emerging economies, interactions were effective with some but not all countries. Other points on the other emerging economies follow:

• The other emerging economies themselves constitute a diverse group, comprising subgroups of “small states,” emerging Europe, and relatively small countries in the Middle East, and other regions, each with distinctive challenges as well as unique country-level issues.

• The authorities of these economies gave IMF technical assistance high marks, in the survey results and the interviews. Interviewed officials from several countries highlighted the staff’s help on banking supervision and inflation targeting. And the FSAP process came in for high praise, including from officials of small states, who more generally were using the IMF to help ratchet up their technical capacity.

• Officials from other emerging economies generally said that interactions were improving, with some associating the improvement with their countries’ transition from program to nonprogram status, yet others a recent change into program status. Some welcomed the Article IV process as an opportunity to test their own ideas and to debate alternatives. But others agreed with the large emerging economies that Article IV reports and discussions were often just updates with “very little new or interesting to the authorities.”

• Importantly, the interactions problems of the other emerging economies tended to be more straightforward, related to the management of turnover and countries’ desire for greater institutional attention to the challenges they faced. Notwithstanding a number of issues that remain to be addressed, successes generally came easier with this group of countries, as solutions were more amenable to individual area departments’ and country teams’ ability to meet countries’ particular circumstances, such as assisting the ambitions for greater regional integration, or providing more country-specific analysis and technical assistance.

Annex 1. Emerging Economies

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IMF Interactions with PRGF-Eligible Countries

1. Introduction and Overview

1. This paper examines IMF interactions in PRGF-eligible countries. It focuses on interactions with the authorities on surveillance, programs and signaling, and technical assistance during the 2001–08 evaluation period. Like the other country papers, it considers the extent to which interactions were effective and well managed. Like them, it considers interactions with country stakeholders beyond the authorities, especially as they affected the primary relationship with the authorities.

2. The paper finds that IMF interactions with PRGF-eligible countries were more effective than with any other country group. This greater effectiveness reflects an institutional strategy for PRGF-eligible countries replete with attractive financing, debt relief, strong links to donor funding, and competent technical assistance, which in turn made for an abundance of traction in interactions with the authorities during the evaluation period. But in some cases it also led to what authorities perceived to be arrogant and inflexible staff behavior—especially in the first half of the evaluation period and especially at times of program interruptions and delays. There were fewer complaints, and more praise, from countries without such interruptions. Though authorities have reported progress in recent years across a number of dimensions, reputational damage from the earlier period remains, including with many stakeholders beyond the authorities, who continue to define the Fund in terms of structural adjustment, privatization, and fiscal austerity, despite increased staff outreach. The paper finds progress in several areas during the latter part of the evaluation period.

3. The evidence and analysis that leads to these conclusions are developed in the remainder of this paper, which is structured as follows. This first chapter profiles the PRGF-eligible countries and the evidence on which the paper is based, and summarizes the policy guidance governing interactions during the evaluation period. Chapter II discusses interactions with the authorities, examining in turn the evaluation evidence on interactions on surveillance, programs and signaling, and capacity building. Chapter III discusses interactions with other in-country stakeholders beyond the authorities. Chapter IV discusses the management of interactions with the PRGF-eligible countries, taking up in more detail issues of strategy, style, and relationship management. Chapter V concludes.

A. Country coverage

4. The evaluation covers IMF interactions with 77 countries eligible for borrowing from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).1 These 77 countries, listed in Annex 1, had a combined GDP of $1.3 trillion in 2008, amounting to under 2 percent of global GDP measured with current exchange rates.

5. These countries form a diverse group. Some are very small (Kiribati’s population is less than 100,000) and some are very large (Nigeria’s population exceeds 150 million). Per capita incomes vary widely (from a low of $140 in Burundi to a high of $5,710 in Grenada).2 And the economic and financial challenges they face are equally varied. Some are just emerging from conflict status and others are poised to join the ranks of the emerging economies. But each faces macroeconomic policy challenges and related institutional capacity constraints that the Fund has both the mandate and expertise to help address. Almost all enjoyed macroeconomic progress over much of the evaluation period. Ninety-eight percent (all except Somalia) had Article IV relationships, 95 percent had technical assistance programs, and 75 percent had a program with the Fund at some time during the evaluation period.

6. IMF interactions with PRGF-eligible countries are managed by all five area departments. As shown in

1According to the IMF’s PRGF Fact Sheet, “Eligibility is based principally on the IMF’s assessment of a country’s per capita income, drawing on the cutoff point for eligibility to World Bank concessional lending (currently 2007 per capita gross national income of $1,095).” See www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm. Eligibility also takes into account country access to financial markets and status as a small island economy. See Annex 1 for the list of 77 countries, from the IMF World Economic Outlook country classification. The sole exclusion from the WEO is India, which the evaluation included among the emerging economies.

2World Bank, World Development Indicators database, October 7, 2009.
B. Evidence base

8. Sources of evidence for this paper include survey, documentary, and interview data developed specifically for the evaluation, as well as relevant data developed for earlier evaluations.4 Highlights of the evidence base follow, with greater detail provided in the companion background technical documents.

- The evaluation’s survey evidence covers the authorities and civil society organizations (CSOs) in PRGF-eligible countries, and IMF staff working on these countries. The evaluation survey of country authorities was answered by 47 respondents from 41 PRGF-eligible countries, for an overall country response rate of 54 percent.5 Responses to the staff survey totaled 290, covering work on 69 PRGF-eligible countries (containing some 88 percent of the total PRGF-eligible country population). The civil society survey received 259 responses from civil society representatives in 61 of the 77 PRGF-eligible countries. The methodology and results are set out in detail in the background technical document on the survey.

- The evaluation team reviewed the Fund’s internal documentary record for the 16 countries in the evaluation sample. The material included confidential briefing memoranda to IMF management, mission back-to-office reports, and interdepartmental correspondence on related country issues. Such material gave the IEO a window into internal debates about staff positions on particular issues, if or how IMF management may have contributed on an issue, and how country views influenced the debate and the decisions.

- Country visits by the evaluation team to Cameroon, Senegal, and Togo provided opportunities for in-depth interviews with a broad representation of authorities in these countries, as well as for discussions with partners and stakeholders. Also, taking advantage of the IMF Spring and Annual Meetings in Washington—the evaluation team interviewed from headquarters many representatives of the authorities and Fund staff—including resident representatives—and some World Bank staff who worked on the evaluation sample countries. The interview methodology across individual sources of evidence and applied judgment and other knowledge when different sources suggested different answers. In terms of possible interpretation and measurement risks, the evaluation survey was quite complex, with many questions and many respondents from a large number of countries; all this raises the risk that some questions may have been interpreted differently by different recipients. Interview bias is a common feature of such evidence, subject to potential biases on both sides. Finally, the use of the documentary evidence is subject to many sources of bias, not the least of which is its having been written for another time and another audience—one quite familiar with the Fund’s culture and issues, and one where strict word limits apply to all documents, so that many issues of interest receive quite abbreviated attention.

4The “nonprogram countries” among the PRGF-eligible countries are: Bhutan, Eritrea, Kiribati, Maldives, Myanmar, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Somalia, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

5As in all such endeavors, the evidence may be subject to misinterpretation. To manage such risks, the evaluation triangulated
and results are set out in the background technical document on the interviews.

- Other evidence includes information drawn from earlier IEO evaluations—especially “The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa” (IEO, 2007), the “PRSP/PRGF” (IEO, 2004), and “Structural Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs” (IEO, 2008). It includes reports from earlier IEO country visits, including to Armenia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Pakistan, and Vietnam; IMF ex post assessments, which are available for 14 of the 16 sample countries; and studies specially commissioned by IEO, including one on IMF outreach to civil society (Scholte, 2009), which included country visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda among the evaluation sample countries.

C. Policies and guiding principles

9. The Fund’s evolving approach to interactions with PRGF-eligible countries is catalogued in a series of papers for the Executive Board, the most recent of which is the staff paper on “The Role of the Fund in Low-Income Countries” (IMF, 2008a), which the Board discussed in July 2008. According to that paper, the Fund provides: (i) advice on macroeconomic policies and institutions that support internal and external macroeconomic stability, foster economic growth, and enhance integration in the international trade and financial system; (ii) assistance in building capacity and institutions for sound macro-economic management and financial stability; and (iii) concessional balance of payments support.

10. The underlying policy guidance to Fund staff on the conduct of these functions is summarized below:

- **Surveillance.** Interactions were governed by the 1977 Surveillance Decision, replaced by the 2007 Surveillance Decision, with specific guidance to staff provided in a series of surveillance guidance notes. These notes instructed staff to engage in a frank policy dialogue that supports members’ receptiveness to Fund advice. The dialogue should include cross-country comparative studies as a way to add value to policy discussions and, more generally, consultations should attempt to bring to bear other countries’ experiences in addressing similar problems, drawing out policy implications. Spillover effects to and from other countries were to be discussed wherever relevant. Priority is to be given to macroeconomic issues related to external sustainability, vulnerability to balance of payments or currency crises, sustainable growth with price stability, and the systemic or regional impact of policies in large economies. Financial sector issues were to receive thorough coverage. And bilateral surveillance should be informed by multilateral and regional surveillance.

- **Programs and signaling.** As the Fund’s concessional lending facility for PRGF-eligible countries, the PRGF was launched in 1999 to be the vehicle by which the Fund provides financial support to countries’ poverty reduction and growth strategies. The PRGF handbook provides information for staff on the role of the PRSP in PRGF arrangements, the objectives and design of PRGF-supported programs, and monitoring under PRGFs. It covers issues of phasing and access and the relationship of the PRGF with Fund facilities and initiatives, and collaboration with the World Bank. Other modalities for PRGF-eligible countries include the Policy Support Instrument (PSI); staff-monitored programs, and emergency assistance to members in post-conflict recovery and those requiring natural disaster assistance as well as the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). The ESF was launched in December 2005 to assist members experiencing short-term balance of payments difficulties and modified in September 2008 to provide for increased access, and rapid assistance with streamlined conditionality. The HIPC Initiative and the MDRI have also provided debt relief for qualifying PRGF-eligible countries. Lending to member countries has entailed conditions from the beginning. In 2000, the Fund
concluded a review of conditionality that recognized that successful economic policy programs must be founded on strong country ownership. Guidelines on conditionality adopted by the Board in September 2002 re-emphasized the importance of ownership and called for “parsimony” and “criticality” in the use of conditions. The Executive Board reviewed the application of the new guidelines in March 2005 and in July 2008 a revision to the operational guidance note on conditionality was prepared as an aid for staff to the implementation of the 2002 guidelines. Recently, the Fund revised its conditionality framework in the context of an extensive reform to improve its capacity to prevent and resolve crises. For the PRGF, ESF and PSI, loan conditionalities were evaluated as part of the general streamlining of Fund conditionality, shifting to a review-based approach to assessment of program performance rather than through the use of structural performance criteria.

- **Technical assistance.** A policy statement on technical assistance issued in April 2001 highlighted the importance of country ownership of technical assistance and called for a review of past and current technical assistance efforts, including a country’s track record in implementing technical assistance. The 2005 Board discussion of the Technical Assistance Task Force emphasized a strategic approach to the programming of technical assistance, including the involvement and ownership of the authorities, and sufficient flexibility to respond to shifts in priorities. Coordination with, and support from donors was seen to be important, with involvement by country authorities in the design and follow-up of technical assistance activities, based on the needs and priorities set out, where possible, in PRSPs. The 2008 Board discussion of reforms to enhance the impact of Fund technical assistance underlined the need to advance the integration of technical assistance with surveillance and lending operations; and to improve the prioritization of TA in line with the strategic objectives of both recipient countries and the Fund, and by introducing a charging regime.

11. Interactions with in-country stakeholders beyond the authorities involving the provision of information are governed by the Fund’s transparency policy and its communications strategy, as well as by individual policies with relevant outreach provisions, such as on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Guidance to staff is contained on the SPR and EXR websites. Under the transparency policy, there is a presumption of publication of staff reports for Article IV consultations, and relevantly in the case of the use of concessional resources, the Managing Director will not recommend approval of an arrangement or the completion of a review if the member concerned does not consent to publication of the staff report. The guidance on outreach places a premium on staff outreach to parliamentarians as the countries’ duly elected officials, to civil society in member countries, and to others, while continuing to respect the primacy of the Fund’s relationship with the authorities (see, for example, IMF, 2003b). To strengthen communication of the Fund’s policy messages, staff are encouraged to develop outreach programs and enhance their contacts beyond the authorities. Press conferences should be held after Article IV missions and/or Board meetings, unless IMF departments see reasons not to hold them (e.g., if the authorities object). Similar guidance is embodied in the conclusions of recent reviews of the Fund’s transparency and communications.

II. Interactions with the Authorities

12. This chapter examines the evidence on the effectiveness of IMF interactions with the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries. It begins with a brief discussion of the overall picture emerging from the survey results, and what it says about IMF interactions with PRGF-eligible countries compared with the other country groups. It then turns to the evaluation evidence on surveillance, programs, and capacity building. A theme running through the discussion is the value most authorities of PRGF-eligible countries placed on the Fund’s products and services in addressing the challenges they faced. How this value affected substantive interactions between the authorities and staff is discussed in this chapter. The implications for the style of interactions are discussed in Chapter IV.

A. Overarching issues

13. The main report uses survey-based indicators to compare different country groups’ perceptions about interactions, and on each indicator the ratings provided by the PRGF-eligible countries are the highest. This section looks behind those indicators (recapped briefly in Figure 2) and explores what drives the ratings from the PRGF-eligible countries. Unless otherwise specified, the survey data and the attendant discussion refer to the 2007–08 period, as most survey questions were framed in terms of “the last two years.”

14. Figures 3–5 illustrate the data underlying several of the indicators set out in Figure 2—those for role relevance, role effectiveness, and strategic alignment.

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12IMF (2008c).
14See Box 2 of the main report.
IMF INTERACTIONS WITH PRGF-ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES

Figure 2. Composite Indicators for Interactions

The data cover survey questions put to both the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries and to the staff working on them about the relevance and effectiveness of ten possible IMF roles.

- As discussed in the main report, all country groups (including the PRGF-eligible countries) expressed strong interest in the Fund’s assessment of their countries’ policies and prospects and in a good exchange of views. Where the responses from the PRGF-eligible countries diverge from the others is in their wider interest in Fund interactions. As shown, at least 80 percent of PRGF-eligible survey respondents said they wanted Fund interactions on five roles—as illustrated in Figure 3—the two just mentioned, plus three others: (i) contributing to the development of policy frameworks; (ii) assisting in the development of capacity; and (iii) presenting analysis and assessments of the country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets. Majorities of PRGF-eligible authorities wanted nine out of the ten possible Fund roles.

- Also as shown in Figure 4, at least 70 percent of the surveyed PRGF-eligible authorities rated interactions on 7 of the 10 queried roles as effective or very effective. For other country groups, only two roles were that highly rated. The three exceptions that received subpar ratings from the PRGF-eligible countries are the Fund’s contribution to (i) international policy coordination, including through the analysis of spillovers; (ii) the development and maintenance of policy consensus inside government; and (iii) the development and maintenance of policy consensus outside government. And even these three roles received higher effectiveness ratings from the PRGF-eligible countries than from any other country group.

- Figure 5 contains the data for the indicator of strategic alignment, which measures by how much the authorities of the different countries and the staff working on them expressed a shared view about the purposes and priorities of their interactions. The strategic alignment indicator for the PRGF-eligible countries reflects the fact that on average, across the ten purposes queried in the evaluation survey, the authorities’ and staff ratings differed by an average of 9 percentage points, compared with 16–25 percentage points elsewhere. Strategic alignment in the context of PRGF-eligible countries is discussed further in Chapter IV.
### Figure 3. Role Relevance: PRGF-Eligible Country Authorities' Views
(Percent of authorities who responded that they wanted the IMF to perform each role “a fair amount” or “very much”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 4. Role Effectiveness: PRGF-Eligible Country Authorities' Views
(Percent of authorities who responded that interactions were “effective” or “very effective”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Includes only those who responded that their country had an IMF financial or monitoring program.
2Includes only those who responded that their country received IMF technical assistance or training.
15. Survey respondents from PRGF-eligible countries also gave the Fund the highest “quality” ratings of all the country groups/subgroups, with the detailed underlying ratings shown in Figure 6. As described in the main report, the survey asked authorities and staff to assess Fund performance in ten dimensions associated with effective interactions. And as shown below, 80 percent or more of responding authorities said that the Fund did a good or excellent job on listening carefully, actively engaging in a constructive dialogue, and focusing on topics of interest to the country. (Not shown, staff rated quality higher than the authorities, by an average of 12 percentage points for each query.) The largest difference between the authorities and the staff was for responding in general to countries’ needs and changing priorities, for which 89 percent of staff said they did a good or an excellent job, compared with only 66 percent of the authorities. The lowest authorities’ rating of 50 percent was for the presenting alterative scenarios and addressing “what if” or “what’s missing” questions (the staff rating was 69 percent). Of course, “alternative scenarios” means something quite specific in a PRGF context, for which IEO’s 2007 Sub-Saharan Africa evaluation, for example, found “ambiguity and confusion” on Fund policy about their use.15

16. Finally, PRGF authorities also rated the overall perceived effectiveness of interactions higher than did other country groups. Of the authorities responding to the survey from PRGF-eligible countries, 77 percent said that interactions were effective or very effective

15See IEO (2007).
18. The evidence suggests that PRGF-eligible countries held mainstream views with respect to the purposes and effectiveness of surveillance processes. Figure 2, for example, shows that two purposes queried in the evaluation survey that are associated with surveillance and other Fund activities (provide a clear and objective assessment of the economy’s policies and prospects and contribute to a good exchange of views) received the highest scores from the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries for relevance and for effectiveness. These are also the two highest rated items for all other country groups. The ratings provided by IMF staff working on PRGF-eligible countries were broadly the same as those of the authorities. The authorities rated the performance of staff carrying out surveillance activities highly, though slightly lower than that of staff working on programs and technical assistance, as discussed later in the paper.

B. Key functions

17. The remainder of this chapter looks at interactions between the authorities and staff in the context of surveillance, programs, and capacity building, drawing on the evaluation’s more detailed survey, interview, and documentary evidence. The discussion details the positives and the negatives, on balance painting a positive picture of interactions during the evaluation period, and especially during the last two years—while acknowledging difficult interactions with several individual countries related to program delays and interruptions in the 2002–04 period.

16In the context of other evidence pointing to a change in staff and attitudes in 2007–08 compared with previously, this larger difference for 2001–08 compared with 2007–08 may be capturing, as a surrogate rating, the views of current staff about the effectiveness of their predecessors.
(i) international coordination of policies, including the analysis of spillovers; (ii) timely alerts about changing external conditions; and (iii) cross-country analysis of other countries’ experiences. Figure 7 shows that these also were problems for the PRGF-eligible countries, albeit not to the same degree as for the other country groups, especially in the Fund’s bringing quickly to their attention the implications of changing external conditions. Based on the evaluation interviews, this reflects the Fund’s quick response to the food and fuel crises of 2007–08, which the authorities found helpful in the dialogue and in the Fund’s action in September 2008 to revise the Exogenous Shocks Facility to make it easier to access. This said, in interviews with government officials, the private sector, and civil society in PRGF-eligible countries, concerns surfaced about what some saw as a double standard in dealing with the then unfolding global crisis, as the Fund was seen to be actively promoting bailouts, government takeovers, and fiscal stimulus packages in advanced economies, which they saw as very different from the medicine prescribed for developing countries.

20. Interviews with PRGF-eligible country officials and staff indicated that a country’s program status affected how surveillance was perceived. Officials of one nonprogram country said that they had found Article IV missions valuable for dialogue and periodic evaluation of policies and processes, although staff felt less satisfied with the progress the surveillance policy dialogue made in getting action. While officials in another country, which had experienced a prolonged interruption of program status and engagement with donors, said that they had found the surveillance to be constructive and helpful to them in preventing a further deterioration of policies and prospects. But not all feedback was positive, with one finance minister echoing what several officials from emerging economies said about surveillance—that it seldom came up with anything new. Meanwhile, for many program countries, it was often hard to distinguish the end of Article IV consultations from the beginning of negotiations, and staff reports provided to the Board often blurred positions as well.17 Officials from one country with a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) relationship highlighted the close interlinkages they saw with the surveillance process.

21. Much more than the other country groups, the PRGF-eligible countries wanted the Fund to contribute to the development of policy frameworks. As shown in Figure 8, the authorities of almost all PRGF-eligible countries wanted IMF policy advice; while three-quarters said the Fund was effective or very effective at it. As the figure illustrates, these numbers were very different for the other country groups, where a small majority of other advanced economies and a larger majority from other emerging economies wanted the Fund to contribute.

17See also the background technical document on the evaluation’s documentary evidence.
IMF Interactions with PRGF-Eligible Countries

22. Of all Fund interactions, those surrounding programs are the most sensitive. As shown in Figure 9, almost 80 percent of official survey respondents from PRGF-eligible countries said they wanted financial and/or monitoring support from the Fund during the 2007–08 period, 81 percent of those receiving such support saying that it was effective or very effective, with the remainder mostly saying interactions in the context of delivery was “average.” In most years of the evaluation period, 40–45 PRGF-eligible countries had programs, with a total of 60 having programs at one time or another over the period. Box 1 briefly summarizes the experiences of the 15 case study countries with program relationships during the evaluation period.

23. Many of these programs also entailed signaling activities by the Fund—to other countries, donors, and financial markets about country policies and prospects—which added greatly to the financial stakes involved in a country’s securing the Fund’s blessing for its policies and prospects. As shown in Figure 10, this is a service that many PRGF-eligible countries wanted and thought the Fund performed well. And in interviews, officials were full of praise for Fund performance in this area. Officials from two countries expressed deep appreciation for the Fund’s help with the Paris Club. Officials from a third said the Fund had been extremely helpful in securing resumption of donor support and resolving arrears to World Bank. An official from a fourth country said that his authorities considered the Fund to have played a unique role relative to other organizations. Another said that this was an area of particularly successful interactions.

24. The bottom line is that most authorities and staff believe that during the evaluation period, the Fund added value in PRGF-eligible countries through financial and monitoring programs, debt relief, and donor signaling. However, there are differences of view across countries, depending on their own particular experience with the Fund. This “suite” of products and services brought to those countries which could access them substantial financial benefits, direct and indirect, securely anchoring the Fund’s role with this group of countries during the evaluation period. The result was an abundance of traction in Fund interactions—in contrast to the situation in the surveillance-only advanced and emerging economies discussed in the main report and in the other country papers. But this abundance of traction was also seen to put staff in a position of power vis-à-vis the authorities, as several ministers of finance from Sub-Saharan African countries observed. In turn, different PRGF-eligible countries saw the playing out of this
IMF INTERACTIONS WITH PRGF-ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES

Box 1. PRGF-Eligible Country Case Studies

The interviews and document reviews for the 15 evaluation sample countries with programs during the evaluation period revealed different kinds of country situations and, in turn, interactions with the Fund during the program process.

1. In a third group of countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Togo), underlying governance issues were present throughout much of the evaluation period and progress is both recent and fragile, with the HIPC Completion Point not reached.

2. Finally, in two others (Bolivia and Vietnam), macroeconomic performance was strong throughout most of the evaluation period, but PRGFs were interrupted early on by other conditionality issues. Neither of these countries needed the Fund’s financial support, and the Fund lost influence in both: in one because of a change in government and the Fund’s identification with the heavily market-oriented policies of the predecessor government, and in the other as the World Bank and other budget support donors and providers of technical assistance became more closely involved.

power imbalance differently depending on their own country situations, as discussed below.

25. The authorities of some PRGF-eligible countries saw the resulting imbalance of power, coupled with what they saw as a rigid intellectual paradigm, as leading to demanding and inflexible conditionality to which the authorities had to agree or else.

• For several interviewed authorities, “inflexibility” was a lightning rod for bitter complaints about Fund interactions, many of which related to major program interruptions and/or delays in the delivery of debt relief. They complained about what they saw as inappropriate inflexibility by the Fund in program negotiations and reviews. Several said that in their experience PRGF conditionality had been calibrated too tightly, too inflexibly, and with too much ambition in light of domestic political considerations and capacity constraints.

• Some saw the Fund as preoccupied with minutia and the letter (rather than the spirit) of the law. In some cases—according to interviewees who recalled them with bitterness—staff stubbornness had led to conditions that were not fully “owned” by the authorities and that in due course led to prolonged program interruptions with adverse consequences.

• Some of the countries (such as Armenia, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Uganda) broadly met their macroeconomic goals over the period, with the Fund making a contribution in each case, whether to the reform process, debt relief, and/or the Paris Club process.

• Others (such as Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi, and Senegal) achieved important progress, albeit with significant program interruptions in the 2002–04 period and controversy—and occasional acrimony—in their interactions with the Fund.

• Several interviewed authorities from Sub-Saharan African countries attributed their conditionality disputes with the Fund to what they termed the “tyranny of the PDR review process.” They argued that at least for the early part of the evaluation period, PDR staff had what they saw as undue power to trump area department staff, who better appreciated the constraints and challenges that the authorities faced.

• Some current and former area department mission chiefs broadly shared this perspective, complaining that the review system forced them to spend valuable time refuting central reviewers’ points, both large and small. But other current and former area department mission chiefs felt that the briefing paper and the associated review process were essential for ensuring evenhandedness across countries and conformity with Fund policies and Board guidance.

26. For the authorities of other PRGF-eligible countries, the Fund’s power was also recognized, but on balance seen as helpful to their interests whether in dealing with the Paris Club, other creditors, or donors

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18The evaluation sample countries, for example, included two important such cases, one involving a safeguard assessment, which ultimately led to the demise of a PRGF, and another involving misreporting, which was ultimately recognized to have constituted a deminimis situation.

19The IEO evaluation on structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs (IEO, 2008) found that: “Views on program design and the process of negotiation differed, but in general, the authorities held more positive views about Fund conditionality in countries where programs had been more successful.”

20There also were instances during the evaluation period in which the “institutional view” was argued by the IMF Legal Department, in connection with a case of misreporting in Pakistan, or by Treasurer’s, with respect to the safeguards issue in Vietnam. See IMF (2002 and 2006).

21Several authorities also pointed to instances in which mission chiefs said they tended to agree with the authorities but it was not in their brief. However, many staff members saw this as more frequently said than meant, as a vehicle for smoothing their relationship with the authorities while carrying out their instructions for headquarters, to which they had contributed.
or in disciplining spending ministries and other policy interests at home. They accordingly saw flexibility somewhat differently.

- Some authorities said that they had found the Fund to be sufficiently flexible—or, in some cases, inflexible but helpfully so—on matters of conditionality. Ministry of finance officials from two countries saw the Fund’s famous strictness on conditionality as a way to reinforce spending discipline with their colleagues in spending and other ministries.

- One former minister of finance said that the Fund in the end proved to be quite flexible. But that it had taken a lot of pushing from staff and the authorities, and lobbying from their supporters among powerful shareholders, to get management to move to where the authorities wanted the Fund to go.

- Yet others said that flexibility had simply not been a problem for them. They debated policies and conditions amicably and professionally with the team, back and forth, and in the end all agreed.

- Several interviewed authorities also pointed to the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) as an important innovation that put them more squarely in the driver’s seat and was more conducive to country ownership than previous Fund approaches. Officials of one country said that they felt more in charge with the PSI and that that had made an important difference to their interactions with the staff, while an official from another PSI country said his authorities considered the PSI relationship to have been successful from all angles.

27. The evaluation evidence suggests that the time dimension is critical to the debate about flexibility. The survey evidence illustrated in Figure 11 shows that 30–40 percent of PRGF-eligible respondents said that Fund policies and procedures were inflexible and that the staff was insufficiently willing to innovate. But 51 percent said the staff’s willingness to consider different approaches had improved over the past two years, suggesting ipso facto a worse situation before. Meanwhile, most of the specific complaints raised in the evaluation interviews dated from the 2002–04 period. In almost all cases, interviewed officials—even from those who complained most bitterly about program interruptions—said that the Fund had changed and was now more reasonable and flexible. Or at least as flexible as they needed; indeed some said they did not want the Fund to be “too flexible” as it would diminish the value of its endorsement, something that they saw as especially important for signaling to donors. Several interviewees highlighted the way the Fund had handled the 2007–08 rise in oil and food prices on world markets and its support for “smart subsidies” targeted to the most affected and with built-in exit strategies.

**Capacity building**

28. Capacity building grew rapidly during the evaluation period, much of it targeted to PRGF-eligible countries. In the survey, 95 percent of respondents said they wanted the Fund to help build capacity and 80 percent said the Fund did a good job in this role. As illustrated in Figure 12, these numbers are much higher than for other country groups, even for the other emerging economies, which also are major users of technical assistance. All respondents said that they saw technical assistance as in their country’s interest, and most officials said they wanted more. They rated the staff delivering technical assistance as second only to resident representatives in effectiveness. Interviewed officials from finance ministries praised the Fund’s technical assistance generally, and specifically technical assistance for public finance and its providers, including those from Regional Technical Assistance Centers (RTACs), for which the Fund endeavors to use resident advisors from the region. Closely related, the desire for greater use of local experts where available also arose in the interviews with authorities and in the surveys. Former central bank governors
praised the Fund’s technical assistance on payments systems, inter alia.

29. But some interviewed officials, noting the very large quantities of IMF technical assistance that had been provided, questioned its results in terms of sustained improvements in local capacity. This raises an issue about the programming of technical assistance and how it relates to the country’s and Fund’s medium-term vision, and in turn how the strategy for technical assistance reflects country track records in following through on past assistance. The documentary evidence reviewed for the evaluation suggests that the links between Fund technical assistance programs and country priorities improved over the evaluation period, but still remained relatively weak—with the most recent round of reforms designed to improve the prioritization of TA in line with the strategic objectives of both recipient countries and the Fund only recently adopted. The Regional Strategy Notes (RSNs) on technical assistance that were launched during the evaluation period contain some forward-looking country information, but minimal detail and links to other work of the Fund and donors. Similarly, the surveillance agenda, introduced in 2006 as a short-hand strategy brief, typically listed elements of the planned technical assistance program, but did not make clear how the programmed items fit into the overall agenda. Interviewed area department mission chiefs said they signed off on Fund technical assistance activities, basically on behalf of the authorities, with a view to vetoing activities that the authorities did not want. But they also said that practice varied on how proactive a role they and the authorities played in the identification and design of the technical assistance program.

22See IMF (2008c).
III. Interactions with Other Stakeholders in PRGF-Eligible Countries

30. This chapter looks at IMF interactions with stakeholders beyond the authorities. It examines recent developments in such interactions, and constraints on their effectiveness. It finds that an increasing amount of outreach took place to parliamentarians, civil society, the media, and market participants during the evaluation period. It also finds greater interest among the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries for such outreach than in most other country groups. However, sensitivities remain, especially with respect to civil society and the media, where painful memories of the structural adjustment era continue to define the Fund’s image and undermine its effectiveness, in some cases making association with the IMF a political liability for the authorities and their ideas.

A. Recent developments

31. In PRGF-eligible countries, the Fund has been making an attempt to increase its efforts to outreach to a broader group of stakeholders, including parliamentarians, civil society organizations, the media, and market participants.

32. Interactions with parliamentarians in PRGF-eligible countries have focused particularly on issues related to parliamentary oversight for public financial management. Staff organized country and regional seminars for legislators, for example, in the Kyrgyz Republic in June 2006, and in Liberia and Tanzania in 2008. Other interactions with parliamentarians of PRGF-eligible countries took place through seminars, meetings with visiting groups of parliamentarians at IMF headquarters, and management speeches to members of parliaments, often under the aegis of the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank.

33. As noted in Chapter I of this paper, the evaluation survey of civil society representatives received 259 responses from 61 of the 77 PRGF-eligible countries. Almost half of these respondents were from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with the remainder fairly evenly divided among think tanks, media, and private sector associations, and with a smaller share of labor union representatives. Of the total, 173 respondents said that they had interactions with the IMF between 2001 and 2008. The survey results suggest that most such respondents found Fund staff respectful and willing to listen, although fewer found them sensitive to cultural differences. Almost half of the respondents who had met with staff did not answer the question on (i) whether their views were taken into account in IMF discussions with the government and (ii) whether their discussions with the IMF generally contributed to building national support and initiative towards “IMF-backed policies.” Of those who did answer, about a third said their views have been reflected, and about half said their discussions had contributed to building national support for policies. The survey results provide no evidence of change one way or another in the Fund’s approach over the evaluation period.

34. At the request of the IEO, Jan Aart Scholte carried out an intensive review of IMF outreach to CSOs, building on earlier work that he had done, including drafting the IMF’s guidance to staff on outreach to civil society. His research for the IEO generally corroborated the earlier IEO finding of “limited and ineffective” outreach by Fund staff with civil society, based on his more intensive engagement with civil society representatives, while also noting evidence of increased outreach in evaluation sample countries such as Malawi and Mozambique. This research also found that a number of civil society organizations felt that the Fund was not being tough enough on fiscal transparency, a topic of widespread concern to civil society in many PRGF-eligible countries. This finding was echoed in the evaluation team’s own meetings with civil society representatives in Cameroon, Senegal, and Togo, discussed below.

35. Survey evidence gathered by the Fund’s External Relations Department (EXR) on staff outreach with trade unions is also germane. EXR survey showed that about half the staff teams working on PRGF-eligible countries had met at least annually with trade unions in the two years preceding the 2007 survey. Of the staff respondents who had held such meetings, about half said that the meetings had “influenced Fund policy advice in the country.” Staff notes suggest that the influence was at a very general level, such as reminding staff of how important labor market flexibility or pension reform was, or educating staff

23Of the 86 respondents reporting no contact with the IMF, only 3 percent said that they had requested a meeting but were not given an appointment. About two-thirds of those who had met with staff said they found the meetings useful, and would like to meet more often. They had mostly met with Fund resident representatives or missions from headquarters; they had almost never met with the Executive Director for the country either locally or in Washington.

24No response,” “not applicable,” or “don’t know.”

25The survey asked the CSO representatives whether interactions with the Fund were important to their work both in the last two years and over the eight-year evaluation period. It also asked whether interactions were useful in the last two years and over the whole eight years. Answers were nearly identical for the two time periods: 78 percent thought interactions were important over the last two years, and 77 percent over the whole eight years. 68 percent thought interactions were useful over the last two years, and 65 percent over the whole eight years.

26IMF (2003b).

about how trade unions and other stakeholders viewed the Fund and/or the country’s policy challenges and agenda. But the meetings do seem to have played a useful role in informing Fund staff and local trade union representatives about each other’s activities and priorities.

36. As in the other country groups, organized outreach to the media in PRGF-eligible countries has focused on the dissemination of the Fund’s *Regional Economic Outlooks* (*REOs*). During the evaluation period, AFR produced eleven *REOs*, beginning in June 2003. Since 2005, *REO* launch has included road show presentations in English and French, for example, in Ghana and Senegal in 2007. Other area departments’ *REO* disseminations to PRGF-eligible countries were more limited.

**B. Constraints on more—and more effective—staff outreach**

37. Most internal IMF documents reviewed by the evaluation team say little about outreach. Many staff back-to-office reports and most staff reports mention meetings with one or more CSOs, or the media, or private sector representatives, but they provide scant detail. Of course, page limits and word counts are fiercely guarded in the Fund, and routine meetings naturally receive limited coverage, leaving more space for recording the policy dialogue with the authorities. Board documents for the period, whether associated with programs or surveillance in the PRGF-eligible evaluation sample, are similarly brief on the subject. The surveillance agendas said relatively more, and included the Fund’s country outreach strategy as one of their four main topics. However, in practice even they tended to list the plans, rather than providing an outreach strategy or explaining how strategy linked the planned actions to possible results—although in fairness to staff there was, in the main, a two-page limit for the entire agenda.

38. IEO interviews with mission chiefs and resident representatives provided an inside view of the incentives affecting staff outreach. Mission chiefs were generally more comfortable with the structured meetings that occurred as part of a two-week country visit, while most of the responsibility for outreach fell to the IMF resident representative in the country in question. Among some resident representatives, risk aversion abounded, colored by concerns that the results of their outreach might surface in the media in ways that the authorities would not like—and mindful of the summary recall to headquarters of several resident representatives in PRGF-eligible countries for crossing the line. While describing the kinds of outreach efforts they made, they also detailed the constraints they faced to doing more—from too little time and too few other resources, to strong reservations from the authorities, to lack of incentives from headquarters, to limited impact in affecting stakeholder views—that deterred them from doing more.28

39. Staff survey responses, too, provide evidence on constraints, highlighting three key issues: risk aversion, training, and resources.

- Risk aversion among staff is understandable; about 40 percent of mission chiefs and resident representatives working on PRGF-eligible countries said that management would not support them when tensions arose with the authorities. And about 20 percent of staff said that management would not support them if tensions arose with other stakeholders.

- As regards training in the skills needed for effective outreach, what is relevant is how Fund staff learn. On-the-job experience, advice from IMF area departments and PDR, and feedback from the authorities were the prime sources from which mission chiefs and resident representatives working on PRGF-eligible countries said they acquired skills for undertaking outreach. EXR was not generally seen as a major source of advice, except for training in interacting with the media. Indeed, the EXR website and the CSO guide got the two lowest rankings of all the learning vehicles that IMF staff queried.

- Third, staff perceive a tight resource constraint, notwithstanding underruns in the Fund’s administrative budget over the period. One interviewed resident representative told the evaluation team that there were things that the department wanted the resident representative to do more of, such as outreach, but with budgetary cutbacks this was not possible. Even without cutbacks, IMF resident representatives’ resources were stretched, as the evaluation team on Sub-Saharan Africa saw firsthand in 2006, and also on its more recent visits to Cameroon, Senegal, and Togo.

40. The power of each of these three constraints on interactions is affected by the country context, and especially by the degree of negativity felt towards the Fund because of its past association with structural adjustment and privatization. As noted in Box 2, the reputational legacy of structural adjustment, the CFA franc devaluation, and privatization looms large in much of West Africa. But in many PRGF-eligible countries, popular interest in fiscal transparency—a core Fund mandate—is even larger and, as the Senegal experience shows, can provide a basis for repositioning the Fund around a positive message. Of course repositioning needs also to be able to deal with the past, with

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28See the background technical document on the interviews for more detail.
Box 2. Moving Beyond Structural Adjustment: A Tale of Three Cities

Three case studies, drawn from IEO staff country visits to Cameroon, Togo, and Senegal, provide an interesting perspective on IMF outreach. In each country, IEO staff met with representatives of civil society, asking about the frequency of meetings with the IMF, the seriousness of the engagement, perceptions of changes in the Fund’s approach over time, and their overall perceptions. In each, the questions about the evolution over time evoked strong negative reactions about the Fund’s perceived role in structural adjustment in the 1980s and the CFA franc devaluation in the 1990s—but beyond this common ground the responses were very different in the three countries.

• In Yaoundé, civil society representatives were generally angry with the IMF. They blamed the IMF for Cameroon’s problems—highlighting privatization problems and the squeezing of social expenditures, inter alia—attributing to the IMF the motive of wanting to keep Cameroon poor. They said that IMF missions “met” with them on occasion, but did not seriously engage.

• In Lomé, civil society representatives had a more favorable view of the IMF, which was widely seen to have played a positive role in brokering the resumption of donor involvement in Togo and the clearance of arrears to the World Bank and others. They said that they met with IMF missions, and that the missions seemed to listen to them. But some cautioned that the Fund should not be too soft on governance issues—it was essential that the IMF be a ruthless truth-teller on these critical fiduciary issues.

• In Dakar, civil society representatives praised the Fund for the very constructive role they perceived that the institution had played in government transparency and in alerting the population to serious risks and problems with the current program, including on governance-related fiduciary issues.

staff equipped with (i) the facts and figures needed to show what the Fund did in the past and how and why it may have been right or wrong and what it has done to change, and (ii) critically important, the authorization from headquarters to speak about the past, and in what terms especially in admitting institutional mistakes.

41. Reflecting the above, the evaluation survey asked the authorities whether they wanted more, less, or about the same amount of outreach with a variety of groups going forward. The surveyed authorities were fairly evenly divided on how much of a role they wanted the Fund to play in outreach aimed at securing consensus on policies. Nearly half said they wanted the Fund to do at least the same amount of outreach as at present, and 40 percent saw the Fund’s efforts to do so as effective or very effective. Very few wanted less outreach than at present. Indeed, 61 percent said they wanted the Fund to engage more in a wide discussion of policies (including through public seminars or meetings) and 30 percent wanted the same amount of engagement. Many PRGF authorities also were open to more outreach to specific groups. The upper panel of Figure 13 shows that 59 percent of the authorities wanted the Fund to increase its outreach to parliamentarians, 46 percent to market participants, 43 to civil society organizations, and 33 percent to the media.

42. The lower panel of Figure 13 suggests that the authorities of the PRGF-eligible countries were more interested in expanded IMF outreach than any other country group/subgroup. This is an important point: while Figure 3’s overall numbers for helping build and maintain consensus outside government are the lowest of all queried roles, they are higher in the PRGF-eligible countries than in the other countries. And more generally, the authorities of the PRGF-eligible countries are looking to Fund staff to help educate the public on economic and financial issues, as part of the Fund’s capacity-building role—to the extent that its adverse reputational legacy does not get in the way or that its efforts to inform and facilitate debate are not misconstrued as efforts to interfere.

43. These themes, and how Fund outreach fits into countries’ complex political dynamics, featured centrally in the evaluation interviews. In some countries such as Uganda, the authorities welcomed Fund outreach. They indicated that at the start of their program they had requested such efforts to help educate the public and gain support for reform; they said the home-grown approach that had been developed in Uganda led to the PRSP approach more generally, which called for engagement with civil society as part of the road to the HIPC. Likewise in other countries, such as Cameroon more recently, the authorities saw the desirability of greater Fund outreach to educate the public and help reduce the stigma that they felt in dealing with the Fund. In Malawi too, the authorities welcomed the Fund’s outreach which they saw had increased in recent years, as a central part of educating the Fund teams on the constraints and issues that their country faced and of educating the public on economic and financial issues. But in some other countries, staff said their outreach efforts either did not take place after having been discouraged by the authorities or had brought unintended (and negative) consequences for interactions with the authorities,
intensifying conflicts between the Fund's confidential advisor role and the increased focus on outreach and transparency. And in other countries, such as Nigeria, memories of the structural adjustment era necessitated a very cautious and low-key approach, working with think tanks and the private sector, and increasingly with parliamentarians, while emphasizing that there was currently no program involvement with the Fund.

IV. Management of Interactions with PRGF-Eligible Countries

44. This chapter looks at three instruments in the management of interactions—strategy, staffing, and relationship management. It asks how and how well each was calibrated to promote effective interactions. The analysis and evidence point to the following:

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**Figure 13. Surveyed Authorities’ Views on IMF Outreach: Do They Want More, Less, or About the Same with Each Group?**

(Percent of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Little or no change</th>
<th>Somewhat more or Much more</th>
<th>Somewhat less or Much less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market participants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison with Other Country Groups

1At an early stage of policy discussions.

2Shows the share of authorities who responded that they would have wanted the IMF to engage “somewhat more” or “much more” with each group.
Figure 14. PRGF-Eligible Countries: Strategic Alignment Between Authorities and Staff

(Percent of staff who thought IMF “aimed” to perform each role minus percent of authorities who “wanted” the IMF to do so)

- First, the Fund did a good job of articulating an institutional strategy for much of its operational work with PRGF-eligible countries, especially when compared to its work on the other country groups. But it did less well in systematically customizing its strategy to individual country conditions, especially with respect to: (i) the management of face-to-face interactions with the authorities in the first half of the evaluation period; (ii) the repositioning of the Fund with stakeholders beyond the authorities around a more positive message than structural adjustment and privatization; and (iii) the development of country-focused technical assistance programs, ensuring coherence across functional departments and other service providers.

- Second, the style of Fund interactions with PRGF-eligible countries improved over the last two years of the evaluation period. Most authorities think disrespectful staff behavior is largely, though not entirely, a thing of the past. The bad news is that it was perceived as a widespread problem during the first half of the evaluation period—in part related to the difficult negotiations referred to above—and remains a component of what many critics and counterparties see as the Fund’s signature style.

- Third, relationship management in PRGF-eligible countries has generally taken a back seat to time-sensitive and stressful interactions on program negotiations and reviews between headquarters-based mission chiefs and the authorities. The resident representative program could be managed more strategically, especially by clarifying roles and accountabilities on the country team and in interfacing with the authorities.

A. Strategy

45. The Fund’s evolving approach to interactions with PRGF-eligible countries is catalogued in a series of papers for the Executive Board. The 2008 staff paper “The Role of the Fund in Low-Income Countries” (IMF, 2008a) was the latest in a series that, along with discussion by Executive Directors, aimed to clarify the purposes and scope of Fund interactions in PRGF-eligible countries. As noted in Chapter I above, that paper covers the policy dialogue, capacity building, use of Fund resources, and cooperation with partners, synthesizing a range of policy decisions and developments from previous few years. Though its immediate audience was the IMF Board itself—in light of continuing debates there on the role of the Fund in PRGF-eligible countries—the 2008 strategy (and its predecessors) was also meant to provide helpful clarification to PRGF-eligible country authorities and partners. Indeed, the PIN for the paper’s Board discussion noted the Board’s support for the strategy, while observing that “it is important that the Fund’s

29See, for example, IMF (2003a and 2004).
30As documented in IEO (2007) and elsewhere.
PRGF-eligible country-related objectives and responsibilities are well-articulated, consistent, and understood both within and outside the institution.

46. The evaluation survey evidence supports the view that the Fund generally succeeded in this goal. As discussed in the main report—and reprised in Figure 2 and Chapter II of this paper, the evaluation’s strategic alignment indicator is considerably higher for the PRGF-eligible countries than for the other country groups: 8 percent higher than for the other emerging economies and 20 percent higher than for the advanced and large emerging economies. In turn, these differences reflect the relatively greater meeting of the minds between the authorities and staff working on PRGF-eligible countries on the purposes and priorities of their interactions with each other. See Figure 14 above.

47. Even so, the clarity of purpose and scope articulated at the institutional level in “The Role of the Fund in Low-Income Countries” was not always as visible at the country level. As one senior area department staff member indicated in an interview with the evaluation team, generally there was no systematic strategic plan for considering Fund engagement at the country level; he said that it depended very much on individual factors largely at the discretion of the mission chief. This had three important dimensions that are highly relevant for the evaluation.

• First, management and senior staff did not always pay sufficient attention to the management of face-to-face interactions with the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries, which was delegated to individual mission chiefs. In many cases, this worked fine even in program situations, if either country implementation was broadly on track or if there were implementation issues but a mature and diplomatic mission chief to manage the situation. But as discussed in Chapter II, in several cases in the first half of the evaluation period, interactions between the authorities and staff associated with program interruptions and delays ran aground, leaving the authorities (and staff) feeling bitter towards the Fund—feelings that linger on both sides despite the passage of much time.

• Second, there was uneven treatment of the adverse reputational legacy issue in outreach, which is a factor in many PRGF-eligible countries, reflecting the Fund’s association with the structural adjustment era of the 1980s and 1990s. As noted in Box 2, in two of the three West African countries visited by the evaluation team, there was progress on this front. In Togo it reflected a hiatus in country relations with other donors and the Fund’s playing the role of first responder to the changing conditions in 2006. In Senegal it reflected the conscious attempt by the country team, including the resident representative as a key member, in repositioning the Fund around fiscal transparency. But in Cameroon, despite the urging of the authorities, the dialogue with civil society remains stuck in the past. A more systematic cross-country approach is needed to deal with the past and rebrand around a positive message for the future, such as fiscal transparency, which is central to the Fund’s mandate, mission, and work program and popular.

• Third, there was uneven attention across mission chiefs to the building and coherence of technical assistance across functional departments and to discussions of it with the authorities and partners. The costs of such omissions have not been so large to date, as they would have been in a more complex organization, given the relatively narrow choice of products and services on offer by the Fund. However, they are relevant for the growing and increasingly complex Fund business of technical assistance, where the importance of ensuring a strategic perspective in the identification of priorities, including for the Regional Strategy Notes remains paramount. Going forward, ensuring work program coherence will become more of an issue. This is an area where the lessons learned from the World Bank’s country assistance strategies are relevant, especially for prioritizing across different functional departments’ possible services and making sure that the whole of the Fund package adds up to more than the sum of its parts, and is supportive of the country’s and the Fund’s medium-term objectives.

B. Style and staffing

48. The Fund’s success in assisting countries to achieve their objectives depends critically on its staff. Considered below are three dimensions of central relevance to interactions with PRGF-eligible countries: attitude, skills, and turnover.

Style

49. Interviewed authorities readily volunteered that people matter for the Fund’s effectiveness. In this connection, and focusing on mission chiefs and resident representatives, they offered high praise for some staff
members and sharp criticisms of others. More generally, they said that the Fund’s style had been improving, and that the days of the Fund’s “dictatorial approach” were a thing of the past. Following up on such a critique of Fund style, the survey asked the authorities whether the staff had shown insufficient respect to them and their colleagues. The comparative results are shown in Figure 15 alongside the answer to the query about whether performance had improved over the past two years. Fourteen percent of official survey respondents from PRGF-eligible countries said that respect was a problem respect was a problem in the 2007–08 period. This number was indeed higher than for the advanced economies, although lower than for the large emerging economies. The good news is that 46 percent said that respectfulness had improved over the past two years—the largest improvement of all country groups. The bad news is that the two numbers taken together suggest that for the 2001–06 part of the evaluation period about which a direct question was not asked, the situation had been worse.

50. Looking at several other behavioral issues in the 2007–08 period, Figure 16 asks whether the survey evidence suggests that Fund staff treated rich countries better than poor countries. To this end, it compares the results for the PRGF-eligible countries with those for the other country groups on issues such as listening, responsiveness, and accountability. In so doing it finds Fund behavior to be comparable or better in the PRGF-eligible countries than elsewhere. This is not to say that the performance levels, generally in the 60–80 percent satisfactory range, are acceptable; but it simply says that problems the Fund may have with listening, responsiveness, and accountability in PRGF-eligible countries are not the result of staff’s treatment of the least powerful countries, but rather reflect more pervasive tendencies across the institution.

Skills

51. As regards staff skills, the authorities’ most pronounced concern was that staff had insufficient country knowledge, including about the decision-making process and constraints. This kind of knowledge is especially important to PRGF-eligible countries, which—as illustrated in Figure 17—look to IMF staff in much greater proportions than do other country groups to “help build and maintain policy consensus within government.” It is highly relevant to the staff’s ability to customize a country strategy to local conditions, taking into account political economy and other considerations affecting the feasibility and sequencing of policy reforms. The survey results suggest that the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries found fewer problems with staff technical skills, practical experience, and language skills than other country groups.33

52. Nevertheless, as indicated in the interviews with the authorities, skills gaps were beginning to emerge during the evaluation period, especially among PRGF-eligible countries that began the transition to emerging economy status. In one case-study country, ministry of finance staff said the mission skills mix was increasingly a problem, especially among the fiscal staff on the core team (though not among the technical assistance and ROSC missions to that country). Interviewed officials from two other case-study countries raised concerns about the Fund’s handling of requests for help with inflation targeting. They felt they had received the brush-off from country teams which said their countries did not meet the pre-conditions. In one case, a subsequent technical assistance mission provided the requested advice and technical support. In another the authorities sought and received the necessary assistance elsewhere.

53. Language skill gaps, raised by 12 percent of surveyed officials, were also raised by several interviewees. One official said that his authorities had been dismayed by the arrival of a mission chief who did not speak the local language. Another said that where members did not speak the local language, it was considered to be a handicap. An official of a third country said that the problem for his team was more with the mission documents, such as the letter of intent and the technical memorandum, which needed to be quickly translated into the local language, than with the discussions. Interviewed staff stressed the importance of local language skills for resident representatives, but less so for mission chiefs. One mission chief said the Fund should make knowledge of the local language (or of a language that

33See Figure 15 of the main report.
is widely spoken in the country) a strict requirement for resident representative positions, and should also provide sufficient language training prior to the assignment. For mission chiefs and mission members, many interviewed staff shared the view of one interviewee, who said that language skills were important but at the end of the day, it was professional skills that mattered the most. This view was expressly shared by some officials, as well, especially for technical experts.

**Turnover**

54. Turnover among mission chiefs is more than an irritant for many PRGF-eligible countries. Nearly one-third of the surveyed authorities of PRGF-eligible countries said that the Fund had not provided enough continuity—this proportion is higher than in the emerging economies and the large advanced economies, though considerably lower than in the other advanced economies (Figure 18). Meanwhile, staff pointed to internal incentives that drive rapid turnover; 77 percent of surveyed staff working on PRGF-eligible countries said they had little incentive to work on a country for more than two years—a proportion broadly comparable to those for some other country groups.

55. In the evaluation interviews, almost all country officials complained about staff turnover, and many staff

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**Figure 16. Did Fund Staff Treat Other Countries Better or Worse Than PRGF-Eligible Countries?**

(Percent of respondents)

1 Shows the share of authorities who responded that the IMF did a “good” or “excellent” job.

2 Shows the share of authorities who responded “disagree” or “strongly disagree” that there was insufficient accountability for the quality of Fund advice.

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**Figure 17. Authorities’ Views on How Much They Wanted the IMF to Help Build and Maintain Policy Consensus Within Government**

(Percent of authorities who responded that they wanted the IMF to perform the role “a fair amount” or “very much”)
Figure 18. Staff Continuity and Turnover: PRGF-Eligible Countries Compared with Other Country Groups
(Percent of respondents who answered “agree” or “strongly agree”)

- IMF has not provided enough continuity and smooth changeover of mission chiefs and mission members
- When reassigned, staff have provided insufficient briefing and/or country information to their successors
- There is little incentive for IMF staff to work on the same country for more than two years

![Chart showing staff continuity and turnover](image)

1 Authorities’ survey.
2 Staff survey.

Figure 19. Authorities of PRGF-Eligible Countries Rate the World Bank over the IMF, but the IMF over the UNDP
(Percent of respondents)

- Taking a long-term strategic approach to the relationship
- Actively engaging in a constructive dialogue
- Responding to needs and changing priorities

![Chart showing authorities' ratings](image)

1 The same as the IMF  2 Better than the IMF  3 Worse than the IMF

1 Authorities’ survey.
2 Staff survey.
agreed. They spoke of significant turnover of mission members, with adverse consequences for interactions. One said that he said his staff had to continually “retrain” Fund staff, as old Fund team members left and new ones came. Another said the Fund’s “revolving-door” approach undermined rather than supported capacity building. Several officials raised special concerns when the mission chief and resident representative changed at the same time, compounding the loss of institutional memory, and called for better management of succession planning in country team coverage. One finance minister referred to a year in which the ministry team had to deal with three different mission chiefs in quick succession. Many staff members said that they thought that current tenures were too short to establish relationships of trust with the authorities—although several staff members cautioned that longer tenures carried risks of staff becoming too close to the authorities and losing objectivity.

C. Relationship management

56. The authorities’ survey results give mixed signals on the Fund’s strategic management of its relationship with them. For PRGF-eligible countries, over 90 percent of authorities’ and staff survey respondents said the Fund’s relationship management was conducive to effective interactions. But only 61 percent of authorities rated highly the Fund’s performance on “long-term strategic approach to the relationship.” Meanwhile, when the authorities were asked to compare the Fund’s approach to long-term relationship management to those of other organizations, the World Bank’s approach scored better (Figure 19). The Fund scored about the same as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the regional development banks.

57. The evidence also points to several qualitative concerns, discussed below: staff incentives; the role of the resident representative in IMF country teams; and the conduct of IMF management’s interactions with the authorities.

Staff incentives

58. Area department staff painted a grim picture of how they see the management of their own interactions with the authorities—a picture that was not unique to work on PRGF-eligible countries. As shown in Figure 20, 68 percent of staff working on PRGF-eligible countries said that their interface with the authorities was given too little weight in their annual performance reviews. More than 40 percent said they thought too little time was devoted to interactions, relative to other work, such as servicing the Board and management and responding to reviewers’ comments. Almost 40 percent reported not getting adequate support

\[\text{Figure 20. Staff Incentives} \]

(Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In performance appraisals, too little weight has been given to effective interactions with countries</th>
<th>IMF staff have spent too little time directly preparing or conducting interactions with country authorities relative to time spent on other work</th>
<th>IMF staff have received insufficient backing from IMF management or senior staff when tensions have arisen between staff and authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>Large emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{Figure 20. Staff Incentives} \]

\[\text{Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”} \]

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\[\text{Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”} \]

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\[\text{Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”} \]

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\[\text{Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”} \]

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\[\text{Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”} \]

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\[\text{Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”} \]

\[\text{Figure 20. Staff Incentives} \]

\[\text{Percent of staff who responded “agree” or “strongly agree”} \]
IMF Interactions with PRGF-Eligible Countries

The authorities and staff both gave much lower ratings to the Managing Director/Deputy Managing Directors. The dip in staff votes for technical assistance staff reflects the lower marks given to them by program mission chiefs and resident representatives. (The right-hand panel of Figure 21 provides a comparative perspective on authorities’ views on the effectiveness of MD/DMD interactions.

Resident representatives

As shown in Figure 21, surveyed authorities rated their interactions with IMF resident representatives as the most effective of all Fund interlocutors, followed closely by their ratings for technical assistance missions. But many resident representatives interviewed for the evaluation felt undervalued and neglected by IMF headquarters. Some (by no means all) expressed bitterness about the Fund’s treatment of resident representatives and what they described as the headquarters-centric approach to interactions, which they found ill-advised. In the survey, 45 percent of the resident representatives said that Fund interactions suffered because of their lack of resources and power (Figure 22). But only 22 percent of the surveyed authorities and 17 percent of the mission chiefs made such an assessment.

Interlocutors

The survey asked the authorities and staff about which they thought was the Fund’s most effective channel for interactions. As shown in Figure 21, authorities gave the highest scores to the staff, especially resident representatives and to the Executive Directors’ offices (OED). From the staff survey, the results were similar, albeit with lower marks for the Executive Directors’ offices. The authorities and staff both gave much lower ratings to the Managing Director/Deputy Managing Directors. The dip in staff votes for technical assistance staff reflects the lower marks given to them by program mission chiefs and resident representatives. (The right-hand panel of Figure 21 provides a comparative perspective on authorities’ views on the effectiveness of MD/DMD interactions.

Interactions between the authorities and the resident representative have been effective

Limited level of responsibilities and resources delegated to the resident representative have adversely affected interactions

Notes: Shows the share of respondents who answered “effective” or “very effective.” Results for resident representatives, TA staff, and program staff include only those respondents who answered that they interacted with them.


Figure 22. Views on Resident Representatives in PRGF-Eligible Countries (Percent of responses)

Notes: Shows the share of respondents who answered “effective” or “very effective.” Results for resident representatives, TA staff, and program staff include only those respondents who answered that they interacted with them.

from senior staff and/or management on disagreements with the authorities.

The apparent split between the views of resident representatives and the views of the authorities parallels a similar finding from IEO’s evaluation of IMF work in Sub-Saharan Africa (IEO, 2007), which found that the work pressures on the resident representatives came less from the relationship with the authorities, who were satisfied with the services they received, than from the growing burden of coordinating with the donors of decentralizing budget support and of doing outreach, which many resident representatives felt was outside their comfort zone.
61. Interviewed authorities expressed a range of views about resident representative offices, but most said they were comfortable with current arrangements. In terms of staff profile for the job, several officials indicated that their authorities preferred junior staff members, with strong technical skills, who could work well with their own technical staff. They said more senior staff as resident representatives were viewed with caution, given past experience in some cases and general concerns with how senior staff might be perceived by the wider public in others. In praising the current representative, officials of one country spelled out their ideal resident representative, as someone with a good balance of technical, managerial, and diplomatic skills—and good judgment.

62. Staff attitudes were more complicated, especially as regards relations between resident representatives and mission chiefs. Interviewed missions chiefs were unanimous in highlighting the importance of the resident representative function, characterized by one mission chief as the most underestimated asset of the Fund. However, some resident representatives pointed to tensions with mission chiefs about their functions—with some mission chiefs seen to be laissez-faire while others are very controlling—including with respect to the residents representatives’ role during missions, where they felt their effectiveness vis-à-vis the authorities was undermined. Summing up the debate, one senior staff member said that in his view, the job of resident representative was not well understood at headquarters, with most resident representatives isolated and not appreciated given the breadth of their responsibilities, but that the converse was also likely true (i.e., that the resident representatives probably did not understand headquarters).

63. Interviewed mission chiefs and resident representatives did share one concern—that resident offices were being cut back. All agreed that relationships with authorities would suffer if resident representative offices were to be closed down, because they have more interactions with the country than the rest of the Fund as they engage in daily and weekly meetings.

V. Conclusions

64. The weight of the evidence presented in the paper points to the high value that the authorities of PRGF-eligible countries attached to Fund products and services. The authorities of a large majority of these countries sought Fund monitoring and program support at some time during the evaluation period; they saw this support as helping them to secure debt relief and donor funding, although many had concerns about specific aspects of conditionality. Most appreciated the Fund’s technical assistance, and wanted more. They also appreciated the Fund’s analysis and exchange of views on surveillance, although the dialogue on the preparation, negotiation, and review of programs tended to crowd out the time allocated for more reflective processes.

65. The resulting abundance of traction in Fund interactions with PRGF-eligible countries put the Fund in a position of power, raising questions about how the staff’s exercise of that power affected interactions with the authorities in both substance and style. Some authorities saw the Fund’s power as useful to them in engaging with the Paris Club and donors, and in disciplining their own spending ministries. But others saw it differently, with particular flash points surrounding difficult face-to-face interactions related to program interruptions and delays especially during the 2002–04 period. Despite the passage of much time, affected authorities—and staff as well—recall these interactions vividly and with bitterness. The authorities’ recollections focus on what they perceived as arrogant and/or rigid staff behavior; while the staff’s on what they perceived as a lack of clear signals and support from senior staff and management. Meanwhile, for many stakeholders outside government, the adverse reputational legacy of structural adjustment and privatization defined the Fund’s image throughout the evaluation period.

66. The evaluation found evidence of progress in the second half of the evaluation period, especially in the last two years. The Fund’s policy tool kit, staff attitudes, and external outreach have evolved. Higher priority has been attached to the management of face-to-face interactions, including in times of substantive disagreement between the authorities and staff. These changes, which preceded the onset of the recent global crisis and the steps the Fund has taken to modify its instruments and approach to conditionality, coincided with the graduation of some PRGF-eligible countries from program support into surveillance-only relationships or into formal monitoring arrangements under the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), for which accessing authorities feel greater ownership. Going forward, strong efforts will be needed to ensure the Fund maintains and appropriate balance between flexibility and firmness, to further improve staff attitudes, and to rebrand around a popular message attuned to the Fund’s core mission such as fiscal transparency, while also honestly acknowledging problems in its past.
# Annex 1. PRGF-Eligible Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Djibouti</th>
<th>Madagascar</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Nepal</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>(India)</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
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<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Kyrgyz Rep.</td>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Congo, Dem. Rep. of</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Rep. of</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes in emerging economies.

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## References


Background Technical Documents
Background Technical Document I: Note on Survey Evidence

I. Introduction

1. The IEO obtained the views of three sets of participants in interactions between the IMF and its member countries. The evaluation team surveyed the authorities and civil society representatives across the membership, and also those IMF staff members who had interacted with authorities and others. The team drafted three separate questionnaires, and engaged Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI)—an independent survey research firm—to help design and administer the surveys.¹

2. This document is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, Section II reviews the survey background. Sections III, IV, and V, respectively, cover each of the three surveys: the authorities, IMF staff, and civil society. These sections each contain a short overview of the survey process, a description of the respondent population, and a brief selection of results that add detail to points covered in the main report and/or the three country papers.

II. General Survey Background

3. Most survey questions asked for views on interactions between the IMF and member countries over the previous two years (i.e., 2007–08), though a few solicited opinions on the whole evaluation period (i.e., 2001–08). Government officials in many economies may have changed over the last eight years, so focusing the bulk of the survey to the most recent period made it easier for those current officials not familiar with interactions over the full period to complete the questionnaire.² Recipients of the civil society survey were similarly unlikely to have been familiar with interactions with the IMF dating back to 2001. All survey results referenced in this paper refer to interactions over the last two years of the evaluation period unless otherwise indicated.³

4. The three surveys were developed in English, and the surveys of authorities and of civil society were translated into several other languages. In addition to English, the survey of authorities was made available to recipients in French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. The survey of civil society was made available in Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish.

5. The survey was sent to representatives in 187 economies: 184 member countries and three selected territorial entities that are not states as understood by international law but which maintain regular interactions with the IMF.⁴ The IEO separated the sample into five subgroups based on stage of development and economic size for the purposes of analysis. These subgroups were used throughout the evaluation. The team first divided the economies into two groups using classifications from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). Based on the October 2008

¹PSRAI assisted the IEO with all aspects of the survey up to the data analysis stage, which was performed by the IEO evaluation team. Specific assistance from PSRAI included advice on the survey methodology, help in preparing the questionnaires, construction of a database of civil society representatives, delivery of the three surveys, and handling of all responses.

²Such an approach was also the only way to allow the direct comparison of views of the authorities and IMF staff over the same time period—since for practical reasons the surveyed staff population included only current staff members and limited them to answers for a single country.

³Most of the survey results included in this paper present the share of respondents to each individual question who gave one of the two most favorable responses out of either four or five possible options (e.g., quality ratings report the combined share of respondents who answered “good” or “excellent,” the two most favorable responses out of five options that also included “very poor,” “poor,” and “average”). Copies of all three survey questionnaires are available upon request.

⁴The evaluation covered interactions with 185 member countries (Kosovo became the 186th member country after the end of the evaluation’s data gathering) and five selected territorial entities. Four of these territories participate in Article IV consultations with the IMF: Aruba, Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR, and the Netherlands Antilles. A fifth territory, the West Bank and Gaza, was also covered by the evaluation. While the IMF does not conduct Article IV consultations with the West Bank and Gaza, it staffs a resident representative office and maintains regular interactions. Macao SAR and Somalia were not surveyed because there were no Article IV consultations during the evaluation period. Montenegro was not surveyed because it became a member late in the evaluation period. Throughout this chapter, the term “country” and “economy” are used interchangeably, each referring to both member countries and selected territories.
BACKGROUND TECHNICAL DOCUMENT I

WEO—published just prior to delivery of the IEO survey—there were 30 “advanced” economies, and 157 were defined as “emerging and developing.”

6. The 30 “advanced” economies were divided into subgroups based on economic size. Specifically, the G-7 economies were defined as “large advanced” and the remaining 23 as “other advanced.”

7. The 157 emerging and developing economies were separated into three subgroups. The first included 76 countries eligible to draw resources from the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The remaining 81 economies were split into “large emerging” and “other emerging” based on a GDP threshold of $250 billion purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2006. India was the lone exception, which is PRGF-eligible but was included in the large emerging group because of the size of its economy and the fact that it has never received PRGF assistance. This process yielded three country groups: 19 large emerging economies, 62 other emerging economies, and 76 PRGF-eligible economies.

8. In the event, PSRAI delivered surveys to civil society representatives on November 12, 2008, and to authorities on November 22, 2008. PSRAI also delivered a survey to current IMF staff members on November 3, 2008. Staff recipients were asked to choose the country on which they had worked the most over the previous two years and complete the questionnaire based on their experiences with that country. Staff survey responses were accepted through February 6, 2009, civil society responses through April 17, 2009, and authority responses through April 20, 2009. PSRAI handled all survey responses to preserve the confidentiality of respondents. Table 1 summarizes the five groups and the criteria used to define them.

### Table 1. Country Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Economies</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>G-7 economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Defined by the October 2008 WEO as “advanced” and not a G-7 economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>19(^1)</td>
<td>Defined by the October 2008 WEO as “emerging and developing,” not eligible to receive PRGF resources, and with GDP more than $250 billion PPP in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>62(^2)</td>
<td>Defined by the October 2008 WEO as “emerging and developing,” not eligible to receive PRGF resources, and with GDP less than $250 billion PPP in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>76(^3)</td>
<td>Eligible to draw resources from the IMF’s PRGF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Includes India.
\(^2\)Excludes Macao SAR, Kosovo, and Montenegro.
\(^3\)Excludes India and Somalia.

III. Survey of the Authorities

A. Survey process

9. On November 22, 2008, PSRAI delivered a survey to the finance ministry and central bank in 187 economies. While the IMF interacts with other government institutions, officials in ministries of finance and central banks remain the Fund’s primary interlocutors. The surveys were addressed and delivered to the highest level possible—usually the minister of finance or the central bank governor—and requested a single response from each institution. The survey was available in five languages, with email recipients asked to complete the questionnaire in the language of their choice. In total, surveys were sent to 351 institutions (187 finance ministries and 164 national central banks), with responses accepted through April 20, 2009.

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\(^7\)The mode of delivery depended on the availability of contact information and the preference of the authorities. Most surveys were delivered via email, and several were sent by fax. In a few cases hard copy surveys were delivered either by hand or regular mail.

\(^8\)Surveys were not sent to the central bank of 23 economies, 20 of which were members of regional monetary unions: 6 in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU), 6 in the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), and 8 in the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA). Central bank surveys were also not sent to the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau (which also do not have a national central bank responsible for monetary policy).

\(^9\)Fax and hard copy surveys were delivered in the country’s official language where possible, and English where not. Recipients were given the option of requesting an additional copy of the survey in any of the five languages.
B. Description of authority respondents

10. The IEO received responses from 179 institutions, a response rate of 51 percent. The response rate from central banks was higher (67 percent) than from finance ministries (37 percent). As a result the final sample comprised responses from 110 central banks and 69 finance ministries.

11. The level of reply varied across the groups, with advanced economies submitting responses at the highest rate. Table 2 summarizes the number of responses from each of the five groups. The IEO received responses from 93 percent of institutions in large advanced and 80 percent of those in other advanced economies. Over half of the institutions in each emerging economy group, meanwhile, returned a questionnaire. The response rate from PRGF-eligible countries was 35 percent.

12. Table 3 compares the distribution of authority responses to the distribution of surveyed institutions across the country groups. Though 39 percent of the total number of surveys delivered went to institutions in PRGF-eligible countries, this group made up 26 percent of responses. Owing to their high response rate the advanced economies were somewhat overrepresented in the overall sample.

13. The number of economies submitting at least one response, meanwhile, was high across all groups. Table 4 details the number of economies in each group that submitted at least one response to the survey. As shown, the IEO received at least one questionnaire from 129 economies, nearly 69 percent of the 187 surveyed. Responses were submitted by 28 out of the 30 advanced economies, and by 17 out of the 19 large emerging economies. Meanwhile, 70 percent of other emerging and 54 percent of PRGF-eligible economies returned at least one response.

14. The distribution of responses also more closely matched the surveyed population from this perspective. Table 5 compares the distribution of economies that submitted at least one reply to the overall distribution across the groups. As shown, PRGF-eligible countries accounted for 41 percent of the 187 economies surveyed and 32 percent of the 129 economies that submitted at least one response.

C. Selected results from the survey of authorities

(i) Purposes of interactions

15. The survey asked authorities how much they wanted the IMF to perform a set of selected roles in their country. Figure 1 gives the main results for each of the country groups.\(^\text{10}\)

(ii) Effectiveness of interactions

16. The survey also asked authorities for their views on the effectiveness of interactions in selected IMF roles

\(^\text{10}\)For individual questions, 5–8 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
Table 4. Number of Economies Submitting At Least One Response to the Authorities’ Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Economies Surveyed</th>
<th>Number of Economies Submitting At Least One Response</th>
<th>Share of Economies Submitting At Least One Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>89%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Distribution of Economies Submitting At Least One Survey Response and Surveyed Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Share of Surveyed Economies</th>
<th>Share of All Economies Submitting At Least One Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. What the Authorities Wanted from the IMF
(Percent of respondents)

a. Large Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects: 15 (Very much), 69 (A fair amount)
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: 15 (Very much), 77 (A fair amount)
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: 8 (Very much), 31 (A fair amount)
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: 8 (Very much), 23 (A fair amount)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: 8 (Very much), 8 (A fair amount)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: 8 (Very much), 8 (A fair amount)
- Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: 8 (Very much), 15 (A fair amount)
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: 23 (Very much), 23 (A fair amount)
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program: 9 (Very much), 8 (A fair amount)
- Assist in building capacity in your country: 8 (Very much), 8 (A fair amount)
b. Other Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects:
  - Very much: 65
  - A fair amount: 22

- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree:
  - Very much: 76
  - A fair amount: 16

- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks:
  - Very much: 38
  - A fair amount: 19

- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies:
  - Very much: 14
  - A fair amount: 14

- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government:
  - Very much: 25
  - A fair amount: 6

- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government:
  - Very much: 33
  - A fair amount: 3

- Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets:
  - Very much: 42
  - A fair amount: 8

- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects:
  - Very much: 41
  - A fair amount: 32

- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program:
  - Very much: 58
  - A fair amount: 37

- Assist in building capacity in your country:
  - Very much: 53
  - A fair amount: 37

---

c. Large Emerging

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects:
  - Very much: 37
  - A fair amount: 58

- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree:
  - Very much: 37
  - A fair amount: 53

- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks:
  - Very much: 26
  - A fair amount: 16

- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies:
  - Very much: 32
  - A fair amount: 11

- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government:
  - Very much: 53
  - A fair amount: 5

- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government:
  - Very much: 21
  - A fair amount: 47

- Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets:
  - Very much: 21
  - A fair amount: 47

- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects:
  - Very much: 16
  - A fair amount: 47

- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program:
  - Very much: 26
  - A fair amount: 11

- Assist in building capacity in your country:
  - Very much: 53
  - A fair amount: 5

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Figure 1 (continued)
d. Other Emerging

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects: 59% very much, 36% a fair amount.
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: 63% very much, 34% a fair amount.
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: 18% very much, 52% a fair amount.
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: 25% very much, 56% a fair amount.
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: 11% very much, 36% a fair amount.
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: 7% very much, 23% a fair amount.
- Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: 21% very much, 39% a fair amount.
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: 13% very much, 27% a fair amount.
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program: 14% very much, 46% a fair amount.
- Assist in building capacity in your country: 0% very much, 20% a fair amount.

Notes: Respondents were asked to choose whether they wanted the IMF to perform each role “very much,” “a fair amount,” “not too much,” or “not at all.” Displayed results give the share of authority respondents who answered “very much” or “a fair amount.”

e. PRGF-Eligible

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects: 49% very much, 49% a fair amount.
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: 44% very much, 53% a fair amount.
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: 39% very much, 55% a fair amount.
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: 33% very much, 47% a fair amount.
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: 27% very much, 39% a fair amount.
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: 20% very much, 27% a fair amount.
- Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: 32% very much, 50% a fair amount.
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: 35% very much, 37% a fair amount.
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program: 45% very much, 32% a fair amount.
- Assist in building capacity in your country: 52% very much, 43% a fair amount.

Notes: Respondents were asked to choose whether they wanted the IMF to perform each role “very much,” “a fair amount,” “not too much,” or “not at all.” Displayed results give the share of authority respondents who answered “very much” or “a fair amount.”
and—at the very end of the survey—for their overall perceptions about the effectiveness of interactions. Figure 2 gives the share of respondents in each country group who answered that interactions in the queried role were “effective” or “very effective.”

17. Figure 3 gives the share of respondents in each country group who answered the direct question about the perceived overall effectiveness of IMF interactions as “effective” or “very effective.” As shown, the authorities’ ratings for the evaluation period as a whole were lower than for the last two years, though caution is needed in interpreting the differences, especially for the large advanced and large emerging economies, particularly in the absence of survey questions on specific aspects of effectiveness over the whole evaluation period. For the combined ratings of “effective” and “very effective,” the differences between the two periods were the smallest for the PRGF-eligible countries, which, however, had the largest difference in ratings of “very effective.”

(iii) Quality of interactions

18. The survey included a series of questions that asked the authorities to assess staff’s performance on selected aspects of interactions generally associated with higher quality. Figure 4 summarizes these results for each of the five country groups.

(iv) IMF staff skills and institutional procedures

19. The survey also asked the authorities the extent to which they agreed with a set of criticisms of IMF staff skills and approaches to interactions, and with a set of criticisms of IMF institutional policies and procedures. Table 6 summarizes the views of the authorities in all five country groups.

Figure 2. Authorities’ Views on the Effectiveness of Interactions in Selected IMF Roles
(Percent of respondents)

a. Large Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects: Very effective 15, Effective 62
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: Very effective 23, Effective 62
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: Very effective 23
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: Very effective 25
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: Very effective 8
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: Very effective 8
- Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: Very effective 15, Effective 15
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: Very effective 8, Effective 31
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program: Very effective 0, Effective 62
- Assist in building capacity in your country: Very effective 0

11Respondents were asked to choose whether interactions were “very effective,” “effective,” “average,” “ineffective,” or “very ineffective” in each role. Respondents could also indicate that there had been “no interactions in this role.” For individual questions, 4–6 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.

12Respondents were asked to choose whether interactions overall were “very effective,” “effective,” “average,” “ineffective,” or “very ineffective.” For individual questions, 5 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.

13For individual questions, 4–10 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.

14For individual questions, 4–6 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
Figure 2 (continued)

b. Other Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects: 30 Very effective, 54 Effective
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: 35 Very effective, 51 Effective
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: 8 Very effective, 14 Effective
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: 3 Very effective, 24 Effective
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: 5 Very effective, 16 Effective
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: 5 Very effective, 19 Effective
- Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: 14 Very effective, 22 Effective
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: 5 Very effective, 22 Effective
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program: N/A
- Assist in building capacity in your country: 50 Effective

---

c. Large Emerging

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects: 30 Very effective, 35 Effective
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: 25 Very effective, 40 Effective
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: 10 Very effective, 20 Effective
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: 5 Very effective, 25 Effective
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: 5 Very effective, 10 Effective
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: 5 Very effective
- Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: 30 Very effective
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: 5 Very effective, 25 Effective
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program: 17 Very effective, 17 Effective
- Assist in building capacity in your country: 20 Very effective, 20 Effective
Figure 2 (concluded)

d. Other Emerging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Respondents were asked to choose whether interactions were “very effective,” “effective,” “average,” “ineffective,” or “very ineffective” in each role. Respondents could also indicate that there had been “no interactions in this role.” Displayed results give the share of authority respondents who answered “very effective” or “effective.”

e. PRGF-Eligible

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Respondents were asked to choose whether interactions were “very effective,” “effective,” “average,” “ineffective,” or “very ineffective” in each role. Respondents could also indicate that there had been “no interactions in this role.” Displayed results give the share of authority respondents who answered “very effective” or “effective.”

1Includes only those respondents who indicated that their country had an IMF financial or monitoring program in 2001–08.
2Includes only those respondents who indicated that their country received IMF technical assistance or training in 2001–08.
**Figure 3. Authorities’ Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Interactions Overall**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall perceived effectiveness 2007−08</th>
<th>Large advanced</th>
<th>Other advanced</th>
<th>Large emerging</th>
<th>Other emerging</th>
<th>PRGF-eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007−08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001−08</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Respondents were asked to choose whether interactions overall were “very effective,” “effective,” “average,” “ineffective,” or “very ineffective” for each time period. Displayed results give the share of authority respondents who answered “very effective” or “effective.”

**Figure 4. Authorities’ Views on Selected Aspects of Quality**

*(Percent of respondents)*

**a. Large Advanced**

- Listen carefully to your perspectives: Excellent 31, Good 31
- Respond in general to your needs and changing priorities: Excellent 8, Good 42
- Respond quickly to your requests for analytical work: Excellent 75
- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue: Excellent 23, Good 54
- Focus on topics of interest to your country: Excellent 8, Good 38
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country: Excellent 15, Good 31
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries: Excellent 38
- Bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions: Excellent 15, Good 31
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions: Excellent 8, Good 23
- Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship: Excellent 8, Good 46
Figure 4 (continued)

b. Other Advanced

- Listen carefully to your perspectives
  - Excellent: 28
  - Good: 58
- Respond in general to your needs and changing priorities
  - Excellent: 19
  - Good: 54
- Respond quickly to your requests for analytical work
  - Excellent: 20
  - Good: 37
- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue
  - Excellent: 30
  - Good: 41
- Focus on topics of interest to your country
  - Excellent: 24
  - Good: 65
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country
  - Excellent: 14
  - Good: 57
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
  - Excellent: 11
  - Good: 42
- Bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions
  - Excellent: 3
  - Good: 35
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions
  - Excellent: 38
  - Good: 49
- Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship
  - Excellent: 16
  - Good: 49

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c. Large Emerging

- Listen carefully to your perspectives
  - Excellent: 15
  - Good: 65
- Respond in general to your needs and changing priorities
  - Excellent: 5
  - Good: 55
- Respond quickly to your requests for analytical work
  - Excellent: 17
  - Good: 67
- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue
  - Excellent: 16
  - Good: 63
- Focus on topics of interest to your country
  - Excellent: 15
  - Good: 70
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country
  - Excellent: 5
  - Good: 55
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
  - Excellent: 15
  - Good: 55
- Bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions
  - Excellent: 5
  - Good: 30
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions
  - Excellent: 40
  - Good: 49
- Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship
  - Excellent: 5
  - Good: 45
Figure 4 (concluded)

d. Other Emerging

- Listen carefully to your perspectives: 25% Excellent, 51% Good
- Respond in general to your needs and changing priorities: 21% Excellent, 44% Good
- Respond quickly to your requests for analytical work: 21% Excellent, 58% Good
- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue: 25% Excellent, 53% Good
- Focus on topics of interest to your country: 25% Excellent, 55% Good
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of your country: 14% Excellent, 50% Good
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries: 14% Excellent, 35% Good
- Bring quickly to your attention the implications of changing external conditions: 11% Excellent, 33% Good
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions: 9% Excellent, 33% Good
- Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship: 11% Excellent, 46% Good

Note: For each aspect of quality, respondents were asked to choose whether the IMF’s performance had been “excellent,” “good,” “average,” “poor,” or “very poor.” Displayed results give the share of authority respondents who answered “excellent” or “good.”
Table 6. Authorities’ Views on Selected Criticisms of Staff Skills and Style, and of IMF Policies and Procedures
(In percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Critiques</th>
<th>Large Advanced</th>
<th>Other Advanced</th>
<th>Large Emerging</th>
<th>Other Emerging</th>
<th>PRGF-Eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMF staff skills and style</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. IMF staff have had insufficient country knowledge, including</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the decision-making process and constraints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. IMF staff have had too little practical experience in policy formulation and</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. IMF staff have been unwilling to consider different</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approaches to achieve desired policy outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. IMF staff have not presented their assessments in a clear and convincing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manner</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Insufficient use of your country’s language has adversely</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>affected interactions</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. IMF staff have changed positions without well-supported</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. IMF staff have not had enough relevant technical</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge, including financial market expertise</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Inadequate preparation by IMF staff has reduced the</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effectiveness of meetings and/or wasted time of country</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>authorities</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. IMF staff have not provided clear written presentation of</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The nationalities and/or educational background of IMF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff have impeded effective interactions</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. IMF staff have been insensitive or shown insufficient</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respect towards the authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IMF policies and procedures</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. The IMF has not been willing enough to experiment and</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>innovate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. IMF policies and procedures have been inflexible or</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burdensome</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. IMF has not provided enough continuity and smooth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>changeover of mission chiefs and mission members</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. There has been insufficient accountability for the quality of advice given</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. There has been insufficient opportunity for the authorities to</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>express their views on the effectiveness of interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Concerns about possible dissemination of information,</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including to the Executive Board, have led country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>authorities to withhold certain topics or data from</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discussions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Respondents were asked to choose whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” with each criticism. Displayed results give the share of authority respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree.”*
IV. Survey of IMF Staff

A. Survey process

20. On November 17, 2008, PSRAI delivered via email a survey to all IMF staff members in selected departments likely to have participated in interactions with authorities. Selected departments included all IMF area departments and those functional departments whose staff regularly interact with authorities. In total, surveys were sent to 1,251 current staff members. Responses were accepted through February 6, 2009.

21. Staff recipients of the survey were asked to identify the single country on which they had worked the most over the previous two years. For practical reasons such a limitation was deemed appropriate, even though staff might have worked on more than one country. Experiences in interactions vary widely depending on the country, and the team did not believe it feasible for a single questionnaire to accurately capture the different experiences of a staff member who had worked on several. The team also thought it unreasonable to ask staff to complete a separate survey for each of the countries on which they had worked.

B. Description of IMF staff respondents

22. The IEO received responses from 830 staff members, a response rate of 67 percent. Recognizing that not all staff selected to receive the survey would have interacted with authorities over the last two years, the questionnaire offered recipients the chance to opt out by indicating that they had not participated in interactions with authorities. Of the 830 staff respondents, 125 chose this option, leaving 705 who submitted a questionnaire with responses.

23. As described above, staff respondents were requested to select the economy on which they had worked the most over the last two years, and the distribution of selected economies across the groups broadly corresponded to the distribution of the 187 economies covered by the authorities’ survey. Table 7 gives the breakdown of staff responses across the groups and compares this distribution to that of all economies covered by the authorities’ survey. Staff working on PRGF-eligible countries made up 44 percent of responses while PRGF-eligible countries accounted for 41 percent of the total number of economies surveyed. The other advanced group was underrepresented, with 6 percent of staff responses from a group accounting for 12 percent of all economies surveyed. Nearly every economy, meanwhile, was represented by at least one staff survey response, as the IEO received submissions from at least one staff member working on 170 economies (Table 8).

24. A majority of staff respondents worked primarily on surveillance and program activities. Table 9 gives the distribution of staff respondents across activity and position. Nearly 65 percent of staff reported that they mostly interacted with authorities in the context of surveillance or programs, and another 7 percent primarily through Financial Sector Assessment Programs or Reports on the Assessment of Standards and Codes. Staff working on technical assistance and training made up 18 percent of staff respondents, and 9 percent of submissions came from resident representatives. Across all activities, meanwhile, 59 percent of responses came from staff who worked as mission team members, and 23 percent came from mission chiefs. In terms of level, 51 percent of submitted questionnaires came from staff at the A14–15 level, 32 percent from the A11–13 level, and 17 percent from B-level.

C. Selected results from the survey of IMF staff

(i) Purposes of interactions

25. The staff survey followed a structure similar to that of the authorities’ survey, and included a set of questions seeking staff views on the extent to which the IMF aimed to fulfill the set of selected roles over the previous two years. Figure 5 gives these results for each country group.

(ii) Effectiveness of interactions

26. Staff were also asked to assess the effectiveness of interactions in selected IMF roles and—at the very end of the survey—for their overall perceptions about the effectiveness of interactions. Figure 6 gives the share of staff respondents working in each country group who answered that interactions in the queried role were “effective” or “very effective.”

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13Surveys were sent to staff at the A11 level (entry level economist) or above.

14The team’s decision to focus most questions on staff experiences over the last two years likely mitigated some of the possible problems caused by not surveying former staff.

15Of these, 48 staff respondents did not select a specific country, so all reported results are based on a sample of 657 staff responses except where noted.
### Table 7. Distribution of Staff Responses and Surveyed Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Share of Surveyed Economies</th>
<th>Share of Staff Responses</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 An additional 48 respondents indicated that they had interactions with authorities but did not select a specific economy.

### Table 8. Economies Represented by At Least One Response to the Staff Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Economies in Authorities’ Survey</th>
<th>Number of Economies with At Least One Staff Submission</th>
<th>Share of Economies with At Least One Staff Submission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9. Position and Primary Function of Staff Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Position</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
<th>Share of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director or front office reviewer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission chief for surveillance or UFR missions</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission chief for FSAP or ROSC missions</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission chief for TA missions</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission member for surveillance or UFR missions</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission member for FSAP or ROSC missions</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission member for TA missions</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident representative</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA advisor in the country or in a regional center</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training provider</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>. . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total responses selecting a staff position and a country1</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Excludes the 48 respondents who did not select a country and another seven who did not select a staff position.
Figure 5. Staff Views on Whether the IMF Aimed to Fulfill Selected Roles (Percent of respondents)

a. Large Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects: Very much (79), A fair amount (14)
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: Very much (69), A fair amount (24)
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: Very much (56), A fair amount (22)
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: Very much (39), A fair amount (7)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: Very much (42), A fair amount (19)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: Very much (39), A fair amount (43)
- Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: Very much (48), A fair amount (48)
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: Very much (48), A fair amount (4)
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program: Very much (7), A fair amount (4)
- Assist in building capacity in your country: Very much (29), A fair amount (11)

b. Other Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects: Very much (82), A fair amount (18)
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: Very much (76), A fair amount (24)
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: Very much (32), A fair amount (62)
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: Very much (54), A fair amount (27)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: Very much (40), A fair amount (29)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: Very much (46), A fair amount (20)
- Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: Very much (43), A fair amount (24)
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: Very much (51), A fair amount (29)
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program: Very much (25), A fair amount (11)
- Assist in building capacity in your country: Very much (29), A fair amount (18)
### c. Large Emerging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Very much (%)</th>
<th>A fair amount (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### d. Other Emerging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Very much (%)</th>
<th>A fair amount (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5 (concluded)

Note: Respondents were asked to choose whether the IMF aimed to perform each role “very much,” “a fair amount,” “not too much,” or “not at all.” Displayed results give the share of staff respondents who answered “very much” or “a fair amount.”

Figure 6. Staff Views on the Effectiveness of Interactions in Selected IMF Roles
(Percent of respondents)

a. Large Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects
  - Very effective: 19
  - Effective: 56

- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree
  - Very effective: 11
  - Effective: 64

- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks
  - Very effective: 8
  - Effective: 12

- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies
  - Very effective: 4
  - Effective: 8

- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government
  - Very effective: 8
  - Effective: 16

- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government
  - Very effective: 13
  - Effective: 33

- Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets
  - Very effective: 12
  - Effective: N/A

- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects
  - Very effective: N/A
  - Effective: N/A

- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program
  - Very effective: N/A
  - Effective: N/A

- Assist in building capacity in your country
  - Very effective: N/A
  - Effective: N/A
Figure 6 (continued)

b. Other Advanced

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects: Very effective (47%) and Effective (41%)
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: Very effective (53%) and Effective (33%)
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: Very effective (20%) and Effective (37%)
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: Very effective (11%) and Effective (31%)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: Very effective (9%) and Effective (23%)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: Very effective (15%) and Effective (26%)
- Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: Very effective (21%) and Effective (29%)
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: Very effective (15%) and Effective (41%)
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program: N/A
- Assist in building capacity in your country: Very effective (29%)

---

c. Large Emerging

- Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country's economic policies and prospects: Very effective (40%) and Effective (40%)
- Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree: Very effective (48%) and Effective (31%)
- Contribute to the development of policy frameworks: Very effective (20%) and Effective (31%)
- Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies: Very effective (6%) and Effective (22%)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government: Very effective (8%) and Effective (21%)
- Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government: Very effective (16%) and Effective (30%)
- Present analysis and assessments of your country's economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets: Very effective (8%) and Effective (23%)
- Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects: Very effective (27%) and Effective (42%)
- Provide financial or monitoring support for your country's economic program: Very effective (37%) and Effective (39%)
- Assist in building capacity in your country: Very effective (1%)

Legend: Very effective, Effective
Figure 6 (concluded)

**d. Other Emerging**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**e. PRGF-Eligible**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide a clear and objective assessment of your country’s economic policies and prospects</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to a good exchange of views, whether or not you agree</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the development of policy frameworks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise you on operational aspects of implementing policies</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus within your government</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help build and maintain policy consensus outside government</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present analysis and assessments of your country’s economy to other countries, donors, or financial markets</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to international policy coordination, including through analysis of spillover effects</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide financial or monitoring support for your country’s economic program</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building capacity in your country</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Respondents were asked to choose whether interactions were “very effective,” “effective,” “average,” “ineffective,” or “very ineffective” in each role. Respondents could also indicate that there had been “no interactions in this role.” Displayed results give the share of staff respondents who answered “very effective” or “effective.”

1Includes only those respondents who indicated that their selected country had an IMF financial or monitoring program in 2001–08.
2Includes only those respondents who indicated that their selected country received IMF technical assistance or training in 2001–08.
27. Figure 7 gives the share of staff respondents working on each country group who answered the direct question about perceived overall effectiveness of IMF interactions as “effective” or “very effective.” As shown, the staff’s ratings for the evaluation period as a whole were lower than for the last two years, though caution is needed in interpreting the differences, both in the absence of survey questions on specific aspects of effectiveness over the whole period, and since the differences may to some extent be capturing the views of current staff about their predecessors. For the combined ratings of “effective” and “very effective,” the differences between the two periods were the largest for the other emerging and large advanced economies, which, in the case of the latter were somewhat muted by increases in “ineffective” and “very ineffective.”

(iii) Quality of interactions

28. Both staff and the authorities were asked to rate the Fund’s performance on the same set of quality aspects. Staff views are shown in Figure 8.

(iv) Staff incentives for interactions

29. The staff questionnaire included a series of questions that sought staff views on a set of criticisms of internal incentives for conducting interactions. Table 10 gives some of these results.

30. Staff were also asked to assess the usefulness of different tools in preparing them for interactions with member countries. Table 11 gives these results.

V. Survey of Civil Society

A. Survey process

31. Though the authorities are the IMF’s primary counterparts in member countries, the Fund also increasingly interacts with groups and individuals outside government, so the IEO also sought views on interactions from representatives of civil society across the world. In this context, the IEO defined “civil society” broadly, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), labor and trade unions, think tanks, academia, chambers of commerce, business and trade associations, and the media.
Figure 8. Staff Views on Selected Aspects of Quality
(Percent of respondents)

a. Large Advanced

- Listen carefully to authorities’ perspectives
- Respond in general to country needs and changing priorities
- Respond quickly to requests for analytical work
- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue
- Focus on topics of interest to the country
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of the country
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
- Bring quickly to authorities’ attention the implications of changing external conditions
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions
- Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship

b. Other Advanced

- Listen carefully to authorities’ perspectives
- Respond in general to country needs and changing priorities
- Respond quickly to requests for analytical work
- Actively engage in a constructive dialogue
- Focus on topics of interest to the country
- Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of the country
- Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries
- Bring quickly to authorities’ attention the implications of changing external conditions
- Present alternative scenarios and address “what if?” or “what’s missing?” questions
- Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship
Take a long-term strategic approach to the relationship

Present alternative scenarios and address "what if?" or "what's missing?" questions

Bring quickly to authorities' attention the implications of changing external conditions

Provide analysis based on the experiences of other countries

Focus on topics of interest to the country

Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of the country

Listen carefully to authorities' perspectives

Respond in general to country needs and changing priorities

Respond quickly to requests for analytical work

Actively engage in a constructive dialogue

Listen carefully to authorities' perspectives

Respond in general to country needs and changing priorities

Respond quickly to requests for analytical work

Actively engage in a constructive dialogue

Focus on topics of interest to the country

Provide advice and analysis that is suited to the specific circumstances of the country

c. Large Emerging

d. Other Emerging
32. The evaluation team wanted to survey a representative sample of civil society across all economies, but concluded early on that existing lists of civil society contacts—both within and outside the Fund—were not suitable for this purpose, leading the team to construct its own list. The IMF’s External Relations Department (EXR) maintains a database of civil society contacts, but its coverage across both countries and categories of civil society organization was not extensive enough for the purposes of this evaluation. The IEO also consulted outside the Fund and examined other lists of civil society contacts, and came to similar conclusions. As a result, the IEO decided to construct a particular database of civil society representatives across all 187 economies, doing so through two principal methods.

33. The civil society questionnaire was designed initially for those groups and individuals who had participated in interactions with IMF representatives during the evaluation period, so the IEO asked all IMF country desks to deliver a list of civil society representatives (including contact information) with whom they had met over the previous two years. Nearly every country desk complied, though in a variety of formats and methods—symbolic of the wide array of approaches to civil society interactions and data management used by IMF teams. Civil society interactions, including the collection and maintenance of contact information, is largely left to the discretion of the individual country desk. There was thus no standard format for delivery of contact information, and information for some countries was more comprehensive than for others.24

34. In a separate exercise, the IEO asked PSRAI to construct independently a new database of civil society contacts in all 187 economies.25 Several factors drove

24For example, some relatively new country team members contacted by the IEO had no list of contacts, and referred the evaluation team to their predecessors to supply the information. Some desks, meanwhile, delivered copies of business cards collected during missions, while others delivered a full schedule of civil society meetings that had taken place during Article IV consultations. In general, there did not appear to be centralized and comprehensive maintenance of contact information in individual departments.

25A small number of contact addresses were also added by the IEO, mostly consisting of civil society representatives who had interacted with the IEO in the context of previous evaluations.
Table 10. Staff Views on Criticisms of Internal Incentives for Interactions
(In percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Incentives for Interactions</th>
<th>Large Advanced</th>
<th>Other Advanced</th>
<th>Large Emerging</th>
<th>Other Emerging</th>
<th>PRGF-Eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 There is little incentive for IMF staff to work on the same country for more than two years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In performance appraisals, too little weight has been given to effective interactions with countries</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The desire to preserve the relationship with the authorities has led to assessments that have been too cautious</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 IMF staff have spent too little time preparing or conducting interactions with country authorities relative to time spent on other work</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 When reassigned, staff have provided insufficient briefing and/or country information to their successors</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 IMF staff have received insufficient backing from IMF management or senior staff when tensions have arisen between staff and authorities</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 IMF management and/or senior staff have been unable or unwilling to consider different approaches to achieve desired policy outcomes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 IMF staff have received insufficient backing from IMF management or senior staff when tensions have arisen between staff and nongovernmental players</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mission chiefs have been unable or unwilling to consider different approaches to achieve desired policy outcomes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents were asked to choose whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” with each statement. Displayed results give the share of staff respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree.”

Table 11. Usefulness of Various Staff Resources for Interactions
(In percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Staff Resources</th>
<th>“A Great Deal” or “A Fair Amount”</th>
<th>“Not At All” or “Not Too Much”</th>
<th>“Did Not Obtain”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Experience within the IMF</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feedback from authorities</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Feedback from supervisors</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Training or experience outside the IMF</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Guidance from your own department, including from the website</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Training for oral communications, negotiations, and interpersonal skills</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Guidance conveyed through PDR/SPR, including from the website</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Training for preparing written presentations for authorities</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Media training</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Language training</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Training on political economy issues</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Guidance conveyed through EXR, including from the website</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 The guide for staff relations with CSOs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents were asked the extent to which selected resources were useful for interactions, and could choose “a great deal,” “a fair amount,” “not too much,” “not at all,” or “did not obtain.” Displayed results include respondents who did not select a specific country.
Surveys were available in seven languages, and e-mail recipients had the option of selecting the language in which they wanted to complete the survey. Limiting the survey to e-mail delivery obviously excluded those groups and individuals who lacked a reliable e-mail contact address or Internet connection—a nontrivial issue for many civil society groups—but the evaluation team and PSRAI decided that such an approach was the only practical means of conducting a global survey across all 187 economies.

Of the 3,622 surveys sent by PSRAI, 899 were returned due to invalid addresses, leaving 2,723 surveys delivered successfully. Survey responses were accepted from November 12, 2008 to April 17, 2009.

B. Description of civil society respondents

37. The IEO received responses from 704 civil society representatives in 159 countries. While this represented only 26 percent of the surveys that were successfully delivered, the number of total responses was far higher than that obtained by any previous IEO survey. Moreover, at least one response was received from 85 percent of the total economies surveyed (Table 12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Surveyed Economies</th>
<th>Number of Economies with At Least One Civil Society Submission</th>
<th>Share of Economies with At Least One Civil Society Submission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. PSRAI sent surveys to the combined list of contacts via email, delivering a total of 3,622 questionnaires. Surveys were available in seven languages, and e-mail recipients had the option of selecting the language in which they wanted to complete the survey. Limiting the survey to email delivery obviously excluded those groups and individuals who lacked a reliable email contact address or Internet connection—a nontrivial issue for many civil society groups—but the evaluation team and PSRAI decided that such an approach was the only practical means of conducting a global survey across all 187 economies. Of the 3,622 surveys sent by PSRAI, 899 were returned due to invalid addresses, leaving 2,723 surveys delivered successfully. Survey responses were accepted from November 12, 2008 to April 17, 2009.

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38. Responses were broadly representative of the surveyed economies. Table 13 gives a breakdown of civil society responses by country group. Of the 704 responses, 259 came from groups or individuals working in PRGF-eligible countries (37 percent of total responses). This group accounted for 42 percent of economies surveyed. Respondents from other advanced economies represented 16 percent of civil society responses and 12 percent of the surveyed economies overall.

26A question at the start of the survey asked recipients to indicate whether they had met with IMF teams from 2001–08. Participants were given a different set of survey questions depending on their response. Questions designed for those who had not interacted with the IMF touched on, for example, whether these groups would have wanted to meet with the IMF and why they felt interactions had not taken place.

27Fax and hard copy surveys were delivered in the language deemed most appropriate by the evaluation team, and recipients were given the option of requesting a copy in any of the other languages.

28The department-provided lists also included approximately 800 contacts without an email address.
The distribution of responses across category of civil society was also broadly representative of the distribution used by PSRAI in constructing its database. NGOs made up 30 percent of responses, academics and think tanks 29 percent, private sector associations 25 percent, media representatives 10 percent, and labor unions 7 percent (Table 14).

This distribution, however, varied considerably across country group. Table 14 gives the breakdown of responses by category of civil society. Unlike for other groups, the responses from PRGF-eligible countries came mostly from NGOs (nearly half of submitted questionnaires compared to only around 20 percent for each of the other groups). A relatively high share of responses from advanced economies, meanwhile, came from private sector associations and think tanks/academics; each of these categories made up 40 percent of the total responses from the large advanced group and only 16 percent of responses from the PRGF-eligible group.

Of the 704 respondents, 443 reported interactions with the IMF. The share of respondents who indicated that they had interacted with the IMF was broadly similar across the country groups, with 58 to 67 percent of respondents from each group reporting interactions with IMF representatives from 2001–08 (Table 15).29

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29This does not mean that this proportion was true for the full population of civil society, as those who did not respond likely included a number of groups and individuals who did interact with the IMF.
### Table 16. Proportion of Civil Society Respondents Who Reported Interactions with the IMF by Category of Civil Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
<th>Number of Responses Reporting Interactions with the IMF</th>
<th>Share of Responses Who Reported Interactions with the IMF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector association</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor union</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think tank/academic</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All categories</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 17. Civil Society Respondents Who Reported Interactions with the IMF by Country Group and Category

#### a. Number of Respondents Who Reported Interactions with the IMF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Private Sector Association</th>
<th>Labor Union</th>
<th>Think Tank/Academic</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>All Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### b. Share of Respondents Who Reported Interactions with the IMF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Private Sector Association</th>
<th>Labor Union</th>
<th>Think Tank/Academic</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>All Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large advanced</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large emerging</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGF-eligible</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All economies</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42. A smaller share of NGO respondents reported having interacted with the IMF than did other types of civil society representatives. While at least two-thirds of the submitted responses from each of the other categories reported interactions with the IMF, only 50 percent of NGO respondents did so (Table 16).30

43. The distribution of responses across category of civil society differed by country group. Table 17 gives the breakdown of respondents who reported interactions with the IMF by country group and category of civil society. Private sector associations, academics, and think tanks made up nearly all responses from advanced economies (93 percent of large advanced and 80 percent of other advanced). NGOs, meanwhile, accounted for a much higher share of civil society respondents from PRGF-eligible countries than any other group (40 percent compared to less than 20 percent for each of the other groups).

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30This again does not show that NGOs in general were less likely than the other types of group to interact with the IMF.
To have the opportunity to express our views to the IMF on the economic policies of the country in which we are located.

To hear the IMF explain its views on the country in which we are located.

To hear the IMF explain its views on other countries, or on regional or global issues.

To have a good exchange of views, whether or not we agree.

To have our views taken into account in the policy discussions between the IMF and the government.

To have our views taken into account in the IMF’s policies in other countries, or on regional or global issues.

Note: Respondents were asked to choose whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” that they wanted to fulfill each selected purpose in their interactions with the IMF. Displayed results give the share of civil society respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree,” and include only those respondents who indicated that they had interacted with the IMF. Shares were calculated excluding those who answered “not applicable” and those who did not answer the question.

**Figure 10. Civil Society Views by Country Group on the Usefulness of Interactions with the IMF in 2007–08**

(Percent of respondents)

Note: Respondents could choose “a great deal,” “a fair amount,” “not too much,” or “not at all.” Displayed results give the share of civil society respondents who answered “a great deal” or “a fair amount,” and include only those respondents who indicated that they had interacted with the IMF. Shares were calculated excluding those who did not answer the question.

**Figure 11. Civil Society Views by Category on the Usefulness of Interactions with the IMF in 2007–08**

(Percent of respondents)

Note: Respondents could choose “a great deal,” “a fair amount,” “not too much,” or “not at all.” Displayed results give the share of civil society respondents who answered “a great deal” or “a fair amount,” and include only those respondents who indicated that they had interacted with the IMF. Shares were calculated excluding those who did not answer the question.
Figure 12. Civil Society Views on Whether Their Purposes for Interacting with the IMF Were Met (Percent of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Interactions</th>
<th>PRGF-eligible</th>
<th>Other emerging</th>
<th>Large emerging</th>
<th>Other advanced</th>
<th>Large advanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We were able to express our views to the IMF on the economic policies of the country in which we are located</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IMF explained its views on the country in which we are located</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IMF explained its views on other countries, or on regional or global issues</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We had a good exchange of views with the IMF, whether or not we agreed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our views were taken into account in the policy discussions between the IMF and the government</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our views were taken into account in the IMF’s policies in other countries, or on regional or global issues</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions contributed to building national support and initiative toward IMF-backed policies</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents were asked to choose whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” that in interactions with the IMF they were able to fulfill each selected purpose. Respondents could also choose “don’t know” or “not applicable.” Displayed results include only those respondents who indicated that they had interacted with the IMF. Shares were calculated including those who answered “don’t know” and “not applicable,” and excluding those who did not answer the question.

C. Selected results from the survey of civil society

(i) Purposes of interactions

44. The civil society survey included a set of questions that asked respondents the extent to which they wanted to fulfill selected purposes during their interactions with the IMF. Figure 9 above shows these results.31

31For individual questions, 18–20 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
The IMF listened carefully to our perspectives

The IMF followed up with reactions to suggestions and concerns

The IMF frankly discussed trade-offs between policy alternatives

IMF staff were sensitive to cultural differences

Language was not a barrier to interactions

Discussions were held in a way that was not too technical

IMF staff treated us with respect

IMF staff demonstrated adequate expertise in the discussions

Note: Respondents were asked to choose whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” with each aspect of interactions with the IMF. Displayed results give the share of civil society respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree,” and include only those respondents who indicated that they had interacted with the IMF. Shares were calculated excluding those who answered “don’t know” and “not applicable,” and those who did not answer the question.

Figure 14. Civil Society Views on the Frequency of Their Meetings with the IMF

Note: Respondents were asked to describe the frequency of meetings with the IMF as “far too many,” “too many,” “about right,” “too few,” or “far too few.” Shares were calculated excluding those who did not answer the question.
(ii) Usefulness of interactions

45. The survey asked civil society respondents to assess the overall usefulness of their meetings with the IMF from 2007–08. The results are illustrated below, both by country group (Figure 10 above) and by category of civil society (Figure 11 above).32

46. Civil society respondents were also asked whether they felt their meetings with the IMF met their intended purposes. (Figure 12 above) illustrates the main results.33

(iii) Staff skills and style, and IMF relationship management

47. The survey asked civil society respondents to rate staff’s performance on a range of selected issues related to skills and approaches to interactions. The results are shown in (Figure 13 above).34

48. The survey also asked respondents to characterize their views on the frequency of meetings with the IMF. (Figure 14 above) gives the results for each country group.35

49. The civil society survey also asked respondents why meetings with the IMF had not taken place. Figure 15 gives these results, first for those who answered that the frequency of meetings with the IMF had been “too few” or “far too few” (Figure 15a),36 then for those who reported that they had not interacted with the IMF (Figure 15b).37

Note: Respondents who reported that they had not interacted with the IMF and those who reported that they had interacted with the IMF but that the frequency of meetings had been “too few” or “much too few” were asked to choose which of the following best described why: “we asked but they were not granted,” “we assumed the IMF would not meet with us,” “we did not know enough about the work of the IMF to ask for meetings,” “we were interested but thought that meetings would be a waste of time,” “the IMF is not relevant to our work,” and “other.”

32Twenty-nine percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
33For individual questions, 23–26 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
34For individual questions, 28–32 percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
35Seventeen percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
36Five percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
37Twenty-seven percent of survey respondents did not provide an answer.
Background Technical Document II: Note on Documentary Evidence

I. Introduction

1. As noted in the main report, the evaluation used three main sources of primary evidence—surveys, interviews, and internal documents. This background paper focuses on the internal documents. It has three sections. The first describes the documents themselves, as well as how they were obtained. The second sets out how the documents were used in the context of the evaluation’s work on the 49 sample countries, which covered the entire evaluation period. The third discusses the evaluation’s cross-country document review of selected issues in interactions, which focused on the last two years of the evaluation period.

2. This examination of the internal IMF documentary record was an important pillar of the evaluation. It helped the team to clarify, validate, and/or reject hypotheses that arose in the course of its work, and played a key role in its ability to triangulate across evidentiary sources and draw conclusions. This said, the evaluation team clearly recognizes that the documentary evidence is but a partial record of the relationship between the IMF and member countries, not least because many IMF interactions are not reflected in the written record. The evaluation team also recognizes that the evidence must be interpreted carefully, mindful that most documents were written for another time and another purpose, often under strict word limits.

II. Documentary Evidence

3. This section describes the document identification, request, and collection process. At the outset of the evaluation, the team identified a set of documents necessary to understand the nature of the staff’s interactions with the authorities and other stakeholders, and how these interactions were managed. This set consisted of documents related to departmental guidance and policy on interactions, and to country-specific documents related to interactions. The team also examined Article IV consultation papers and program documents prepared for the Board, and the related Board minutes. Most of these background documents were available to the IEO from the Fund’s internal institutional repository (some of which were also available on the IMF’s external website). In a few cases requests were made through the Fund Secretary to obtain confidential documents. The relevant set of identified documents covered the entire evaluation period (2001–08).

4. The IEO requested the staff documents from the relevant area departments, and the request was fulfilled through the combined efforts of the departments and the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (SPR). Initially the IEO worked with a contact person within each area department to establish efficient ways of transmitting information and avoiding duplication wherever possible. Many documents were sent electronically, and when an electronic version was not available, hard copies were sent. The team also collected documents from SPR when they were not available from the area departments. For all sample countries, the team gathered a core set of documents, as summarized in Box 1. IEO staff reviewed all the documents delivered for the 49 case study countries and prepared inputs based on them for both the country case studies and the cross-country analysis discussed below.
III. Country-Based Document Review

5. The most important use of the documentary evidence was to underpin the evaluation team’s country-based analysis. This section highlights issues that arose in the course of this analysis, organized around the three country groups: advanced economies, emerging market economies, and PRGF-eligible countries. In conducting this analysis, IEO staff reviewed the documents for the 49 sample countries to gain an overall perspective on interactions during the full review period and to study specific issues, in both cases building on the survey and interview evidence. Particularly important for the review were briefing papers and back-to-office reports, along with, in some cases, one-off memoranda between an area department and either management or a functional department on specific issues.

6. In its review of the documentary evidence related to advanced economies, the evaluation team paid particular attention to three issues. The first, as in all country cases, was the exploration of issues on which the dialogue was conducted over the years, and especially the identification of any recurring disagreements and how they were resolved (or not). The second was any intervention by management in the resolution of any disagreements, especially important in view of the survey findings that staff provided cautious assessments, that staff did not feel they would get sufficient backing from management if tensions arose with the authorities, and the degree of satisfaction of the authorities with the outcomes of complaints against staff. The third was the question of outreach, especially in light of survey evidence (from both the authorities and staff) and staff interview evidence that suggested that authorities of some advanced economies discouraged staff from holding press conferences on their mission findings. The documents were also reviewed for evidence on the analysis of international policy coordination and spillovers, the use of cross-country analysis, and the macro-financial sector linkages, as set out in the companion paper on the advanced economies.

7. In reviewing documents related to emerging economies, the evaluation team focused on program dynamics, country strategy, and outreach, inter alia. For program dynamics, the team concentrated on countries where transition to a surveillance-only relationship was under way or anticipated and/or where the design and/or flexibility of conditionality had surfaced as an issue in the evaluation interviews. These considerations also raised questions of country strategy, such as (i) how staff considered possible political economy constraints to reform, and the implications for sequencing in its policy advice; (ii) how they discussed with senior staff and management the evolution of the country relationship in post-program and other surveillance-only economies, including with respect to global imbalances and exchange rate policies in systemically important economies; and how they perceived the Fund’s value added to the authorities. The team also examined the documents for different facets of outreach, especially with respect to any noted tensions between the Fund’s role as confidential advisor and its evolving communications strategy, which stressed outreach as a way of influencing public debate. The documents were also reviewed for evidence of discussions about excessive staff turnover, a recurring theme of interviews with authorities from small states and other emerging economies in the evaluation sample.

8. As in its analysis of the documentary record for the advanced and emerging economies, the evaluation team studied the documents on PRGF-eligible countries in the first instance (i) to understand the nature of IMF-country interactions over the evaluation period and (ii) to follow up on specific issues raised by the authorities (and by staff in a few instances) in the evaluation interviews and surveys. Of particular importance in the analysis of interactions with the PRGF-eligible countries was the exploration of the theme of flexibility as it played out in the different country cases, for example in connection with conditionality-related program interruptions, delays in HIPC completion, and the development of the PSI, as well as tensions related to safeguards assessments and misreporting. The documents for the PRGF-eligible countries were also studied to see the extent to which they set out a coherent strategy for Fund engagement over time, taking into account (i) the political economy constraints to reform that the authorities faced, and how they affected the sequencing of policy actions and outreach; and (ii) relevant implementation capacity constraints and priorities for technical assistance—as these two sets of issues were recurring themes in interviews with authorities of PRGF-eligible countries.

IV. Cross-Country Documentary Review

9. Supporting and complementing this country-based review of the documentary evidence, which covered the full evaluation period, the team also carried out a cross-country analysis of specific aspects of interactions, more narrowly focused on 2007–08. In part, this exercise was motivated by the need to develop and ensure the usage of common standards for the document review by the different IEO staff and consultants engaged in the review work. But it also allowed for the exploration of several issues of interest looking across the entire sample group.

10. This cross-cutting analysis involved a review of 116 surveillance and use of Fund resources “events” over this two-year period for the 49 countries in the evaluation sample using a consistent approach. “Events” included the set of activities from missions leading up
to Executive Board meetings, for both Article IV consultations and program discussions (negotiations and reviews). Reviewed documents included briefing papers and back-to-office reports (and, where available, comments from management); cover notes and clearance memoranda for draft staff reports sent to management (including, where available, the Surveillance Agendas); final staff reports; minutes of Executive Board discussions; and any press statements.

11. In undertaking this analysis, the evaluation team examined several issues, including:

(a) Clear identification of the authorities’ views as distinguished from the staff’s views in the Fund’s internal documentation: The analysis found that in about two-thirds of the studied surveillance cases, there was clear attribution of the authorities’ views in the documents. For the use of Fund resources, the corresponding share was lower (about one-third), which may reflect in part that agreement between authorities and staff is reached before a request for the use of Fund resources is presented in the documents to the Board.

(b) Staff flexibility in negotiations and discussions, in light of complaints raised by some authorities during the evaluation interviews: For surveillance activities, the analysis found few substantive changes in staff positions between the briefing paper and the back-to-office report, though there were some examples of briefing papers with flexibility written into the staff position to account for political economy concerns. Flexibility in this narrow sense was found to be somewhat more common in the context of programs—where either a change in position was flagged in the back-to-office report as a result of the discussions with the authorities, or the briefing paper had been drafted at the outset with flexibility embedded in the initial policy stance. However, this analysis is partial as it does not capture the extent to which the IMF staff position evolved over time.

(c) The content of the Surveillance Agendas, a new initiative launched in late 2006: The analysis found that Surveillance Agendas covered economic issues without linking the various elements of the Fund’s work program into an overall strategy, including their sequencing and links to the proposed outreach actions. Most did not contain specific/explicit references to authorities’ views or disagreements between the authorities and staff; fewer suggested that they had been discussed with the authorities. Technical assistance priorities were often listed, but without the broader context of the capacity building goals and complementarities with other providers of technical assistance.
Background Technical Document III: Note on Interview Evidence

I. Introduction

1. This document provides an overview of interview evidence for the evaluation of IMF interactions with member countries. It summarizes the number and type of interviews conducted; sets out the methodological approach to the interviews; and discusses particular issues that arose in the context of the interviews with members, as well as staff working with them, in different country groups.

II. Interview Coverage

2. The evaluation team conducted interviews with country authorities, IMF staff and, for several countries, civil society organizations (CSOs) and representatives of partner organizations, such as the World Bank and donors. These interviews were focused primarily on 49 sample countries identified for closer study by the evaluation team (see paragraphs 7 and 8 below).

3. Interviews with authorities were conducted for almost all countries in the evaluation sample. These interviews were at the level of finance ministers, central bank governors, and/or senior officials. In some cases, interviews were conducted with former officials who had interacted with the IMF during the evaluation period. Supplementary material included written responses to interview questions received from several countries in the sample, for which there were also direct interviews in almost all cases. The evaluation also benefited from interviews conducted with authorities in the course of other recent evaluations—often in the context of country visits—in which issues related to interactions with the Fund had been discussed.

4. The interviews with staff covered all 49 countries in the sample and with current or former resident representatives assigned to 27 countries in the sample. In most cases, more than one member of staff per country was interviewed. For a number of PRGF-eligible countries, staff from the World Bank knowledgeable about Fund interactions with sample countries were also interviewed.

5. Also, as opportunities arose, interviews were conducted with officials or former officials from countries outside the sample, and with staff or former staff covering such countries. In addition, several interviewed staff who had worked on countries outside the sample shared their views on interactions with those countries. These additional sources of interview evidence are included in the evaluation’s interview database, and were taken into account by the evaluation team in preparing the main report and the companion country papers. However, no further research on those countries—such as follow-up examination of internal and/or published IMF documents and so on—was carried out.

6. Most interviews with civil society organizations took place in four advanced economies (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and three PRGF-eligible countries (Cameroon, Senegal, and Togo). These interviews provided an important perspective for the evaluation, especially with the respect to considering interactions outside government at different stages of development.

7. As summarized in the main report, the evaluation considered three main country groups—advanced economies, emerging economies, and PRGF-eligible countries, subdividing the first two into “large” and “other” subgroups. The 49 countries in the sample are distributed across these groups as follows, and as shown in the table below: 4 are large advanced economies; 6 are other advanced economies; 9 are large emerging economies; 14 are other emerging economies; and 16 are PRGF-eligible countries.

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1In most cases, the staff interviewed were current or former mission chiefs. In two cases, however, only resident representatives were interviewed.

2The evaluation also drew on the interviews with civil society organizations conducted in the context of IEO (2007) and Scholte (2009).

3For purposes of this report, the “large advanced economies” are the 7 largest industrial countries (the “G-7”), while the “other advanced economies” are the 23 smaller advanced economies; the “large emerging economies” are the 19 largest such economies, while the “other emerging economies” are the 62 smaller emerging market economies.
8. The countries in the evaluation sample were selected to facilitate the exploration of several themes. The evaluation team sought to capture the diversity of interactions with the Fund’s membership by achieving broad country representation across, inter alia, different regions, sizes, and stages of development. The evaluation team also aimed to reflect countries’ diversity with respect to (i) their past experience with economic and financial crises and their systemic importance; (ii) programs supported by use of Fund resources, technical assistance, Financial Sector Assessment Programs; and (iii) the hosting of resident representatives.

9. In several instances, countries of similar characteristics were included in the sample to provide an opportunity for exploring specific hypotheses. In one such example, four small states were included in the group of other emerging economies to enable a focused assessment of interactions with this category of countries, which have sometimes expressed concerns about being neglected by the Fund (and other international institutions). In another, two countries were included in the group of other advanced economies to enable an exploration of different members’ experiences with the same mission chief and country team.

III. Interview Methodology

10. Interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. Most took place face to face, but in a few cases, interviews were conducted by telephone or videoconference.

11. An initial round of interviews was guided by specific questions about interactions since 2001. The questions explored: what aspects of the interactions (with the IMF or with the country authorities, as appropriate) were the most successful and least successful; what the interviewee(s) had hoped to achieve through these interactions and what they thought their counterparts (the IMF or country authorities) were trying to achieve; whether there were ways in which the interactions (with the IMF or the country authorities, as appropriate) could be better managed; and to what extent authorities conveyed their views on the nature and efficacy of the interactions to the IMF, via what channel, and with what effect. The evidence from this initial round of interviews was instrumental in selecting and formulating the questions for the evaluation’s surveys of authorities, staff and civil society (see Background Technical Document I).

12. Additional questions were posed either in the same interview or subsequent interviews with the same or other country officials and/or staff members to follow up on issues that arose. Such follow-on questions and interviews typically pursued specific issues, beyond the basic line of questioning, about the effectiveness and management of IMF interactions, including diagnostic questions about key drivers of staff actions. In most cases, they involved the exploration of complaints by the authorities, but also examples of successful interactions highlighted by the authorities or of the evolution of interactions over time. They also involved the attempt by the evaluation team to look at the issues from different angles and take into account the views of different observers, including the authorities, staff, and others, such as donors and other partners. Other
questions that were raised when appropriate included the role of Executive Directors and IMF management in particular relationships, the manner and extent of outreach, and the role of resident representatives.

13. The interview evidence provided more textured information about interactions and in many cases introduced nuances into the evidentiary base than would have been apparent from the survey and documentary evidence alone. It thus provided an important source for triangulation, so that the evaluation could juxtapose the views of interviewed authorities and staff with the relevant survey findings and internal documents, as well as dig deeper to understand information gleaned from survey evidence. This approach worked in both directions, with the interview evidence providing a vehicle for reality checking the survey and documentary evidence, and the survey and documentary evidence providing a vehicle for reality checking the interview evidence, thereby helping to guard against interview bias and possible misinterpretation of interview evidence.

IV. Country Groups

14. In carrying out the interviews across the different country groups, the evaluation team aimed to balance consistency of approach with customization to individual country conditions. In so doing, it utilized the basic set of questions described above as an initial framework for asking interviewees about interactions, allowing the ensuing discussion to follow the interests of the interviewees. In the event, and as discussed briefly below, the interviews on the advanced economies focused almost exclusively on surveillance issues, while those on the emerging economies covered technical assistance and programs as well as surveillance. In the interviews for the PRGF-eligible countries, the focus was on programs and technical assistance, with attention to surveillance typically surfacing as it interfaced with programs. A brief discussion of the modalities and content of the interviews follow.

Advanced economies

15. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with authorities from all ten advanced economies in the evaluation sample. These interviews were mainly conducted during the IMF Spring and Annual Meetings in Washington in 2008–09, as well as in visits to some countries in late 2008 (after a visit to two countries at a preliminary stage of the evaluation in late 2007). The interviews with Fund staff who worked on the ten countries were carried out over the same time frame. Follow-up interviews were conducted when further information was needed. The evaluation team also conducted interviews with authorities from and staff working on advanced economies outside the sample countries as opportunities arose. Visits were made to Australia, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well to U.S. officials. During these visits, the evaluation team met with a wider representative of authorities as well as other stakeholders, including, as mentioned earlier, with representatives from CSOs in Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

16. The time frame of the interviews for the advanced economies affected their content, with the global financial crisis—both its unfolding and the Fund’s response—an important contextual factor underpinning many discussions. In interviews with authorities, recurring themes concerned questions about the international dimensions of Fund surveillance, especially with respect to timely projections and analysis of spillovers, including from the financial sector, and the provision of relevant cross-country analysis. For mission chiefs, a striking feature of the interviews was the pressure several said they felt from the authorities of some countries to give a positive assessment of their policies and prospects, and the lack of support they received—or thought they would receive—from management in case of disagreements with the authorities. Mixed messages emerged from the authorities and staff on outreach, with authorities suggesting that more might be done and staff indicating that they felt constrained by the authorities from so doing.

Emerging economies

17. For the emerging economies, face-to-face interviews were conducted with current and/or former country officials of 21 of the 23 sample countries and with staff members working on all 23 countries. The authorities of the remaining sample countries (one large and one other emerging economy) sent written responses to the interview questions. Interviews were conducted with 27 mission chiefs and/or resident representatives working on the nine large emerging economies and 27 mission chiefs and/or resident representatives working on the 14 other emerging economies. The evaluation team also conducted interviews with authorities from and staff working on emerging economies outside the sample countries as opportunities arose. Interviews took place in Washington during the IMF Spring and Annual Meetings, during other visits by the authorities or staff to Washington, and by telephone, as well as by IEO staff during their visits to countries for other purposes. A member of the evaluation team visited Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Oman. Additional interviews with authorities of and staff were carried out by a consultant, an experienced former IMF staff member, contracted by the evaluation team to assess the role
of resident representatives and management of them in interactions in five large emerging market economies. These additional interviews were conducted with current and former resident representatives, as well as mission chiefs and country officials who interacted with the resident representatives.4

18. As with the advanced economies, the timeframe of the interviews with the emerging economies affected their content. Among interviewed authorities, a recurring theme was concern about surveillance, which many saw as adding little that was new, useful, or interesting. Officials also expressed much greater openness to the Fund’s technical assistance, conferences, seminars and other vehicles for acquiring knowledge. Fund “style” was also a recurring concern—including attitudinal issues, rigidities of analytic approaches, lack of appreciation of domestic political economy issues, and excessive turnover (especially problematic for other emerging economies, including small states). Interviewed mission chiefs and resident representatives reported challenges in engaging authorities in surveillance discussions. Although there was a negative legacy in some cases from earlier lending arrangements, staff noted that without a program, traction was much diminished. Several reported their concern that the particular attention to exchange rate policy issues, including in the wake of the 2007 Surveillance Decision, had been at the expense of other topics of interest and were seen as counterproductive by some authorities. More generally, staff were considering ways to be influential in a surveillance-only relationship. While they saw the potential benefits of greater public outreach, staff reported acute trade-offs between pressures from headquarters in this direction, and the adverse consequences for their relationship with the authorities, many of whom did not want the Fund taking anything but a low key approach to outreach.

PRGF-eligible countries

19. For the PRGF-eligible countries, interviews were conducted with current and/or former officials of 15 out of 16 countries in the evaluation sample, in some cases by telephone and/or videoconference.5 As in the other country groups, interviews were also conducted with Fund staff—including resident representatives—who had worked on the evaluation sample countries during the evaluation period. Follow-up inter-

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4See Dodsworth (2009).
5The evaluation also utilized the interview evidence base from three earlier IEO evaluations, which had involved case studies (including IEO country visits) in about half of the 16 countries in the evaluation sample, including the one for which there was not a new interview with country officials as part of the present evaluation. See IEO (2004, 2007, and 2008).
References


Statement by the Managing Director

Staff Response

IEO Comments on Management and Staff Responses

The Acting Chair’s Summing Up
1. I welcome this latest report from the Independent Evaluation Office, which provides important insights into Fund interactions with its membership. Coming at this juncture, the report reinforces the thrust of the reforms undertaken by the Fund in its response to global crisis as called for by the membership.

2. The survey results offer a wealth of information on the perceived effectiveness of Fund relations by authorities, staff, the Executive Board, and civil society organizations. The survey evidence points to an essentially favorable assessment of the Fund’s relations with its members, but also—and very rightly—emphasizes specific areas that we need to work on in the period ahead.

3. The underlying evidence of the report highlights several encouraging messages. First, the overall effectiveness of Fund interactions was very positively rated by the broad majority of authorities in almost all country groups. There was also a high degree of strategic alignment between the authorities and staff on the purposes of Fund interactions in all countries. It is important that this alignment be maintained for the Fund to best support its members in responding to the crisis. Second, the very favorable responses from PRGF-eligible countries on Fund relations is encouraging, and lend support to stepped up efforts to enhance our engagement with low-income countries. Finally, the survey responses by civil society organizations provide some fresh evidence on the effectiveness of Fund outreach efforts and constitute important inputs in shaping the Fund’s outreach strategy going forward.

4. The report also suggests areas where the Fund needs to do more. We need to continue with our efforts to strengthen the role and relevance of our surveillance and policy advice, not only in advanced and large emerging market economies, but across the entire membership. Importantly, as the institution assists its members in securing a durable recovery from the crisis while striving to limit any recurrences, promoting candor in staff’s assessments is critical. On these issues, I believe the report offers the basis for a constructive debate at the Board meeting.

5. The accompanying staff statement responds in more detail to the report’s findings and recommendations. I look forward to the Board’s reflections on the report, which will help draw out further the implications for the Fund’s policies and procedures.
1. While the Fund’s effectiveness is widely perceived to have improved since the onset of the crisis, this IEO report is a useful reminder of the complexity of Fund interactions with members and the many dimensions along which more needs to be done. It is with the latter objective in mind that staff offers the following observations on the report’s facts and conclusions.

2. The overall findings of the report should be considered against the background of important changes in Fund surveillance and financing frameworks. The analysis identifies key issues that were at the core of the debate on the Fund’s relevance before the crisis. Progress in several fronts has already been made and is acknowledged in the report to some extent. The Fund has stepped up to the challenge of supporting a global response to the crisis through strengthened surveillance, policy advice, and a modernized financing framework. The new responsibilities entrusted to the Fund since the onset of the crisis—including the early warning exercise, the tripling of its resources, and the call by the G-20 for peer assessment—are in line with the report’s recommendations for a greater role by the Fund in international policy coordination and analysis of spillovers. The broader membership’s interest in closer engagement suggests that the Fund’s efforts to better serve members are bearing fruit. While the report attempts to update the context for the findings in several places, its long gestation results in pre-crisis assessments and in recommendations that may sometimes have been overtaken by events.

3. The underlying survey evidence, perhaps more than the report, presents a generally positive assessment of Fund interactions with members. The survey evidence shows more than two-thirds of authorities in most countries (and still more than half among the large emerging market economies) rating Fund interactions overall as very effective or effective. Box 4 provides further evidence of the positive assessment of the Fund’s relationship management by authorities in all country groups, with more than half of country authorities in advanced and large emerging market economies rating the Fund’s long-term strategic approach to the relationship well above “average.” These positive messages are often downplayed in the main text that follows the Executive Summary.

4. The report raises important issues regarding the effectiveness and independence of Fund surveillance in large countries that deserve serious consideration. The mere perception of less than even-handed surveillance undermines the institution’s legitimacy. As such, it will be important for the Fund to put forward the hard and candid messages that have become more evident since the onset of the crisis (e.g., on the need to go much further in financial sector reform). At the same time, and without being defensive, the point can be taken too far, and it is important to appreciate the extent to which interactions with advanced and large emerging market economies involve special factors.

- First, Fund advice—especially if critical—may gain little traction in periods of market exuberance. The response from large emerging market economies could also be influenced by the few cases related to financial crises or potentially contentious issues such as the 2007 Surveillance Decision.
- Second, the report acknowledges that, for advanced countries, the apparent inconsistency in the high score for the overall indicator on Fund effectiveness and the low scores in the individual indicators (Box 2) may reflect that other (omitted) factors were also important to the authorities. It may also
suggest the lack of relevance of many of the indicators in the survey to advanced or large emerging market economies (e.g., assisting in policy consensus building or capacity building).

- Finally, staff face several constraints when interacting with the membership—notably the tension inherent in the authorities’ receptiveness of tough messages—which are largely overlooked in the analysis.

Going forward, despite these factors, we must ensure that staff analysis and policy advice is clear and hard-hitting.

5. The positive assessment of relations with PRGF-eligible countries confirms the importance of the Fund’s catalytic role in low-income countries. The report’s observations touch upon a very important catalytic role that the Fund plays in some PRGF-eligible countries, where the Fund can be a credible partner in supporting reforms. We share the IEO’s finding that a proactive outreach strategy could help further address some misperceptions about the Fund’s engagement with PRGF-eligible countries, which nonetheless should remain mindful of overall resource constraints. The contribution of resident representatives, whose role was very positively viewed by country authorities, could have been further highlighted in the report, and implications of resource constraints on further expanding their role to enhance Fund interaction acknowledged.

6. Staff do not agree with key conclusions on the institutional framework guiding the provision of technical assistance (TA).

- First, regional technical assistance centers (RTACs) do not operate independently of headquarters (as may be inferred from paras. 29 and 33). Indeed, their strategic directions are developed by headquarters. The higher frequency of TA support provided by RTACs helps to explain the overall favorable assessment.

- Second, while acknowledging the generally high level of satisfaction with Fund TA, the report infers from the comments of some officials that large amounts of Fund TA have not resulted in sustained improvements in local capacity and that there is a major problem with the “programming of technical assistance” (para. 33). Improvements in local capacity in PRGF-eligible countries are influenced by a number of factors, including the retention of trained counterparts.

- Finally, regarding the lesson drawn in para. 55 (second bullet) about avoiding supply-driven work programs, current Fund practice anchors the work of functional departments in the priorities of area departments, including in TA and economist assignments. The responsibilities between area and functional departments are now clearer and their collaboration is closer than used to be the case.

7. Conclusions about the value of outreach should be better anchored in the underlying survey results. About half of respondents to the civil society organizations survey considered that their views had been reflected in Fund discussions with country governments, and that their discussions with the Fund had contributed to building national support for policies (para. 37). The companion paper on PRGF countries also conveys the CSOs’ positive perceptions of the Fund’s role and the authorities’ preference for greater engagement by the Fund in outreach.

Comments on the Recommendations

8. Our views are provided on select recommendations with operational relevance for staff’s work going forward.

Recommendations to make the Fund more attractive to country authorities and promote traction

9. Staff agrees on the importance of further enhancing the international dimension of its surveillance and policy work. The Fund now delivers statistics and cross-country analysis through such vehicles as the WEO, GFSR, REOs, and Fiscal Monitor. Newer initiatives, such as the systemic five surveillance report, need to be taken further, together with ongoing work on large complex financial institutions and coordination of crisis-recovery strategies. Similar products have already been added to the Work Program.

10. The recommendation to increase the Fund’s specific expertise is important and significant progress is being made. Over time, the Fund has expanded its recruitment of mid-career and specialized staff in its effort to strengthen sector-specific institutional knowledge and better respond to members’ needs and requests. Effort to increase mid-career recruitment will continue to be part of departments’ strategies. The proposal to bring “more experts on country visits” does not seem to be shared by very many authorities (Figure 15), and should also be seen against the authorities’ desire for continuity on country assignments.

11. There are important drawbacks to the proposal to replace the Surveillance Agenda with “strategic agendas.” The proposed agendas may create an additional burden with little real effect on interactions with authorities. Importantly, as the Fund is embarking on a review of its surveillance mandate and modalities, the Board will have opportunities to consider ideas for reforms to improve surveillance and its traction. The key factor to consider is the ability to respond swiftly to changing circumstances.

Recommendations to improve the effectiveness of outreach
12. Staff agrees on the importance of coming to grips with current and past controversies. The communications toolkit, launched in March 2009, already provides extensive material for staff and is regularly updated to reflect ongoing reforms in Fund policies. The Interdepartmental Communications Group, chaired by the FDMD, is also working to facilitate the use of the communications toolkit in support of staff’s increased outreach efforts. However, specific guidance on what staff “can and cannot say” seems excessively rigid.

_**Recommendations to improve the management of interactions**_

13. Enhancing candor and effective engagement with country authorities is undoubtedly important to staff, but the case for yet another task force is questionable. The first point to note is that candor is not so much a matter of training and “professional conduct” as much as of resolve on the part of country authorities, the Board, and management to support staff analysis even when it involves politically difficult messages. Indeed, the report itself finds that “large majorities of respondents to the authorities’ survey portrayed IMF staff as analytic, respectful, and responsive” (para. 47). The Fund has a broad and continuously updated training framework in place that supports staff and, in particular, mission chiefs in conducting country relations; a working group on Standards of Staff Conduct is already operating, with the participation of the Ethics Officer, to review and update associated rules. Rather than convene another task force to go into so narrow a set of issues, it would be more productive for HRD and relevant departments to consider ways to further deepen our guidance and training in this area.

14. We can sympathize with the desire to reduce staff turnover on country assignments and recognize the value of staff knowledge of country conditions. Significant efforts are being made in this regard. However, this proposal should be considered against other factors, including personnel management issues and the importance of bringing fresh and cross-country perspectives.
1. We appreciate the support by management and staff for some of the report’s findings and recommendations, and in particular the recognition that there are important issues regarding the effectiveness and independence of Fund surveillance in large countries that deserve serious consideration. Despite this, there appear to be markedly different assessments of the extent of effectiveness of the IMF’s interactions, and of the management of those interactions, and, as a result, a different take on the importance of some of IEO’s recommendations.

2. To help the discussion of these issues by Executive Directors, we briefly set out our understanding of what lies behind the contrasting assessments, and clarify the reasoning behind some of the evaluation’s recommendations. To this end, and in light of the Management and Staff Responses, this note focuses briefly on four topics: (i) what the evaluation evidence says about the Fund’s effectiveness and strategic alignment in advanced and large emerging economies; (ii) the implications of the evaluation’s findings about the candor of staff assessments of country conditions; (iii) what the evaluation says about country strategies for, and the management of, technical assistance; and (iv) the motivation behind the evaluation’s recommendations. There are other points on which we differ with the Staff Response, but for the sake of brevity, we do not include them here.

3. First, what does the evaluation evidence say about the Fund’s effectiveness and strategic alignment in advanced and large emerging economies?

- On the effectiveness and quality of Fund interactions, the evaluation did present some favorable evidence, but also much that was unfavorable and that warrants serious attention by the Board and management. Most striking in the cases of advanced and large emerging economies for example, which together account for 90 percent of global GDP, the evaluation noted that the IMF’s interactions were not rated highly in areas such as the international dimensions of surveillance covering coordination/spillovers, alerts about upcoming risks, and cross-country analysis. There are areas that are central to the Fund’s main job and that will be essential for the Fund to improve if it is to respond effectively to the new responsibilities it has been given by the G-20, as well as more generally strengthen the Fund’s surveillance for the whole membership.

- On strategic alignment, while management appears to agree with the IEO that the evaluation’s strategic alignment indicators provide an important barometer of the effectiveness of Fund interactions and performance, the IEO sees more dissonance than alignment in key underlying scores for the advanced and large emerging economies. The Management Response finds encouragement in what it sees as “a high degree of strategic alignment between the authorities and staff on the purposes of Fund interactions in all countries.” Yet the evaluation points to major differences between the staff views and the authorities’ views in several key areas. For example, in the critical role of contributing to the development of policy frameworks highlighted in the Staff Response, the disconnect ranges from 38–39 percentage points for the advanced economies to 44 percentage points for the large emerging economies (in other words, 86 percent of staff working on the large emerging economies aimed to contribute to the development of policy frameworks, but only 42 percent of authorities wanted the IMF to do so). And on helping to build and maintain consensus outside government, the critical plank underpinning the outreach strategy, the differences range from 30–33 percentage points for the other advanced and large emerging economies to 45 percentage points for the large advanced economies. While for contributing to policy coordination, including the analysis of spillovers, the disconnect between the authorities of the large advanced economies and the staff working on them is 50 percentage points.
These gaps are too large for such strategically important functions; how to narrow them warrants careful consideration, and, in part, motivated the evaluation’s recommendations to establish a strategic approach to interactions at the level of country groupings, as a well as at individual country level, in consultation with the country authorities.

4. Second, on the issue of candor in country assessments, which is arguably one of the most troubling findings of the evaluation, the IEO believes the position articulated in the Staff Response is too relaxed. The Management Response rightly states that: “Importantly, as the institution assists its members in securing a durable recovery from the crisis while striving to limit any recurrences, promoting candor in staff’s assessments is critical.” Yet in expanding on this statement, the Staff Response goes in another direction, pointing “…to the tension inherent in the authorities’ receptiveness of tough messages…” The IEO is of the view that the issue is less the authorities’ receptiveness (or not) to tough messages, but rather the value added of the message and the support that management and senior staff provide to staff conveying tough messages where necessary. Indeed, as Figure 14 of the main report shows, about half of surveyed staff working on advanced economies answered that they did not get backing from management and senior staff in tensions with the authorities, a recurring theme also of interviewed staff. Meanwhile, paragraph 13 of the Staff Response further blurs the discussion, by stating: “Enhancing candor and effective engagement with country authorities is undoubtedly important to staff, but the case for yet another task force is questionable. The first point to note is that candor is not so much a matter of training and ‘professional conduct’ as much as of resolve on the part of country authorities, the Board, and management to support staff analysis even when it involves politically difficult messages…” While the IEO can fully sympathize with task force fatigue, the evaluation’s evidence on how staff view their own caution in country assessments—and the support they do or do not receive from management and senior staff—suggests serious risks to institutional integrity and governance in core areas. We accordingly believe that the issue should be addressed expeditiously and by highly-visible action, and reported to the Executive Board, as recommended in the main report.

5. Third, on technical assistance (TA), there is actually less disagreement between the IEO and the staff than the Staff Response suggests—although there is some. Contrary to what paragraph 6 of the Staff Response suggests, the IEO does not believe—nor does the evaluation report say—that the regional technical assistance centers (RTACs) operate independently from headquarters; the evaluation report simply echoes the positive feedback on RTAC activities and staff that interviewed officials voiced. Also contrary to the Staff Response, the IEO report recognizes that a number of factors affect the translation of technical assistance into enhanced capacity on the ground. Indeed, these are factors that Fund staff need to take into account in proposing technical assistance activities and appraising their likely results. More generally, the IEO report acknowledges that the different departmental responsibilities “are now clearer and their collaboration is closer than used to be the case.” This said, there are differences with the Staff Response, since the IEO report says that more progress is needed, especially in the formulation of country TA strategies, a point volunteered by interviewed staff in both area and functional departments that also resonated with comments of interviewed officials from some PRGF-eligible countries.

6. Fourth, the Staff Response takes issue with some of the evaluation’s recommendations, including the specificity with which they have been formulated. Three points are warranted at this stage.

- First, IEO’s experience with past recommendations designed to address similar issues has not been reassuring. For example, the 2007 recommendation that management take a strategic approach to identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness of the dialogue with authorities was met by “surveillance agendas,” which have subsequently been dropped without clarity on how that recommendation would then be carried out. Similarly, follow-up on the recommendation that management and the Board send clear signals of support for the staff’s conveyance of difficult messages has not been sustained. In the circumstances, IEO saw the need for recommendations in these areas with clearly monitorable actions, designed to assist the Board in its oversight role of management.

- Second, the package of recommendations as a whole responds to the evaluation’s major findings, for example on the Fund’s perceived limited value added in surveillance-only relationships; the various unresolved outreach issues highlighted in the report; and the many relationship management issues, including with respect to too much staff turnover, too little staff training, and too little staff and management accountability.

- Finally, the recommendations reflect the need to improve the IMF’s effectiveness both in responding to the longstanding challenge of bringing value added to surveillance-only relationships and in meeting its new responsibilities on international policy coordination. They were designed to help improve Fund performance in the near term, when crisis conditions prevail with implications for demand for Fund services, but also beyond, when the challenges of maintaining traction will continue.
Executive Directors welcomed the IEO evaluation of IMF interactions with member countries and the important insights it offers into the effectiveness of these interactions, which they saw as key to the Fund’s ability to achieve its goals. Directors took note of the finding that the majority of authorities in all country groupings had rated the Fund’s overall effectiveness positively. However, they expressed concerns about the indications of a lack of agreement between the Fund and the large advanced and large emerging countries, respectively, on the scope of interactions, and of widely varying effectiveness in areas where the Fund was supposed to excel. Directors observed that the report covers principally the pre-crisis period, and significant progress has been made on several fronts since then. Nevertheless, several of the report’s key findings remain a source of concern. If the Fund is to effectively respond to the new opportunities and challenges it confronts, careful consideration needs to be given to the IEO’s findings and recommendations, together with other possible areas for enhancement, acknowledging the complexity of interactions with Fund members.

Key IEO Findings

Directors noted that the Fund’s effectiveness is perceived to have improved since the onset of the crisis, reflecting important reforms and the central role which the Fund has been asked to play in the international community’s response to the crisis. A number of Directors observed that the new responsibilities entrusted to the Fund are consistent with the recommendations for a greater role by the Fund in international policy coordination and analysis of spillovers.

Directors stressed that issues regarding the effectiveness and independence of Fund surveillance in large advanced and large emerging market economies merit serious consideration. They acknowledged that interactions with large countries involve special factors, including the extensive analyses of these countries undertaken outside the Fund. Nevertheless, the perceived lack of candor and value by these countries as well as concerns about evenhandedness in the case of emerging economies point to challenges requiring close follow up. Concerns were also expressed about the survey findings that staff working on all country groupings toned down their assessments to preserve the relationship with the authorities, and that many staff stated that there was a lack of support from management and senior staff when tensions arose between staff and country authorities. Directors stressed that the need for the Fund to provide candid messages was highlighted by the crisis, and that candor will remain essential in the period beyond the crisis. Some Directors highlighted the survey finding that increased outreach appears to have done little to improve traction. Some Directors also highlighted the evaluation finding that the transparency policy had done less well in increasing traction than staff had hoped, given evidence that some authorities had resisted timely dissemination of mission findings. Many Directors underscored the importance of governance reforms to address the perceived problems with evenhandedness and to underpin effective interactions with members, based on mutual understanding and trust. A few Directors cautioned against the illusion that changes in the governance of the Fund would do much to improve member countries’ willingness to listen to the Fund’s advice.

Directors welcomed the positive assessment of relations with PRGF-eligible countries, although some cautioned that these members’ relatively weak capacity and reliance on external official funding could mask underlying challenges in the effectiveness of the Fund’s interactions. Directors agreed that a proactive outreach strategy, within overall resource constraints, could help further address some misperceptions about the Fund’s engagement with PRGF-eligible countries. Some Directors observed that a key measure of effectiveness would be a continued strong relationship beyond the PRGF. Directors also welcomed the positive assessment of the role of resident representatives and technical assistance provided by the Fund.
A number of Directors highlighted the importance of addressing internal issues related to institutional culture that undermine the Fund’s ability to establish itself as a trusted policy adviser to members, and noted that the recommendations could have gone further in considering how the institutional culture of the Fund could be made more responsive to the needs of its members. These Directors questioned whether, in part, the issues raised by the IEO Report reflect a lack of clarity as to who “the client” in the Fund’s engagement with members is. At the same time, it was emphasized that membership in the IMF entails obligations for countries.

Key IEO Recommendations

Directors broadly supported the thrust of the key IEO recommendations to enhance the traction of Fund surveillance and policy advice, improve the effectiveness of outreach, and strengthen the management of interactions. At the same time, they expressed a range of views on several specific proposals, and underlined that the complexity of the issues warrants further analysis and discussion. The point was made that effective interaction also calls for efforts on the part of national authorities and Executive Directors.

Directors stressed the importance of further enhancing the international dimension of the Fund’s surveillance and policy work with greater attention to cross-country analysis and spillovers. They emphasized that, building on the flagship products of the World Economic Outlook, the Global Financial Stability Report, the Regional Economic Outlooks, and other products in the Work Program, there is scope for improvements and better integration of multilateral surveillance products into bilateral surveillance. While efforts to improve traction should aim to strengthen existing instruments in the first instance, Directors remained open to exploring other products that could enhance the Fund’s cross-country analysis. They also remained open to considering menus of products for different country groupings within resource limits and while preserving the evenhandedness of surveillance.

A number of Directors supported further consideration of the proposal to replace the Surveillance Agenda with “strategic agendas.” Other Directors were concerned that such agendas could create an additional burden with little real effect on interactions. Directors looked forward to considering proposals to improve surveillance and its traction, and reference was made to the upcoming review of the Fund’s mandate and modalities.

Directors generally supported the proposal to increase mission chief and staff tenure on country assignments. They welcomed the steps being taken in this regard and noted that this objective should be balanced against the desire for fresh and cross-country perspectives. Directors supported the expanded recruitment of experienced, mid-career professionals to ensure the right skills mix and expertise. Some Directors saw merit in the proposal to bring more experts on country visits, especially when they offer significant value added, but others were concerned that a greater role of experts could run counter to team continuity.

Directors strongly supported efforts to enhance the candor and effectiveness of Fund engagement with country authorities. They acknowledged the critical role of management and the Executive Board in supporting staff analysis involving politically difficult messages. Directors supported continued deepening of guidance and training for staff in conducting difficult relations. A few Directors supported the establishment of a task force to develop professional standards for staff interactions with the authorities on country assessments. A few Directors supported the IEO recommendation that the responsibilities and accountabilities of management in interactions with members need to be better established.

Directors generally considered that it would be useful to provide greater guidance on outreach efforts, while ensuring sufficient flexibility. They agreed that it is important for the Fund to deal forthrightly with current and past controversies, and that outreach efforts should be regularly updated to reflect ongoing reforms in Fund policies. While outreach efforts were seen to have a critical role in overcoming a negative reputational legacy in many countries, Directors generally did not support the proposal to develop specific guidance in this particular area. Several Directors stressed the need for care in engaging in policy debates outside the official dialogue, and a few asked for further discussion on this issue.

Today’s discussion has highlighted that efforts to strengthen the role and relevance of surveillance and policy advice across the entire membership need to be sustained and further enhanced. As we press ahead with efforts to assist members in securing a durable recovery from the crisis, promoting candor in staff’s assessments will remain critical. We will need to reflect further on internal cultural changes to enhance the Fund’s engagement with its members. Directors’ views have provided background for ongoing work on the Fund’s surveillance mandate and its modalities, and have also provided some useful input for shaping the Fund’s outreach strategy going forward. Management and staff will give careful consideration to today’s discussion in formulating the implementation plan.
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