

BACKGROUND PAPER



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IEO Evaluation of IMF Financial Surveillance: Survey Results

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I. SURVEY SAMPLE AND RESPONSE RATES

- 1. This paper summarizes the main results of IEO surveys of the Offices of Executive Directors (OED) and IMF staff (staff) conducted for the evaluation of IMF Financial Surveillance. The OED survey was sent to 211 recipients and was open from March 28 through May 6, 2018. The IMF staff survey was sent to 1,368 economist and specialized career stream staff (levels A12 to B4) in area departments, the Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM) and other select functional departments, and was open from March 13, 2018 to May 6, 2018.
- 2. The OED survey focused on the goals and strategic direction of IMF financial surveillance, how IMF financial surveillance could be more helpful to member countries, respondent interactions with IMF staff in preparing and conducting Article IV consultations and the Financial Sector Assessment Program exercise (FSAP), and multilateral surveillance. Respondents were asked to reply based on their home country's experience with IMF financial surveillance (and not of the whole constituency). Since the evaluation did not directly survey authorities, on some questions respondents were asked to reflect as much as possible the views of their home country authorities.
- 3. The IEO received 84 completed OED responses, for a response rate of 39.8 percent. The majority of respondents (70 percent) were Advisors and Senior Advisors. EDs and ALTs constituted 12 percent and 18 percent of respondents, respectively.³ Half of the survey respondents were from one of the 29 jurisdictions deemed by the IMF to have a systemically important financial sector (S29).⁴ Nearly half of respondents (48 percent) were from emerging market economies (EMs), 37 percent were from advanced economies (AEs), and 15 percent were from low-income countries (LICs). Over 60 percent of respondents had between zero and two years of IMF Executive Board experience.
- 4. The staff survey focused on the goals and strategic direction of financial surveillance, respondent experience with integrating financial sector issues in IMF bilateral and multilateral surveillance, and individual skills and training. The survey also asked two open-ended questions: "how could IMF financial surveillance be more helpful to authorities?"

¹ For the purposes of this survey, OED includes Executive Directors (EDs), Alternate Executive Directors (ALTs), Senior Advisors, and Advisors.

² Fiscal Affairs Department, Finance Department, Legal Department, Research Department, Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, and Statistics Department.

³ This represented 42 percent of EDs, 50 percent of ALTs, and 39 percent of Advisors and Senior Advisors.

⁴ In September 2010, the Executive Board made financial sector stability assessments under the FSAP (FSSAs) a mandatory part of bilateral surveillance under the Article IV for countries with systemically important financial sectors. For a list of the S29, see http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr1408.

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and "how could the IMF adjust its organizational structures and incentives to better integrate financial and macrofinancial analysis in surveillance?" A summary of main themes reported in response to the open-ended questions is presented in Section VII, and select related responses are incorporated in relevant sections below.

- 5. **The IEO received 415 completed staff responses, for a response rate of 30.3 percent.** The majority of respondents (70 percent) were mid-level (A13-A15), fungible economists who had been involved in various IMF activities during their Fund career: Article IV consultations (91 percent); multilateral surveillance (59 percent); financial surveillance research or policy work (57 percent); FSAP (53 percent); and the Early Warning Exercise (EWE) (24 percent).
- 6. This paper presents the key and most interesting survey findings. Full survey results, including respondent demographics for OED and staff, are provided in Appendix Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The paper is organized along the structure of the questionnaires. Section II covers the goals and strategic direction of financial surveillance. Sections III, IV, and V cover OED and staff views on financial surveillance in Article IV consultations, FSAPs and multilateral surveillance respectively. Finally, Section VI presents the findings on staff's financial surveillance skills.

II. GOALS AND STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF FINANCIAL SURVEILLANCE

- 7. The survey results revealed strong alignment of OED and staff respondent views on the clarity of the IMF's financial surveillance mandate and goals (Q8 staff; Q7 OED). Nearly all respondents viewed the mandate and goals of IMF financial surveillance as "clear" or "somewhat clear," while only 7 percent of staff respondents and 4 percent of OED respondents viewed the mandate and goals as "not sufficiently clear."
- 8. While most staff respondents reported having received adequate guidance on their team's role in financial surveillance, one-quarter indicated that they had not (Q9 staff). When asked about the clarity of guidance, 18 percent of staff respondents reported that they were often unclear about their team's role, while 7 percent reported not having received any guidance. B-level staff were more likely to find the guidance adequate (91 percent) as compared to A-level staff (71 percent).
- 9. Nearly half of staff respondents thought that a candid IMF assessment of financial sector vulnerabilities could heighten market tensions or even trigger a crisis; this view was shared, although to a lesser extent, by OED respondents (Q10 staff; 10 and Q11 OED). This concern was most often expressed by OED-LIC respondents (46 percent) and least often by OED-AE respondents (32 percent). More broadly, nearly 90 percent of all OED respondents reported that their authorities were satisfied with the candor of discussions with IMF staff on

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⁵ When relevant, the figures reported in this paper have been scaled up to take into account that the question was not relevant for some respondents. For example, the views about recent FSAPs exclude responses for those countries that had not had a recent FSAP (e.g., paragraph 20).

financial sector issues in their countries; however, nearly half believed that there was a need for reassurance that sensitive issues would not become public. This concern was most prevalent among EM and LIC respondents and least so for AE respondents (63 percent, 54 percent, and 26 percent, respectively). Only 25 percent of all OED respondents and 10 percent of staff respondents thought that the IMF was unlikely to identify vulnerabilities and risks that were not already known.

10. Only 16 percent of OED and 23 percent of staff respondents thought that 29 was "about the right number" of countries with systemically important financial sectors and that the current degree of attention placed on them is adequate (Q11 and Q12 staff; Q12 OED). About a third of OED and more than half of staff respondents thought that financial surveillance should be more focused and/or intense in the five to seven countries with the largest and most systemically important financial sectors. On the other hand, about one-third of OED (but only 10 percent of staff respondents) believed that more resources should be devoted to countries beyond the S29.

III. FINANCIAL SURVEILLANCE IN ARTICLE IV CONSULTATIONS

- 11. **OED** and staff respondents strongly agreed that recent efforts to integrate financial sector issues in Article IV bilateral surveillance constituted an important initiative to improve the quality of IMF surveillance (82 percent and 72 percent, respectively) (Q13 staff and OED). Only a small share thought that financial sector issues were already adequately covered in surveillance and that recent efforts had little or no value added (7 percent and 5 percent for OED and staff, respectively). A slightly higher share of staff respondents viewed this as an important initiative but as relevant only for a few countries (16 percent of staff as compared to 7 percent of OED respondents).
- 12. **B-level staff respondents reported receiving significant support in internal** discussions and when raising difficult issues on financial sector vulnerabilities and risks with country authorities (Q14 and Q15 staff). Of the 42 percent of staff respondents who agreed that their department "significantly" promoted open internal discussions on alternative points of view on financial sector analysis, B-level staff were of this view more often than A-level staff (65 percent and 35 percent, respectively). Similarly, more B-level than A-level staff reported feeling "significantly" supported by their supervisors and management when raising difficult issues on financial sector vulnerabilities and risks in discussions with country authorities (61 percent and 43 percent, respectively). Only a small share of staff reported feeling "only minimally" or "not really" supported (approximately 5 percent of each respondent category).
- 13. Nearly all staff respondents reported that their team integrated financial vulnerabilities and risks in macroeconomic analysis and Article IV consultation discussions "significantly" or "to some extent" (63 percent and 31 percent, respectively) (Q19 staff). In an open-ended question on how IMF financial surveillance could be more helpful to authorities, respondents frequently pointed to the following factors: more candid risk identification in

discussions with authorities; increased involvement of MCM staff on country teams; and a greater use of IMF cross-country experience.

- 14. Most respondents believed that the focus on financial risks and their integration into the macroeconomic analysis had strengthened the traction of IMF advice in Article IV consultations (Q20 staff; Q14 OED). Over 25 percent of staff respondents believed that authorities were more willing to take actions based on a mission team's advice on financial risks; and 49 percent thought authorities were more interested in the mission's analysis and advice, even if they did not take immediate action. This latter view was echoed by OED respondents (56 percent). Only 2 percent of OED respondents expressed concern about IMF statements negatively affecting financial markets, and only 1 percent of staff respondents believed that the focus on financial risks complicated policy discussions and weakened traction.
- 15. While a majority of staff thought that the 2015 Guidance Note for Surveillance Under Article IV consultations had been helpful when conducting financial surveillance, about a third would welcome more guidance. (Q21 staff).
- 16. A majority of staff believed that the internal review process had improved IMF analysis and advice on financial and macrofinancial issues (Q22 staff). Most respondents believed that analysis and advice had improved "significantly" or "to some extent" following internal review (19 percent and 53 percent, respectively), whereas 18 percent thought it had improved "minimally" and 7 percent "not at all."
- 17. A majority of staff respondents reported that their team did not face constraints in paying appropriate attention to financial and macrofinancial issues in the most recent Article IV consultation (62 percent) (Q23 staff). Among the constraints faced by teams, respondents cited time constraints (15 percent), a lack of support from MCM (14 percent), lack of skills (12.5 percent) or necessary analytical tools (9 percent). In an open-ended question on how to better integrate macrofinancial analysis in surveillance, respondents most often cited the need for building more macrofinancial expertise within country teams (including through training, staff swaps with MCM, and secondments to financial markets), followed by larger teams and/or more resources, making more MCM experts available to area departments, and the need for better prioritization of ongoing surveillance topics and pilots.
- 18. Only half of OED respondents believed that Article IV staff teams had the right expertise to analyze financial and macrofinancial issues (Q15 OED). OED-AE respondents were most critical of Article IV teams' expertise: only 35 percent thought teams were "well qualified" to analyze financial and macrofinancial issues, as compared to 58 percent of OED-EM and 69 percent of OED-LIC respondents.
- 19. A large majority of OED and staff respondents reported that issues raised by a recent FSAP played a role in the most recent Article IV consultation (Q16 OED; Q24 staff). Three-quarters of OED respondents from countries with a recent FSAP thought that FSAP

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recommendations played an important role in the most recent Article IV consultation, and another 15 percent believed that authorities would have preferred even more attention to FSAP recommendations. Also, about half of staff respondents thought that FSAP recommendations played a significant role in Article IV consultations.

IV. FSAPs⁶

- 20. There are significant differences across OED income groups in their satisfaction with the periodicity of FSAPs. (OED, Q19). While 70 percent of OED-LIC would prefer that FSAPs take place more often in their country, no respondent from OED-AE thought that their authorities would like more frequent FSAPs. Among OED-EM, the vast majority are satisfied with the current periodicity.
- 21. **OED respondents across all income groups saw FSAPs as helpful, but they differed greatly in what they saw as the FSAPs' main benefit.** (Q28 staff; Q21 OED). A majority of OED-AE saw the FSAP mission as a useful sounding board for authorities, as a catalyst for measures to address domestic vulnerabilities, and as a mechanism for informing the international community of compliance with standards and codes. Most OED-EM and OED-LIC respondents believed that FSAPs helped authorities identify risks and vulnerabilities and served as a catalyst for reform. OED-EM respondents also saw it as a useful sounding board, while OED-LIC respondents believed that it served to promote financial development. About 70 percent of OED-AE respondents considered that the FSAP was a large burden on their authorities' time and/or resources. Staff respondents saw the FSAPs as much more influential in informing authorities of risks and vulnerabilities (76 percent) and providing a catalyst for reforms (65 percent).
- 22. Again, OED respondents differed greatly across income groups on the benefits from stress tests conducted in the context of FSAPs (Q29-Q33 staff; Q22 OED). While almost all OED-LIC thought that stress tests helped authorities learn about emerging risks, less than a quarter of OED-AE respondents and only half of OED-EM respondents agreed. Still about half of OED-AE respondents saw value in stress tests either to validate the authorities' own tests or to help improve their models. OED-EM and OED-LIC respondents also saw higher value in helping improve their own stress tests. Staff concurred that FSAP stress tests and the identification and assessment of financial risks were significantly more helpful to LICs than to EMs, and least useful for AEs.
- 23. Two-thirds of staff who participated in joint FSAPs with the World Bank reported that coordination was weak and needed improvement. (Q34 staff; Q23-Q24 OED). However,

⁶ This includes FSAPs and FSAP Updates (which are a voluntary exercise for all Fund members), as well as FSAs (which are mandatory financial stability assessments for countries with systemically important financial sectors as per Decision No. 14736-(10/92). For all these exercises the staff prepares an FSSA report that is issued to the Executive Board.

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only a few OED respondents from EMs and LICs thought that there were coordination problems or thought that the respective roles of the IMF and the World Bank in the context of FSAPs were not clear to their authorities. On the other hand, a majority of these OED respondents thought that their offices should be more involved in the organization of FSAPs, along the lines of their roles in Article IV consultations.

24. **Staff viewed the value added of FSAPs to be the highest for authorities from EMs and LICs** (Q30-33 staff). This was the case across key FSAP elements: assessment of financial development, review of standards and particularly for the assessment of financial stability risks. Staff respondents rated the value added of FSAPs nearly twice as high for authorities in EMs and LICs as compared to authorities in AEs (58 percent and 61 percent, as compared to 34 percent, respectively).

V. MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE

- 25. **Both OED and staff respondents found the** *GFSR* **helpful to understand global financial developments and risks** (Q37 staff; Q25 OED). More than 90 percent of OED and 80 percent of staff respondents considered the *GFSR* "very" or "moderately useful." The very few who found it "not useful" (1 percent of OED; 7 percent of staff), cited a lack of relevance for their work.
- 26. The majority of staff respondents drew on the analysis or recommendations from the *GFSR* in their work (Q39 staff). Forty-one percent reported drawing on the *GFSR* when working on Article IV consultations, and 13 percent on FSAPs. At the same time, forty percent of staff respondents reported that they did not draw on the analysis or recommendations from the *GFSR* in their work.
- 27. More than two-thirds of authorities with access to the EWE found the exercise to be "very" or "moderately useful" (Q29 OED).

VI. INDIVIDUAL SKILLS AND TRAINING OF STAFF

- 28. When asked to self-assess their expertise on macrofinancial issues, 50 percent of staff respondents self-identified as macroeconomists with "significant financial sector expertise" and one-third self-identified as macroeconomists with "limited or no financial sector expertise" (Q40-Q41 staff). About 10 percent of staff respondents self-identified as financial sector experts. The factors cited as most helpful in developing their macrofinancial expertise were on-the-job experience inside or outside the IMF (76 percent and 32 percent, respectively). Both internal and academic training also contributed.
- 29. Forty-two percent of staff respondents reported that they did not participate in internal training on financial and macrofinancial issues in the last 3 years. (Q42-43 staff). Almost two-thirds of staff respondents cited time constraints and other pressures as reasons for

not taking part in internal training on financial and macrofinancial issues. But almost 30 percent thought that sufficient courses were available in the IMF's structured curriculum and/or that the content was well-targeted to enhance the skills needed to conduct macrofinancial surveillance. In any case, half of those who had participated found it "very" or "somewhat useful."

- 30. Staff respondents reported that they were sufficiently qualified in a number of financial and macrofinancial areas (Q44 staff). The three areas in which staff felt most competent were: interacting with authorities on relevant financial sector issues (80 percent), integrating financial variables in baseline projections (65 percent), and quantifying the possible macroeconomic impact of financial sector risks (63 percent). Most of these staff considered themselves adequately qualified, rather than experts. A smaller share of staff respondents self-identified as qualified to perform bank balance sheet analysis (53 percent) and simple stress tests for banks (38 percent).
- 31. Seventy percent of staff respondents believed that their financial and macrofinancial skills contributed to their career advancement at the Fund (Q45 staff). However, only one-third of these noted that these skills "significantly" contributed to their career advancement, while for the others the contribution was only "to some extent."

VII. MAIN THEMES FROM STAFF SURVEY OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES

- 32. In addition to the structured questions discussed above, staff were asked two openended questions: "how could IMF financial surveillance be more helpful to authorities?" and "how could the IMF adjust its organizational structures and incentives to better integrate financial and macrofinancial analysis in surveillance?" Many of the responses to these questions overlapped. The common themes included calls for an increase in resources or staffing, more direct involvement of MCM experts with country teams, and more hands-on training (including staff swaps with MCM and secondments to the private sector).
- 33. **On how IMF financial surveillance could be more helpful to authorities,** staff respondents suggested that given the time intensity of stress tests and potential data issues, these tests could be deployed more strategically to economies with less developed capacity, where they might have significant value. For jurisdictions with deep and developed financial markets, however, some thought it may make sense to avoid replicating authorities' stress tests and to focus instead on pockets of vulnerability or sectors outside of the regulatory perimeter. Other respondents suggested increasing coverage of the financial sector to include non-banks; sharing the IMF's cross-country experience with authorities; anticipating the need for regulation of new technologies and financial instruments (e.g., fintech, cyber threats); and providing frontier research on the intersection of macroeconomics and finance.
- 34. On how to better integrate financial and macrofinancial analysis in surveillance, staff respondents most often pointed to the need for increasing skills and training in this area. They suggested hiring more experts with macrofinancial expertise and putting greater

weight on macrofinancial expertise in hiring and promotion decisions. Many called for greater internal job mobility for financial economists/experts/specialists (including to managerial positions), and for more senior staff positions to be filled by those who truly understand macrofinancial issues. Others saw a need to reduce the number of surveillance topics (including emerging macro-critical issues), initiatives, and pilots, or to prioritize them better to avoid lapsing into a box-ticking mode. One respondent pointed to a continuing disconnect between macroeconomics and finance in academia, and that in the IMF, MCM—which is a center of expertise on finance—is not well-connected to area departments.

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APPENDIX TABLE A.1. EXECUTIVE BOARD SURVEY RESULTS

| | | vistribution of answers in percentage | Total | | By Income Level | | Systemically importar financial sectors | | |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|-------|---------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|---|-----|--|
| | | | | Advanced Economy | Emerging Market Economy | Low-Income Country | Yes | No | |
| Information about Yours | elf | | | | | | | | |
| | | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 | |
| 1. Which of the following | describes your | ED | 12 | 16 | 10 | 8 | 17 | 7 | |
| current position in | | Alternate ED | 18 | 16 | 20 | 15 | 17 | 19 | |
| current position in | the non : | Advisor | 45 | 45 | 43 | 54 | 44 | 47 | |
| | | Senior Advisor | 25 | 23 | 28 | 23 | 22 | 28 | |
| | | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 | |
| | | AFR | 11 | 0 | 0 | 69 | 0 | 21 | |
| 2. Region | | APD | 21 | 16 | 30 | 8 | 22 | 21 | |
| | | EUR | 40 | 74 | 28 | 0 | 56 | 26 | |
| | | MCD | 11 | 0 | 18 | 15 | 5 | 16 | |
| | | WHD | 17 | 10 | 25 | 8 | 17 | 16 | |
| | | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 | |
| 3. Country classif | fication | Advanced Economy | 37 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 61 | 14 | |
| | | Emerging Market Economy | 48 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 39 | 56 | |
| | | Low Income Country | 15 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 30 | |
| 4. Is your country on | | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 | |
| jurisdictions with systemi | | | 49 | 81 | 40 | 0 | 100 | 0 | |
| financial sectors | (S29)? | No | 51 | 19 | 60 | 100 | 0 | 100 | |
| | | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 | |
| | | 0-2 | 63 | 65 | 58 | 77 | 61 | 65 | |
| 5. Years in Ol | ED? | three to five | 21 | 29 | 15 | 23 | 24 | 19 | |
| | | six to ten | 6 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 10 | 2 | |
| | | 11+ | 10 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 14 | |
| | | Number of responses | 51 | 16 | 29 | 6 | 20 | 31 | |
| | | 0 years | 4 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 3 | |
| | Central Bank | 1-5 years | 24 | 31 | 21 | 17 | 25 | 23 | |
| | | 6-10 years | 14 | 13 | 10 | 33 | 10 | 16 | |
| | | 11+ years | 59 | 50 | 66 | 50 | 60 | 58 | |
| | | Number of responses | 49 | 23 | 19 | 7 | 26 | 23 | |
| 6. Prior experience (in | | 0 years | 10 | 4 | 21 | 0 | 8 | 13 | |
| years) | Government | • | 29 | 26 | 26 | 43 | 19 | 39 | |
| , , | | 6-10 years | 18 | 30 | 11 | 0 | 27 | 9 | |
| | | 11+ years | 43 | 39 | 42 | 57 | 46 | 39 | |
| | | Number of responses | 12 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 7 | |
| | Regulatory | 0 years | 67 | 75 | 63 | 0 | 60 | 71 | |
| | agency | 1-5 years | 25 | 25 | 25 | 0 | 40 | 14 | |
| | | 6-10 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | | 11+ years | 8 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 14 | |

| | D | ictuibution of anguage in negroutors | Total | | By Income Level | | Systemically importar | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|--------|---------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----|
| | U | istribution of answers in percentage | i otai | Advanced Economy | Emerging Market Economy | Low-Income Country | Yes | No |
| | | Number of responses | 15 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 10 |
| | | 0 years | 60 | 67 | 71 | 0 | 80 | 50 |
| | IMF Staff | 1-5 years | 27 | 17 | 29 | 50 | 20 | 30 |
| | | 6-10 years | 7 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| | | 11+ years | 7 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 10 |
| | | Number of responses | 17 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 10 |
| 0 | ther IFIs (e.g., | 0 years | 53 | 67 | 57 | 25 | 57 | 50 |
| | | 1-5 years | 29 | 33 | 43 | 0 | 43 | 20 |
| ' | World Bank) | 6-10 years | 6 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 10 |
| | | 11+ years | 12 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 20 |
| | | Number of responses | 29 | 12 | 13 | 4 | 14 | 15 |
| | Private | 0 years | 21 | 25 | 15 | 25 | 14 | 27 |
| | financial | 1-5 years | 66 | 75 | 62 | 50 | 71 | 60 |
| i | institution(s) | 6-10 years | 14 | 0 | 23 | 25 | 14 | 13 |
| | | 11+ years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | Number of responses | 17 | 6 | 11 | 0 | 9 | 8 |
| | | 0 years | 29 | 33 | 27 | 0 | 11 | 50 |
| | Other | 1-5 years | 41 | 33 | 45 | 0 | 56 | 25 |
| | | 6-10 years | 18 | 17 | 18 | 0 | 22 | 13 |
| | | 11+ years | 12 | 17 | 9 | 0 | 11 | 13 |
| Goals and Strategic Direction | ons of Financi | al Surveillance | | | | | | |
| | | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 |
| 7. To what extent are the IM | 1E mandato | Clear | 49 | 45 | 53 | 46 | 46 | 51 |
| and goals with respect to | | Somewhat clear | 48 | 52 | 43 | 54 | 51 | 44 |
| Surveillance clear | | Not sufficiently clear | 4 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| Survemance cicar | • | Not clear at all | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | Do not know | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | Number of responses | 83 | 31 | 39 | 13 | 40 | 43 |
| 8. Overall, has IMF financial | surveillance | To a large extent | 33 | 19 | 38 | 46 | 30 | 35 |
| contributed to your autl | horities' | Somewhat | 60 | 68 | 59 | 46 | 60 | 60 |
| understanding of financi | ial sector | Minimally | 7 | 13 | 3 | 8 | 10 | 5 |
| vulnerabilities and risks in yo | our country? | Not at all | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | Do not know | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 |
| 9. Overall, has IMF financial | surveillance | To a large extent | 33 | 45 | 25 | 31 | 37 | 30 |
| contributed to your autl | | Somewhat | 49 | 45 | 58 | 31 | 51 | 47 |
| understanding of financi | | Minimally | 14 | 6 | 15 | 31 | 12 | 16 |
| vulnerabilities and risks in oth | ner countries? | | 2 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 5 |
| | | Do not know | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 |

| | Nietziloution of augusta in management | Total | | By Income Level | | • | y important Il sectors |
|--|--|--|--------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| | Distribution of answers in percentage | iotai | Advanced Economy | Emerging Market Economy | Low-Income Country | Yes | No |
| | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 |
| | Yes, very much so | 39 | 65 | 23 | 31 | 41 | 37 |
| 10. Are your authorities satisfied with the | Yes, but authorities need to be reassured that sensitive issues would not | 48 | 26 | 63 | 54 | 46 | 49 |
| candor of discussions with IMF staff on | become public | 40 | 20 | 05 | 54 | 40 | 49 |
| financial sector issues in your country? | No, because the potential gain does not justify the risks (e.g., that these | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| initialicial sector issues in your country: | discussions become public) | ۷ | O | 3 | O | O | J |
| | Other (please explain) | 7 | 3 | 8 | 15 | 5 | 9 |
| | Do not know | 4 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 |
| | Yes, but no more than with macro and other forms of surveillance | 19 | 13 | 23 | 23 | 12 | 26 |
| 11. Are your authorities concerned that | Yes, more than with other forms of surveillance and therefore IMF staff needs | 38 | 32 | 40 | 46 | 34 | 42 |
| IMF reports dealing with financial sector | to be even more careful on how it discusses sensitive financial sector issues | 30 | 32 | 40 | 40 | 54 | 42 |
| vulnerabilities and risks may heighten | No, it is unlikely that IMF staff will identify vulnerabilities and risks that are not | 25 | 42 | 15 | 15 | 37 | 14 |
| market tensions or even trigger a crisis? | already known | 23 | 42 | 13 | 13 | 31 | 1-7 |
| market terisions of even trigger a crisis. | No, IMF messages are always presented in ways that would not raise alarm in | 13 | 10 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 16 |
| | financial markets | | | | | | |
| | Do not know | 5 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 7 | 2 |
| | Number of responses | 82 | 30 | 39 | 13 | 40 | 42 |
| | 20 is also with a right annulus of a stancia financial contact and the annual | | | | | | |
| | 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, and the current | 16 | 12 | 15 | 22 | 20 | 12 |
| | degree of attention placed on them is adequate | 16 | 13 | 15 | 23 | 20 | 12 |
| 12. Currently, there is a list of 29 | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven | 16 | 13 | 15 | 23 | 20 | 12 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous | 16 24 | 13 17 | 15 28 | 23 | 20 | 12 29 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance | | | | | | |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to | 24 | 17 | 28 | 31 | 20 | 29 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. | | | | | | |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 | 24 | 17 | 28 | 31 | 20 | 29 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions | 24 | 17 7 | 28 | 31 | 20 | 29 7 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries | 24 | 17 7 | 28 | 31 | 20 | 29 7 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors | 24 5 4 35 | 17 7 0 23 | 28 5 8 41 | 31 0 0 46 | 20 3 8 23 | 29 7 0 48 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments under the FSAP. | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) | 24 5 4 | 17 7 0 | 28 5 8 | 31 0 0 | 20 | 29 7 0 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) | 24 5 4 35 | 17 7 0 23 | 28 5 8 41 | 31 0 0 46 | 20 3 8 23 | 29 7 0 48 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments under the FSAP. | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) | 24 5 4 35 | 17 7 0 23 | 28 5 8 41 | 31 0 0 46 | 20 3 8 23 | 29 7 0 48 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments under the FSAP. Financial Surveillance in Article IV Const | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) | 24 5 4 35 16 | 17 7 0 23 40 | 28 5 8 41 3 | 31 0 0 46 0 | 20 3 8 23 28 | 29 7 0 48 5 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments under the FSAP. Financial Surveillance in Article IV Constant 13.What is your view on the IMF's recent | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) Ultations Number of responses | 24 5 4 35 16 | 17 7 0 23 40 | 28 5 8 41 3 | 31 0 0 46 0 | 20 3 8 23 28 | 29 7 0 48 5 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments under the FSAP. Financial Surveillance in Article IV Constant 13.What is your view on the IMF's recent efforts to improve the integration of | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) Ultations Number of responses This is an important initiative to improve the quality of surveillance This is an important initiative, but it is relevant only to relatively few countries These issues are already adequately covered in surveillance, so this initiative | 24 5 4 35 16 84 82 7 | 17 7 0 23 40 31 84 10 | 28 5 8 41 3 40 88 0 | 31 0 0 46 0 13 62 23 | 20 3 8 23 28 41 85 5 | 29 7 0 48 5 43 79 9 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments under the FSAP. Financial Surveillance in Article IV Constitution of financial sector issues in Article IV bilateral | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) Ultations Number of responses This is an important initiative to improve the quality of surveillance This is an important initiative, but it is relevant only to relatively few countries These issues are already adequately covered in surveillance, so this initiative has little or no value added | 24 5 4 35 16 84 82 7 | 17 7 0 23 40 31 84 10 3 | 28 5 8 41 3 40 88 0 8 | 31 0 0 46 0 13 62 23 15 | 20 3 8 23 28 41 85 5 | 29 7 0 48 5 43 79 9 |
| jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors (the 29 systemic financial sectors or S29) that receive priority attention in financial surveillance, mainly mandatory financial stability assessments under the FSAP. Financial Surveillance in Article IV Constant 13.What is your view on the IMF's recent efforts to improve the integration of | degree of attention placed on them is adequate 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors should receive more continuous and intensive financial surveillance The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions More resources should be moved to countries outside the S29, i.e., to countries with non-systemic financial sectors Other (please explain) Ultations Number of responses This is an important initiative to improve the quality of surveillance This is an important initiative, but it is relevant only to relatively few countries These issues are already adequately covered in surveillance, so this initiative | 24 5 4 35 16 84 82 7 | 17 7 0 23 40 31 84 10 | 28 5 8 41 3 40 88 0 | 31 0 0 46 0 13 62 23 | 20 3 8 23 28 41 85 5 | 29 7 0 48 5 43 79 9 |

| | Sietuibution of anguage in negrouters | Total | | By Income Level | - | y important Il sectors | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------|
| · | listribution of answers in percentage | iotai | Advanced Economy | Emerging Market Economy | Low-Income Country | Yes | No |
| | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 |
| | Yes, authorities were more interested in the mission's analysis and advice | 56 | 58 | 58 | 46 | 66 | 47 |
| 14. Did the focus on financial | No, the focus on financial risks did not enhance authorities' interest in the | 19 | 29 | 18 | 0 | 20 | 19 |
| vulnerabilities and risks in your country | IMF's analysis and advice | 19 | 29 | 10 | U | 20 | 19 |
| and their integration into the | No, the focus on financial risks detracted from policy discussions, as authorities | 6 | 3 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 9 |
| macroeconomic analysis make IMF advice | did not believe that the IMF understood our financial sector | O | 3 | J | 15 | | 9 |
| in your recent Article IV consultation more useful? | No, the focus on financial risks detracted from policy discussions, as authorities | 2 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 5 |
| | were concerned that IMF statements may negatively affect financial markets | | | | | | |
| | No, the macroeconomic analysis or policy discussions did not focus on | 6 | 0 | 8 | 15 | 0 | 12 |
| | financial vulnerabilities and risks | 44 | 10 | 10 | 45 | 42 | 0 |
| | Do not know | 11 | 10 | 10 | 15 | 12 | 9 |
| | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 |
| 15. To what extent did the Article IV team | • | 51 | 35 | 58 | 69 | 46 | 56 |
| have the right expertise needed to analyze | | 33 | 45 | 25 | 31 | 39 | 28 |
| financial and macrofinancial issues? | Insufficiently qualified | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Do not know | 13 | 19 | 13 | 0 | 15 | 12 |
| | Number of responses | 83 | 30 | 40 | 13 | 40 | 43 |
| | FSAP recommendations played an important role in the analysis and | 45 | 43 | 43 | 54 | 53 | 37 |
| | discussions during the last Article IV Consultation | 43 | 43 | 73 | 5-4 | 33 | 31 |
| | Authorities would prefer more attention to FSAP recommendations during | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 13 | 7 |
| | Article IV consultations as they were only covered in a pro-forma manner | | | | | | |
| subsequent Article IV discussions? | Authorities would prefer less attention to FSAP recommendations during | 6 | 3 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 7 |
| | Article IV consultations as they distract from other more pressing issues | 21 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 12 | 40 |
| | No recent FSAP Do not know | 31 8 | 30 13 | 30 8 | 38 0 | 13 18 | 49 0 |
| | | 0 | 13 | 0 | Ü | 10 | Ü |
| FSAP (this refers to FSSAs, FSAPs, and FS | SAP Updates) | | | | | | |
| | Number of responses | 83 | 30 | 40 | 13 | 40 | 43 |
| | None | 7 | 7 | 3 | 23 | 0 | 14 |
| 17. How many FSAPs have been | One | 18 | 10 | 25 | 15 | 3 | 33 |
| conducted for your country? | Two | 39 | 37 | 45 | 23 | 43 | 35 |
| | Three or more | 27 | 40 | 20 | 15 | 48 | 7 |
| | Do not know | 10 | 7 | 8 | 23 | 8 | 12 |
| | Number of responses | 77 | 29 | 39 | 9 | 41 | 36 |
| 18. When was the last FSAP completed? | 2008 or earlier | 13 | 10 | 15 | 11 | 0 | 28 |
| (Calendar year) | 2009-2013 | 31 | 28 | 31 | 44 | 29 | 33 |
| | 2014-2018 | 56 | 62 | 54 | 44 | 71 | 39 |
| | Number of responses | 77 | 28 | 39 | 10 | 40 | 37 |
| 19. What are your authorities' views on the | They would prefer that FSAPs take place more often | 18 | 0 | 18 | 70 | 0 | 38 |
| periodicity of FSAPs in your country? | They are satisfied with the current periodicity | 57 | 50 | 69 | 30 | 68 | 46 |
| periodicity of FSAFS III your country! | They would prefer that FSAPs take place less often | 10 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 20 | 0 |
| | Do not know | 14 | 29 | 8 | 0 | 13 | 16 |

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|---|----|--|
| r | ٠, | |

| | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | Advanced | By Income Level | Low-Income | Systemically important financial sectors | |
|---|---|-------|----------|----------------------------|------------|--|----|
| | | | Economy | Emerging Market Economy | Country | Yes | No |
| | Number of responses | 77 | 29 | 39 | 9 | 41 | 36 |
| 20.7 | To a large extent | 21 | 14 | 31 | 0 | 27 | 14 |
| 20. To what extent were your authorities | Somewhat | 52 | 59 | 44 | 67 | 59 | 44 |
| involved in setting the goals and priorities | Minimally | 5 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 8 |
| for the FSAP? | Not at all | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Do not know | 22 | 24 | 18 | 33 | 12 | 33 |
| | Number of responses | 76 | 28 | 39 | 9 | 41 | 35 |
| | Providing a useful sounding board for authorities' assessments and plans | 61 | 68 | 62 | 33 | 66 | 54 |
| | Identifying risks and vulnerabilities | 72 | 46 | 85 | 100 | 63 | 83 |
| | Serving as a catalyst for measures to address vulnerabilities | 53 | 50 | 51 | 67 | 56 | 49 |
| 21. Was the FSAP helpful to your authorities in: (select all that apply): | Informing the international community on our compliance with international standards and codes | 49 | 54 | 49 | 33 | 56 | 40 |
| | Promoting financial development | 22 | 0 | 31 | 56 | 12 | 34 |
| | It was a large burden on my authorities' time and/or resources | 33 | 68 | 15 | 0 | 54 | 9 |
| | It was not very helpful | 3 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| | Other (please explain) | 4 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 |
| | Number of responses | 76 | 27 | 39 | 10 | 39 | 37 |
| | FSAP stress tests help authorities learn about emerging risks and vulnerabilities | 42 | 22 | 44 | 90 | 28 | 57 |
| | FSAP stress tests provide useful validation for stress tests conducted regularly by authorities | 62 | 44 | 74 | 60 | 62 | 62 |
| 22. How useful are stress tests conducted in the context of FSAPs? (select all that | The FSAP team helps improve the models and systems used for stress tests by authorities | 32 | 15 | 41 | 40 | 26 | 38 |
| apply) | The FSAP team provides good insights into scenarios for stress testing | 32 | 19 | 38 | 40 | 28 | 35 |
| | FSAP stress tests are duplicative of authorities' work and add little value | 8 | 11 | 5 | 10 | 8 | 8 |
| | The benefits from FSAP stress tests do not justify their high cost in terms of my authorities' time and/or resources | 5 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 8 |
| | Do not know | 13 | 26 | 5 | 10 | 13 | 14 |
| | Number of responses | 74 | 28 | 36 | 10 | 40 | 34 |
| | We are closely involved in organizing FSAPs | 38 | 57 | 31 | 10 | 50 | 24 |
| 23. Your views on the role that the office of the Executive Director plays in organizing FSAPs: | We should be more involved in organizing FSAPs, along the lines of our involvement in organizing Article IV Consultations | 43 | 25 | 53 | 60 | 30 | 59 |
| | We are and should remain less involved in organizing FSAPs than is the case for Article IV consultations | 14 | 11 | 14 | 20 | 13 | 15 |
| | Other (please explain) | 5 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 8 | 3 |

| | Nistribution of annual in annual in | Total | | By Income Level | | Systemically importation financial sectors | |
|---|---|-------|---------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|--|----|
| , | Distribution of answers in percentage | lotai | Advanced Economy | Emerging Market Economy | Low-Income Country | Yes | No |
| | Number of responses | 78 | 29 | 39 | 10 | 41 | 37 |
| | The World Bank did not participate in the FSAP for my country | 31 | 76 | 3 | 10 | 49 | 11 |
| | Good coordination | 32 | 0 | 51 | 50 | 12 | 54 |
| 24. How would you assess the | Weak coordination, but it did not affect the policy dialogue | 8 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 3 |
| coordination between the IMF and the | Weak coordination hindered the policy dialogue | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| World Bank in the context of FSAPs? | My authorities were not clear about the respective roles of the IMF and the | 4 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| | World Bank in the context of FSAPs | 4 | U | 0 | U | 2 | 5 |
| | Other (please explain) | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| | Do not know | 23 | 21 | 23 | 30 | 22 | 24 |
| Multilateral Surveillance | | | | | | | |
| | Number of responses | 83 | 31 | 39 | 13 | 41 | 42 |
| 25. How useful do you find the GFSR to | Very useful | 58 | 61 | 54 | 62 | 54 | 62 |
| help you understand global financial | Moderately useful | 37 | 39 | 41 | 23 | 46 | 29 |
| developments and risks? | Not useful | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | I have not read enough GFSRs to have an opinion | 4 | 0 | 3 | 15 | 0 | 7 |
| | Number of responses | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| | GFSR analysis is usually outdated | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | GFSRs do not usually provide new insights | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 26. Please indicate the reason(s) why you | GFSRs are not reader friendly | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| do not find the GFSR useful or have not | GFSR analysis is not robust enough | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| read the GFSR. (select all that apply): | GFSRs are not relevant for my work | 50 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| | Time constraints | 50 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| | Other (please explain) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Number of responses | 83 | 31 | 39 | 13 | 41 | 42 |
| 27. To what extent are the analysis and | To a large extent | 31 | 29 | 28 | 46 | 32 | 31 |
| policy recommendations on financial | Somewhat | 63 | 65 | 67 | 46 | 63 | 62 |
| sector issues in the GFSR and in the WEO | Minimally | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| consistent and well-integrated? | Not at all | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Do not know | 4 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 7 |
| | Number of responses | 83 | 31 | 39 | 13 | 41 | 42 |
| 28. How useful do your authorities find the | Very useful | 18 | 13 | 21 | 23 | 17 | 19 |
| GFSR to help identify vulnerabilities and | Moderately useful | 66 | 74 | 69 | 38 | 73 | 60 |
| spillover risks to your country? | Not useful | 6 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 10 | 2 |
| | Do not know | 10 | 3 | 8 | 31 | 0 | 19 |
| | Number of responses | 84 | 31 | 40 | 13 | 41 | 43 |
| | Very useful | 20 | 13 | 23 | 31 | 20 | 21 |
| 20 D | Moderately useful | 40 | 48 | 35 | 38 | 54 | 28 |
| 29.Do your authorities find the Early | Not useful | 4 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| Warning Exercise (EWE) useful? | My authorities do not have access to the results of the EWE | 15 | 0 | 25 | 23 | 2 | 28 |
| | Other (please explain) | 7 | 16 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 5 |
| | Do not know | 13 | 16 | 13 | 8 | 12 | 14 |

APPENDIX TABLE A.2. STAFF SURVEY RESULTS

| | | | | Posi | tion | | Departmen | nt |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|-----|--------------------|--------------------------|
| | | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | мсм | Area Department | Functional Department |
| Information about Yourself | | | | | | | | |
| | | Number of responses | 415 | 323 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 146 |
| | | A12 | 8 | 11 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 10 |
| | | A13 | 12 | 15 | 0 | 4 | 11 | 16 |
| 1. Which of the following desc | rihes vour current | A14 | 41 | 53 | 0 | 60 | 38 | 36 |
| position in the II | | A15 | 17 | 21 | 0 | 15 | 16 | 18 |
| position in the n | VIII : | B1 | 2 | 0 | 11 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| | | B2 | 9 | 0 | 39 | 3 | 12 | 8 |
| | | B3 | 6 | 0 | 28 | 7 | 9 | 3 |
| | | B4 | 5 | 0 | 22 | 4 | 4 | 7 |
| | | Number of responses | 415 | 323 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 146 |
| | | AFR | 11 | 12 | 10 | 0 | 24 | 0 |
| | | APD | 7 | 7 | 11 | 0 | 16 | 0 |
| | | EUR | 13 | 12 | 17 | 0 | 29 | 0 |
| | | FAD | 6 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 16 |
| | | FIN | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 2. What is your current d | lenartment? | LEG | 7 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| 2. What is your current o | iepartinent: | MCD | 7 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 16 | 0 |
| | | MCM | 18 | 19 | 12 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| | | RES | 5 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| | | SPR | 9 | 9 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 26 |
| | | STA | 7 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| | | WHD | 7 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 16 | 0 |
| | | None of the above | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | Number of responses | 415 | 323 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 146 |
| | | 0 Years | 26 | 30 | 11 | 44 | 2 | 49 |
| | Area Departments | 1-5 years | 28 | 32 | 15 | 27 | 31 | 25 |
| 3.Experience at the IMF (in | | 6-10 years | 23 | 22 | 26 | 15 | 30 | 16 |
| years; counting current | | 11+ years | 24 | 17 | 48 | 14 | 38 | 10 |
| department) | | Number of responses | 415 | 323 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 146 |
| , | MCM and | 0 Years | 71 | 71 | 71 | 4 | 82 | 88 |
| | predecessor units | 1-5 years | 17 | 18 | 14 | 48 | 11 | 10 |
| | predecessor units | 6-10 years | 8 | 8 | 8 | 30 | 5 | 1 |
| | | 11+ years | 4 | 3 | 8 | 18 | 2 | 1 |
| | | Number of responses | 415 | 323 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 146 |
| | Other Functional | 0 Years | 26 | 29 | 14 | 67 | 29 | 1 |
| | Departments | 1-5 years | 41 | 45 | 26 | 29 | 41 | 47 |
| | Departments | 6-10 years | 23 | 20 | 34 | 3 | 26 | 29 |
| | | 11+ years | 11 | 6 | 26 | 1 | 5 | 23 |

| | | | Posi | tion | | Departmen | nt |
|--|---|-------|---------|---------|-----|--------------------|-----------------------|
| | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | мсм | Area Department | Functional Department |
| | Number of responses | 414 | 322 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 145 |
| | Economics with specialization in Finance | 26 | 28 | 20 | 45 | 19 | 26 |
| 4.Education | Economics with other specialization | 61 | 57 | 73 | 41 | 78 | 48 |
| | Finance or related fields (including CPA, Auditing) | 5 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 7 |
| | Other | 8 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 19 |
| | Number of responses | 414 | 322 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 145 |
| 5.Work experience outside the IMF (Select all | Country authority (Central Bank, Government, Regulatory agency) | 57 | 60 | 46 | 77 | 48 | 58 |
| options where you have at least 2 years of | Private financial institution(s) | 21 | 22 | 18 | 32 | 21 | 16 |
| experience) | Other IFI (e.g., BIS, OECD, World Bank) | 17 | 18 | 15 | 22 | 17 | 16 |
| ехрепенсе) | Other | 27 | 27 | 28 | 22 | 30 | 26 |
| | None | 14 | 12 | 20 | 8 | 15 | 16 |
| | Number of responses | 412 | 321 | 91 | 73 | 194 | 145 |
| | Fungible macroeconomist | 78 | 75 | 88 | 62 | 99 | 58 |
| 6.How are you classified in the IMF? | Financial Sector Expert/Specialist | 8 | 10 | 1 | 37 | 0 | 4 |
| o. How are you classified in the livir: | Other Specialist (e.g., Fiscal or Statistical) | 6 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| | Specialized Career Stream (e.g., Counsel) | 7 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 18 |
| | Do not know | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| | Number of responses | 415 | 323 | 92 | 73 | 196 | 146 |
| | Article IV consultation | 91 | 91 | 91 | 89 | 99 | 80 |
| 7.Please select all the activities in which you were | FSAP/FSSA | 53 | 50 | 63 | 85 | 50 | 41 |
| involved in any capacity (including review) during | GFSR | 29 | 28 | 34 | 64 | 18 | 26 |
| the past ten years. (select all that apply) | WEO | 30 | 27 | 39 | 18 | 34 | 30 |
| the past terr years. (select all that apply) | Early Warning Exercise | 24 | 21 | 34 | 22 | 27 | 21 |
| | Research or policy work related to financial surveillance | 57 | 55 | 63 | 81 | 54 | 49 |
| | None of the above | 6 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 16 |
| Goals and Strategic Directions of Financial Surve | illance | | | | | | |
| | Number of responses | 390 | 304 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 122 |
| 8.To what extent are the IMF mandate and goals | Clear | 45 | 41 | 62 | 50 | 47 | 39 |
| with respect to Financial Surveillance clear? | Somewhat clear | 46 | 50 | 33 | 40 | 44 | 52 |
| | Not sufficiently clear | 7 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 7 |
| | Not clear | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 9. How would you rate the clarity of guidance you | Number of responses | 388 | 303 | 85 | 72 | 195 | 121 |
| received regarding your team's role in financial | Adequate guidance. I am usually clear about my team's role. | 75 | 71 | 91 | 81 | 78 | 67 |
| surveillance? (Or your own role if you were not part | Insufficient guidance. I am often unclear about my team's role. | 18 | 21 | 7 | 14 | 17 | 21 |
| of a team) | I have not received guidance about my team's role. | 7 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 12 |

| | | | Posi | tion | | Departmer | nt |
|--|--|-------|---------|---------|-----|--------------------|-----------------------|
| | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | МСМ | Area Department | Functional Department |
| | Number of responses | 389 | 303 | 86 | 72 | 195 | 122 |
| | Yes, but no more than with macro and other forms of surveillance. | 27 | 28 | 24 | 26 | 28 | 27 |
| 10. In preparing IMF reports, are you concerned | Yes, more than with other forms of surveillance and therefore we are even more careful on | 46 | 43 | 55 | 47 | 50 | 39 |
| that a candid IMF assessment of financial sector | how we discuss sensitive issues in Staff Reports and FSSAs. | .0 | | | | | |
| vulnerabilities and risks may heighten market | No, the IMF is unlikely to identify vulnerabilities and risks that are not already known. | 10 | 11 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 13 |
| tensions or even trigger a crisis? | No, IMF messages are always presented in ways that would not raise alarm in financial markets. | 11 | 9 | 16 | 11 | 9 | 13 |
| | Not sure/Do not know | 6 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 8 |
| | Number of responses | 390 | 304 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 122 |
| | Yes, the current focus is appropriate. | 23 | 24 | 22 | 18 | 25 | 24 |
| | Yes, the focus on systemic financial sectors is appropriate but there needs to be greater | | | | | | |
| 44.5 | differentiation between the largest and other such sectors (as explained in the next | 39 | 36 | 50 | 57 | 33 | 39 |
| 11.Resources and attention in financial surveillance | question). | | | | | | |
| are appropriately focused on systemically important financial sectors? | No, financial surveillance should focus even more on systemic financial sectors. | 5 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| important imancial sectors: | No, resources should be shifted to non-systemic countries (and away from systemic | 11 | 10 | 14 | 8 | 13 | 8 |
| | financial sectors). | 11 | 10 | 14 | O | 13 | 8 |
| | No opinion/Do not know | 16 | 19 | 3 | 4 | 19 | 17 |
| | Other (please explain) | 6 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 7 |
| | Number of responses | 386 | 301 | 85 | 72 | 194 | 120 |
| | 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, and the current degree of | 23 | 26 | 15 | 17 | 24 | 27 |
| | attention placed on them is adequate. | 23 | 20 | 13 | ., | 2. | 2. |
| | 29 is about the right number of systemic financial sectors, but the five to seven largest and | | | | | | |
| 12.Which of the following best describes your | most systemic financial sectors should receive more intensive financial surveillance, | 34 | 33 | 38 | 42 | 31 | 34 |
| views? | including in their Article IV consultations, than they do now. | | | | | | |
| | The number of systemic financial sectors should be substantially reduced to only include | 21 | 18 | 33 | 26 | 20 | 21 |
| | the five to seven largest and most systemic financial sectors. The number of systemic financial sectors should be expanded beyond 29 jurisdictions. | 6 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 3 |
| | Other (please explain) | 15 | 17 | 11 | 8 | 18 | 16 |
| | | 389 | 304 | 85 | 72 | 195 | 122 |
| | Number of responses This is an initiative of critical importance for the quality of surveillance | 72 | 70 | 82 | 83 | 70 | 70 |
| 13 What is your view on the IME's recent efforts to | This is a positive initiative but it is relevant only to relatively few countries | 16 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 19 | 14 |
| • | These issues were already adequately covered in surveillance, so this initiative has little or | | | | | | |
| Article IV bilateral surveillance? | no value added | 5 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 3 |
| | I am not aware of such initiatives | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| | No opinion/Do not know | 4 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 7 |
| | Number of responses | 389 | 304 | 85 | 72 | 195 | 122 |
| 1414 | Significantly | 42 | 36 | 65 | 51 | 46 | 30 |
| 14.My department promotes open internal discussions on alternative points of view on financial sector analysis, vulnerabilities and risks: | To some extent | 35 | 37 | 27 | 32 | 38 | 31 |
| | Minimally | 6 | 6 | 4 | 14 | 2 | 7 |
| inianiciai sector analysis, vuirierabilities and fisks. | Not really | 6 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 13 |
| | Do not know | 11 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 20 |

| | | | Posi | tion | Department | | | |
|--|---|------------|------------------|-----------------|------------|------------------|--------------------------|--|
| | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | | B Level | МСМ | Area | Functional Department | |
| | Number of responses | 388 | 303 | 85 | 72 | 194 | 122 | |
| 15.I feel supported by my supervisors and | Significantly | 47 | 43 | 61 | 57 | 51 | 34 | |
| management when raising difficult issues on | To some extent | 32 | 32 | 32 | 28 | 35 | 31 | |
| financial sector vulnerabilities and risks in | Minimally | 4 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 5 | |
| discussions with country authorities: | Not really | 3 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | |
| | Do not know | 14 | 17 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 25 | |
| Financial Surveillance in Article IV Consultations | | | | | | | | |
| 16. Have you worked on an Article IV consultation | Number of responses | 391 | 305 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 123 | |
| in the past 5 years? (Excluding in the review | Yes | 80 | 81 | 76 | 64 | 96 | 63 | |
| process) | No | 20 | 19 | 24 | 36 | 4 | 37 | |
| 17 Diagon in directs the areast recent value you had in | Number of responses | 310 | 246 | 64 | 45 | 189 | 76 | |
| 17.Please indicate the most recent role you had in an Article IV consultation. | Mission chief | 31 | 15 | 91 | 11 | 42 | 16 | |
| an Article IV consultation. | Team member | 69 | 85 | 9 | 89 | 58 | 84 | |
| | Number of responses | 310 | 246 | 64 | 45 | 189 | 76 | |
| 19 In what type of country was your most recent | 29 Systemic Financial Sectors ¹ | 29 | 24 | 45 | 42 | 23 | 36 | |
| 18.In what type of country was your most recent involvement in an Article IV consultation? | Other Advanced Economies (i.e. excluding the systemic 29 ¹) | 10 | 12 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 14 | |
| involvement in an Article IV consultation: | Other Emerging Market Economies (i.e. excluding the systemic 29 ¹) | 35 | 35 | 34 | 33 | 37 | 30 | |
| | Low Income Countries | 26 | 29 | 17 | 18 | 31 | 20 | |
| | Number of responses | 309 | 246 | 63 | 45 | 188 | 76 | |
| 19.To what extent has your team integrated | Significantly | 63 | 60 | 76 | 51 | 67 | 61 | |
| financial vulnerabilities and risks in the | To some extent | 31 | 33 | 22 | 42 | 28 | 33 | |
| macroeconomic analysis and Article IV policy | Minimally | 5 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 4 | |
| discussions? | Not really | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | Do not know | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | |
| | Number of responses | 309 | 245 | 64 | 45 | 188 | 76 | |
| | Yes, authorities were more willing to take actions based on the mission's advice. | 26 | 26 | 25 | 38 | 25 | 21 | |
| 20.Did the focus on financial risks and their | Yes, authorities were more interested in the mission's analysis and advice, even if they did not take immediate action on the mission's advice. | 49 | 47 | 55 | 33 | 53 | 47 | |
| integration into the macroeconomic analysis strengthen the traction of IMF advice in your recent | No, the focus on financial risks did not enhance authorities' interest in the mission's | 18 | 10 | 10 | 20 | 18 | 17 | |
| Article IV consultation. | analysis and advice. | 10 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 10 | 17 | |
| Author IV consultation. | No, the focus on financial risks complicated policy discussions and may have weakened its | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
| | traction. Do not know | 7 | 8 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 13 | |
| | | | | | | 4 | | |
| | Number of responses | 310 | 246 30 | 64 56 | 45 | 189 37 | 76 | |
| 21.The 2015 Surveillance Guidance Note is helpful | Sufficiently Yes, but I need more guidance | 35 28 | 30 | 16 | 33 29 | 37 28 | 33 | |
| to understand what I need to do in conducting | Not at all | 26 7 | 6 | 13 | 29 7 | 20 11 | 0 | |
| macrofinancial surveillance. | I am not familiar with the 2015 Surveillance Guidance Note | 7 19 | 22 | 9 | 22 | 16 | 25 | |
| | Do not know | 9 | 10 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 12 | |
| | DO HOURION | , | 10 | U | , | | 12 | |

| | | | Position | | Department | | |
|---|--|-------|----------|---------|------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | МСМ | Area Department | Functional Department |
| | Number of responses | 307 | 245 | 62 | 45 | 187 | 75 |
| | Significantly | 19 | 16 | 29 | 20 | 17 | 23 |
| 22. The review process improves the analysis and | To some extent | 53 | 56 | 45 | 64 | 55 | 44 |
| advice on financial and macrofinancial issues. | Minimally | 18 | 18 | 16 | 9 | 18 | 23 |
| | Not at all | 7 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 9 | 4 |
| | Do not know | 4 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 7 |
| | Number of responses | 308 | 244 | 64 | 44 | 188 | 76 |
| | No, my team paid appropriate attention to financial and macrofinancial issues and did not face binding constraints in doing so. | 62 | 63 | 59 | 75 | 59 | 63 |
| | Yes, my team lacked needed skills to carry out financial or macrofinancial analysis itself. | 13 | 13 | 13 | 9 | 15 | 9 |
| 23.Did your team face constraints in paying | Yes, my team did not receive support on financial or macrofinancial issues from MCM or other departments. | 14 | 15 | 11 | 2 | 16 | 17 |
| appropriate attention to financial and macrofinancial issues in your most recent Article IV | Yes, my team lacked the necessary analytical tools to sufficiently address financial and macrofinancial issues. | 9 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 13 |
| consultation? (Select all that apply) | Yes, my team faced time constraints that limited the attention to financial and macrofinancial issues. | 15 | 15 | 16 | 7 | 16 | 17 |
| | Yes, lack of support from senior reviewers constrained my team's attention to financial and macrofinancial issues. | 2 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| | Other (please explain) | 10 | 7 | 22 | 5 | 13 | 8 |
| | Number of responses | 307 | 245 | 62 | 45 | 188 | 74 |
| 24.Issues raised by a recent FSAP played a role in | Significantly (e.g., they played an important part in the analysis and discussions of the Article IV team) | 26 | 25 | 32 | 38 | 24 | 26 |
| your most recent Article IV consultation: | To some extent (e.g., the Article IV team reviewed FSAP recommendations with authorities and/or listed them in the Staff Report) | 26 | 27 | 23 | 31 | 23 | 31 |
| | Not at all | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| | Not applicable (e.g., no recent FSAP) | 43 | 43 | 44 | 27 | 49 | 38 |
| FSAP (this refers to FSSAs, FSAPs, and FSAP Upd | ates) | | | | | | |
| 25.Have you worked at any point in the past 5 | Number of responses | 391 | 305 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 123 |
| years on a FSAP/FSSA? (Excluding in the review | Yes | 27 | 27 | 24 | 74 | 16 | 15 |
| process) | No | 73 | 73 | 76 | 26 | 84 | 85 |
| | Number of responses | 102 | 82 | 20 | 52 | 31 | 19 |
| 26.How many FSAPs have you participated in the past 5 years? | 1 | 44 | 45 | 40 | 23 | 77 | 47 |
| | 2-3 | 32 | 29 | 45 | 40 | 16 | 37 |
| | 4 or more | 24 | 26 | 15 | 37 | 6 | 16 |
| | Number of responses | 104 | 83 | 21 | 53 | 32 | 19 |
| 27.Please indicate if you participated in a FSAP for: | 29 Systemic Financial Sectors | 65 | 64 | 71 | 72 | 47 | 79 |
| (Select all that apply) | Other Advanced Economies (i.e. excluding the systemic 29) | 17 | 16 | 24 | 19 | 13 | 21 |
| | Other Emerging Market Economies (i.e. excluding the systemic 29) | 48 | 48 | 48 | 51 | 53 | 32 |
| | Low Income Countries | 20 | 24 | 5 | 28 | 13 | 11 |

| | | | | Posi | tion | Department | | |
|--|---|---|-------|---------|---------|------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | МСМ | Area Department | Functional Department |
| | | Number of responses | 102 | 82 | 20 | 53 | 30 | 19 |
| | | As a sounding board for country authorities' assessments and plans | 67 | 68 | 60 | 74 | 60 | 58 |
| 28.FSAPs in the 29 systemic fi | nancial costors are | To inform country authorities of risks and vulnerabilities | 76 | 77 | 75 | 81 | 63 | 84 |
| effective at: (Select all | | To inform the international community of risks of financial spillover | 55 | 54 | 60 | 66 | 50 | 32 |
| effective at. (Select all | шас арріу) | As a catalyst for measures to address domestic vulnerabilities | 65 | 61 | 80 | 75 | 60 | 42 |
| | | As a catalyst for reforms at the multilateral level | 27 | 26 | 35 | 36 | 23 | 11 |
| | | Other (please explain) | 4 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 10 | 0 |
| 20 14/1 | £ + £ - + - | Number of responses | 103 | 82 | 21 | 53 | 31 | 19 |
| 29.What is your assessment o | | Have not worked in any of these countries | 20 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 29 | 16 |
| country authorities of stress tes | | Useful (e.g., to validate stress tests conducted regularly by authorities) | 59 | 56 | 71 | 72 | 58 | 26 |
| 29 systemic financial sectors in | i the context of an | Not useful (e.g., little value added over tests conducted regularly by authorities) | 13 | 13 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 37 |
| FSAP? | | Do not know | 8 | 10 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 21 |
| | | Number of responses | 103 | 82 | 21 | 53 | 31 | 19 |
| | | Significantly | 36 | 32 | 52 | 45 | 32 | 16 |
| | Assessment of | To some extent | 47 | 49 | 38 | 45 | 42 | 58 |
| | financial stability | Minimally | 11 | 13 | 0 | 9 | 10 | 16 |
| | risks | Not at all | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | | Do not know | 6 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 16 | 5 |
| 30.To what extent do you | Assessment of financial development issues | Number of responses | 102 | 82 | 20 | 53 | 30 | 19 |
| believe that FSAPs in the 29 | | Significantly | 11 | 10 | 15 | 6 | 20 | 11 |
| systemic financial sectors | | To some extent | 46 | 46 | 45 | 49 | 37 | 53 |
| provide value added to the | | Minimally | 24 | 26 | 15 | 28 | 20 | 16 |
| authorities in the following | | Not at all | 9 | 10 | 5 | 11 | 3 | 11 |
| areas | | Do not know | 11 | 9 | 20 | 6 | 20 | 11 |
| | | Number of responses | 103 | 82 | 21 | 53 | 31 | 19 |
| | Review of | Significantly | 35 | 32 | 48 | 45 | 26 | 21 |
| | Standards and | To some extent | 35 | 40 | 14 | 28 | 35 | 53 |
| | Codes | Minimally | 15 | 12 | 24 | 15 | 19 | 5 |
| | Codes | Not at all | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| | | Do not know | 13 | 13 | 10 | 8 | 19 | 16 |
| | | Number of responses | 103 | 82 | 21 | 53 | 31 | 19 |
| | Assessment of | Significantly | 34 | 29 | 52 | 45 | 26 | 16 |
| 21 To what extent do you | financial stability | To some extent | 47 | 46 | 48 | 43 | 45 | 58 |
| 31.To what extent do you believe that FSAPs in other Advanced Economies (i.e. excluding the systemic 29) provide value added to the authorities in the following | risks | Minimally | 6 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| | 113K3 | Not at all | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 |
| | | Do not know | 12 | 15 | 0 | 6 | 19 | 16 |
| | | Number of responses | 102 | 82 | 20 | 53 | 30 | 19 |
| | Assessment of | Significantly | 13 | 10 | 25 | 9 | 20 | 11 |
| areas | financial | To some extent | 41 | 41 | 40 | 47 | 23 | 53 |
| a. cus | development | Minimally | 18 | 18 | 15 | 23 | 13 | 11 |
| | issues | Not at all | 8 | 9 | 5 | 6 | 10 | 11 |
| | | Do not know | 21 | 22 | 15 | 15 | 33 | 16 |

| | | | Posi | Position | | Department | | |
|---|---|-------|---------|----------|-----|--------------------|-----------------------|--|
| | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | МСМ | Area Department | Functional Department | |
| | Number of responses | 101 | 81 | 20 | 51 | 31 | 19 | |
| | Did not participate in FSAPs run jointly with the World Bank | 17 | 12 | 35 | 8 | 29 | 21 | |
| 34. How would you assess the coordination with the | Good coordination | 28 | 23 | 45 | 31 | 32 | 11 | |
| World Bank in the context of FSAPs? | Coordination needs improvement | 34 | 40 | 10 | 45 | 19 | 26 | |
| | Weak coordination, but it did not affect the policy dialogue with authorities | 16 | 17 | 10 | 12 | 16 | 26 | |
| | Weak coordination hindered the policy dialogue with authorities | 6 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 16 | |
| Multilateral Surveillance | | | | | | | | |
| | Number of responses | 390 | 304 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 122 | |
| 35.How often have you read chapter 1 of the GFSR | Almost always | 27 | 21 | 47 | 43 | 27 | 18 | |
| · · | At least 5 times | 15 | 16 | 10 | 21 | 9 | 20 | |
| in the past 5 years? | Between 1 and 4 times | 47 | 49 | 38 | 33 | 55 | 41 | |
| | Never | 12 | 14 | 5 | 3 | 10 | 20 | |
| | Number of responses | 388 | 302 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 120 | |
| 26 Have after have you read the analytical charteres | Almost always | 13 | 10 | 26 | 25 | 9 | 13 | |
| 36. How often have you read the analytical chapters | At least 5 chapters | 18 | 18 | 16 | 33 | 11 | 20 | |
| of the GFSR in the past 5 years? | Between 1 and 4 chapters | 53 | 55 | 45 | 38 | 64 | 43 | |
| | Never | 16 | 18 | 13 | 4 | 17 | 23 | |
| | Number of responses | 390 | 304 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 122 | |
| 37.How useful do you find the GFSR to help you | Very useful | 30 | 30 | 28 | 50 | 29 | 19 | |
| understand global financial developments and | Moderately useful | 52 | 48 | 63 | 40 | 54 | 55 | |
| risks? | Not useful | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 | |
| | I have not read enough GFSRs to have an opinion | 12 | 14 | 2 | 4 | 10 | 19 | |
| | Number of responses | 72 | 64 | 8 | 6 | 34 | 32 | |
| | GFSR analysis is usually outdated | 15 | 13 | 38 | 50 | 9 | 16 | |
| | GFSRs do not usually provide new insights | 33 | 31 | 50 | 67 | 32 | 28 | |
| 38.Please indicate why. (Select all that apply) | GFSRs are not reader friendly | 24 | 23 | 25 | 33 | 29 | 16 | |
| | GFSR analysis is not robust enough | 21 | 22 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 25 | |
| | GFSRs are not relevant for my work | 46 | 48 | 25 | 0 | 50 | 50 | |
| | Other (please explain) | 15 | 16 | 13 | 17 | 21 | 9 | |
| | Number of responses | 387 | 301 | 86 | 72 | 194 | 121 | |
| | Yes, for Article IV consultations | 41 | 38 | 50 | 42 | 49 | 27 | |
| 39.Do you draw on the analysis or recommendations from the GFSR in your work? | Yes, for FSAPs | 13 | 11 | 19 | 47 | 5 | 6 | |
| | Yes, for WEO and other multilateral surveillance | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 12 | |
| (Select all that apply) | Yes, for Early Warning Exercise | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | |
| | Yes, other | 21 | 20 | 23 | 35 | 13 | 25 | |
| | No | 40 | 43 | 30 | 18 | 43 | 49 | |

| | | | | Posi | tion | Department | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--|-------|---------|---------|------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| | | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | МСМ | Area Department | Functional Department |
| Individual Skills and Training | | | | | | | | |
| | | Number of responses | 390 | 304 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 122 |
| | | Macroeconomist with significant financial sector expertise | 52 | 50 | 58 | 63 | 54 | 41 |
| 40.11 | | Macroeconomist with limited or no financial sector expertise | 31 | 30 | 35 | 3 | 43 | 29 |
| 40.How would you assess y | · | Other economist | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 |
| macrofinancial is | sues? | Financial Sector expert with macroeconomic expertise | 6 | 7 | 3 | 26 | 1 | 3 |
| | | Financial Sector expert with little or no macroeconomic expertise | 4 | 5 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 7 |
| | | Other | 5 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| | | Number of responses | 386 | 300 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 118 |
| 41.What factors were most help | oful to dovolon vour | Academic training | 28 | 28 | 28 | 33 | 27 | 25 |
| skills and expertise on macr | ' ' | Internal training at the IMF | 31 | 32 | 27 | 11 | 39 | 30 |
| · · | | On the job experience at the IMF | 76 | 72 | 90 | 75 | 77 | 76 |
| (Select up to two o | puons) | On the job experience outside of the IMF | 32 | 34 | 26 | 54 | 26 | 30 |
| | | Other | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| | | Number of responses | 381 | 297 | 84 | 69 | 194 | 118 |
| 42.Please indicate which best | describes your view | Sufficient courses are available. | 28 | 28 | 31 | 26 | 30 | 27 |
| of internal training on financial | and macrofinancial | Course content is well-targeted to enhance the skills needed to carry out macrofinancial | 20 | 20 | 20 | 22 | 2.4 | 22 |
| issues in the structured curricu | | | 28 | 28 | 30 | 23 | 34 | 22 |
| apply) | | Time constraints or other pressures prevent me from enrolling. | 62 | 63 | 58 | 59 | 62 | 64 |
| | | Other (please explain) | 14 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 13 | 14 |
| | | Number of responses | 387 | 302 | 85 | 71 | 196 | 120 |
| 43.Was internal training o | n financial and | Very useful | 15 | 16 | 11 | 13 | 19 | 8 |
| macrofinancial issues you took | | Somewhat useful | 33 | 31 | 40 | 30 | 35 | 31 |
| useful for your v | | Minimally useful | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 13 |
| userur for your v | VOIK: | Not useful | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| | | I did not participate in any such training | 42 | 43 | 38 | 46 | 37 | 48 |
| | | Number of responses | 387 | 302 | 85 | 72 | 195 | 120 |
| | Banks' balance | Not qualified | 17 | 19 | 12 | 7 | 13 | 30 |
| | sheet analysis | Minimally qualified | 30 | 27 | 39 | 14 | 39 | 25 |
| | Silect allalysis | Adequately qualified | 40 | 38 | 45 | 50 | 41 | 32 |
| | | Expert | 13 | 16 | 5 | 29 | 7 | 13 |
| | | Number of responses | 385 | 300 | 85 | 71 | 195 | 119 |
| 44.To what extent are you | Simple stress tests | Not qualified | 29 | 31 | 21 | 8 | 28 | 43 |
| qualified to perform the | for banks | Minimally qualified | 34 | 30 | 46 | 28 | 38 | 29 |
| following | IOI Daliks | Adequately qualified | 29 | 29 | 27 | 35 | 29 | 24 |
| | | Expert | 9 | 9 | 6 | 28 | 5 | 3 |
| | Interrupto finari-i-l | Number of responses | 387 | 302 | 85 | 72 | 195 | 120 |
| | Integrate financial | Not qualified | 13 | 15 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 27 |
| | variables in | Minimally qualified | 22 | 25 | 13 | 11 | 26 | 23 |
| | baseline | Adequately qualified | 55 | 49 | 74 | 56 | 63 | 42 |
| | projections | Expert | 10 | 11 | 8 | 24 | 6 | 8 |

| | | | Position | | Department | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|-------|----------|---------|------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| | Distribution of answers in percentage | Total | A Level | B Level | МСМ | Area Department | Functional Department |
| Quantify pos | Number of responses | 386 | 301 | 85 | 72 | 194 | 120 |
| , , | Not qualified | 10 | 12 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 24 |
| macroecond impact of final | Minimally dualified | 26 | 26 | 29 | 14 | 31 | 26 |
| sector risk | Adequately qualified | 51 | 50 | 55 | 44 | 58 | 43 |
| Sector risk | Expert Expert | 12 | 13 | 12 | 31 | 9 | 8 |
| Interact with | the Number of responses | 387 | 301 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 119 |
| authorities i | n a Not qualified | 5 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 13 |
| dialogue o | n Minimally qualified | 16 | 19 | 6 | 3 | 21 | 17 |
| relevant fina | cial Adequately qualified | 55 | 50 | 72 | 29 | 65 | 53 |
| sector issues | es Expert | 25 | 25 | 22 | 67 | 13 | 18 |
| | Number of responses | 389 | 303 | 86 | 72 | 196 | 121 |
| 45 To what extent do you believe that | Significantly | 22 | 19 | 35 | 17 | 21 | 28 |
| 45.To what extent do you believe that financial/macrofinancial skills contribute to ca | To some extent | 49 | 48 | 53 | 43 | 57 | 41 |
| advancement in the IMF? | Minimally | 17 | 19 | 7 | 21 | 14 | 19 |
| advancement in the livir? | Not at all | 3 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 |
| | Do not know | 8 | 10 | 2 | 11 | 6 | 10 |